

William of Moerbeke's Twofold Translation of Philoponus' Commentary on De Anima III 4, 429 a 10-13

A Comparative Analysis with a Greek Retroversion

Benedikt Strobel, Carlos Steel

Abstract

Before composing in 1268 a complete translation (= G) of Ammonius-Philoponus' commentary on *De Anima* III 4-8 – the famous chapters *de intellectu* –, William of Moerbeke translated already in 1267 the opening section on III 4, 429 a 10-13 (= g). The twofold translation of the same lost Greek text offers an extraordinary case to test the possibilities and constraints of a retroversion. Our detailed comparative analysis of both versions aims to bring out the differences between g and G on the basis of a revised edition of g and G and to explain them by offering a tentative reconstruction of the Greek text with textual notes. We will conclude that William used the same Greek manuscript for g and G, that he used g when he was working on G, and, on a more general level, that, as far as William is concerned, even a twofold translation, though allowing more certainty about the lost Greek text, is often compatible with more than just one plausible retroversion.

I. Introduction

William of Moerbeke produced an extraordinary corpus of translations of Aristotle, Archimedes, Proclus, Simplicius and so many more. Of some texts we have even different versions, for William kept revising his translations, such as *De Caelo*, *Physics* or *De Anima*. There are also cases in which he first made a partial translation and later a complete one. Thus, William started translating the *Politica* early in his career, but he stopped at II 11, 1273 a 20, because the Greek manuscript he was using was incomplete. Having found later a complete copy of the *Politica*, he restarted from the beginning and made a full translation. Another case is the translation of Simplicius' Commentary on *De Caelo*. As F. Bossier has shown, William first made a translation of a long digression dealing with Eudoxus' and Calippus' hypotheses on the concentric celestial spheres (p. 492.25-504.32), a text he thought might interest Thomas Aquinas when commenting on *Metaphysics* XII. Some years later, he made a full translation of this bulky commentary *cum magno corporis labore ac multo mentis tedio*.¹ Finally, we know that William started translating Philoponus' commentary on *De Anima* III 4 but stopped after a few pages. A year later he restarted and made a full translation of III 4-8. A comparative study of two translations of the same text may help us to understand how William works as a translator, how close he remains to the Greek original, whether his

¹ *Simplicius. Commentaire sur le traité Du ciel d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, Volume I: Édition critique par F. Bossier avec la collaboration de Chr. Vande Veire et G. Guldentops, Leuven U.P., Leuven 2004 (*Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, 8.1).

knowledge of Greek has improved (which is clearly the case in the second version of the *Politica*), whether he used another Greek model, whether he started from the earlier version modifying it and whether there is a shifting preference for a particular terminology.² The two Philoponus versions offer an important test case because we have no Greek text with which to compare them. However, through a comparison of the two Latin versions in their variation we can gain more insight into the possibilities and limitations of reconstructing the lost Greek text than we would have if the reconstruction were based on one version only. Our aim in this study is to explore these possibilities and limitations, offering a revised edition of the two Latin versions and a tentative reconstruction of the Greek text with textual notes.

The translation of Philoponus' In De Anima III 4-8

First, we briefly introduce the two versions.³ On December 17th, 1268, William of Moerbeke finished in Viterbo his translation of Philoponus. It contains only the chapters on the intellect III 4-8, a section he thought might interest scholars in the discussion on the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect. As he says in the colophon: "I think that the person who will have read this, will have more 'light' than before to understand Aristotle's text" (p. 120.69-70: *Puto qui hoc legerit ad intellectum litterae Aristotelis plus quam ante lumen habebit*). It took him only a few months to finish the translation (the previous translation of Ammonius *On De interpretatione* was finished on September 18th). And yet it was a difficult task. He warns the reader that the Greek exemplar he used was in a bad state because of humidity, and that some sections could not be read: "I thought that I should not translate the rest of the text. The reader of this work should also know that the Greek exemplar has been damaged by water in many places so that I could not read it at all. In these places I have sometimes left a space, sometimes supplied [what is missing] from the 'sense' [of the argument], sometimes I considered it corrupted and false".⁴

Moerbeke's translation does not correspond to the Greek text as edited in the CAG series by M. Hayduck (1897), nor to any existing manuscript of Philoponus' work. In fact, in the manuscript transmission of the third book, the original version by Ammonius-Philoponus was lost and replaced by another version attributed to Stephanus.⁵ For practical reasons we designate the the 'Stephanus' version as 'Philoponus^b' as distinguished from Ammonius-

² A model of such a comparative study is F. Bossier's Introduction to the edition referred to in n. 1.

³ In what follows we rely on *Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, Édition critique par G. Verbeke, Publications universitaires de Louvain-Éditions Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Paris 1966 (*Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, 3), and F. Acerbi-G. Vuillemin-Diem, *La transmission du savoir grec en Occident. Guillaume de Moerbeke, le Laur. Plut. 87.25 (Thémistius, in De An.) et la bibliothèque de Boniface VIII*, Leuven U. P., Leuven 2019, in particular, pp. 97-107. An important supplement to the latter monograph is C. Luna's detailed review article, *Studia graeco-arabica* 9 (2019), pp. 326-41.

⁴ See the colophon of the translation: *Reliqua huius operis non indicavi oportere transferri. Sciat etiam lector huius operis exemplar graecum in plerisque locis ab aqua fuisse destructum, ita quod nullatenus legere potui, et ibi spatia quandoque dimisi, quandoque ex sensu supplevi, quandoque etiam corruptum falsitate putavi* (p. 119.65-120.69).

⁵ We will not enter the debate on whether 'Stephanus' is the author of this version. On this question (with a defence of Philoponus as author), see P. Golitsis, "John Philoponus' Commentary on the third Book of Aristotle's *De Anima*, Wrongly Attributed to Stephanus", in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of Ancient Commentators*, Bloomsbury, London-New York 2016, pp. 393-412.

Philoponus (= Philoponus^a). William must have discovered an extremely rare copy, maybe a unique exemplar of the lost Greek Philoponus^a and his Latin translation is an exceptional witness of this text. However, it is possible to recover parts of the original Greek thanks to excerpts in Sophonias' paraphrase (around 1300)⁶ and scholia on the *De Anima* in some manuscripts.⁷ William's Greek manuscript probably also contained the two first books, for he also translated a long section from the first book, namely Philoponus' interpretation of the psychogony of the *Timaeus* (pp. 115.31-120.33 Hayduck).⁸ William may have discovered this rare Philoponus manuscript when he was working on his translation of Themistius' *De Anima*, a translation that was completed in Viterbo on November the 22th, 1267. In fact, the 'psychogony' fragment is transmitted only in connection with Themistius' text. One finds it on the margins of ff. 6v-7v of Toledo, Bibl. Capitular 47-12, and inserted in the text in all other copies of Themistius. William probably wrote it in the margin of his own Themistius autograph copy. In the same Toledo manuscript, one finds in the margins of ff. 12v-13r a translation of the first pages of III 4 on the intellect with the title *ex commento Phyloponi*. In his introduction, Gerard Verbeke argues that William may have found these Philoponus extracts in the margin of the Greek manuscript he used for his translation of Themistius. However, Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem and Fabio Acerbi (above, n. 3) have shown that this hypothesis must be rejected (see pp. 104-7). In fact, they could identify the Greek exemplar used by William for his Themistius translation. It is the *Laurentianus Plut.* 87, 25 and this manuscript has no extracts from Philoponus in the margins. How then should one explain the presence of the Philoponus fragments in the Themistius manuscripts? William may have discovered the Philoponus text when he was working on Themistius, and he became so interested in it that he translated two remarkable extracts from it and wrote them down in the margins of the copy of the Themistius translation he had just finished.

Manuscripts of the complete translation (= G, the author of G will be referred to as 'Mbk_G').⁹

T: Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular 95-13, ff. 57v-78r, copy probably made from Moerbeke's own copy (before 1280)

C: Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, ms. 957, ff. 44r-67v, early 14th century

V: Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Vat. gr.* 2438, ff. 60r-73v, end of the 13th century

B: An important indirect witness is Henricus Bate, who inserted large extracts in his encyclopedia *Speculum divinatorum*.

⁶ Cf. S. Van Riet, "Fragments de l'original grec du *De Intellectu* de Philopon dans une compilation de Sophonias", *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 63 (1965), pp. 5-40. On Sophonias see D.M. Searby, "Sophonias", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500 (Second edition)*, Springer, Dordrecht 2020, pp. 1791-5.

⁷ Cf. C. Steel, "Newly discovered scholia from Philoponus' lost commentary on *De Anima* III", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84.2 (2017), pp. 223-43. See also C. Steel, "Scholia on *De Anima* III from Philoponus' lost commentary. New evidence: the case of the *Parisinus* 1853", in J.J. Valverde Abril (ed.), *Text in Change: Greek Transmission and Latin Reception of Aristotle's Works* (forthcoming). A full survey of scholia will appear in C. Steel-B. Strobel, *Philoponus' Kommentar zu Aristoteles, De Anima (Buch III): Quellen zur Rekonstruktion des verlorenen griechischen Textes*, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2024 (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina. Series academica*, 10).

⁸ See Verbeke (above, n. 3), pp. LXXXIX-XCI, with an edition on pp. 121-31.

⁹ For a study of the manuscript tradition of G see Verbeke (above, n. 3), pp. CVII-CXV.

B, C and V have a number of errors in common which set them as group apart from T, which is the best copy of the text.

Manuscripts of the partial translation (= g, the author of g will be referred to as 'Mbk_g')

To: Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare 47-12, ff. 12v-13r, with the Philoponus text in the margin of Themistius.

This is the most important witness of the text. The second only contains some selected texts, again in connection with Themistius' text:

P: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16.133 ff. 51v-52r

This is a manuscript in parchment of the early 14th century, originating from "Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne". It contains, after Moerbeke's translation of Themistius, on ff. 51v-52r, a selection of extracts from the beginning of chapter III 4 *Incipiunt notabilia super tertio de anima abstracta a commento Johannis Grammatici*. These extracts are followed by a series of quaestiones of Siger of Brabant: *Incipiunt questiones naturales ordinate a magistro Sygero de Brabantia* (f. 53v-54v), *Incipiunt questiones de anima intellectiva ordinate a magistro Sygero de Brabantia* (54v-57v), *Incipiunt questiones logicales ordinate a magistro Sygero de Brabantia* (57v-58v). Maybe Siger of Brabant, whose interest in the discussion on the intellective soul is well attested, had these *notabilia* once in his possession. The *notabilia* only give a selection of extracts, each introduced by *item nota*, or, in the second part, by the first words of the lemma on which the extract is a commentary. The *notabilia* not only contain extracts corresponding to what is found in the fragmentary text in the margin of the Toledo manuscript (To), but also provide extracts from what follows in the commentary until 20.88. Verbeke noticed this fact (see n. 6 on p. XCII), but he did not comment on it. We collated the complete *notabilia*. Surprisingly, in the section that goes beyond the fragmentary text preserved in To, they have the version of the complete translation (G) with some variant readings corresponding to the ms. CV (+ B when available) against T. Here are some examples: 9.89 *colore aliquo*] inv. CV+P; 9.93 *intelligibilium*] *actu* add. CV+P; 12.75 *necesse*] *est* add. CVB+P; 12.87 *reliquas qualitates*] inv. CVB+P; 12.90 *corpore*] *corporeo* CVB+P; 16.74 *quod*] *in* add. CV+P; 16.81 *intellectus*] *intelligit* CV+P; 16.87 *subinduere*] *subinducere* CV+P; 20.83 *impeditur a corpore*] *a corpore impeditur* CVB+P. Verbeke should have used P as an extra witness in that part of his edition of the complete text.

G. Vuillemin-Diem and F. Acerbi (above, n. 3) give a long argument (see p. 103, n. 21) to demonstrate that the *notabilia* in P probably originate from the Toledo marginal scholium and so are no independent witnesses. However, they did not take into consideration the fact that the *notabilia* in P go beyond what is found in To. The scholar who made the excerpts must have had a copy with a more complete text than what he could read in To. They are therefore witnesses of the original text independently from To. Therefore, one may occasionally use P to correct To, in particular when it is concordant with the G tradition. We did this with some hesitation. For the scholar who copied these *notabilia* selected passages he found interesting and may have rephrased some. In the following cases P is in surprising agreement with G: 134.56-57 *potentiis animae* P [+G] : *animae potentiis* To; 134.58-59 *quoniam* P [*quia* G] : *quando* To; 134.59 *erant haec* P [*haec erant* G] : *erant* To; 134.73 *enim* P [+G] : *om.* To; 134.78-79 *dixit quod* P [+G] : *ait quia* To; 135.6 *ipsum* P [+G] : *idem* To.

However, it remains difficult to explain why P gives in the first part excerpts from the first version of the text (g) but in the second part, with excerpts related to *lemmata*, simply follows the standard version as found in CVB with their own particular readings. Maybe Moerbeke, when he decided to make a full translation of III 4–8, started working on the section that not yet had been translated and only at the end made a revision of the fragmentary translation (which just covers the introduction to III 4). The excerpts in P could come from an exemplar that still had version g for the introductory section and version G for the continuation of the commentary.

In what follows we present both versions of the translation (g and G) according to the edition of Verbeke¹⁰ (p. 132.1–140.88 = 1.1–6.36), followed by an attempt at retroversion (= R) and a philological commentary on important variations and textual problems.

II. Texts and Notes

Sigla

g = translatio Guillelmi prima (a. 1267)

G = translatio Guillelmi secunda (a. 1268)

R = interpretatio Graeca

Mbk = Guillelmus de Moerbeka

Mbk_g = auctor versionis g

Mbk_G = auctor versionis G

Charlton = W. Charlton – F. Bossier, *Philoponus on Aristotle on the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8)*, Translated by William Charlton with the assistance of Fernand Bossier, Duckworth, London 1991 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle).

Mansion = A. Mansion, “Le texte du *De intellectu* de Philopon corrigé à l’aide de la collation de Monseigneur Pelzer”, in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, Bibliothèque de l’Université-Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, Louvain 1947, pp. 325–46.

Schramm = M. Schramm, “Johannes Philoponos: Kommentar zu *De Anima* (Einleitung und III 4–7)”, in H. Busche-M. Perkams (eds.), *Antike Interpretationen zur aristotelischen Lehre vom Geist. Texte von Theophrast, Alexander von Aphrodisias, Themistios, Johannes Philoponos, Priskian (bzw. Simplicios) und Stephanos (Philoponos)*, Meiner, Hamburg 2018 (Philosophische Bibliothek, 694), pp. 351–487.

Strobel = B. Strobel (ed.), *Proklos, Tria opuscula. Textkritisch kommentierte Retroversion der Übersetzung Wilhelms von Moerbeke*, De Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2014 (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina* 6).

Verbeke / ed. / *De Int.* = G. Verbeke, *Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le De Anima d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, Édition critique par G. Verbeke, Publications universitaires de Louvain-Éditions Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Paris 1966 (*Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 3).

+λέξις+] This indicates that we wish to leave it open whether λέξις was part of the Greek text or not.

¹⁰ In a few passages we modified the Verbeke edition. The changes we introduce largely concern variants due to copy errors or confusions in the Latin tradition.

verbum g - *littera* G] Underlining indicates divergences between g and G, whether different words or different inflections or differences in word order.

~ *verba*] Unless otherwise indicated, the Latin text quoted after ‘~’ is MbK’s translation of the preceding Greek text according to the respective editions of the series *Aristoteles Latinus* (Aristotle), *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* (Alexander, Philoponus, Simplicius, Themistius), and *Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series I (Proclus [volumes III-V] and Ptolemy [volume XIX]).

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the ancient commentators on Aristotle are to the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Reimer, Berlin 1882-1909).

i. 132.1-8 (= 1.1-4)

Texts

g

[132.1] *De parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et prudentiat, sive separata ente sive non separata secundum magnitudinem sed secundum rationem, considerandum quam habet differentiam et qualiter quidem fit¹¹ intelligere.*

G

[132.1] *De parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et prudentiat, sive separata ente sive non separata secundum magnitudinem sed secundum rationem, considerandum quam habet differentiam et quomodo quandoque fit¹² intelligere.*

R

[= Arist., *De An.* III 4, 429 a 10-13] Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε ⁺καὶ⁺ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν’ ἔχει διαφορὰν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

(Cf. ‘translatio vetus’ (James of Venice): *De parte autem anime qua cognoscit anima et sapit, sive separabili sive non separabili secundum magnitudinem sed secundum rationem, considerandum est quam habet differentiam et quomodo forte sit ipsum intelligere.* ‘translatio nova’ (MbK): *De parte autem anime qua cognoscit | anima et sapit, sive separabili existente sive non separabili | secundum magnitudinem set secundum rationem, considerandum quam habet differenciam | et quomodo quidem fit ipsum intelligere.*)

Notes

prudentiat] *prudentiat* is a rather extravagant translation for φρονεῖ, a verb deriving from *prudentia* and only found in this translation (both in g and G). In his other translations MbK frequently uses *sapere* for φρονεῖν (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 210.16-17: ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως τὸ φρονεῖν ~ *sicut a fronesy fronyyn (quod est sapere)*). *Sapere* is also used in the ‘translatio vetus’ (James of Venice) and the ‘translatio nova’ (MbK’s revision). Here, however, MbK seems to prefer *prudentiare* to *sapere* to emphasize that Aristotle is talking of a special sort of thinking, namely practical reasoning; in doing so he might have been inspired by Philoponus’ comment

¹¹ *fit* corr. : *sit* codd. ed.

¹² *fit* corr. : *sit* codd. ed.

in *De Int.*, p. 1.10–12 [= p. 133.21–23]: *Prudentiare enim circa agibilia fit; circa haec enim prudentia* (cf. also *De Int.*, p. 5.8–10).¹³ To make a similar point, he occasionally resorts to the less literal translation *prudenter agere* (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 210.19–20: αἰτία γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις καὶ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν ~ *Causa enim est prudentia et ipsius prudentis et ipsius 'fronyn' (quod est prudenter agere)*).

sive ... sive non] The absence of *etiam* (or *et*) between *sive* and *non* does not allow us to infer that καὶ (the reading of Förster's branch **b** [cf. also Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 516.5 and 520.30], omitted by **a**) was lacking in MbK's exemplar (see e.g. Them., *In De An.*, p. 42.13: εἴτε ἐδώδιμον τοῦτο εἴτε καὶ μὴ ~ *sive esibile sit hoc sive non*). However, *etiam* is also strikingly absent from the quotations of 429 a 11 in 6.26 (= 139.65–66) and 7.46.

non separata g : *inseparabili* G] Since MbK is quite consistent in using *inseparabilis* for ἀχώριστος, one may well wonder whether *inseparabili* in G should be emended to *non separabili*, thus making it conform to both the 'translatio vetus' and the 'translatio nova'. Cf., however, Arist., *Metaph.* 1026 a 15 and 1070 b 36, where MbK retains from the 'translatio media' *inseparabilia* for οὐ χωριστά.

qualiter quidem g : *quomodo quandoque* G] MbK's translation of πῶς ποτὲ is preferable and the one which MbK is likely to have come up with (cf. Arist., *GA* 729 b 1 and Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 197.4). ποτὲ is used here to put emphasis on the interrogative particle πῶς. The second translation makes ποτὲ an indefinite temporal particle, as if Aristotle wanted to examine how thinking occurs at some time. MbK's choice of *quomodo* may have been influenced by his own translation of the *De Anima*, where he writes *quomodo quidem* (James of Venice: *quomodo forte*).

ii. 132.9–133.25 (= 1.5–12)

Texts

g

[132.9] *Cum dixisset de anima vegetativa et sensitiva et phantastica et, ut simpliciter dicatur, de irrationali, transit ad doctrinam de rationali anima. Prius autem de estimatione facit sermonem, dico autem de opinativo et rationativo. Quod enim non sit sermo meditativo. Quod enim non sit nunc sermo de de speculativo intellectu et de secundum speculativo intellectu et de vocato secundum habitu⟨m⟩¹⁴ vocato intellectu palam per habitum insinuat per hoc quod dicit qua hoc quod dicit qua cognoscit anima¹⁵ et cognoscit anima et prudentiat. Prudentiare prudentiat. Prudentiare enim circa agibilia enim circa agibilia fit; circa haec enim fit; circa haec enim prudentia est; speculativus prudentia; speculativus autem intellectus non autem intellectus non versatur circa agibilia.*

G

[132.9] *Cum dixisset de vegetativa anima et sensitiva et phantastica, ut simpliciter autem dicatur de irrationali, transit ad doctrinam de rationali anima. Prius autem de existimatione facit sermonem, dico autem de opinativo et rationativo. Quod enim non sit nunc sermo de de speculativo intellectu et de vocato secundum habitu⟨m⟩¹⁴ vocato intellectu palam per habitum insinuat per hoc quod dicit qua hoc quod dicit qua cognoscit anima et prudentiat. Prudentiare prudentia; speculativus autem intellectus non negotiatur circa agibilia.*

¹³ Cf. R. Forrai, *The Latin Tradition of Aristotle's De Anima (1120–1270): The Relationship between Text und Commentary*, M.A. Thesis in Medieval Studies, Central European University Budapest June 2001, p. 25: "This passage [sc. *De Int.*, p. 1.5–12 and 5.5–10] could have influenced Moerbeke to change the term he had once chosen [sc. *sapio*], and to stick with *prudentia*".

¹⁴ *habitu* ed. : *habitu* To

¹⁵ *anima* corr. ex G : *autem* To ed.

R

Εἰπὼν περὶ +τῆς+ φυτικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ +τῆς+ αἰσθητικῆς καὶ +τῆς+ φανταστικῆς καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν +περὶ+ τῆς ἀλόγου μέτεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ +τῆς+ λογικῆς ψυχῆς διδασκαλίαν· πρότερον δὲ περὶ ὑπολήψεως ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, λέγω δὲ¹⁶ περὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ καὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ· ὅτι γὰρ οὐ+κ ἔστι+ νῦν ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕξιν καλουμένου δηλοῦ διὰ τοῦ +εἰπεῖν+ ἡ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ· τὸ γὰρ φρονεῖν περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ καταγίνεται· περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις· ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς οὐκ ἔχει περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ.

Notes

Cum dixisset ... transit ad] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 620.3-4: Εἰπὼν ... μέτεισιν ἐπὶ ~ *Cum dixisset ... transit ad*; Phlp., *In GC*, p. 69.28-70.1: Εἰπὼν ... μέτεισιν ἐπὶ; Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 490.2-3: Εἰπὼν ... μέτεισιν ἐπὶ.

de anima vegetativa [a. v. g : *vegetativa anima* G] *et sensitiva et phantastica*] Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 227.28-32: πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῆς φυτικῆς, εἶτα περὶ αἰσθητικῆς, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τῆς φανταστικῆς· ἐπὶ τούτοις προῖων ἐπὶ τὰς λογικὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἄρχεται πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ ἀτελεστέρων, πρότερον περὶ τῆς δοξαστικῆς δυνάμεως διαλεγόμενος, εἶτα περὶ τῆς διανοητικῆς, καὶ τελευταῖον περὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

et, ut simpliciter dicatur g : *ut simpliciter autem dicatur* G] To translate (ὡς) ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, Moerbeke uses generally *ut simpliciter est dicere* (cf. e.g. Them., *In De An.*, p. 65.28) or *ut simpliciter dicatur* (cf. e.g. Them., *In De An.*, p. 59.11) as in g. If the phrase is preceded by καὶ, he usually translates this as *et* (cf. Simp., *In Cael.* p. 132.9-10; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 79.20: καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ~ *et, ut simpliciter dicatur*; Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 957.17-18 Steel = p. 957.20 Luna-Segonds: καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ~ *et simpliciter dicendo*). The formula *ut simpliciter autem* in G poses a problem: Did Mbkg read in his Greek ms. ἀπλῶς δὲ εἰπεῖν and Mbkg καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν? This is not plausible, as Philoponus always uses the form καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν (without ὡς, by the way). ἀπλῶς δὲ εἰπεῖν, by contrast, occurs only rarely and only at the beginning of a new sentence. There is reason to suppose, then, that *et* and *autem* are different translations of the same Greek word, καὶ; and Mbkg is indeed prepared to use *autem* for καὶ (cf. Ptol., *Tetr.*, III 346, p. 188 Hübner: καὶ τούτου μὴ συμβεβηκότος ~ *hoc autem si non factum fuerit*), even if only occasionally. But what consideration led him to replace *et* by *autem*? Perhaps he wished to underline the summarizing character of the last item in the series, translated as *de irrationali*.

transit ad doctrinam de rationali anima] Cf. Phlp., *In APo.*, p. 66.9-10: μέτεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ καθόλου and p. 69.19-20: μέτεισιν εἰς τὴν περὶ τοῦ καθόλου διδασκαλίαν. *ad doctrinam de rationali anima* could correspond either to τὴν περὶ +τῆς+ λογικῆς ψυχῆς διδασκαλίαν (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 4.9: μετὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων διδασκαλίαν ~ *post doctrinam de celestibus*) or to τὴν διδασκαλίαν +τῆς+ λογικῆς ψυχῆς (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 157.1-2: τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ ἀνωμένου ὑποκειμένου ~ *doctrinam de innominabili subiecto*; p. 204.18-19: εὐθύς μεταβάς ἐπὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ θεωρήματος ~ (*cum ...*) *mox transivisset ad doctrinam de theoremate*).

dico autem de] This translates λέγω δὲ περὶ (cf. Phlp., *In GC*, p. 217.4); more frequent is, however, λέγω δὴ περὶ (cf. Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 46.1; Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 278.31; Herm., *In Phdr.*, p. 201.22 Lucarini-Moreschini).

¹⁶ δὲ] lg. δὴ?

opinativo et ratiocinativo g : *opinativo et meditativo* G] Cf. Ammon., *In APr.*, p. 24.31–34: καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι τριῶν οὐσῶν τῆς ψυχῆς γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων, τῆς νοερᾶς, τῆς διανοητικῆς, τῆς δοξαστικῆς, οὐ δύναται οὔτε ἡ πρώτη οὔτε ἡ τρίτη συλλογίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡ μέση μόνη. – The rare translation *meditativus* for διανοητικός (here and in 95.69 [lemma *De An.* 431 a 14–15]) appears in Ptol., *Tetr.* twice (II 448; III 1408) against *ratiocinativus* (2x) and *intellectivus* (1x), and once in Themistius (*In De An.*, p. 113.14, again = *De An.* 431 a 14–15) against *intellectivus* (2x) and *ratiocinativus* (1x). Comparable is also the use of *meditabilis* for διανοητός in Procl., *Inst.* 123.8–9 and 11. MbK probably thought that the term *ratiocinativus* was too general to convey the meaning of διανοητικός and tried *meditativus*, an adjective corresponding to the noun *meditatio* for διάνοια (cf. *De Int.*, p. 19.66: *dyaniām, id est mentem vel meditationem vel ratiocinationem*). However, even in this translation he keeps using *ratiocinativus* for διανοητικός in p. 4.63 and 95.74 (but in p. 6.30 it stands for λογιστικός), and also *intellectivus* (so in p. 94.16; 96.77; 97.8, 97.24–25), a term usually reserved for νοητικός. The inconsistency shows that the translator was uncertain about using the ambiguous *meditativus*. The translation disappears in later works (cf. Procl., *In Prm.*), where MbK uses again *ratiocinativus*.

non sit nunc [nunc G : om. g] *sermo de*] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 221.30–31: περὶ γὰρ τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην νῦν ὁ λόγος ~ *de hiis enim que sub luna nunc est sermo*; *In Cat.*, p. 114.22: ὅτι οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης νῦν ὁ λόγος ~ *quod non de illa nunc est sermo*. When using the phrase περὶ ... νῦν ὁ λόγος, Philoponus prefers to omit the copula (it is used, however, e.g. in *In GC*, p. 52.22, 78.25, 98.3).

palam g : *insinuat* G] g translates δῆλον, G δηλοῦ. The latter reading is correct, as is indicated by the following words *per hoc quod dicit*. The corresponding Greek is διὰ τοῦ (εἰπεῖν) or τῷ εἰπεῖν, and while neither phrase occurs in connection with δῆλον, both can often be found after δηλοῦ. MbK frequently uses *per hoc quod dicit* for διὰ τοῦ, adding *dicit* without a Greek equivalent (cf. e.g. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 141.36, 146.10; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 114.1–2, 188.28; Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 190.8–10). But δηλοῦ διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν is also a plausible retroversion (cf. Phlp., *In APr.*, p. 377.10, 388.17–18; Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 80.27–28; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 75.31–32 [reading εἰπεῖν for εἰπῶν]), as well as δηλοῦ τῷ εἰπεῖν (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 132.32).

circa agibilia fit] For περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ καταγίνεται cf. Nem., *De Nat. hom.*, p. 118.14 Morani; Olymp., *In Alc.*, p. 179.5–6 (p. 113 Westerink); *In Phd.* 4 § 4.3 (p. 79 Westerink); 4 § 11.4 (p. 87 Westerink). We could not find any instances of περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ γίνεσθαι. For *fit* translating καταγίνεται see Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 65.33–66.2: περὶ μὲν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ ~ *circa habitudinem quidem ipsius ad audientes fiunt poetica et rhetorica*.

versatur g : *negotiat* G] MbK generally uses *negotior* for πραγματεύομαι and *versor* for διατρέβω or στρέφομαι (and compounds of στρέφομαι as well, cf. e.g. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 137.12: ἀναστρεφόμενοι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ~ *versantes circa inquisitionem*). As far as *negotior* is concerned, there are a few exceptions to this rule: Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 65.5–6: οἱ τούτων ἑκατέραν ἐπιτηδεύοντες περὶ τε τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς καθ' αὐτοὺς ἔχουσι ~ *qui circa utramque harum negotiantur circa orationes ipsas secundum se habent agere*; p. 254.26: οὐ καταγίνεται περὶ τὴν τῆς λέξεως αὐτῆς σαφήνειαν ~ *non negotiat* *circa explanationem litterae huius*; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 556.21–22: τῆς φυσικῆς σκέψεως τῆς περὶ τὰ κινούμενα ἐχούσης ~ *physice speculationis circa ea que moventur negotiantis*. The last passage is particularly interesting because *versatur*, too, may correspond to ἔχει – even if we could not find an instance of the type ‘*versari circa aliquid* ~ ἔχειν περὶ τι’ – and ἔχειν περὶ τι is often used in the sense required here (cf. Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 10.16–18: τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν ἔχει περὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ψευδοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ

κακοῦ; Phlp.³, *In De An.*, p. 3.6-7: κατὰ διάνοιαν, ἥτις ἔχει περὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν πραγμάτων; p. 71.29: νοῦς μὲν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ψυχὴ δὲ ἔχει περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον; Ammon., *In APr.*, p. 3.25: ὁ δὲ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχει περὶ τὰ ποτὲ μὲν ὄντα ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄντα). Therefore, we have put ἔχει into our retroversion, though not without the caveat that this remains highly conjectural.

iii. 133.26-55 (= 2.13-27)

Texts

g

[133.26] *Tria autem proponit in his inquirere, unum quidem utrum separabilis sit rationalis anima a corpore aut inseparabilis, secundum autem quo differt a sensu, quamvis et superius distinxerit haec ab invicem, cum diceret quod sensus quidem omnibus animalibus, intellectus autem neque hominibus omnibus – sed hic, postquam prius convenientiam ipsius et sensus dixerit, ut ostendat necessariam esse inquisitionem de differentia ipsorum, posterius aliam disgregationem ipsorum realem dicit; superius quidem enim, ut iam dixi, distinxit intellectum a sensu eo quod non in omnibus consideret<ur> intellectus in quibus et sensus videtur, nunc autem ab ipsa natura potentiary harum faciens distinctionem etiam in eodem animali consideratis utrisque, distinguit ipsa; et aliter in quibus videtur convenire intellectus cum sensu, in ipsis his differentiam ipsorum et distinctionem ostendit –, primo autem in his inquirat qualiter fiat in nobis intelligere.*

G

[133.26] *Tria autem quaedam proponit inquirere in his, unum quidem utrum separata est rationalis anima a corpore aut inseparabilis, secundum autem in quo differt a sensu, quamvis et superius discreverit haec ab invicem, cum diceret quod sensus quidem omnibus animalibus inest, intellectus autem neque hominibus omnibus – sed hic,¹⁷ prius cum dixisset convenientiam ipsorum¹⁸ et sensus, ut ostenderet necessariam esse inquisitionem de differentia ipsorum, posterius aliam segregationem ipsorum realem dicit; superius quidem enim, ut iam dixi, discrevit intellectum a sensu per hoc quod intellectus non videtur in omnibus sicut sensus, nunc autem ab ipsa natura potentiary harum faciens discretionem et in eodem animali consideratis ambabus, discernit ipsum¹⁹; et aliter [in ipsis] in quibus videtur communicare intellectus cum sensu, in his ipsis differentiam ipsorum et discretionem ostendit –, tertio autem post haec²⁰ inquirat quomodo fiat in nobis intelligere.*

R

τρία δέ τινα προτίθεται ζητῆσαι ἐν τούτοις· ἐν μὲν πρότερον χωριστὴ ἐστὶν ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἢ ἀχώριστος, δεύτερον δὲ τί⁺νι⁺ διαφέρει τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἀνωτέρω διέκρινε ταῦτα ἀπ⁺ ἀλλήλων εἰπὼν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐδὲ ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν – ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθα πρότερον εἰπὼν τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἵνα δείξῃ ἀναγκαίαν οὔσαν τὴν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς αὐτῶν ζήτησιν, ὕστερον ἄλλην διάκρισιν αὐτῶν πραγματικὴν λέγει· ἀνωτέρω μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἤδη εἶπον, διέκρινε τὸν νοῦν ἀπὸ⁺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῷ μὴ ἐν πᾶσι θεωρεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, νυνὶ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως τῶν δυνάμεων τούτων ποιούμενος τὴν διάκρισιν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ζῳῷ θεωρουμένων

¹⁷ *hic* corr. ex g : no’ T ideo CV ed. *nunc* con. Bossier

¹⁸ *ipsorum* codd. ed. : an *ipsius* ex g (Bossier)?

¹⁹ *ipsum* codd. ed. : an *ipsa* ex g?

²⁰ *haec* CV : *hoc* T ed.

ἀμφοτέρων διακρίνει αὐτά· καὶ ἄλλως, καθ' ἃ δοκεῖ κοινωνεῖν ὁ νοῦς τῇ αἰσθήσει, κατ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν καὶ διάκρισιν δείκνυσιν -, τρίτον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις ζητεῖ πῶς γίνεται ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ νοεῖν.

Notes

Tria autem quaedam [quaedam om. g] Cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 516.9–15: ἐπὶ τῆς λογικῆς τοίνυν τρία τινὰ ζητεῖ, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ φθαρτὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφθαρτος, δεύτερον δὲ διάκρισιν ποιεῖται τῆς λογικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως [...] εἶτα τρίτον κεφάλαιον ζητεῖ πῶς τὸ νοεῖν γίνεται and p. 525.6–8: Τρία περὶ τοῦ νοῦ προθέμενος ζητῆσαι, ἐν μὲν εἰ ἀίδιος ἢ φθαρτός, δεύτερον δὲ κοινωνίαν καὶ διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αἰσθησιν, ἐξ οὗ πάλιν τὸ αἰδίον ἠγρεύετο, καὶ τρίτον πῶς γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν. Cf. for τρία δὲ τινὰ also Olymp., *In Mete.*, p. 291.10–11: τρία δὲ τινὰ ζητεῖ περὶ τῆς ἐψήσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος [...] and Phlp., *In Apo.*, p. 271.3: Ἐντεῦθεν τρία τινὰ ζητεῖ προβλήματα.

proponit ... inquirere] Cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 637.6 Steel = p. 637.8 Luna-Segonds: προτίθεται ζητεῖν ~ *proponit inquirere*; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 297.17–18: προτίθεται ζητῆσαι ~ *proponit inquirere*; p. 201.32–33: προβάλλεται ζητεῖν ~ *proponit inquirere*. We opt for προτίθεται ζητῆσαι in view of a number of parallels in Philoponus (cf. *In GC*, p. 70.2: δύο δὲ ἐστὶν ἃ προτίθεται ζητῆσαι; p. 213.5–6: νῦν προτίθεται ζητῆσαι τίνες ποτέ εἰσιν αἱ εἰδοποιοὶ ἐναντιώσεις; Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 192.22: νῦν αὐτὸ τοῦτο προτίθεται ζητῆσαι).

in his inquirere g : *inquirere in his* G] Cf. Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 369.24: ἐν τούτοις ζητῆσαι.

unum quidem utrum ... secundum autem] Cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 463.2–4: ἐν μὲν πότερον [...], δεύτερον δὲ [...].

in [in G : om. g] *quo differt*] Both translations (with and without *in*) are compatible with either τί διαφέρει (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 397.27: τί διενήνοχε ~ *in quo differt* and Arist. *De An.* 431 a 20: τί διαφέρει ~ Phlp., *De Int.*, p. 100.84: *quo differt*) or τίνι διαφέρει (cf. Alex., *In Mete.*, p. 196.3: τίνι διαφέρει ~ *in quo differt*; p. 15.2, 198.19, 216.33–217.1: τίνι διαφέρει ~ *quo differt*). τί διαφέρει occurs more frequently in Philoponus than τίνι διαφέρει. Even καθ' ὃ διαφέρει should be considered (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 47.22–23: καθ' ὃ διαφέρει ~ *in quo differt*).

quamvis et superius distinxerit [distinxerit g : discoverit G] *haec ab invicem*] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 44.11–12: κἂν ὥρισεν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐμέτρησεν ~ *quamvis terminaverit ipsam et mensuraverit*; p. 96.17–18: κἂν γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ μακαρίων μετέσχεν ἀπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀγαθῶν ~ *quamvis enim multis et beatis bonis ab eo qui genuit participaverit*; p. 158.7: κἂν μὴ προσέθηκεν ~ *quamvis non apposuerit*. Notice, however, that MbK uses *quamvis* also for καίτοι (+ participle), cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 336.29: καίτοι ἐν τῇ τῆς λέξεως ἐκθέσει γράψας ~ *quamvis in propositione littere scripserit*.

hic] The text of G is uncertain, as both variants (*ideo CV, non T*) make no sense. Bossier ap. Charlton (p. 27 n. 2) proposes to read *nunc* (but then the translation *hic* in g becomes problematic). We prefer to follow g and read *hic* in G, too. For a similar use of ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα (~ *sed hic*), cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 187.13 and 418.21 (followed by μὲν).

postquam ... dixerit g : *cum dixisset* G] While the structure 'cum + subordinate clause' is MbK's standard translation for the aorist participle εἰπὼν (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 10.10, 10.28, 14.31: Εἰπὼν ~ *Cum dixisset*), he also uses *postquam*, though mostly with the indicative form (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 382.35/383.7: Εἰπὼν ~ *postquam* (...) dixit).

convenientiam ipsius [ipsius g : ipsorum G] *et sensus*] The contrast with *differentia* (~ διαφορά) makes it clear that *convenientia* stands for κοινωνία (cf. e.g. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 525.7: κοινωνίαν καὶ διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αἰσθησιν and Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 468.24–25:

Εἰπὼν τήν τε κοινωνίαν καὶ τήν διαφορὰν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων). For *convenientia* translating *κοινωνία* cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 235.24-25: περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ τε ἀναγκαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ~ *de convenientia et differentia necessarii et impossibilis*.

ut ostendat g : *ut ostenderet* G] Having first chosen *ut ostendat*, the obvious candidate for the translation of ἵνα δείξῃ (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 33.27, 285.14) and the (semantically) similar expression ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνδείξασθαι (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 156.22), MbK noticed later that the imperfect subjunctive form *ostenderet* was needed to link the *ut* clause with the preceding subordinate clause rather than with the subsequent main clause (cf. Charlton, p. 27 n. 4).

necessariam esse inquisitionem de differentia ipsorum] As the Greek counterpart to *esse* one would expect here οὖσαν rather than εἶναι (cf. Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 306.24: ἵνα δείξῃ ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ζήτησιν). For the possibility of MbK rendering οὖσαν as *esse*, see Strobel, p. 446.

posterius aliam disgregationem ipsorum realem dicit] Cf. Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 153.18-20: Διακρίνας ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς χρήσεως τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, διακρίνει νῦν αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς αὐτῶν τῆς φύσεως, ἥπερ ἐστὶ πραγματικὴ διάκρισις [...].

superius quidem enim ... nunc autem] Cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 529.17-18: ἀνωτέρω μὲν γὰρ [...], νυνὶ δὲ [...].

ut iam dixi] ὡς ἤδη εἶπον is a phrase used many times by Philoponus.

eo quod g : *per hoc quod* G] Cf. for τῷ ~ *eo quod* e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 112.8, 186.20, 297.12; for τῷ ~ *per hoc quod* e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 41.9, 279.26, 588.25.

non in omnibus] Cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 487.35-38: ἐπειδὴ οὖν πολλή ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ κοινωνία, διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον αὐτῶν λέγει τὴν διαφορὰν. διαφέρει τοίνυν ὁ νοῦς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν μόνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ.

consideret⟨ur⟩ g : *videtur* G] Are we dealing with two different translations of θεωρεῖσθαι or of ὀρᾶσθαι? To be sure, θεωρεῖσθαι is more common in the sense required here than ὀρᾶσθαι, and while *considerare* is MbK's standard translation for θεωρεῖν, *videre* is also (though much more rarely) used by MbK to translate θεωρεῖν (cf. e.g. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 839.18 Steel = p. 839.23 Luna-Segonds: θεωρεῖσθαι ~ *videri*). However, ὀρᾶσθαι cannot be ruled out here (cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 85.29-30: ἐν πᾶσιν ὀρᾶται τοῖς ζώοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις; p. 85.31: τὸ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀρᾶσθαι τοῖς ζώοις; p. 237.23-24: διότι ἐν πᾶσιν ὀρᾶται τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἢ κίνησις, and for *considerare* ~ ὀρᾶν see e.g. the Latin/Greek indices in the editions of MbK's translations of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* [ed. Pattin] and Proclus' commentary on the *Parmenides* [ed. Steel], respectively).

in quibus et sensus videtur g : *sicut sensus* G] Our retroversion follows g, assuming that *videtur* is MbK's addition (which is not easy to explain given that MbK translates the corresponding word in the preceding clause as *consideret*⟨ur⟩ - did he really want to avoid repeating the same word?). Another difficulty is posed by G's version *sicut sensus*: Is this deliberately shorthand for the text we can reconstruct from g? Or did MbK_C read εἰ ὡς instead of ἐν οἷς so that *sicut* should be corrected into *si ut*?

consideratis] Cf. e.g. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 59.32, 72.15, 183.33: θεωρουμένων ~ *consideratis*.

utrisque g : *ambabus* G] While MbK uses *uterque* for both ἀμφοτέρως and ἐκάτερος, *ambo* is reserved for ἀμφοτέροι. Therefore, we have put ἀμφοτέρων into our retroversion.

et aliter] καὶ ἄλλως is very often used by Philoponus to signal the introduction of an additional reason or consideration (cf. e.g. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 379.15; *In Phys.*, p. 340.12; *In GC*, p. 219.12-13). ἄλλως τε is also used in this way but would have been translated by MbK as *aliter que* (cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 19.29; 60.20 [~ ἄλλως δὲ]; 79.2; 88.3; Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 156.20; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 60.13).

in quibus ... in ipsis his [*in ipsis his g : in his ipsis G*] The respect in which X is said to have something in common (κοινωνεῖν) with Y is almost always expressed by a prepositional phrase of the type 'κατά τι', and Philoponus follows this rule strictly. Therefore, one would expect *secundum quae ... secundum ipsa haec* (~ καθ' ἃ ... κατ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, cf. for κατ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα Procl., *In Alc.* 339, 1 [p. 158 Westerink]). Why both Mbkg and Mbkg opted here for *in* and against *secundum* is hard to tell, but other cases can be found where Mbkg uses *in aliquo* for κατά τι without obvious motivation (after all, the Index of Vuillemin-Diem-Steel's edition of his translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos* lists 11 instances).

convenire [g : *communicare* G] *intellectus cum sensu* Cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 558.13–14: κοινωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς τῆ αἰσθήσει κατὰ τὸ ἀμέσως ἐνεργεῖν. Although Mbkg generally uses *communicare* for κοινωνεῖν, it is reasonable to assume that *convenire*, too, corresponds to κοινωνεῖν. Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 235.24–25: περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ τε ἀναγκαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ~ *de convenientia et differentia necessariū et impossibilis* and above on 133.36–37: *convenientiam ipsius [ipsius g : ipsorum G] et sensus*.

primo autem in his g : tertio autem post haec G (i) The variation *primo/tertio* can be explained in two ways: Either Mbkg mistook τρίτον for πρῶτον, or both Mbkg and Mbkg found πρῶτον in the Greek manuscript, and Mbkg translated τρίτον as a correction of πρῶτον (for a similar case, cf. below on 139.49–50: *morion, id est particula g : solum G*). (ii) Thanks to the literal translation in g, we understand that *post haec* is an interpretation of ἐπὶ τούτοις (cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 1025.12 Steel = p. 1025.15 Luna-Segonds: τρίτον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις ~ *tertio autem post hec*). The expression τρίτον (...) ἐπὶ τούτοις is frequently used (cf. e.g. Phlp., *In Cat.*, p. 198.24; *In Apr.*, p. 147.6; Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 545.21). τρίτον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις is translated by Mbkg also as *tertio autem super hec* (cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 782.19–20 Steel = p. 782.27 Luna-Segonds).

iv. 133.54–134.66 (= 2.27–32)

Texts

g

[133.55] *Sicut autem iam et prius diximus, de irrationabilibus animae potentiis²¹ disserens, prius de obiectis disseruit quando²² evidentiora erant haec,²³ hic vero prius de intellectu disserit et posterius de obiectis, hoc est de intelligibilibus; ignotiora enim et inevidentiora existunt intelligibilia quam intellectus. Propter quod iterum ab evidentioribus eadem intentione principium facit.²⁴*

G

[133.54] *Sicut autem iam prius diximus, de irrationabilibus quidem potentiis animae prius de obiectis disputans, prius de obiectis disputavit quia evidentiora haec erant, hic vero prius de intellectu disputat²⁵ et posterius de obiectis, hoc est de intelligibilibus; magis ignota enim et inevidentiora sunt intelligibilia quam intellectus. Propter quod rursum eadem intentione ab evidentioribus principium facit.*

²¹ *animae potentiis* To ed. : inv. P

²² *quando* To ed. : *quoniam* P (fortasse recte, cf. *quia* G)

²³ *haec* P : om. To ed.

²⁴ *facit* corr. ex G : *fecit* P To

²⁵ *disputat* CV : *disputavit* T ed.

R

ὡς δὲ ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν, περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων διαλεγόμενος πρότερον περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων διελέχθη ὅτι σαφέστερα ταῦτα ἦν, ἐναυθῆα δὲ πρότερον περὶ τοῦ νοῦ διαλέγεται καὶ ὕστερον περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, τουτέστι περὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἀγνωστότερα γὰρ καὶ ἀσαφέστερά ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ἢ ὁ νοῦς· διὸ πάλιν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει²⁶ ἀπὸ τῶν σαφεστέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖται.

Notes

Sicut autem iam et [et g : om. G] prius diximus] Since the occasional omission of the adverbial καὶ is quite characteristic of MbK's translation method,²⁷ it is safe to assume that g here reflects the Greek text more faithfully than G. And though the corresponding Greek ὡς δὲ ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν appears nowhere else in exactly this form, we can compare Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 344.18: ὡς δὲ ἤδη εἶπομεν (without καὶ πρότερον) and *Op. mund.*, p. 211.6-7 Reichardt: ὡς ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἶπον (without δὲ and with εἶπον instead of εἶπομεν).

disserens] Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 252.2-3 and Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 436.15-16: διαλεγόμενος ~ *disserens*.

prius de obiectis] In MbK's translations, *obiectum* usually stands for τὸ ὑποκείμενον (cf. e.g. Them., *In De An.*, p. 49.24, 57.30, 80.5). Here, however, the context demands to take *obiectis* as a translation of τῶν ἀντικειμένων. Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 207.10-15: βουλόμενος γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀλόγου διαλεχθῆναι, πρῶτον περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων διαλέγεται, οἷον περὶ αἰσθήσεως μέλλων διδάσκειν πρότερον τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ποιεῖται λόγον, καὶ περὶ ὄψεως τὸν τῶν ὄρατῶν, καὶ περὶ θρέψεως τὸν περὶ τροφῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως· εἴτα οὕτως ἀνεισιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας, ἀκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς προακτικὰς τούτων and p. 263.29-264.2: οὔσης γὰρ πρώτης μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, δευτέρας δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας, πρότερον μὲν περὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐνεργειῶν διαλέγεται, εἴτα περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, διὰ τὸ σαφεστέρως εἶναι τῶν δυνάμεων τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ ἔτι πρὸ τούτων περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς δυνάμεις, ἀντικειμένων δὲ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι· τῇ γὰρ θρέψει ἢ τροφῇ ἀντίκειται· ἢ γὰρ θρέψις τῇ τροφῇ τρέφει καὶ τροφῆς ἐστὶ θρέψις, ὁμοίως ἢ ὄρασις ὄρατος ὄρασις, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. αὐτὸ οὖν τοῦτο διὰ τούτων κατασκευάσαι βούλεται, ὅτι δεῖ τῆς διδασκαλίας ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρξασθαι ὡς σαφεστέρων. Philoponus refers to *De An.* 402 b 14-16: εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἂν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα [~ *obiecta* both in the 'translatio vetus' and 'nova'] πρότερον τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ.

quando g : quia G] Whereas MbK_G correctly translates ὅτι, MbK_g seems to have read ὅτε (unless he wrote *quoniam* [~ ὅτι], which is the reading of g according to P).

eadem intentione] None of the various Greek terms for which *intentione* is used by MbK - most noticeably σκοπός, but also e.g. ἔννοια and πρόθεσις - makes sense here; rather, the meaning of the sentence demands τάξει (~ *ordine*) as part of the phrase τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει. This is shown by three similar passages in Philoponus' commentary on the *De Anima* (cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 76.5-7: ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τοῖς ὑποδείγμασιν οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει ἐχρήσατο, οἷσπερ ἐξέθετο ὑποδείγμασι τὰ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου; p. 227.26-28: ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῇ

²⁶ τάξει] *intentione* (~ τάσει) g et G

²⁷ Cf. C. Luna, "L'utilizzazione di una traduzione greco-latina medievale per la costituzione del testo greco: la traduzione di Guglielmo di Moerbeke del commento di Proclo *In Parmenidem*", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010), pp. 475-555, here p. 485.

προχειρίσει τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν ψυχικῶν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει χρῆται ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων ἀρχόμενος καὶ ἐσχάτων καὶ προῖων ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τελειότερα; p. 266.7-10: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐπω ταῦτα διείρηκεν [lg. διήρηκεν], λέγω δὴ τὰ περὶ τῶν διδασκαλιῶν πασῶν τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων, διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκε 'καὶ νοητοῦ', ἵνα μὴ ἐπιταράξῃ τὴν διδασκαλίαν, ἐπεὶ, ὡς εἶπον, οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει ἐπὶ τούτων χρήσεται). In addition, the characteristic combination of τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει with πάλιν (~ *iterum* g, ~ *rursum* G) can be found in Phlp., *In Apr.*, p. 57.16-17: τῇ αὐτῇ πάλιν τάξει κέχρηται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἥπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν προτάσεων. But how did τάξει become *intentione* in MbK's translation? Though we cannot be certain, a plausible assumption is that MbK read τάσει instead of τάξει, understood this in the sense of ἐπιτάσει and translated it accordingly as *intentione* (one would expect *intensione*, but cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 938.12 Steel = p. 938.15 Luna-Segonds: ἐπιτάσεων ~ *intentiones*). A similar copyist error is found in Procl., *In Eucl.*, p. 354.14 Friedlein: the oldest mss. V (*Marcianus* gr. 306) and M (*Monacensis* gr. 427) have τάσιν, a later hand in V corrected τάσιν into τάξιν.

v. 134.67-82 (= 2.33-40)

Texts

g

[134.67] *Intellectum autem hic ait Aristoteles simpliciter omnem rationalem substantiam, et hunc intellectum partem animae ait, abutens nomine partis. Non enim est pars totius animae rationalis substantia: esset enim²⁸ utique sic aut omnis anima immortalis aut omnis mortalis; pars enim toti consubstantialis;²⁹ utrumque autem inconueniens. Et ipse etiam de hoc intellectu in prioribus ait quia³⁰ videtur animae genus alterum esse et hoc solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.*

R

νοῦν δὲ ἐνταῦθά φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπλῶς πᾶσαν τὴν λογικὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν 'μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς' φησι καταχρώμενος τῷ τοῦ μορίου ὀνόματι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς ἢ λογικὴ οὐσία· ἦν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἢ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἢ πᾶσα θνητὴ· τὸ γὰρ μόριον τῷ ὅλῳ ὁμοούσιον· ἐκάτερον δὲ ἄτοπον. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τούτου τοῦ νοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἶπεν ὅτι 'ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίου τοῦ φθαρτοῦ' [*De An.* 413 b 25-27].

Cf. scholium: ἡγουν πάσης τῆς λογικῆς οὐσίας ἦν καὶ νοῦν φησὶ νῦν καταχρηστικῶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς ἢ λογικὴ οὐσία ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν σημανόμενον τῆς ὁμωνύμου ψυχῆς τῆς φερομένης κατὰ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς καὶ ἥλιον λέγομεν καὶ τὸν δίσκον καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, τὸν μὲν ὡς αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἰτιατόν.

²⁸ *enim* P : om. To ed.

²⁹ *toti consubstantialis* To ed. : *consubstantialis est toti* P

³⁰ *ait quia* To ed. : *dixit quod* P (fortasse recte, cf. G)

³¹ *autem hic* TCV : inv. ed.

Notes

abutens nomine partis [partis g : om. G] Cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 88.25-26: καταχρώμεθα γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῷ τῆς διανοίας ὀνόματι ~ *abutimur enim in ipsis mentis nomine*; p. 95.6: τῷ ὀνόματι καταχρῶνται τοῦ τόπου ~ *nomine loci abutantur*. Cf. also ἦν καὶ νοῦν φησι νῦν καταχρηστικῶς in the corresponding scholium.

et ipse etiam] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 20.26, 49.1: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ~ *et ipse etiam*.

in prioribus ait quia [ait quia To : dixit quod P] g : *in prioribus dixit quod G*] The simplest way to bring the two versions into agreement is the assumption that MbK, reading ἔφη in his Greek exemplar, translated it first as *ait* (cf. for *ait* ~ ἔφη Strobel, p. 649) and then as *dixit*. However, in only a few cases does Philoponus construe ἔφη with a clause introduced by ὅτι (~ *quia* / ~ *quod*) (cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 544.22, 568.29; *Aet.*, p. 196.25 Rabe), and he never uses ἔφη in connection with ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν or ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν (~ *in prioribus*, cf. *infra* on 136.56-137.1: *in praecedentibus g : in prioribus G*). By contrast, we find many instances of εἶπε(ν) (...) ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν / προλαβοῦσιν and ἔλεγε(ν) (...) ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν/προλαβοῦσιν in Philoponus' works as well as related texts (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 402.1: εἶπεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ~ *dixit in prioribus* and Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 108.24: ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ~ *dixit in prioribus*). With this in mind, it is interesting to observe that P, one of the two witnesses for g, shares with G the reading *dixit quod*, which may be due, however, to an intervention by the scribe of P.

vi. 134.82-135.99 (= 2.40-3.48)

Texts

g

[134.82] *Sic igitur dicit partem totius animae rationalem, tanquam unum significatum rationalem aequivocae animae dictae de irrationali et rationali ac si utique et solis aequivoce dicti. Dicimus enim solem et ipsum corpus solare et lumen quod in aere provenit; consuevimus enim inferiorem³² locum solem appellare; sicut igitur si diceremus partem solis lumen, non vellemus dicere quod toti pars haec consubstantialis esset (haec quidem enim causa, scilicet corpus solis, hoc autem causatum), sed partem animae dicit intellectum.*

G

[134.82] *Ita igitur dicit totius animae rationalem esse partem, sicut unum significatum aequivocae animae dictae de irrationali et rationali ac si utique de aequivoce dicto sole. Dicimus enim solem et ipsum corpus et lumen factum in aere; consuevimus enim illuminatum locum solem appellare; sicut igitur si diceremus partem solis lumen, non hoc dicimus quia toti pars aequivocae vocis, ita et hic pars totius aequivocae vocis, ita et hic partem animae dicit intellectum.*

R

οὕτως οὖν λέγει μῶριον τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς τὴν λογικὴν εἶναι ὡς ἐν σημαινόμενον τῆς ὁμωνύμου ψυχῆς τῆς φερομένης κατὰ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ τῆς λογικῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ τοῦ ὁμωνύμως φερομένου ἡλίου. λέγομεν γὰρ ἡλίον καὶ τὸν δίσκον καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γινόμενον· εἰώθαμεν γὰρ τὸν πεφωτισμένον τόπον ἡλίον προσαγορεύειν· ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ λέγοιμεν 'μῶριον

³² *inferiorem* To P ed. : an *illuminatum* ex G?

τοῦ ἡλίου' τὸ φῶς, οὐ τοῦτο φαμεν ὅτι τῷ ὄλῳ τὸ μόριον τοῦτο ὁμοούσιον ἐστὶ – τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ αἰτιατόν –, ἀλλ' ὅτι μόριον ὅλης τῆς ὁμωνύμου φωνῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα 'μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς' λέγει τὸν νοῦν.

Cf. scholium: ἤγουν πάσης τῆς λογικῆς οὐσίας ἦν καὶ νοῦν φησὶ νῦν καταχρηστικῶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς ἢ λογικῆς οὐσίας ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν σημαινόμενον τῆς ὁμωνύμου ψυχῆς τῆς φερομένης κατὰ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς καὶ ἡλιον λέγομεν καὶ τὸν δίσκον καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, τὸν μὲν ὡς αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἰτιατόν.

Notes

aequivocae anima dictae] Verbeke considers the Greek term translated as *aequivocae* to be an adverb and accordingly writes *aequivocae*, but the scholium shows that the term is here used as an attribute to τῆς ... ψυχῆς. Even if ὁμώνυμος generally occurs in attributive position as a modifier of φωνή (sc. ἡ ὁμώνυμος φωνή), it is perfectly possible to follow the scholium in writing τῆς ὁμωνύμου ψυχῆς, where τῆς ... ψυχῆς refers to a particular φωνή, namely 'ἡ ψυχῆ'. The scholium also suggests reconstructing φερομένης κατὰ for *dictae de* (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 24.24: εἴτε ὁμώνυμος κατὰ πλείονων φέρεται τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴτε συνωνύμως ~ *si aequivocae de pluribus dicatur idem nomen vel si univoce*).

ac si utique] Cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 99.15 and 106.7: ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ~ *ac si utique*. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ τοῦ ὁμωνύμως φερομένου ἡλίου is probably brachylogical for ὥσπερ ἂν λέγοι εἰ καὶ τοῦ ὁμωνύμως φερομένου ἡλίου μόριον λέγοι.

solis aequivocae dicti g : de aequivocae dicto sole G] Mbkg falsely construes the genitive with the preceding κατ'.

ipsum corpus solare g : ipsum corpus G] Two points are worth mentioning here: First, *solare* is missing in (the copies of) G (and, whether by coincidence or not, the copies of G also omit *solis* in Mbkg's explanatory gloss on τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον in 135.95-96); secondly, the Greek counterpart found in the scholium is not αὐτὸ τὸ ἡλιακὸν σῶμα (~ g) or αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα (~ G), but τὸν δίσκον. All three possibilities of retroversion (i.e. αὐτὸ τὸ ἡλιακὸν σῶμα, αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα, and τὸν δίσκον) make good sense and can be defended on the basis of parallel passages (cf. for τὸ ἡλιακὸν σῶμα Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 441.2: τοῦ ἡλιακοῦ σώματος ~ *a solari corpore* and p. 519.25: τοῦ ἡλιακοῦ σώματος ~ *solaris corporis*; cf. for τὸν δίσκον Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 348.37: τὸν δίσκον αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ ἡλίου]). Two explanations for the variation present themselves: (i) The Latin wording, whether that of g or that of G, is closer to the original Greek, which became τὸν δίσκον in the scholium; or (ii) it is a kind of paraphrase employed by Mbkg to translate τὸν δίσκον (or whatever expression he thought he was reading in his text). The main argument against (ii) and in favour of (i) is the fact that it is difficult to see why Mbkg, reading τὸν δίσκον, should not have translated it simply as *discum* (cf. Arist., *Po.* 1461 b 31). But there are also strong reasons for (ii): First, the difference between g and G here and in 135.95-96 can be better explained if we assume that the Latin wording is a paraphrase (with g adding, and G omitting, *solare* as well as *solis*). Moreover, in view of the rareness of the term ὁ δίσκος, it is not easy to see why the scholiast should have come up with τὸν δίσκον for αὐτὸ τὸ ἡλιακὸν σῶμα (~ g) or αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα (~ G). If *corpus* (+ *solare* g) is a paraphrase for τὸν δίσκον, *ipsum* may be understood either (i) as part of Mbkg's paraphrase without a Greek counterpart (cf. our retroversion), or (ii) as part of the translation for αὐτὸν τὸν δίσκον. And if (ii) is the case, it cannot be ruled out that Philoponus wrote αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ ἡλίου] τὸν δίσκον as in *In De An.*, p. 348.37 (quoted above).

quod in aere provenit g : factum in aere g] quod ... provenit corresponds to the same Greek as *factum*, either γινόμενον (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 97.17: πολλῆς οὖν γενομένης τῆς ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ πλήθει διαστάσεως ~ *multa igitur proveniente in extrema multitudine distensione*) or παραγινόμενον (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 146.10: ὁ μετὰ διαστάσεως εἰς τὴν ὕλην παραγίνεται ~ *quae cum distensione in materiam provenit* and p. 249.16: εἰς αὐτὸ παραγίνεται ~ *in ipsam provenit*). Despite MbK's use of the perfect *factum*, the aorist (παρα)γενόμενον is less probable; cf. Phlp., *Op. mund.*, p. 86.23-24 Reichardt: τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γινόμενον φῶς, and for the translation of γινόμενος as *factus* Strobel, p. 198.

*inferiorem locum g : illuminatum locum G] Whereas illuminatum gives the expected meaning, inferiorem makes little sense, regardless of its exact Greek counterpart (e.g. τὸν κάτω, τὸν ὑποκάτω, τὸν κατωτέρω, τὸν καταδεέστερον, τὸν ὑποδεέστερον). It may be regarded simply as a corruption of illuminatum or as resulting from a difficulty posed by the Greek text. We could speculate, for example, that inferiorem is the attempt to translate a (non-existing) verb form like κατωτιζόμενον, for which MbK_G restored καταφωτιζόμενον (the verb καταφωτίζειν is used by Philoponus twice: Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 327.4 and 337.34). However, this is mere speculation.*

*non vellemus dicere g : non hoc dicimus G] The variation is difficult to explain. While both versions make sense, MbK_G's seems to have the advantage that vellemus (imperfect active subjunctive) better squares with diceremus (attested both in g and G, p. 135.91-92) than dicimus (present active indicative). MbK_G's translation non hoc dicimus, on the other hand, seems to be supported by two parallels in Philoponus (Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 179.6-10: ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ζῶον ἐκ ζῴου γίνεσθαι, οἷον ἐξ ἵππων σφῆκας, οὐ δὴπου τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ζῶον ὁ ἵππος μεταβάλλει εἰς ζῴα τοὺς σφῆκας (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπόκειται τοῖς σφῆξιν ὡς ὕλη ὁ ἵππος), ἀλλὰ τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὅτι ἐκ τινος ᾧ συμβέβηκε ζῶν εἶναι ἄλλο τι γίνεται ᾧ καὶ αὐτῷ ζῶν εἶναι ὑπάρχει and p. 471.14-17: ὅταν λέγωμεν τὴν ὕλην πάντα εἶναι δυνάμει, οὐ τοῦτ' αὖ φάμεν ἢ ὅτι πάντα ἅμα ποτὲ ἐνεργεῖα γενήσεται, ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν εἶδος ἔχει ἐνεργεῖα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει μὲν τι εἶδος ἐνεργεῖα, πέφυκε δὲ καὶ πάντα δέχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος, ἅμα δὲ οὐδέποτε). Moreover, the difficulty posed by the seeming incoherence between diceremus and dicimus can be mitigated by supposing that diceremus translates the potential optative λέγοιμεν (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 5.7). In addition, it is not easy to find a plausible Greek equivalent for non vellemus dicere; one could think of οὐκ ἄν) ἀξιοῖμεν, comparing Pl., *R.* 436 C 9 - D 3 (εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ἄνθρωπον ἐστηκότα κινουῦντα δὲ τὰς χεῖράς τε καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἔστηκε καὶ κινεῖται ἅμα, οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι ἀξιοῖμεν οὕτως λέγειν δεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ἔστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. οὐχ οὕτως; - οὕτω), but the use of ἀξιώω would give the statement a strange evaluative emphasis. All in all, MbK_G's version seems to us preferable; the possibility should be kept in mind, however, that MbK encountered an illegible text and translated ad sensum in either case.*

haec [haec To : hoc P] g : hoc [hoc T : haec CV] G] Unless haec is also the reading of G - or, conversely, hoc is also the reading of g -, hoc in G can be explained as the literal translation of τοῦτο, whereas g writes haec to make the pronoun agree with causa (~ αἴτιον).

scilicet corpus solis g : scilicet corpus G] Presumably added by MbK as an explanatory remark referring back to haec g / hoc G. For the omission of solis in (the copies of) G see above on 135.87-88: ipsum corpus solare g : ipsum corpus G.

vii. 135.99-10 (= 3.48-53)

Texts

g

[135.99] *Diceremus enim utique quia et huius huius aequivocae vocis "Aiax" pars utique erit Telamonius id est unum significatum, non quia consubstantialis sit iste reliquis Aiaticibus; non enim est idem cum Aiace Troiano secundum hoc idem³³ significatum secundum hoc ipsum significatum Aiaticis, sicut utique si quis et entium omnium partem diceret angelicam substantiam et gubernatorem navis.*

G

[135.99] *Dicemus enim utique quia et huius vocis "Aiax" aequivocae existentis pars utique erit qui Telamonius quasi unum significatum, non quod homousios sit iste reliquis Aiaticibus; non enim est idem³⁴ cum Aiace Troiano secundum hoc ipsum significatum Aiaticis, sicut utique si quis et entium omnium partem dicat angelicam substantiam et gubernatorem navis.*

R

εἴποιμεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι καὶ τῆς Αἴας φωνῆς ὁμωνύμου οὐσης μῶριον ἂν εἶη ὁ Τελαμώνιος ὡς ἐν σημαίνομενον, οὐχ ὅτι ὁμοούσιός ἐστιν οὗτος τοῖς λοιποῖς Αἴασι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ Ὀϊλέως³⁵ Αἴαντι κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ σημαίνομενον τοῦ Αἴαντος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ τις καὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων μῶριον λέγοι τὴν ἀγγελικὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν πλωτῆρα τοῦ πλοίου.

Notes

huius aequivocae vocis "Aiax" g : huius vocis "Aiax" aequivocae existentis G] The two translations differ not only in word order but also in syntax: while *aequivocae* appears in g in attributive position, it serves in G as a predicative adjective, with the copula *existentis* being added. Our retroversion rests on the double assumption that (i) *huius* translates the article τῆς (cf. Michael Eph., *In EN*, p. 533.22-23: διὰ τῆς προσθήκης τοῦ ταῦ στοιχείου ἢ τῆς προσθήκης τῆς φωνῆς τῆς 'αὐτό' ~ *per appositionem huius elementi T - tau - vel per appositionem huius vocis "auto" (quod latine sonat "ipsum")* [translation by Robert Grosseteste] and that (ii) *huius vocis "Aiax"* translates τῆς Αἴας φωνῆς, a phrase frequently used by the commentators with various inflections of ἡ ... φωνή (cf. e.g. Porph., *In Cat.*, p. 62.31, Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 27.30, Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 18.4, Phlp., *In Cat.*, p. 20.31). Given this, the question arises whether Mbkg omitted οὐσης or Mbkg added *existentis*. Perhaps the situation is more complicated, and Mbkg was faced with the syntactically awkward expression τῆς Αἴας φωνῆς ὁμωνύμου, which called for some intervention. While Mbkg tried to solve the problem by reading τῆς Αἴας φωνῆς <τῆς> ὁμωνύμου and thus put *aequivocae* before *vocis*, Mbkg supplied the participle *existentis*, reading τῆς Αἴας φωνῆς ὁμωνύμου <οὐσης>. Both attempts are equally plausible.

id est unum significatum g : quasi unum significatum G] *id est* is almost certainly the corruption of a term corresponding to ὡς (~ *quasi* G) - perhaps *sicut*? The retroversion ὡς ἐν σημαίνομενον is suggested by the comparison of p. 134.83-84 (*tanquam* [g : *sicut* G] *unum significatum*) with the corresponding scholium (ὡς ἐν σημαίνομενον).

Troiano] This translates Ὀϊλέως, which Moerbeke erroneously took for Ἰλέως (i.e. 'from Troy'). Our conjecture is inspired by Bossier's, see Charlton p. 29 n. 13: "The MSS have

³³ *idem* To ed. : an *ipsum* cum P?

³⁴ *est idem* corr. ex g (P To) : *iidem* TCV *idem* ed.

³⁵ Ὀϊλέως] *Troiano* (~ Ἰλέως) g et G

Troiano, ‘the Trojan Ajax’, but no Trojan Ajax is known to legend, and Moerbeke probably read *Iliadei*, ‘Trojan’ for *Oiliadei*, ‘son of Oileus’ (Bossier).” For Ὀιλέως see Alex., *In Top.*, pp. 120.35-121.1, Porph., *In Cat.*, p. 64.9-12, Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 27.13, etc.

hoc idem g : hoc ipsum G] Unless Mbkg, too, wrote *ipsum* (as is transmitted in P), the variation has its origin in two different readings of the Greek text: Mbkg seems to have read *κατ’ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, Mbkg_G correctly κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

sicut utique si quis ... diceret g : sicut utique si quis ... dicat G] Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 324.23-24: ὥσπερ ἄν εἴ τις ... λέγοι ~ *sicut utique si quis ... dicat* and Them., *In De An.*, p. 58.10: ὥσπερ ἄν εἴ λέγοι ~ *sicut si diceret*. For λέγοι ~ *diceret* cf. also Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 5.7.

angelicam substantiam] Cf. Phlp., *In Cat.*, p. 49.26: ἡ ἀγγελικὴ [sc. οὐσία].

gubernatorem navis] The retroversion is based on Charlton’s observation: “Probably an allusion to [*De An.*] 413 a 8-9” (p. 29 n. 14).

viii. 135.11-136.43 (= 3.53-4.69)

Texts

g

[135.11] *Primum autem ait Aristoteles esse intellectum, non substantia sed habitudine, eum quidem qui potentia, qualis quidem est in omnibus; secundum autem eum qui secundum habitum, qualis est qui in scientibus quidem et non utentibus scientia, qualis est dormiens geometra aut simpliciter qui non in promptu habet theoremata; tertium autem ait eum qui secundum actum iam in promptu habentem operationes, speculativo altero existente praeter istos, in quo secundum nihil est quod potentia, sed est actus sine potentia, ex quo scientiarum principia habet qui potentia, quem et proprie actu dicit esse; ratiocinativum enim etiam quando actu fit, et sic³⁶ potentia aliququaliter [aliququaliter] esse ait, propterea quod non simul totum habet actum, sed transit³⁷ a prioribus ad secunda. Et hunc intellectum omnes immortalem faciunt, dico autem rationalem substantiam, et Aristotelem consonantem sibi ostendunt etiam in his quae hic dicuntur;*

G

[135.11] *Triplicem autem intellectum ait esse Aristoteles, non essentia sed habitudine, eum scilicet qui potentia, qualis est in omnibus; secundum autem eum qui secundum habitum, qualis est qui in scientibus quidem, non utentibus autem scientia, qualis est dormiens geometer aut simpliciter qui non in promptu habet theoremata; tertium autem ait eum qui secundum actum iam³⁸ in promptu habens operationes, speculativo altero existente ab his, in quo secundum nihil est quod³⁹ potentia, sed est sine potentia actus, ex quo scientiarum principia habet qui potentia, quem et proprie actu dicit esse; ratiocinativum enim et cum actu fiat, et sic potentia aliququaliter esse ait, quia non simul totum habet actum, sed transitivum a prioribus in secunda. Et hunc intellectum omnes immortalem faciunt, dico⁴⁰ itaque rationalem substantiam et Aristotelem consonum sibi ostendunt etiam in his quae hic dicuntur;*

³⁶ sic (?) To : *similiter* ed.

³⁷ transit To ed. : *an transitivum* corr. ex G?

³⁸ iam CV : om. T ed.

³⁹ quod corr. ex g : *quidem* TV ed. om. C

⁴⁰ dico corr. ex g : *dicunt* TCV ed.

econtra enim pronuntiat "separatam" esse econtra enim "separatam" esse hanc partem hanc particulam animae et impassibilem et animae enuntiat et impassibilem et non non mixtam ad corpus. mixtam ad corpus.

R

τριττὸν δὲ φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, οὐ τῆ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῆ σχέσει, (πρῶτον μὲν) τὸν δυνάμει, οἷόσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν παισί,⁴¹ δευτέρου δὲ τὸν καθ' ἑξῆς, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιστήμοσι μὲν, μὴ χρωμένους δὲ τῆ ἐπιστήμῃ, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ καθευδὼν γεωμέτρης ἢ ἀπλῶς ὁ μὴ προχειριζόμενος τὰ θεωρήματα· τρίτον δὲ φησι τὸν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἢ δὴ προχειριζόμενον τὰς ἐνεργείας, τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ ἐτέρου ὄντος παρὰ τούτους, ἐν ᾧ κατ' οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἄνευ δυνάμεως ἐνέργεια, ἐξ οὗ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ὁ δυνάμει, ὃν καὶ κυρίως ἐνεργείᾳ λέγει εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ διανοητικόν, καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται, καὶ οὕτω δυνάμει πως εἶναι φησιν, διότι οὐχ ἅμα ὅλην ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ μεταβατικὴν ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ δεύτερα. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν πάντες ἀθάνατον ποιοῦσιν - λέγω δὴ τὴν λογικὴν οὐσίαν - καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην συμφωνοῦντα ἑαυτῷ δεικνύουσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένοις· ἀντικρὺς γὰρ ἀποφαίνεται χωριστὸν εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μόνιον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀμιγρὸς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα.

Cf. scholium: ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς, ὁ καθ' ἑξῆς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ ὁ θεωρητικὸς ὃς ἄνευ δυνάμεως ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ ἐξ οὗ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ὁ δυνάμει ὃν καὶ [κυρίως] ἐνεργείᾳ λέγει εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ διανοητ[ικόν] καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται καὶ οὕτω δυνάμει πως εἶναι φησι διότι οὐχ ἅμα ὅλην [ἔχει τὴν] ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ μεταβατικὴν καὶ ἀπὸ προτέρων] ἐπὶ δεύτερα· τριττός ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς οὐ τῆ οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ τῆ σχέσει:-

Cf. Sophon., *In De An.*, p. 132.28-39: εἷς ὢν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος πολυπλασιάζεται τῆ σχέσει ταῖς ἐνεργείαις καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσι. καὶ δυνάμει μὲν λέγεται, πρὶν τι μαθεῖν ἢ εὐρεῖν, ὡς ἐν παισί· καθ' ἑξῆς δὲ, ὡς ὅταν ἐπιστημῶν μὲν γένηται, μὴ ἐνεργῆ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ὡς ὁ καθευδὼν γεωμέτρης ἢ καὶ ἐργηγορῶς μὴ ἐνεργῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην. κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ, ὡς ὅταν θεωρῆ, καὶ τοῦτο διττῶς· ἢ περὶ τῶν αἰδίων καὶ καθόλου καὶ θείων, ὡς ὅταν ἀστρονομῆ ἢ γεωμετρῆ, καὶ καλεῖται θεωρητικὸς διανοητικὸς, τέλος ποιούμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ μερικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, τέλος τιθέμενος τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ καλεῖται πρακτικὸς· καὶ ἔτι παρὰ τούτους ὁ κυριώτατος καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς ὁ θεωρητικὸς ὄντως, ἐν ᾧ κατ' οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἄνευ δυνάμεως ἐνέργεια, ἐξ οὗ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς· οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἀθάνατος εἶναι τοῖς ἐξῆς ἀποφανθήσεται.

Notes

primum g : *triplicem* G] Mbk_G translates τριττὸν, which gives the required sense and is confirmed by the scholium (τριττός ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς οὐ τῆ οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ τῆ σχέσει). Mbk_g, by contrast, seems to translate πρῶτον. The difference may be due to a mistake on Mbk_g's part (τριττὸν misread as πρῶτον) or to a correction made by Mbk_G (πρῶτον corrected into τριττὸν). In any case, we do not need to assume that Mbk_g and Mbk_G used different Greek exemplars or found two different readings in the same Greek exemplar.

eum quidem qui potentia g : *eum scilicet qui potentia* G] A literal retroversion of the two versions leads to different results, τὸν μὲν δυνάμει on the basis of g (cf. Arist., *Cael.* 301 b 20:

⁴¹ παισί Verbeke ex Sophon. : *omnibus* (~ πᾶσι) g et G

τὴν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ~ *eum quidem qui secundum naturam*; Them., *In De An.*, p. 16.6: τὴν μὲν παρὰ φύσιν κίνησιν τῆς ψυχῆς ~ *eum quidem qui praeter naturam animae motum*), τὸν δυνάμει on the basis of G (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 85.34: ἐνὸς τρόπου τοῦ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν ~ *unius modi eius scilicet qui circa aequivocationem*; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 63.21: ἡ ἄνω ~ *scilicet qui sursum*). Both results are insufficient in that δεύτερον δὲ (~ *secundum autem* 135.15) always follows upon πρῶτον μὲν and πρῶτον is missing in either case. Assuming that πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δυνάμει was the original Greek text and further assuming that the text read by MbK in his exemplar was either (i) τὸν μὲν δυνάμει (~ g) or (ii) τὸν δυνάμει (~ G), we prefer interpretation (ii) because it seems to us more likely that MbK_g added *quidem* and less likely that MbK_G read μὲν and replaced *quidem* by *scilicet*.

qualis quidem g : *qualis* G] Unless the additional *quidem* in g is repeated from *eum quidem qui* in 135.13, *qualis quidem* may translate οἷόςπερ (cf. Arist., *Cael.* 292 b 2: οἷα περ ~ *qualis quidem*; *Mete.* 355 a 7: οἷανπερ ~ *qualis quidem*; *MA* 701 b 21: οἷόν περ ~ *qualis quidem*), offering a more precise translation of the suffix -περ than G (cf. also 138.11 and 139.54); it should be noted, however, that the two subsequent occurrences of *qualis* in 135.16 and 136.18 are not accompanied by *quidem* in g either.

omnibus] Both g and G read παῖσι, error for παισί (cf. Sophon., *In De An.*, p. 132.30).

et g : autem G] MbK occasionally uses *et* to translate δὲ (cf. e.g. the instances listed in the Index of Vuillemin-Diem-Steel's edition of his translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*). Here, however, MbK_g's choice of *et* (instead of *autem* as later in G) is surprising, given that *quidem*, which corresponds to μὲν, is left without its usual counterpart *autem*. Perhaps MbK_g first wrote *quidem* without a second thought but then abandoned the *quidem* – *autem* structure to avoid confusion with the similar structure of the main clause (cf. *quidem* [135.13] – *autem* [135.15] – *autem* [136.21]). MbK_G noticed the inconsistency and replaced *et* by *autem* rather than deleting *quidem*.

qui non in promptu habet theoremata] Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 68.29-31: ἔξεστι γὰρ προχειρίζομένους ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων ὄραν ὅπως εἰς ἓν τι πάντως τούτων τῶν γενῶν ἀναφέρεται ~ *licet enim in promptu habentes quodcumque entium videre qualiter in unum aliquod horum generum modis omnibus referatur*.

eum qui ... habentem g : *eum qui ... habens* G] One would expect *habet* as in 136.20. Despite the difference between *habentem* and *habens*, both versions have in common that MbK seems to translate τὸν κατ' ἐνέργειαν as *eum qui secundum actum* (by analogy with *eum ... qui potentia* 135.13-14 and *eum qui secundum habitum* 135.15-16) and take (ἡδῆ) προχειρίζομενον τὰς ἐνεργείας as an additional participle clause.

praeter istos g : *ab his* G] Both MbK_g and MbK_G translate παρὰ τούτους (~ Sophon., *In De An.*, p. 132.36); cf. for *praeter istos* Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 215.30: παρὰ τούτους ~ *praeter istos*; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 50.28: παρὰ ταύτας ~ *praeter hos*; *In Cat.*, p. 181.3: παρὰ ταύτας ~ *praeter has*, for *ab his* Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 167.5-6: τὰ λοιπὰ παρὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα ~ *reliquae a prius dictis*; p. 167.9: τὰ λοιπὰ παρ' αὐτὰς ~ *reliquas ab ipsis*.

transit g : *transitivum* G] The translation *transitivum* (~ μεταβατικὴν) is confirmed by the scholium. It is hard to decide whether the reading *transit* is due to a deliberate choice on MbK_g's part or the result of an error by MbK_g or by a copyist of g. A deliberate departure from the Greek syntax would not be untypical of MbK_g (cf. below on 139.61-62: *ostensum est quod Aristoteles vult* g : *ostensus est velle* G).

a prioribus ad secunda] The scholium reads ἀπὸ προτέρων ἐπὶ δεύτερα. Since ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων is used much more frequently than ἀπὸ προτέρων – as well as ἐπὶ τὰ πρότερα

than ἐπὶ πρότερα –, we are inclined to think that the scholiast shortened the phrase ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ δεύτερα to ἀπὸ προτέρων ἐπὶ δεύτερα.

dico autem g : dicunt utique G] The first person (*dico* ~ λέγω) is required for this supplementary remark (*dicunt* is a slip caused by *faciunt* at the end of the preceding sentence), but we keep δὴ from G (often confused with δὲ in mss.): λέγω δὴ τὴν λογικὴν οὐσίαν.

consonantem g : consonum G] *consonus* usually corresponds to σύμφωνος, but in some cases also to συμφωνῶν (cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 659.12 Steel = p. 659.16 Luna-Segonds and Ptol., *Tetr.* III 556f. [p. 202 Hübner]). Conversely, *consonans* usually corresponds to συμφωνῶν but in some cases also to σύμφωνος (cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 705.16 Steel = p. 705.21 Luna-Segonds). It is therefore hard to tell whether MbK's exemplar read συμφωνοῦντα or σύμφωνον.

e contra] In accordance with MbK's use of *e contra* (cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 19.7 and 120.19: ἄντικρυς ~ *e contra*), Bossier proposes ἄντικρυς, which makes excellent sense here ('outright', 'openly'). Moreover the adverbial expression is often connected with ἀποφαινομαι as is the case here (see Phlp., *In APr.*, p. 6.21–22: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνονται and Phlp.³, *In De An.*, p. 193.3: ἄντικρυς ἀποφαινόμενος). MbK translates the term ἄντικρυς in various ways: *e contra* (Them., *In De An.*), *e contrario* (Ptol., *Tetr.*; Simp., *In Cael.*), *ex opposito* (Alex., *In Mete.*), *e diverso* (Simp., *In Cat.*; Them., *In De An.*), *e converso* (Procl., *In Prm.*), *a regione* or *e regione* (Them., *In De An.*; Ptol., *Tetr.*; Simp., *In Cael.*). It is clear that he mistakenly thought that the only meaning of ἄντικρυς was that which is given by LSJ as “= ἄντικρύ, opposite” (LSJ, s.v. ἄντικρυς II.) and can be found e.g. in Alex., *In Mete.*, p. 154.26 (where MbK correctly translates *ex opposito*).

ix. 136.44–137.73 (= 4.70–5.83)

Texts

g

[136.44] *Alexander vero his quae hic dicuntur resistere non potens, mortalem autem esse⁴² putans etiam rationalem animam, et volens attrahere ad suam opinionem etiam Aristotelem, ait quod de conditore intellectu hic loquitur, et quia ait hunc esse et separatum et non mixtum et impassibilem, valde inconsiderate. Primo quidem enim de illo demonstrare vanum est. Quis enim utique de illo ostendere vanum. Quis enim utique de illo dubitabit⁴³ tanquam non sit separatus? Et in praecedentibus autem de intellectu dixit prioribus autem Aristoteles de ipso intellectu ipso quia intellectus autem videtur inferi et non <non> corrumpi; maxime enim corrumpetur ab ea quae in senectute imbecillitate.*

G

[136.44] *Alexander vero contrariari his quae resistere non potens, mortalem autem hic dicuntur non potens, mortalem autem esse⁴² putans etiam rationalem animam, et volens attrahere ad propriam opinionem Aristotelem, dicit quod de conditore intellectu hic loquitur, et quod ait hunc esse et separatum et non mixtum et impassibilem, valde inconsiderate. Primo quidem enim de illo ostendere vanum. Quis enim utique de illo ostendere vanum. Quis enim utique de illo dubitaret quod non sit separatus? Et in praecedentibus autem de intellectu dixit prioribus autem Aristoteles de ipso intellectu ipso quia intellectus videtur inferi et non <non> corrumpi; maxime enim utique corrumpetur ab ea quae in senectute imbecillitate.*

⁴² esse corr. ex G : et To ed.

⁴³ dubitabit corr. : dubitav' To (dubitavit ed.)

Et quis utique suspicabitur quod de conditore intellectu dicit quod totaliter⁴⁴ infiat in nobis aut intus factus non corrumpitur? Quomodo vero de illo diceret: si corrumperetur,⁴⁵ maxime corrumperetur utique ab ea quae in senectute imbecillitate, quasi sit hoc dubium, quod incorruptibilis sit conditor intellectus? *Et quis utique suspicaretur quod de conditore intellectu⁴⁶ diceret quod totaliter infiat in nobis aut ingenitus non corrumpitur? Quomodo autem⁴⁷ de illo diceret utique: si corrumperetur, maxime utique corrumperetur ab ea quae in senectute imbecillitate, tanquam utique dubitabili existente, quod incorruptibilis sit conditor intellectus?*

R

Ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένοις ἀντιβλέψαι μὴ δυνάμενος, θνητὴν δὲ οἰόμενος εἶναι καὶ τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ βουλόμενος συγκατασπᾶν πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην, φησὶν ὅτι περὶ τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ ἐνταῦθα λέγει καὶ ὅτι φησὶ τοῦτον εἶναι καὶ χωριστὸν καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ, λίαν ἀπερισκέπτως· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ (ταῦτα) περὶ ἐκείνου δεῖξαι μάταιον· τίς γὰρ ἂν περὶ ἐκείνου ἀπορήσειεν ὡς οὐκ ὄντος χωριστοῦ; καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἶπεν αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φθειρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ' ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἀμαυρώσεως' [*De An.* 408 b 18-20]. Καὶ τίς ἂν ὑπονοήσειεν ὅτι περὶ τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ λέγει ὅτι ὅλως ἐγγίνεται ἐν ἡμῖν ἢ ἐγγινόμενος οὐ φθείρεται; πῶς δὲ περὶ ἐκείνου εἶπεν ἂν, εἰ ἐφθείρετο, 'μάλιστα ἐφθείρετ' ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἀμαυρώσεως', ὡς ἂν ἀπόρου ὄντος τοῦ ἀφθαρτον εἶναι τὸν δημιουργικὸν νοῦν;

Notes

Alexander vero] Cf. Phlp., *In Apr.*, p. 258.23 and *In GC*, p. 15.2: Ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος. Though *vero* might correspond to δὲ (as is sometimes the case in MbK's translations), MbK's usage is in favour of Ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος: an ALD search yields eight instances of *Alexander vero* ~ Ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος, against no occurrences of *Alexander vero* ~ Ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος.

resistere g: *contrariari* G] MbK's use of *contrariari* could lead one to think of ἐναντιοῦσθαι, but it is doubtful whether MbK would have translated this term by *resistere*. An interesting parallel is Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 80.24-25: τοῖς περὶ τῆς αἰδιότητος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ λεγομένοις ἀντιτάττεσθαι ~ *hiis que de perpetuitate celi dicuntur contrariari*. Could ἀντιτάττεσθαι correspond to *resistere*? We found in Moerbeke one possible case, Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 64.3-4: οὕτως μὲν οὖν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον καὶ Πορφύριον διατάττονται ~ *Sic igitur qui circa Iamblichum et Porphyrium resistunt* (where it corresponds to διατάττονται, but Moerbeke probably read ἀντιτάττονται). Even more intriguing, however, is a passage from Philoponus himself: Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 159.9-11: διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀντιβλέψαι μὴ δυνάμενος πρὸς τὰ προφανῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λεγόμενα, ὁμολογεῖ μὲν ἐκὼν καὶ ἄκων τὸν νοῦν ἀθάνατον εἶναι (cf. for this use of ἀντιβλέπειν also Phlp., *Op. mund.*, p. 57.15, 120.22, 148.9 Reichardt, where the verb is used with the dative as here [cf. *his quae hic dicuntur*]). MbK's struggle to find a Latin equivalent is shown by his various attempts to translate the related adjective δυσαντίβλεπτος (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 132.8: δυσαντίβλεπτος ~ *difficile avertibilis*; p. 135.1:

⁴⁴ *totaliter* corr. ex G: *corporaliter* To ed.

⁴⁵ *corrumperetur* corr. ex G: *corrump' r* To (*corrumpitur* ed.)

⁴⁶ *conditore intellectu* CV: *inv.* T ed.

⁴⁷ *autem* CV: *autem primo* T ed.

δυσαντίβλεπτον ~ *difficile avertibilem* and p. 266.12: δυσαντιβλεπτότατον ~ *maxime difficulter pervertibile*; Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 954.12 Steel = p. 954.15 Luna-Segonds: δυσαντίβλεπτον ~ *difficulter revincibilem*). In his translation of Proclus' *Parmenides* commentary, he desperately resorts to the simplest and least intelligible way of translating ἀντιβλέπειν, ending up with *contravidere* (cf. p. 710.19 Steel = p. 710.26 Luna-Segonds). In the present case, the variation *resistere/contrariari* also likely reflects MbK's struggle for a suitable Latin equivalent for ἀντιβλέψαι or ἀντιβλέπειν. - Based on the quoted passage from Philoponus' *De Anima* commentary (Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 159.9-11), we regard *non potens* as a translation of μὴ δυνάμενος; it could also correspond to ἀδυνατῶν (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 58.15) or μὴ δυναθεῖς (cf. Phlp., *Op. mund.*, p. 250.19 and 278.19 Reichardt).

attrahere] Translation of συγκατασπᾶν or συγκατασπάσαι. Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 10.2-3: Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀφροδισιεύς, ὃς καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην πειροᾶται εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν συγκατασπᾶν; p. 21.20-23: ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλούταρχος, ἔκθεσιν τῶν ἰδίων δογμάτων ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενος καὶ συγκατασπάσαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους προσεποιήσατο ὑπομνηματίζειν ταύτην τὴν πραγματείαν; Ascl., *In Metaph.*, p. 90.24-25: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι θνητὴν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐβούλετο συγκατασπάσαι καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα.

suam g : propriam G] MbK uses both *suus* and *proprius* for ἴδιος (cf. e.g. the instances listed in the Index of Vuillemin-Diem-Steel's edition of MbK's translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*), and he uses both *suus* and *proprius* for οἰκεῖος (cf. e.g. the instances listed in the Index of Steel's edition of MbK's translation of Proclus' commentary on the *Parmenides*). Cf. for πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 92.4-5.

conditore intellectu] Cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 762.21 Steel = p. 762.28-29 Luna-Segonds, p. 764.2 Steel = p. 764.2-3 Luna-Segonds, p. 771.11 Steel = p. 771.16 Luna-Segonds, etc.: ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς ~ *conditor intellectus*.

hic loquitur] Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 100.30: περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ὀριστικοῦ λόγου λέγει ἐνταῦθα ~ *de definitiva enim ratione loquitur hic*.

valde inconsiderate] Cf. Arist., *GA* 756 b 17: λίαν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀσκέπτως ~ *valde simpliciter et inconsiderate*. Whereas ἀσκέπτως is used by the commentators only once (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 35.24), ἀπερισκέπτως occurs many times, often as part of a strong reproach (translated as *inconsiderate* e.g. in Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 134.27, 136.12, Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 71.23).

de illo demonstrare g : de illo ostendere G] Both *demonstrare* and *ostendere* could correspond to either δεικνύναι/δεῖξαι or ἀποδεικνύναι/ἀποδεῖξαι. Either way, one would expect that the infinitive has an accusative object referring to the proposition expressed by *hunc esse et separatum et non mixtum et impassibilem*, viz. τοῦτο or ταῦτα (cf. the translation by Charlton, p. 29: "[...] it would be a waste of time to offer a proof of this concerning the creative intellect" and *De Int.*, p. 49.57: *Haec enim non solum dixit de ipso, sed et ostendit*). Perhaps this object is to be supplied, or it has been replaced by περὶ ἐκείνου in anticipation of the next sentence, where we again find περὶ ἐκείνου.

quis ... utique ... dubitabit [dubitabit corr. : dubitav' To] g : quis ... utique ... dubitaret G] *dubitaret* in G could stand for a future form, whether ἀπορήσειεν or διαμφισβητήσειεν (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 87.10: διαμφισβητήσειεν ἂν τις ~ *dubitaret utique aliquis*) or the future of another verb translated as *dubitare*. If this is the case, however, one would expect in g *dubitabit* rather than *dubitavit*. And there are indeed at least four further instances of *quis ... utique ... dubitabit* in MbK's translations (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 66.17: τις ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἄνθρωπος ὢν ~ *quis utique homo existens dubitabit*; p. 134.12: καίτοι τις ἂν ἀμφιβάλοι ~ *Et quidem quis utique dubitabit*; p. 159.11: τίς ἂν ἀμφιβάλλοι ~ *quis utique dubitabit*; Them.,

In De An., p. 33.19: τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσειεν ~ *Quis enim utique dubitabit*), whereas the combination *utique (...)* *dubitavit* is found only here. And though the combination ἂν ... ἠπόρησεν is attested for Philoponus (esp. as part of the phrase ἠπόρησε γὰρ ἂν τις [cf. Phlp., *In Cat.*, p. 68.14, 80.25; *In Mete.*, p. 58.4]), it is never found together with τίς as part of a rhetorical question. Besides that, a very similar variation appears in p. 137.62-63: *Et quis utique suspicabitur* g : *Et quis utique suspicaretur* G.

tanquam non sit separatus g : *quod non sit separatus* G] Mbkg's translation suggests that the corresponding Greek is a participle construction (cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 16.11-12: ὡς ἀδυνάτου καθεστῶτος τοῦ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν κινουμένην ~ *tanquam sit impossibile movere corpus, si non prius ipsa moveatur*). For this construction in connection with ἀπορεῖν cf. Alex., *In Mete.*, p. 11.9-10: ἦν δὲ ἀπορεῖ ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀπορεῖ ὡς ὄντος ψυχροῦ τῆ αὐτοῦ φύσει ~ *Quam autem dubitat dubitationem, de aere dubitat velut existente frigido sui natura*. Mbkg's choice of *quod*, on the other hand, makes it more plausible to conjecture ὡς οὐκ ἔστι χωριστός (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 99.19-20: Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἀπορεῖ, ὡς εἰ ποιότης ἐστὶν ἢ διαφορά, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῆ οὐσία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἔτι καθ' ὑποκειμένης αὐτῆς λέγεται ~ *Alexander autem dubitat, quod si differentia sit qualitas, in subiecto sive in substantia est et non adhuc de subiecta ipsa dicitur*).

in praecedentibus g : *in prioribus* G] Both translations are compatible with: ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν (cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 69.31 [~ *in prioribus*]; p. 108.24 [~ *in prioribus*]; p. 189.21 [~ *in praecedentibus*]; p. 204.15 [~ *in praecedentibus*]; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 240.34 [~ *in praecedentibus*]; p. 247.17f. [~ *in praecedentibus*]); ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 282.16 [~ *in praecedentibus*]; Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 306.28 [~ *in prioribus*]; p. 402.1 [~ *in prioribus*]); ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 290.17 [~ *in praecedentibus*]); ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 139.1 [~ *in prioribus*]; p. 284.31-32 [~ *in praecedentibus*]); ἐν τοῖς προτέροις (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 246.25 [~ *in prioribus*]). Whereas ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων and ἐν τοῖς προτέροις are never used by Philoponus and ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν(ν) only three times, we find numerous occurrences of ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν and ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν in Philoponus; in this context, then, these are the most plausible candidates for the retroversion of *in praecedentibus* and *in prioribus*, respectively.

Et quis utique suspicabitur g : *Et quis utique suspicaretur* G] Both *suspiciabitur* and *suspicaretur* may correspond to ὑποπτεύσειεν or ὑπονοήσοι/ὑπονοήσειεν. Cf. for ὑποπτεύσειεν Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 41.21: ἂν τις ὑποπτεύσειεν ~ *aliquis suspicabitur*; p. 100.14: ἂν ὑποπτεύσειέ τις ~ *utique suspicabitur aliquis* (here within a negative statement: οὐδ' ἂν ὑποπτεύσειέ τις προσήκειν αὐταῖς τὸ ὄνομα τῶν ἐναντίων); p. 100.18-19: ὑποπτεύσειεν ἂν τις ~ *suspiciabitur utique aliquis*; p. 124.21-22: τῆς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ τίς ἂν ὑποπτεύσειεν ἀπόφασιν εἶναι τὴν ἵππος οὐ περιπατεῖ ~ *huius enim 'homo ambulat' quis utique suspicabitur negationem esse hanc 'equus non ambulat'*; p. 229.1: ὑποπτεύσειεν ἂν τις ~ *suspicaretur utique aliquis*. Cf. for ὑπονοήσοι/ὑπονοήσειεν Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 241.37-242.1: πῶς δ' ἂν τις ὄλως κἂν ὑπονοήσειεν αὐτόν μὴ περὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ταῦτα λέγειν; p. 159.32: καίτοι τίς ἂν τὸν θεῖον νοῦν οὐσιωδῶς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεσθαι ὑπονοήσειε; p. 339.14-16: καίτοι τίς ἂν ὑπονοήσοι τὸ εἶδωλον τὸ φαινόμενον ἔξω περιφέρεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ διαθέσεων γίνεσθαι (the last two passages, by the way, may lead one to think of καί(τοι) τίς ἂν ὑπονοήσειεν); for the translation of ὑπονοεῖν as *suspiciari* see Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 147.25 and p. 291.23.

totaliter infiat in nobis] Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 159.32: καίτοι τίς ἂν τὸν θεῖον νοῦν οὐσιωδῶς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεσθαι ὑπονοήσειε;

intus factus g : *ingenitus* G] *intus factus* translates ἐγγιγνόμενος (cf. Arist., GA 739 a 16; HA 602 b 26; Mete. 370 a 6-7; 370 a 24) or ἐγγενόμενος. The use of *ingenitus*, though yielding a more literal translation, is very confusing as this term is regularly used for ἀγένητος. MbK himself seems to have been uncertain about the term *ingenitus*. In the margin of ms. T (f. 58ra) a corrector added in clumsy Greek characters: *grecum* ἐγγινομενος. He may have found this note in MbK's autograph from which T had been copied.

diceret g : *diceret utique* G] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 274.16: ἄν ... εἶπε ~ *diceret utique*.

corrumpetur] ἐφθείρετο (~ *corrumpetur*) is obviously the correct reading; *corrump'* in To, if to be read as *corrumpitur*, seems to be a repetition from the preceding sentence (cf. *corrumpitur* 137.65 g, 137.66 G).

quasi sit hoc dubium g : *tanquam utique dubitabili existente* G] MbK_g permits himself a looser treatment of the syntax than MbK_G; for the translation of a genitive absolute with a subordinate clause introduced by *quasi* cf. Arist., *Pol.* 1295 a 1-2: οὐχ ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν ~ *non quasi sit multa sermocinatio circa ipsam*. Cf. for the construction Simp., *In Phys.*, p. 565.1: ὡς ἀπόρου καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν τόπον φανέντος; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 553.7-8: ὡς φανεροῦ ὄντος τοῦ τῶν φύσει λεγομένων τὰ μὲν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἔργα καὶ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν ~ *tamquam manifesto hoc existente quod eorum que natura dicuntur hec quidem substantie sunt, hec autem opera et passiones substantiarum*; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 53.15-16: ὡς ἂν τούτων θατέρου μὲν ὄντος ὀνόματος θατέρου δὲ ῥήματος ~ *tamquam utique horum altero existente nomine, altero autem verbo*; *De Int.*, p. 45.61-62: *tanquam utique dubium sit. dubium* and *dubitabili* may also translate ἀμφισβητησίμου (cf. Asp., *In EN*, p. 20.30-31: ἀμφισβητησίμου ὄντος).

x. 137.71-90 (= 5.84-92)

Texts

g

[137.71] *Quod autem actu intellectum quem et ait separatum esse et immixtum, quem separatum et non mixtum, non non alium dicit quam eum qui potentia in alium dicit quam eum qui in nobis potentia nobis [potentia] intellectum perfectum fieri intellectum perfectum fieri actu intellectum, actu intellectum, palam quidem et ex ipsis palam quidem et ex ipsis verbis Aristotelicis, verbis Aristotelis, palam etiam et ex ipsa palam autem et ex ipsa consequentia sensus; consequentia intellectus; irrationabile enim irrationabile enim est dicere quod qui est non dicere quod qui potentia intellectus potentia est intellectus in nobis non sit ille in nobis iste est qui per perfectionem ducitur qui per perfectionem ducitur in actum; non in actum; non enim utique est aliquid semper enim utique est aliquid semper in potentia, in potentia, quod nunquam perducitur in nunquam ductum in actum. Si autem ducitur actum. Si autem ducitur ad actum, hunc ait in actum, hunc autem ait separatum esse, eum separatum esse, eum ergo⁴⁸ qui in nobis dicit ergo qui in nobis dicit separatum esse.*

G

⁴⁸ ergo corr. ex G : vero To ed.

R

ὅτι δὲ τὸν ἐνεργεία νοῦν, ὃν καὶ φησι χωριστὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ, οὐκ ἄλλον λέγει ἢ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμει νοῦν (ὄν) τελειωθέντα γίνεσθαι ἐνεργεία νοῦν, δῆλον μὲν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν λέξεων, δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀκολουθίας τῆς ἐννοίας· ἄλογον γὰρ τὸ μὴ λέγειν ὅτι ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμει νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διὰ τοῦ³ τελείου ἀγόμενος εἰς ἐνεργείαν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τι αἰεὶ ἐν δυνάμει, οὐδέποτε *προ*αχθησόμενον εἰς ἐνεργείαν· εἰ δὲ ἄγεται εἰς ἐνεργείαν ὃν δὴ φησι χωριστὸν εἶναι, τὸν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν λέγει χωριστὸν εἶναι.

Notes

immixtum g : non mixtum G] Cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 94.20: ἀμιγῆ ~ *non mixtum*.

non alium dicit] Did the original Greek read οὐκ ἄλλον <τινὰ> λέγει? Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 163.31: οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγει; p. 242.5: οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ φησιν; *De Int.*, p. 43.14-15: *non aliquem alium dicat*; p. 50.82: *non alium aliquem dicit*.

perfectum fieri actu intellectum] We assume that the syntax is the same as in Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 250.27-28: τελεσφορηθὲν γενέσθαι κατ' ἐνεργείαν ἄνθρωπον ~ *perfectum fieri secundum actum hominem*. We do not think, however, that *perfectum* translates τελεσφορηθέντα - a biological term, which is not suitable here - but rather τελειωθέντα (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 54.21: τελειωθὲν ~ *perfectus*). Moreover, we supply (ὄν) as the subject of an *Accusativus cum infinitivo* dependent on λέγει (to be mentally supplied from λέγει (~ *dicit*) in the main clause).

ex ipsis verbis Aristotelis g : ex ipsis verbis Aristotelicis G] The difference between g and G points to different possibilities of retroversion (cf. Phlp., *Aet.*, p. 69.10-11 Rabe: δι' αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους λέξεων and Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 672.8: ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν λέξεων). But since MbK frequently uses *Aristotelis* for Ἀριστοτελικός (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 124.18: τοῦ Ἀριστοτελικοῦ λόγου ~ *sermonis Aristotilis*; *In Cat.*, p. 3.21-22; 25: τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ~ *librorum Aristotelis*; p. 7.34: τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν νοημάτων ~ *intellectu(m) Aristotelis*; p. 269.24: τὰς Ἀριστοτελικὰς ἐννοίας ~ *Aristotelis sententias*) and never *Aristotelicus* for (τοῦ) Ἀριστοτέλους, it is reasonable to assume that he found Ἀριστοτελικῶν in his manuscript, which he first translated as *Aristotelis* and later as *Aristotelicis*.

ex ipsa consequentia intellectus g : ex ipsa consequentia sensus G] A similar phrase can be found in Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 707.3-4: ἡ ἀκολουθία τῆς λέξεως. In the present passage, however, Philoponus seems to refer to the logical consequence of the following argument (cf. Phlp., *Aet.*, p. 268.11-13 Rabe: τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς Πλατωνικῆς ἀποφάνσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς ἀκολουθίας καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως δῆλον καθέστηκεν).

irrationabile enim - ducitur in actum] g and G differ (i) in the position of *non* and (ii) in writing *iste est* vs. *sit ille*. As regards (i), the phrase ἄλογον γὰρ τὸ λέγειν (~ G) is commonly attested (cf. Phlp., *In Mete.*, p. 108.10-11: ἄλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸ λέγειν; *In GC*, p. 94.19-20: τὸ δὲ λέγειν τὸ καθόλου εἶναι τὸ ὑπομένον, ἄλογον; Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 216.16-17: οὐκέτι γὰρ ἄλογον τὸ λέγειν τελειότητα τὴν μὲν πρώτην, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν), whereas we were unable to find parallels for ἄλογον γὰρ τὸ μὴ λέγειν (~ g) in Phlp. or other commentators. Yet the Greek retroversion of g sounds more natural than that of G, and there is nothing to rule out the collocation ἄλογον ... τὸ μὴ λέγειν (cf. the similar collocation τὸ μὴ λέγειν ... ἄτοπον ~ *non dicere ... inconueniens* in Them., *In De An.*, p. 36.3-4). – With regard to (ii), it is tempting to think that both *iste* and *ille* have been added by MbK; a similar case can be found in Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 170.29: εἰ ἔστιν ἐναντία τις τῇ κύκλῳ κινήσει, ἢ ἐπ' εὐθείας ἐστὶν ~ *si est contrarius motus aliquis circulari, est ille qui super rectam*.

qui per perfectionem ducitur in actum] This is the only passage known to us where MbK uses the phrase *per perfectionem*. The corresponding Greek is, alas, far from transparent. (i) One

prima facie attractive option is to regard *perfectionem* as a translation of a form of τελείωσις. If this interpretation is correct, the phrase κατὰ τελείωσιν has much better credentials (cf. Asp., *In EN*, p. 147.6 and Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 272.1) than e.g. ^{+τῆ+} τελειώσει or διὰ ^{+τῆς+} τελειώσεως (for *per* ~ κατὰ + acc. cf. the references in the *Greek Latin Index* of Vuillemin-Diem-Steel's edition of MbK's translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*), but it remains rather rare. The same objection tells against διὰ τὴν τελείωσιν, suggested by an anonymous referee and (to our knowledge) attested nowhere else in the commentators. (ii) Another option, adopted here with some hesitation, is to view *per perfectionem* as a translation for διὰ ^{+τοῦ+} τελείου (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 38.25: διὰ τοῦ τελείου ~ *ex perfectione*) und to understand: 'by/through the perfect [intellect]' (the preposition διὰ is used in a similar context by Ammon., *In Porph.*, p. 104.14-15: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν ἄγεται εἰς ἐνέργειαν διὰ τινος ἐνεργεία τοιούτου ὄντος; the preposition ὑπό would also be possible but is rarely translated as *per* [see, however, Alex., *Fat.*, p. 201.26 and 209.10-11]). One might object that the phrase 'the perfect intellect' is reserved for the divine intellect (cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 126.20-21: λαμβάνει δὲ τὸν κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὸν τέλειον νοῦν τὸν ἐν τοῖς θείοις, οὐ τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν), and Philoponus holds that the actualization of the human intellect is performed by another human intellect (cf. *De Int.*, p. 49.44-54). But τέλειος is also used in a generic way to describe the intellect in actuality tout court (cf. e.g. Them., *In De An.*, p. 98.29-30: καὶ τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς νοῦ τελειοῦσθαι τελείου ὄντος ἤδη καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐχὶ δυνάμει), and it would be even more plausible to assume this generic meaning here if the original Greek text read τελείου or του τελείου rather than τοῦ τελείου. (iii) Lastly, the text rendered as *per perfectionem* may be regarded as a corruption of some other expression, for example τελειωθείς (if MbK read τελειώσει); if so, one could consider writing ὁ τελειωθείς <καὶ> ἀχθεις εἰς ἐνέργειαν. – While reflecting on the various possibilities of interpreting *per perfectionem*, we wondered whether the two instances of *dum perficitur* to be found later (cf. *De Int.*, 45.54-55: *dum perficitur enim qui potentia fit actu* and 47.8: *dum perficitur qui potentia fieri actu*) might shed light on our present passage; unfortunately, however, the retroversion of this phrase is not straightforward, either.

non enim utique] Cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 31.21, 71.5-6, 102.8: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ~ *non enim utique*.

quod nunquam perducitur in actum g : *nunquam ductum in actum* G] Cf. Simp., *In Phys.*, p. 141.34-35: δόξει γὰρ μάτην ἔχειν τὸ δυνάμει, ὃ μὴ ἐκβαίνει μηδέποτε εἰς ἐνέργειαν and Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 240.24-25: τὸ δὲ εἰς ἐνέργειαν μὲν οὐδέποτε ἀχθησόμενον ~ *hoc autem ad actum quidem nunquam ducendum*. The latter passage suggests that *ductum* translates a future participle; this is indeed perfectly possible (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 420.32-33: τὸ ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἐπαχθησόμενον ~ *quod consequenter autem subiunctum est*). Moreover, MbK's choice of *perducere*, a verb which is only rarely used by MbK, seems to indicate that MbK found in his manuscript a form of προάγειν rather than ἄγειν (cf. Arist., *Rh.* 1355 b 13: προαγαγεῖν ~ *perducere* and Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 305.25: προάγουσαι αὐτάς εἰς ἐνέργειαν ~ *producentes ipsos in actum*; Ammon., *In Porph.*, p. 102.7-8: μὴ προαχθὲν εἰς ἐνέργειαν; Phlp., *Aet.*, p. 132.14 Rabe: μηδέποτε εἰς ἐνέργειαν προαγόμενον).

hunc autem [autem G : om. g] *ait separatum esse*] There are two general ways to interpret the argument of which this is one of the two (explicit) premisses. (i) If *hunc* refers to *actum* and *hunc autem ait separatum esse* translates ταύτην δὲ φησι χωριστὴν εἶναι, the argument runs like this: (P¹) The intellect in us is brought to actuality. (P²) The actuality to which the intellect in us is brought is separate. (P³) If the actuality to which X is brought is separate, X is itself separate (tacit premise). Hence: (K) The intellect in us is separate. This type of argument is common in Neoplatonist thought (cf. e.g. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 16.2-10), yet

its conclusion is not exactly that which one would expect here; the context rather suggests that Philoponus wants to demonstrate that it is the intellect in us which Aristotle says in *De An.* 430 a 17 is separate (οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἀμιγῆς). This brings us to the second possible interpretation of the argument, which underlies the translations by Charlton⁴⁹ and Schramm⁵⁰ and takes *hunc* to refer to some sort of intellect: (ii) (P^{1*}) It is the intellect in us which is brought to actuality. (P^{2*}) The intellect which Aristotle says in *De An.* 430a17 is separate is no other intellect than that which is brought to actuality. (An argument for this premise can be found e.g. in Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 536.7-19.)⁵¹ Hence: (K*) It is the intellect in us which Aristotle says in *De An.* 430 a 17 is separate. Since the conclusion announced in 137.71-78 is captured better by (K*) than by (K), interpretation (ii) is more likely to be correct. But it suffers from the problem that it must ascribe to the pronoun τοῦτον (~ *hunc*) the meaning ‘the intellect which is brought to actuality’ despite the fact that the preceding text lacks a term referring to this kind of intellect (unless one is willing to elicit the desired meaning of τοῦτον from εἰ δὲ ἄγεται εἰς ἐνέργειαν [~ *si autem ducitur ad actum*]; yet the subject to be supplied here is ‘the intellect in us’, and if τοῦτον were to refer to the intellect in us, the words translated as *hunc autem ait separatum esse* would express the same proposition as the conclusion translated as *eum ergo qui in nobis dicit separatum esse*). The easiest way to tackle this problem is the assumption that Philoponus wrote ὃν δὴ φησι χωριστὸν εἶναι and that, due to an error of his Greek manuscript, Mbkg read τόνδε for ὃν δὴ, whereas Mbkg read τὸν δὲ.

xi. 137.89-138.4 (= 5.92-98)

Texts

g

[137.89] *Alexander autem suspicatus fuit actu intellectum ab Aristotele dici conditorem ex eo quod dicit Philosophus ipsum omnia facere. Sed qualiter hoc dictum facere.*

G

[137.90] *Suspiciatus autem fuit Alexander actu intellectum conditorem dici ab Aristotele conditorem ex eo quod dicit Philosophus ipsum omnia facere. Qualiter autem hoc dictum sit ab ipso, cum ad illa venerimus dicemus, ab ipso, quando ibi fuerimus dicemus, ostendentes quod neque omnino concordant ostendentes quod neque totaliter consonant quae ab ipso dicuntur conditori intellectui, quae ab ipso dicuntur conditori intellectui,*

⁴⁹ p. 30: “But if it is brought to actuality, and it is the intellect in actuality which he says is separate, then it is the intellect in us which he says is separate”.

⁵⁰ p. 423: “Wenn es [read “er”, sc. the intellect in us] jedoch in die Verwirklichung überführt wird – es ist jedoch der Geist in der Verwirklichung, von dem er sagt, dass er abgetrennt ist –, dann ist es der Geist in uns, von dem er sagt, dass er abgetrennt ist”.

⁵¹ εὐρίσκομεν γὰρ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην λέγοντα ὅτι ὁ ἐνεργεῖα νοῦς τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ διάφορος παρὰ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα· πρότερον γὰρ ὢν δυνάμει ὕστερον ἐνεργεῖα γέγονεν. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ λέξει φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε θεὸν λέγει νῦν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν νοῦν, ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοκεῖ (ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὐκ ἦν πρότερον δυνάμει, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖα ἐστὶ, πηγή ὢν ἀγαθότητος), οὔτε ὁ δαιμόνιος νοῦς ἢ ὁ ἀγγελικὸς πρότερον δυνάμει ἦν· καὶ τούτους γὰρ τοὺς νοῦς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνεργεῖα βούλεται εἶναι· ὥστε οὖν καὶ ὁ Μαρίνος κακῶς λέγει. ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλωτίνῳ ἐναντιοῦται. εἰ γὰρ κατ’ αὐτὸν αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, οὐκ ἦν πρότερον δυνάμει· ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει ὅτι πρότερον δυνάμει ἦν. δῆλον οὖν ἄρα γέγονεν διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι οὔτε τὸν θεὸν λέγει οὔτε τὸν δαιμόνιον ἢ τὸν ἀγγελικὸν οὔτε τῶν αἰεὶ ἐνεργούντων νοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος.

*et hoc quod*⁵² *dicitur de actu intellectu: qualis et hoc: qualis autem pars aut qualiter autem particula aut qualiter*⁵³ *intellectus intellectus continebit, difficile est etiam fingere, continebit, difficile est et fingere, quomodo de intellectu actu hoc dictum ostendens*⁵⁴ *non Aristoteles dicat de divino intellectu? de intellectu divino Aristotelem dicentem.*

R

ὁ δ' Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπόπτευσε τὸν ἐνεργεία νοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγεσθαι τὸν δημιουργικὸν ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν τὸν φιλόσοφον αὐτὸν πάντα ποιεῖν [De An. 430 a 15]. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο εἴρηται αὐτῷ, ἐκεῖσε γενόμενοι ἐροῦμεν δεικνύοντες ὅτι οὐδ' ὅλως συνάδει τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα τῷ δημιουργικῷ νῷ· καὶ τὸ 'ποῖον γὰρ μῶριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι' [De An. 411 b 18-19] περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεία νοῦ τοῦτο λεγόμενον δεικνύσιν⁵⁵ οὐ περὶ τοῦ θείου νοῦ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην λέγοντα.

Notes

suspiciatus fuit ... ex eo quod] Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 185.11: ἄν ... ὑπόπτευσεν ἐκ τοῦ ~ itaque (lg. utique) ... *suspiciatus fuisset ex eo quod* and *In Int.*, p. 7.13: ὑπόπτευσεν ~ *suspiciatus est*. Other candidates for the retroversion of *suspiciatus fuit* are: ὑπένοι (cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 97.9), ὑπέιληφε (Arist., GA 764a12), ὑπελάμβανεν (Arist., GA 777a9). We opted for ὑπόπτευσε because this term is more frequent in Philoponus than the other candidates.

sed qualiter g : qualiter autem G] This variation indicates that *sed* in g stands for δέ. The translation *sed* for δέ is much less frequent than *autem*.

cum ad illa venerimus g : quando ibi fuerimus G] A literal retroversion yields different results for *ad illa* and *ibi*, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα (~ *ad illa*) on the one hand (cf. e.g. Alex., *In Mete.*, p. 74.3: ἐπάνεισι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ὅθεν ἐξέβη τοῦ λόγου ~ *redit iterum ad illa sermonis unde exiit*), and ἐκεῖ (always ~ *ibi*) on the other. Assuming that *cum ... venerimus* and *fuerimus* stand for γενόμενοι, we are led by Philoponus' *usus scribendi* to conjecture ἐκεῖσε γενόμενοι (cf. Phlp., *In Mete.*, p. 8.9: καὶ ταῦτα δείξομεν ἐκεῖσε γινόμενοι and *Op. mund.*, p. 220.12-13 Reichardt: ὡς εἰσόμεθα ἐκεῖσε γενόμενοι; by contrast, we could not find any instances of ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα γενόμενοι/γινόμενοι or ἐκεῖ γενόμενοι/γινόμενοι). It remains difficult, however, to explain why both times MbK opted against his standard translation for ἐκεῖσε, viz. *illuc* (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 36.16; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 149.8). Could the variation *ad illa/ibi* reflect MbK's doubts as to how to translate ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενόμενοι (cf. Phlp., *In Phys.*, p. 749.33)? But this conjecture is not unproblematic, either, since it would have been more natural for MbK to translate ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενόμενοι as *in loco* (or *ad locum*) *venerimus/fuerimus*.

concordant g : consonant G] Both translations are consistent with συνάδει (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 139.13-14: τίνα μᾶλλον τῇ τε τοῦ θεοῦ μεγαλειότητι καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων συνάδειν δοκεῖ ~ *que magis magnitudini dei et nature rerum concordare videantur*; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 21.11-12: αἱ φωναὶ συνάδωσι τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποστάσει ~ *voces sunt consonae subsistentiae rerum*; p. 254.20: συνάδει δὲ τούτοις ~ *Consonat autem his*) and συμφωνεῖ (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 663.18: ταῖς κινήσεσιν οὐ συμφωνεῖ τὰ σχήματα ~ *motibus non consonant figure* and Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 100.29-30: οὗτοι οὐ συμφωνοῦσι πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη ~ *isti non concordant cum Aristotele*).

⁵² *hoc quod* inv. : *quod hoc* To ed.

⁵³ *qualiter* corr. ex G : *qualis* To ed.

⁵⁴ *ostendens* codd. ed. : an *ostendit* (Charlton)? *ostendentes* Mansion (p. 332)

⁵⁵ δεικνύσιν] *ostendens* (~ δεικνύων? ~ δεικνύς?) codd.

quae ab ipso dicuntur] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 297.9: τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα ~ *que ab ipso dicuntur*; *In Cat.*, p. 138.13: τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα ~ *quae ab ipso dicuntur*.

et hoc - de divino intellectu g : et hoc - Aristotelem dicentem G] Even if the translation in g is slightly adapted to that in G by writing *hoc quod dicitur* (instead of *quod hoc dicitur*), there remain two large differences between g and G: (i) the position of *hoc quod dicitur de intellectu actu g / de intellectu actu hoc dictum G* and (ii) the end of the sentence (*quomodo Aristoteles dicat de divino intellectu g / ostendens non de intellectu divino Aristotelem dicentem G*). We believe that Mbkg's convoluted translation reflects the original Greek more faithfully than Mbkg's (as is particularly clear from Mbkg's use of the phrase *Aristotelem dicentem*, on which see below) and that Mbkg, maybe due to difficulties in reading or understanding the Greek text, came up with a rather loose paraphrase. However, if one follows G, it is necessary to correct the word translated as *ostendens*. We propose δεικνυσιν,⁵⁶ taking it as a predicate, the subject being τὸ ποῖον γὰρ μόριον κτλ.⁵⁷ (that the subject to δεικνυσιν does not need to be the name of a person is shown by Procl., *In Tim.* I p. 293.6-9 Diehl: ἔτι τὸ μὴ προσθεῖναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον τὸ σέβας αὐτοῦ τὸ περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἀποδείκνυσι, καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔστιν ὅπη ἀληθές, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον. ὅμως τήν γε τοῦ Πλάτωνος εὐλάβειαν καὶ τοῦτο δεικνυσιν). The pronoun *hoc* (~ τοῦτο) which Mbkg puts before *dictum* seems to be redundant but is in fact very welcome, as τοῦτο takes up the article τὸ (~ *hoc*¹) by which the long intervening quotation is introduced.⁵⁸

qualis autem particula g : qualis autem pars G] As far as Philoponus' extant Greek works are concerned, a TLG search reveals that whenever Philoponus quotes this Aristotelian *dictum*, the quotation contains γὰρ, not δὲ. Turning to the Latin text, it is surprising, then, to find *autem* used in three out of four occurrences of the quotation (5.96, 12.91, 49.61; 114.21 reads *enim*). Two of these three instances (12.91 and 49.61) may be explained by Philoponus' wish to mark a contrast between the preceding and the following statement.⁵⁹ But in the present passage there is nothing to indicate such a motivation. Another remarkable peculiarity of our passage, noticed by Charlton (p. 30 n. 28), is that Mbkg and, following him, Mbkg did not realize that ποῖον ... μόριον is in the accusative, governed by συνέξει. From p. 12.90 on, Mbkg correctly writes *qualem ... partem*.

Aristotelem dicentem G] Cf. for the *accusativus cum participio* τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην λέγοντα in connection with δεικνύει Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 222.5-6: πειρῶνται καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην τοῦτο δεικνύει λέγοντα and Phlp.^b, p. 508.24: καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ λέξει Ἀριστοτέλην λέγοντα δείξομεν.

⁵⁶ "*ostendit* for *ostendens* would improve the grammar" (Charlton, p. 30 n. 29).

⁵⁷ Charlton's translation (p. 30), following a suggestion by K. Verrycken, implies a retroversion of this sort.

⁵⁸ Cf. for this use of τοῦτο R. Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre*, Dritte Auflage in zwei Bänden in neuer Bearbeitung besorgt von B. Gerth. Erster Band, Hahnsche Buchhandlung, Hannover-Leipzig 1898, p. 660: "Hingegen haben die Personalpronomen und die Demonstrativpronomen οὗτος und αὐτός sehr häufig auch zurückweisende Kraft, indem in demselben Satze nach einem vorausgegangenen Substantive oder Substantivpronomen teils der Deutlichkeit wegen, z. B. *wenn zwischen dasselbe und das dazu gehörige Verb ein längerer Zwischensatz getreten ist* [our emphasis], teils des rhetorischen Nachdrucks wegen ein solches Pronomen gesetzt wird, welches das vorausgegangene Substantiv oder Substantivpronomen noch einmal aufnimmt und entweder wieder ins Gedächtnis ruft oder nachdrucksvoll der Aufmerksamkeit vorhält."

⁵⁹ A similar case is Them., *In De An.*, p. 37.34: ποῖον δὲ μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, δύσκολον καὶ πλάσαι ~ *qualem autem particulam aut qualiter intellectus contineat, difficile est etiam fingere*, where Themistius' choice of δὲ is well motivated.

xii. 138.4-17 (= 5.99-4)

Texts

g

[138.4] *Quidam autem alii non aiunt nunc dici ab Aristotele intellectum conditorem, sed quendam alium inferiorem quidem illo, digniorem autem eo qui in nobis, puta angelicum quendam. Veritas autem neque hoc est neque illud, sed quod quidem nos dicebamus: eum qui in nobis perfectum ait⁶⁰ et proprium actum assumentem siquidem ipsum ait esse particulam nostrae animae, ut et litterae supervenientes ostendemus.*

G

[138.5] *Quidam autem alii conditorem intellectum⁶¹ non aiunt nunc dici ab Aristotele, sed quendam alium demissiorem quidem illo, meliorem autem eo qui in nobis, puta angelicum quendam. Veritas autem neque [in]⁶² hoc est neque illud, sed quod nos diximus: eum qui in nobis perfectum dicit[ur]⁶³ et propriam operationem sortitum sive partem ipsum esse dicat nostrae animae, <ut> et verbis supervenientes ostendemus.*

R

Ἄλλοι δέ τινες οὐ φασι νῦν λέγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τὸν δημιουργικὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον, καταδεέστερον μὲν ἐκείνου, κρείττονα δὲ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν, οἷον ἀγγελικόν τινα. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὔτε τοῦτό ἐστιν οὔτε ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ', ὅπερ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν, τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν τελειωθέντα φησὶ καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν ἀπολαβόντα, εἴ γε μῶριον αὐτὸν εἶναι φησὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, ὡς καὶ τῆ λέξει ἐπελθόντες δείξομεν.

Notes

Quidam autem alii] The standard formula is (καὶ) ἄλλοι δέ τινες (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 140.3 [~ *alii autem quidam*], Phlp., *In GC*, p. 282.11, *Aet.*, p. 145.24, 223.18 Rabe), not τινές δὲ ἄλλοι. Yet, since τινές δὲ is frequently used by Philoponus, τινές δὲ ἄλλοι also has a chance of being correct.

Veritas] Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 108.2: τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε ἔχει ~ *Veritas autem ita se habet.*

quod quidem g : quod G] As far as the suffix -περ is concerned, g seems to be more precise than G (cf. also p. 135.14 and 139.54).

dicebamus g : diximus G] Cf. Phlp., *In Apr.*, p. 322.28: ὅπερ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν and for ἐλέγομεν ~ *diximus* Strobel, p. 443.

assumentem g : sortitum G] g seems to have read ἀπολαβόντα, G ἀπολαχόντα. The reading of g is correct, cf. Simp., *In Phys.*, p. 697.25-26: οὐδέπω τελῶς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ εἶδος ἀπείληφε γινόμενον ἔτι, ὅταν δὲ ἀπολάβῃ τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον, τότε καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἀπολαμβάνει τὸ οἰκεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖα τοῦ ὅπερ ἦν δυνάμει τότε ἀπολαμβάνει; Phlp., *In Cat.*, p. 164.16-17: εἰς τελειότητα γὰρ ἄγεται ἡ ὄρασις ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπολαμβάνουσα ἐνέργειαν; *In Phys.*, p. 834.17-19: Τὸ κινούμενον, φησὶν, ἔτι ἐστὶ πρὸς τῷ δυνάμει καὶ οὐπω ἀπέλαβε τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, οἷον τὸ θερμαινόμενον οὐπω ἐστὶ θερμόν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὁδεύει.

siquidem ipsum ait esse particulam g : sive partem ipsum esse dicat G] *siquidem* could stand for εἴπερ, but given the translation in G, it was probably εἴ γε (read as εἴτε by Mbkg), as suggested by Bossier *ap.* Charlton (p. 31 n. 32).

⁶⁰ *ait* corr. : *ā* To (*aut* ed.)

⁶¹ *intellectum* corr. ex g : *quidem* codd. ed.

⁶² *in* del. Bossier

⁶³ *dicit* Bossier : *dicitur* codd. ed.

litterae supervenientes g : *verbis supervenientes* G] Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 165.5: ἐπελθεῖν τῇ ῥήσει ~ *supervenire litterae*; Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 68.32-33: εἰς τὴν λέξιν ... εἰσελθεῖν ~ *ad litteram supervenire*; Phlp., *In GC*, p. 29.2: τούτων οὕτως εἰρημένων τῇ λέξει ἐπέλθωμεν. The use of the plural *verba* for λέξεις is common in MbK (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 132.18: ἀτῇ λέξει ~ *ipsis verbis* and Them., *In De An.*, p. 108.9: τῇ γε λέξει ~ *in verbis*). Another candidate – besides τῇ λέξει ἐπελθόντες – for the retroversion of *litterae/verbis supervenientes* is τὴν λέξιν ἐπιόντες (Philoponus always uses ἐπιόντες with the accusative: τὴν λέξιν or τὸ ῥητόν, cf. Phlp., *In Mete.*, p. 14.38, *In GC*, p. 131.34, *In Phys.*, p. 30.1, Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 145.10, 312.39-313.1).

xiii. 138.18-29 (= 5.5-6.10)

Texts

g

[138.18] *De parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et prudentiat. Per “cognoscit” scit anima et prudentiat. Per “cognoscit” cognoscitivas animae potentias significat, per cognitivas animae potentias significat, per “prudentiat” autem practicas; ad duo enim “prudentiat” autem activas; in duo enim haec potentiae animae reducuntur, scilicet haec potentiae animae dividuntur, scilicet in speculativum et practicum. Prudentia in speculativum et activum. Prudentia enim circa agibilia: hunc enim consuevimus autem circa practica vel agibilia: hoc enim prudentem vocare, qui circa contingentia aliter se consuevimus prudentiam vocare, circa habere bene se habet: haec autem sunt agibilia. contingentia aliter se habere bene se gerere.*

G

R

‘Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ.’
διὰ τοῦ γινώσκει τὰς γνωστικὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις δηλοῦ, διὰ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖ τὰς πρακτικὰς· εἰς δύο γὰρ ταῦτα αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις διήρηνται εἰς τε τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν· ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰώθαμεν φρόνησιν καλεῖν τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν εὖ πράττειν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ πρακτὰ.

Cf. Scholium (in E) διὰ τοῦ γινώσκει τὰς γνωστικὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις δηλοῦ· διὰ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν, τὰς πρακτικὰς· εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις διήρηνται:-

Notes

reducuntur g : *dividuntur* G] Either version is consistent with a plausible reconstruction of the Greek text (cf. for ἀνάγονται Alex., *De An.*, p. 99.18: εἰς δύο δὲ ταῦτα ἀνάγονται αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς and for διήρηνται Phlp., *In Cat.*, p. 4.24-25: ὅτι καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς δύο ταῦτα διήρηνται, εἰς τε τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν). The scholium, however, confirms διήρηνται. How to explain, then, *reducuntur* in g? Is it just a free translation of διήρηνται, or did MbK_g read συνήρηνται? Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 52.25-26: εἰς τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας συναίρειται ~ *in decem praedicamenta reducuntur*.

Prudentia enim circa agibilia g : *prudentia autem circa agibilia* G] The interpretation of *prudentia ... circa agibilia* is obvious: ἡ ... φρόνησις περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ (cf. e.g. Arist., *MM* I, 34.8.3: ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ). The variation *enim* g / *autem* G suggests two candidates for the particle: γὰρ and δὲ – we opted for δὲ, as the remark concerning the objects

of practical reasoning does not offer an explanation or justification of the preceding division of the powers of the soul into theoretical and practical ones. But even so there remains a problem with the text as translated by Mb_k_G: whereas the objects of practical reasoning are specified as ^{+τὰ+} πρακτά, those of theoretical reason are left unspecified. Is this a deliberate move on Philoponus' part? (After all, he places considerable weight on Aristotle's use of φρονεῖ in 429 a 11, taking it to indicate that the discussion focuses here on those cognitive powers which are concerned with ^{+τὰ+} πρακτά [cf. *De Int.*, p. 1.8-12].) Or is it due to the omission of a clause corresponding to ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ ^{+τὰ+} πρακτά, e.g. <ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεωρία περὶ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ψεῦδος> (cf. Ps.-Simp., *In De An.*, p. 295.19-22: ὁ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικὸς οὐδὲ ὄλως κινεῖ ὡς θεωρητικὸς· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ψεῦδος ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πρακτά, ἐν οἷς τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτὸν, πρὸς ἃ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις)?

hunc enim consuevimus prudentem vocare, qui circa contingentia aliter se habere bene se habet: haec autem sunt agibilia g : *hoc enim consuevimus prudentiam vocare, circa contingentia aliter se habere bene se gerere* G] According to both versions, Philoponus is invoking the well-known definition of φρόνησις as successful practical reasoning regarding contingent matters (cf. e.g. Marinus, *Vita Procli* § 21.5-6 (p. 25 Saffrey-Segonds): τὸ φρονεῖν ... τὸ πολιτικόν, τὸ πράττειν εὔ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν). There is, however, a major difference between the two versions, having an impact on the reconstruction of the Greek text. The retroversion of g reads: τοῦτον γὰρ εἰώθαμεν φρόνιμον καλεῖν τὸν περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν εὔ πράττοντα· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ πρακτά, the retroversion of G: τοῦτο γὰρ εἰώθαμεν φρόνησιν καλεῖν τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν εὔ πράττειν. Moreover the last section is missing in G: ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ πρακτά. The version of G (supplementing, however, what is lacking from g: ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ πρακτά) seems to be slightly preferable: after the statement ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ ^{+τὰ+} πρακτά it is explained why this is so ('we are used to call φρόνησις so and so'). However, the retroversion of g yields an almost equally plausible reconstruction of the Greek. How is the variation to be explained? In our view, it is not necessary to assume that Mb_k_g and Mb_k_G read two different Greek versions. If G offers the more literal version (except for the missing clause *haec autem sunt agibilia*, of course), the looser version appearing in g may have been motivated by Mb_k_g's wish to avoid the clumsy juxtaposition of the infinitives *aliter se habere* and *bene se habere* (which, of course, could also have been avoided by a rather drastic modification of the word order: *hoc enim consuevimus vocare prudentiam, bene se habere circa contingentia aliter se habere*). Alternatively, both Mb_k_g and Mb_k_G may have had difficulties in reading the same Greek text and tried to make the best of the situation by translating ad sensum.

xiv. 138.29-139.64 (= 6.10-25)

Texts

g

[138.30] *Notandum autem in his quod neutraliter intellectum nominat partem animae. (Pars in graeco est neutri generis.) Multa enim cum dixisset intermedia de intellectu et masculine ipsum vocasset, ultimo*

G

[138.29] *Notandum autem in his quod neutraliter intellectum nominat partem animae. (Pars in graeco neutri generis est.) Multa enim cum dixisset de intellectu et cum intellectu inducit conclusionem de intellectu inducit dicens: idem autem est quae secundum actum scientia rei; quae autem secundum potentiam,*

tempore prior in unoquoque, totaliter autem tempore prior in uno est, omnino autem neque neque in tempore, sed non quandoque (qu)idem in tempore, sed non quandoque quidem intelligit, quandoque autem non intelligit. intelligit, quandoque autem non intelligit. Separatus autem est solum hoc quod quidem Separatus autem est solum hoc quod vere est, et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum; non est, et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum, adhuc masculine, ut referendo ad intellectum, non adhuc masculine, ut ad intellectum, sed sed neutraliter dicit "hoc morion", id est neutraliter dicens "hoc solum", ad ea quae particula, ad ea quae hic⁶⁴ faciens relationem. hic faciens relationem, dico autem "morion" Dicit igitur partem animae qua cognoscit anima neutraliter, id est partem animae qua cognoscit et partem qua prudentiat, quam quidem solam scit anima et prudentiat, quam⁶⁵ solam (partium animae videlicet) immortalem et (videlicet partium animae) immortalem et perpetuam evidenter pronuntiat; et palam quia perpetuam evidenter enuntiat; et palam quia non utique neque conditorem intellectum neque non utique neque conditorem intellectum alium aliquem meliorem et super nos partem neque alium aliquem digniorem et super nos animae appellaret utique. Planissime igitur partem animae appellabit.⁶⁶ Manifestissime ostensum est quod Aristoteles vult immortalem igitur ostensus est velle immortalem et et perpetuam esse rationalem animam. perpetuam esse rationalem animam.

R

σημειωτέον δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὅτι οὐδετέρως τὸν νοῦν ὀνομάζει 'μόριον' τῆς ψυχῆς. πολλὰ γὰρ μεταξὺ εἰπὼν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ ἀρρενικῶς αὐτὸν καλέσας τελευταῖον ὡς συμπέρασμα περὶ τοῦ νοῦ ἐπάγει λέγων· 'τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίου' [*De An.* 430 a 19-22], οὐκέτι ἀρρενικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐδετέρως λέγων 'τοῦτο μόνον', πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναφοράν, λέγω δὴ 'τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ', ὅπερ 'μόνον' (τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι) 'ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίου' διαρρήδη ἀποφαίνεται· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν οὔτε τὸν δημιουργικὸν νοῦν οὔτε ἄλλον τινὰ κρείττονα καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς 'μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς' προσαγορεύσειεν· σαφέστατα οὖν δέδεικται βούλεσθαι ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίου εἶναι τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν.

Notes

[*Notandum autem*] This is used by MbK for σημειωτέον δὲ (cf. Alex., *In Mete.*, p. 83.6; Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 111.24, 112.5; *In Cat.*, p. 426.10: ~ *Notandum autem*), ἐπιστῆσαι δὲ ἄξιον (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 231.16: ~ *Notandum autem*), and ἀλλ' ἐπιστῆσαι ἄξιον (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 165.6: ~ *Notandum autem*). We propose σημειωτέον δὲ, as this phrase is encountered much more frequently in Philoponus than ἐπιστῆσαι δὲ ἄξιον or ἀλλ' ἐπιστῆσαι ἄξιον. Another candidate for the retroversion of *Notandum autem* is ἐπιστάσεως δὲ ἄξιον (cf. Phlp., *In Apr.*, p. 139.13; *In Phys.*, p. 17.4, 197.30).

[*neutraliter*] The use of *neutraliter* for οὐδετέρως is a unique trait of this passage; in his other translations, MbK uses *neutro modo* to translate οὐδετέρως (cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 339.29, 476.33;

⁶⁴ *hic* ex G : *h*· To (*hoc* ed.)

⁶⁵ *quam* corr. ex g : *quia* codd. ed.

⁶⁶ *appellabit* corr. : *appellavit* codd. ed.

Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 872.24 Steel = p. 872.30 Luna-Segonds). Cf. for οὐδετέρως in the present context Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 541.13–17: ὄρα δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο οὐ περι τοῦ θύραθεν νοῦ λέγει· τὸ γὰρ ‘τοῦτο μόνον’ οὐδετέρως κείμενον πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ῥηθὲν συντάττεται ὅτι μόνιον ψυχῆς [ὡς] εἶναι τὸν νοῦν· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μόνιον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ αἰδιδιον, ὁ δὲ θύραθεν οὐ μόνιον.

multa ... cum dixisset intermedia] Following Bossier's suggestion *ap.* Charlton (p. 31 n. 34), we believe that *intermedia* was omitted by Mbkg rather than added by Mbkg. Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 92.21: πλείονα μεταξύ εἰπῶν ~ *pluribus interpositis*.

masculine] Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 35.31: τὸν μὲν νοῦν ἀρρενικῶς ... λέγειν διέταξαν ~ *intellectum quidem masculine ... dici statuerunt*.

ultimo g : tandem G] We propose τελευταῖον, an adverbial term which is translated by Moerbeke both as *ultimo* (often) and *tandem* (occasionally, cf. e.g. Arist., *Mete.* 353 a 6 and Alex., *In Mete.*, p. 78.32: τὸ τελευταῖον ~ *tandem*).

conclusionem ... inducit] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 232.25: τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐπάγων ~ *conclusionem inducens*; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 141.27: συμπέρασμα ἐπαγαγεῖν ~ *conclusionem inducat*; Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 14.32–33: ἐπάγει τὸ συμπέρασμα ~ *inducit conclusionem*; p. 143.37: ἐπάγει συμπέρασμα ~ *inducit conclusionem*.

idem autem] This translation is consistent both with Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ (the generally received reading of Foerster's branch a, adopted also by Sophon., *In De An.*, p. 125.24) and Τὸ αὐτὸ δέ (CUX, cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 540.14–15 and 557.16–17 [lemmata]: Τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι). We propose to follow the reading of CUX, as Phlp.^a's lemmata usually follow this branch.

unoquoque g : uno G] The reading of g is surprising, as *unusquisque* is Mbkg's standard translation for ἕκαστος, not for εἷς. Mbkg may have ascribed generalizing force to the article τῷ, equating ἐν τῷ ἐνί ('in every single [cognizing entity]', according to this interpretation) τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ.

quod quidem est g : quod vere est G] *quod vere est* is already used by James of Venice in his translation of *De An.* 430 a 23, followed by Mbkg in Them., *In De An.*, p. 101.30–31: χωρισθεῖς δέ ἐστι μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδιδιον ~ *separatus autem est solum hoc quod vere est et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum*. Further instances of *quod vere est* in Mbkg's translations include Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 104.25 and 299.29: ὅπερ ἐστὶ.

ut referendo ad intellectum g : ut ad intellectum G] The only other passage where Moerbeke uses *referendo* suggests that *referendo* is added by Mbkg (cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 160.8–9: οὐχ ἐνικῶς λέγει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ~ *non singulariter dicit quod ad aliquid, sed quod esse (referendo le quod ad esse)*). It may also suggest that the whole phrase *ut referendo ad intellectum* is a gloss introduced by Mbkg to explain ἀρρενικῶς. We cannot exclude, however, that Mbkg, reading ὡς πρὸς τὸν νοῦν in his manuscript, added *referendo* on his first encounter with the text and omitted it afterwards in order to offer a more literal translation.

dicit g : dicens G] A reconstruction of the Greek text based on *dicit* in g would only have a chance of being correct if οὐκέτι (~ *non adhuc*) formed the beginning of a new sentence, marked as such by a particle like δὲ or οὖν. Since both versions lack a particle at this point, we prefer *dicens*, the reading of G, and propose that Mbkg tried to simplify the convoluted syntax by opening a new sentence with *non adhuc ... dicit*.

hoc morion, id est particula g : hoc solum G] This is a striking variation: Mbkg translates τοῦτο μόνιον and explains *id est particula*, whereas Mbkg translates τοῦτο μόνον, which is the correct quotation. However, the variation does not need to be explained by reference to different Greek models. More plausible is the assumption that both Mbkg and Mbkg

read *μόριον* and Mbkg reproduced this reading accurately (even transcribing the Greek word), though without either paying much attention to its meaning or venturing a textual intervention, whereas Mbkg made the obvious correction.

ad ea que hic faciens relationem] Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 389.27: ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα δὲ ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ~ *ulterius* [~ ἐπέκεινα] *autem facientes relationem* and Phlp., *Op. mund.*, p. 298.2-3 Reichardt: ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναφορὰν. For τὰ ἐνταῦθα referring to the present Aristotelian passage, cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 495.15-17: ὡς ἀληθεύειν καὶ τὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ, τὰ ἐκεῖ μὲν ὅτι ὅπου αἰσθησις, πάντως καὶ φαντασία, τὰ ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅπου αἰσθησις ἤδη καὶ φαντασία.

dicit igitur g : dico autem G] The phrases λέγω δὲ and λέγω δὴ are often added when a commentator uses an appositional phrase to explain what is meant by a previous word or remark. In keeping with this usage, the quotation 'τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχή καὶ φρονεῖ' makes excellent sense as an apposition to πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα. Though this interpretation, adopted by Bossier and, following him, Charlton (p. 31 with n. 36), seems to be at odds with *igitur* in g, which may indicate that Mbkg read οὖν or δ' οὖν rather than δὲ or δὴ, it would not be surprising to find *igitur* correspond to δὴ (cf. Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 1044.21 Steel = p. 1044.25 Luna-Segonds). Another possibility is to take *igitur* as translating δ' οὖν, as this particle combination is rendered by Mbkg both as *igitur* and *autem*, and to follow g with λέγει: "Aristotle thus means by 'the part of the soul by which it knows and understands' [that part] which he openly says is alone immortal and eternal" (omitting *neutraliter*, which appears only in G).

partium animae videlicet g : videlicet partium animae G] Cf. for δηλονότι (~ *videlicet*) as indicating an explanatory parenthesis e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 113.22: κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλονότι ~ *secundum substantiam videlicet*.

evidenter pronuntiat] Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 186.17: διαρρήδη ἀποφαίνεται ~ *evidenter pronuntiat*.

utique ... appellaret utique g : utique ... appellabit G] Mbkg's choice of *appellaret* allows two interpretations of the corresponding Greek verb form: (i) as an optative (whether present or aorist) – cf. Strobel, p. 636 on Procl., *De Prov.*, p. 57.14 Boese – or as (ii) a past tense (whether imperfect or aorist) in the indicative. The reading *appellavit*, attested for Mbkg, is in strong favour of (ii) and of the aorist in particular (cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 112.7: καίτοι ἐχρήσατο ἂν αὐτῷ ~ *et quidem usus fuit utique ipso*) – but just one letter needs to be changed (*appellabit* < *appellavit*) for interpretation (i) to come into play again (Mbkg standardly uses the future for the potential optative). Another ambiguity arises from the fact that Mbkg uses *appellare* both for προσαγορεύειν (in most cases) and (ἀπο)καλεῖν (only rarely, cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 230.20: καλεῖν ~ *appellare* and Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 1216.23 Steel = p. 1216.28 Luna-Segonds: ἀποκαλεῖν ~ *appellare*). Whichever interpretation is adopted in each case, it is not easy to decide between one of the resulting possibilities. If *appellavit* is correct, ἐκάλεσε(ν) (cf. e.g. Ascl., *In Metaph.*, p. 88.2-3: διὰ τί δὲ ὅλως παράδειγμα ἐκάλεσεν ἂν τὰς ιδέας) is much more likely than προσηγόρευσε(ν) (there is no TLG result for the combination with ἂν); if *appellabit* is correct, προσαγορεύσειεν is more likely (cf. Arist., *Pol.* 1290 a 38-39: οὐδεὶς ἂν ὀλιγαρχίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ~ *nullus utique oligarchiam appellaret neque talem*), given that Mbkg uses *appellare* much more often for προσαγορεύειν than for καλεῖν. Did Mbkg read προσαγορεύσαι ἂν and therefore add another *utique*?

planissime g : manifestissime G] Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 37.26 and 197.32: σαφέστατα δηλοῖ ~ *manifestissime insinuant*; Procl., *In Prm.*, p. 953.3-4 Steel = p. 953.4 Luna-Segonds: σαφέστατα ... δεδήλωκεν ~ *planissime manifestavit*; p. 1098.2 Steel = p. 1098.2-3 Luna-Segonds: καταμάθωμεν σαφέστατα ~ *addiscamus planissime*.

ostensum est quod Aristoteles vult g : ostensus est velle G] It seems to us that the version of G, which is more succinct and less explicit than that of g, reproduces the underlying Greek more closely. This would be another indication of Mbkg's willingness to depart from the Greek text in order to render it in a more accessible fashion (cf. above on 137.69-71: *quasi sit hoc dubium g : tanquam utique dubitabili existente G*; 138.98-4: *et hoc - de divino intellectu g : et hoc - Aristotelem dicentem G*; 138.26-29: *hunc enim consuevimus prudentem vocare, qui circa contingentia aliter se habere bene se habet g : hoc enim consuevimus prudentiam vocare, circa contingentia aliter se habere bene se gerere G*; 139.49: *dicit g : dicens G*).

xv. 139.65-140.88 (= 6.26-36)

Texts

g

[139.65] *Sive separata existente, sive non separata secundum magnitudinem sed secundum rationem.*

Differens secundum litterae expositionem. “Separata” enim ait “secundum magnitudinem”, aut, ut videtur dicere Timaeus, quia in Timaeus, quod in alia quidem particula alia quidem particula irascitivum, puta sit irascibilis, puta in corde, in alia autem in corde, in alia autem concupiscitivum, concupiscibilis, scilicet in epate, et rationabilis in altera, puta in cerebro, tanquam sint disgregatae ab invicem partes animae, non unitae; aut igitur sic quod dicitur “secundum magnitudinem”, aut, quod et magis, quod dicitur “secundum magnitudinem” intelligendum pro “magnitudine”, id est⁶⁷ “separatum a corpore et magnitudine”, aut “secundum magnitudinem” pro “secundum substantiam et hypostasim”, ut magnitudines dicuntur ab invicem separari.⁶⁸

R

‘εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε +καί+ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον’.
 διάφορος ἢ τῆς λέξεως ἐξήγησις· ‘χωριστοῦ’ γάρ φησι ‘κατὰ μέγεθος’ ἢ ὡς δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ Τίμαιος, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν μορίῳ τὸ θυμικόν, οἷον ἐν +τῆ+ καρδίᾳ, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, δηλονότι ἐν +τῷ+ ἥπατι, τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν ἐν ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἐν +τῷ+ ἐγκεφάλῳ, ὡς διακεκριμένων +ἀπ’+ ἀλλήλων τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐχ ἠνωμένων· ἢ οὖν οὕτω τὸ ‘κατὰ μέγεθος’ ἢ - ὅπερ καὶ μᾶλλον - τὸ ‘κατὰ μέγεθος’ ἀκουστέον ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘μεγέθους’ τουτέστι ‘χωριστὸν σώματος καὶ μεγέθους’, ἢ τὸ ‘κατὰ μέγεθος’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν’, ὡς τὰ μεγέθη λέγεται ἀλλήλων χωρίζεσθαι [...].

⁶⁷ *id est* corr. : *idem* To ed.

⁶⁸ *separari* corr. ex G : *separatae* To ed.

Cf. Scholium (in E) χωριστοῦ] ἀντὶ τοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν· ὡς τὰ μεγέθη χωρίζεται ἀλλήλων ἢ χωριστὰ κατὰ μέγεθος ὡς ὁ Τίμαιος φησιν· ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

Notes

Differens secundum litterae expositionem g : *Diversa est verbi expositio* G] The syntax of G is clearly preferable, and we think that it was intended by Mbkg, too. He was probably confused by the various occurrences of κατὰ (~ *secundum*) in the preceding and the following sentence. Another, though less plausible, possibility is that the confusion occurred already in the Greek tradition and was reproduced by Mbkg, whereas Mbkg tried to restore the original reading.

ut videtur dicere Timaeus] Cf. Phlp., *Aet.*, p. 428.12 Rabe: ὡς δοκεῖ λέγειν Πλάτων.

irascibilis ... concupiscibilis ... et rationabilis g : *irascitivum ... concupiscitivum ... ratiocinativum autem* G] The reason why Mbkg uses the feminine forms is that he interprets τὸ θυμικόν etc. as standing for τὸ θυμικὸν μόριον, the 'irascible part', etc.

in corde ... in epate ... in cerebro] Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 194.29-32: [...] τὸν Τίμαιον [...] λέγοντα μεμερίσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια, καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν ἰδρῦσθαι ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ, τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἥπατι τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν and p. 237.31-32: ὡς περ ἐδόκει λέγειν καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος λέγων ἐν καρδίᾳ μὲν εἶναι τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐν ἥπατι καὶ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Cf. also Them., *In De An.*, p. 37.4-6: ὡς δόξειεν ἂν ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος ἄλλῳ μὲν ἐννοεῖν ἡμᾶς λέγων, ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἄλλῳ δὲ θυμοῦσθαι, καὶ διοικίζων γε ταῦτα τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν ἐν κεφαλῇ, τὸ δὲ ἐν καρδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἥπατι ~ *ut videbitur utique facere Timaeus alio quidem dicens nos intelligere, alio autem desiderare, alio autem irasci, et assignans has particulas animae, hanc quidem in capite, hanc autem in corde, hanc autem in epate*; Ps.-Simp., *In De An.*, p. 101.6-8: ὡς δοκεῖ ὁ Τίμαιος τῇ μὲν κεφαλῇ τὸν λόγον, τῇ δὲ καρδίᾳ τὸν θυμόν, τῷ δὲ ἥπατι τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐνοικίζων; Sophon., *In De An.*, p. 38.27-28: ὡς περ ὁ Τίμαιος ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ μὲν ἐγκατοικίζει τὸ λογιστικόν, τῇ δὲ καρδίᾳ τὸ θυμικόν, ἐν ἥπατι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

et rationabilis in altera g : *ratiocinativum autem in alia* G] Both *et* and *autem* are consistent with either καὶ or δὲ. Since *et* is more often used for δὲ than *autem* for καὶ, we propose τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν ἐν ἄλλῳ; it is somewhat surprising, however, to find the word order broken in the third case (one would expect ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ λογιστικόν), and the scholium (καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) seems to confirm καὶ rather than δὲ, viz. καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ λογιστικόν.

quod et magis] Cf. for ὅπερ καὶ μᾶλλον ('which is even more the case') after the second ἢ of the disjunctive phrase ἢ ... ἢ ... Phlp., *In APo.*, p. 153.12, 240.6, *In GC*, p. 27.10, 178.23, Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 77.33, 241.30, 360.5. The first to propose the correct punctuation was A. Mansion (p. 332).

quod dicitur g (om. G)] *quod dicitur* is added by Mbkg and translates the article τὸ; cf. e.g. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 113.15: τὸ δοκεῖ ~ *quod dicitur* 'videtur'; Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 80.35: τὸ εἰ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχει ~ *quod dicitur* 'si existit aliquid vel non existit'; p. 35.29-31: τὸ μεστὰ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυαί, πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί ~ *quod dicitur*: 'plena autem Jove omnes quidem scientiae, omnes autem hominum plateae'.

separatum a corpore et magnitudine g : *separata a corpore et magnitudine* G] This is an explanation of the underlined part of the Aristotelian quotation εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος, taking it to mean χωριστοῦ ὄντος ... [sc. τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἢ ψυχῇ καὶ φρονεῖ] (τοῦ) σώματος καὶ μεγέθους. Did Philoponus

use for his explanatory remark the genitive in accordance with the Aristotelian wording, or did he choose the nominative form χωριστόν? The latter retroversion seems to find support in Mbkg's choice of the nominative *separatum*, while Mbkg's translation *separata* – correctly connecting χωριστοῦ or χωριστόν with its subject μορίου or μόριον (*particula, pars*) – is ambiguous between the nominative and the ablative and thus compatible with either interpretation.

secundum substantiam et hypostasim g : secundum essentiam et hypostasim G] Since the use of καθ' ὑπόστασιν is much more common than that of κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν (which latter, unlike καθ' ὑπόστασιν, is never found in Philoponus), our retroversion departs from the scholium in omitting the article τὴν before ὑπόστασιν.

xvi. 6.36–7.51

Texts

G

[...] *quod idem est cum secundo, hoc est substantiam separatam habere⁶⁹ a corpore et magnitudine. Utrum igitur, ait, sit separatus sic intellectus aut sic quidem nullatenus, sola autem ratione est separatus, hoc est sola intelligentia et definitione sicut tactivum a secundum locum motivo ratione sola separatur, magnitudine autem non. Hoc igitur problematum primum: utrum essentia separatus sit intellectus aut ratione sola. Non ut in ordine autem problema<tis>⁷⁰ hoc produxit, propter quod et videntur duo esse problemata post hoc. Hoc tamen non ut unum problema protulit sed ut in divisione: de parte enim animae, ait, qua cognoscit et prudentiat, sive separata sit haec sive non. Deinde iam quae sint quae quaeruntur de parte hac inducit: considerandum enim, ait, quam habet differentiam ad reliquas, et quomodo fit⁷¹ intelligere. Reliqua duo problemata: quam differentiam habeat intellectus ad sensum aut etiam simpliciter rationales potentiae ad seipsas, et quomodo fit⁷² intelligere.*

R

[...] ὅπερ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ δευτέρῳ, τουτέστι τὴν οὐσίαν χωριστὴν ἔχειν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους. πότερον οὖν, φησίν, ἔστιν⁺ χωριστός οὕτως ὁ νοῦς ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδαμῶς, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἔστι⁺ χωριστός, τουτέστι μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ τῷ ὀρισμῷ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀπτικόν τοῦ κατὰ τόπον κινητικοῦ τῷ λόγῳ μόνῳ χωρίζεται, μεγέθει δ' οὐ. τοῦτο οὖν τῶν προβλημάτων τὸ πρῶτον, πότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ χωριστός ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς ἢ τῷ λόγῳ μόνῳ· οὐχ ὡς ἐν τάξει δὲ προβλήματος τοῦτο προήγαγε - διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ δύο εἶναι τὰ προβλήματα ἑκάστη μετὰ τοῦτο - τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ ὡς ἐν πρόβλημα προήνεγκεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν διαίρεσει· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς, φησίν, ὃ γινώσκει τε καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος τούτου εἴτε ἑκάστη⁺ μή· εἴτα λοιπὸν τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ζητούμενα περὶ τούτου τοῦ μορίου ἐπάγει· σκεπτέον γάρ, φησί, τίς ἔχει διαφορὰν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν, τὰ λοιπὰ δύο προβλήματα· τίνα διαφορὰν ἔχει ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς αἰ λογικαὶ δυνάμεις πρὸς ἑαυτάς, καὶ πῶς γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

⁶⁹ *habere* corr. : *habens* codd. ed.

⁷⁰ *problema<tis>* corr. : *problema* codd. ed.

⁷¹ *fit* corr. : *sit* codd. ed.

⁷² *fit* corr. : *sit* codd. ed.

Notes

hoc est substantiam separatam habere [habens codd.] a corpore et magnitudine] The transmitted text could be interpreted as analogous to 6.34: *hoc est 'separata a corpore et magnitudine'*, with *substantiam separatam habens* playing the same syntactic role as *separata* (for which see above). It is easier, however, to restore an exegetical infinitive explaining ὁπερ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ δευτέρῳ (~ *quod idem est cum secundo*).

sic quidem nullatenus] Cf. Simp., *In Cat.*, p. 172.20-21: τοῦτο δὲ ὑποστάσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς ~ *hoc autem hypostasi quidem nullatenus*; p. 279.34: ἐν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὐδαμῶς θεωρεῖται ~ *in substantia quidem nullatenus considerantur*.

sola autem ratione] μόνῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ? τῷ δὲ λόγῳ μόνῳ? Cf. Them., *In De An.*, p. 97.5-7: ὡς οὖν ταῦτα τῷ λόγῳ χωρίζεσθαι μόνῳ δύναται, καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑποσταίη, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς χωρίζειν αὐτὰ τῷ λόγῳ μόνῳ ἐπιχειρεῖ ~ *sicut igitur haec ratione sola separari possunt, per se autem non utique subsistunt, ita et intellectus separare ipsa sola ratione conatur*.

sola intelligentia] Cf. Phlp.^b, *In De An.*, p. 520.32-33: μόνῃ μὲν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ χωριστός ἐστιν, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. For *intelligentia* translating ἐπίνοια see Them., *In De An.*, p. 120.19: ἄντικρυς ἐπίνοιαν ἡμετέραν ποιῶν τὸν χρόνον ~ *faciens tempus econtra intelligentiam nostram*.

tactivum a secundum locum motivo] Cf. Phlp.^a, *In De An.*, p. 238.23-24: τῆς ἀπτικῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήτικῆς.

non ut in ordine autem problema hoc produxit] Philoponus' point here is not that the first *problema* is misplaced (*non ut in ordine*) but rather that it is not explicitly formulated as a *problema*. Therefore we suggest reading *problema<tis>* or understanding προβλήμα<τος>, so that the whole sentence runs as follows: οὐχ ὡς ἐν προβλήματος δὲ τάξει τοῦτο προήγαγεν or οὐχ ὡς ἐν τάξει δὲ προβλήματος τοῦτο προήγαγεν. Cf. Ammon., *In Int.*, p. 203.5: *quasi in corollarii ordine apponit* ~ ὡς ἐν πορίσματος τάξει προστίθησιν. Many instances of phrases of the type ὡς ἐν τάξει + genitive can be found, most notably the phrase ὡς ἐν ὕλης τάξει.

ut in divisione] Cf. Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 42.21: ὡς ἐν διαίρεσει ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα.

deinde iam] Cf. Simp., *In Cael.*, p. 326.1, 617.22: εἶτα λοιπόν ~ *deinde iam*.

Appendix

Lists of alternative translations and alternative readings

A. Alternative translations

1. Different words/word sequences

- 132.3-4 *non separata* g : *inseparabili* [lg. *non separabili?*] G - μὴ χωριστοῦ
132.7 *qualiter quidem* g : *quomodo quandoque* G - πῶς ποτέ
132.11 *et ut simpliciter dicatur* g : *ut simpliciter autem dicatur* G - καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν
133.14 *estimatione* g : *existimatione* G - ὑπολήψεως
133.15-16 *ratiocinativo* g : *meditativo* G - τοῦ διανοητικοῦ
133.24 *versatur* g : *negotiat* G - ἔχει (?)
133.28 *separabilis* g : *separata* G - χωριστή
133.31-32 *distinxerit* g : *discreverit* G - διέκρινε
133.36 *postquam* g : *cum* G
133.40 *disgregationem* g : *segregationem* G - διάκρισιν
133.42 *distinxit* g : *discrevit* G - διέκρινε
133.43 *eo* g : *per hoc* G - τῷ
133.43-44 *consideret(ur)* g : *videtur* G - θεωρεῖσθαι? ὁρᾶσθαι?
133.46-47 *distinctionem* g : *discretionem* G - τὴν διάκρισιν
133.47-48 *etiam* g : *et* G - καὶ
133.48-49 *utrisque* g : *ambabus* G - ἀμφοτέρων
133.48-49 *distinguit* g : *discernit* G - διακρίνει
133.49-51 *convenire* g : *communicare* G - κοινωνεῖν
133.52-53 *distinctionem* g : *discretionem* G - διάκρισιν
133.53-134.54 *in his* g : *post haec* [haec CV : hoc T] G - ἐπὶ τούτοις
133.53-134.54 *qualiter* g : *quomodo* G - πῶς
134.57-58 *disserens* g : *disputans* G - διαλεγόμενος
134.58 *disseruit* g : *disputavit* G - διελέχθη
134.60 *disserit* g : *disputat* [CV : disputavit T] G - διαλέγεται
134.62 *ignotiora* g : *magis ignota* G - ἀγνωστότερα
134.63 *existunt* g : *sunt* G - ἔστι
134.65 *iterum* g : *rursum* G - πάλιν
134.67 *ait* g : *dicit* G - φησιν
134.75-76 *consubstantialis* g : *homousion* G - ὁμοούσιον
134.78-79 *ait quia* [an dixit quod cum P?] g : *dixit quod* G - εἶπεν ὅτι
134.81 *sicut* g : *quemadmodum* G - καθάπερ
134.82 *sic* g : *ita* G - οὕτως
134.83-84 *tanquam* g : *sicut* G - ὡς
135.88-89 *quod ... provenit* g : *factum* G - γινόμενον
135.93 *quod* g : *quia* G - ὅτι
135.94 *consubstantialis* g : *homousia* G - ὁμοούσιον
135.96-97 *quod* g : *quia* G - ὅτι
135.3 *quia* g : *quod* G - ὅτι
135.3 *consubstantialis* g : *homousios* G - ὁμοούσιος
135.12 *substantia* g : *essentia* G - τῆ οὐσίᾳ
136.17-18 *et* g : *autem* G - δὲ
136.19 *geometra* g : *geometer* G - ὁ ... γεωμέτρης

- 136.24-25 *praeter istos* g : *ab his* G - παρά τούτους
 136.30 *etiam* g : *et* G - και
 136.30 *quando* g : *cum* G - ὅταν
 136.31-33 *propterea quod* g : *quia* G - διότι
 136.33-34 *ad* g : *in* G - ἐπὶ
 136.37-38 *consonantem* g : *consonum* G - συμφωνοῦντα? σύμφωνον?
 136.40-41 *pronuntiat* g : *enuntiat* G - ἀποφάνεται
 136.40-42 *particulam* g : *partem* G - τὸ μέρος
 136.44-45 *resistere* g : *contrariari* G - ἀντιβλέψαι/-βλέπειν? ἀντιτάττεσθαι/-τάξασθαι?
 136.48 *suam* g : *propriam* G - οἰκείαν? ἰδίαν?
 136.49 *ait* g : *dicit* G - φησὶν
 136.50-51 *quia* g : *quod* G - ὅτι
 136.54 *demonstrare* g : *ostendere* G - ⁺ἀπο⁺δεῖξαι? ⁺ἀπο⁺δεικνύειν?
 136.56 *tanquam* g : *quod* G - ὡς
 137.57 *praecedentibus* g : *prioribus* G - τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν? τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν?
 137.58-59 *quia* g : *quod* G - ὅτι
 137.65 *intus factus* g : *ingenitus* G - ἐγγινόμενος
 137.66-67 *vero* g : *autem* G - δὲ
 137.69-71 *quasi sit hoc dubium* g : *tanquam utique dubitabili existente* G - ὡς ἂν ἀπόρου ὄντος
 137.73-75 *immixtum* g : *non mixtum* G - ἀμιγῆ
 137.78-79 *Aristotelis* g : *Aristotelicis* G - Ἀριστοτελικῶν
 137.78-80 *etiam* g : *autem* G - δὲ
 137.79-81 *intellectus* g : *sensus* G - τῆς ἐννοίας
 137.82-83 *iste* g : *ille* G
 137.85-87 *quod ... perducitur* g : *ductum* G - ⁺προ⁺αχθησόμενον? ⁺προ⁺αχθὲν?
 137.87-88 *ad* g : *in* G - εἰς
 137.93-95 *sed* g : *autem* G - δὲ
 137.95-96 *cum ad illa venerimus* g : *quando ibi fuerimus* G - ἐκεῖσε γενόμενοι
 137.96-138.98 *omnino* g : *totaliter* G - ὅλως
 137.97-138.98 *concordant* g : *consonant* G - συνάδει? συμφωνεῖ?
 138.00 *particula* g : *pars* G - μέρος
 138.1-2 *et* g : *etiam* G - και
 138.7-8 *inferiorem* g : *demissioem* G - καταδεέστερον
 138.7-9 *dignioem* g : *melioem* G - κρείττονα
 138.13-14 *ait* [*ā* To *aut* ed.] g : *dicit* [*dicitur* codd.] G - φησὶ
 138.13-14 *actum* g : *operationem* G - τὴν ... ἐνέργειαν
 138.14-16 *ait* g : *dicat* G - φησι
 138.15 *particulam* g : *partem* G - μέρος
 138.16 *litterae* g : *verbis* G - τῇ λέξει
 138.20 *cognoscitivas* g : *cognitivas* G - γνωστικὰς
 138.22 *practicās* g : *activās* G - πρακτικὰς
 138.22 *ad* [sc. *reducuntur*] g : *in* [sc. *dividuntur*] G - εἰς
 138.25 *practicum* g : *activum* G - τὸ πρακτικόν
 138.26 *agibilia* g : *practica vel agibilia* G - τὰ πρακτὰ
 138.29 *se habet* g : *se gerere* G - πράττειν
 139.35-36 *ultimo* g : *tandem* G - τελευταῖον
 139.35-36 *tanquam* g : *veluti* G - ὡς
 139.40-41 *unoquoque* g : *uno* G - ἐν τῷ ἐνί
 139.40-41 *totaliter* g : *omnino* G - ὅλως
 139.45-46 *quod quidem* g : *quod vere* G - ὅπερ
 139.56 *pronuntiat* g : *enuntiat* G - ἀποφάνεται
 139.58-59 *melioem* g : *dignioem* G - κρείττονα

- 139.60-61 *planissime* g : *manifestissime* G - σαφέστατα
139.68 *differens* g : *diversa* G - διάφορος
139.68 *litterae* g : *verbi* G - τῆς λέξεως
140.71 *quod* g : *quia* G - ὅτι
140.72-73 *irascibilis* g : *irascitivum* G - τὸ θυμικόν
140.73-74 *concupiscibilis* g : *concupiscitivum* G - τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν
140.74-75 *rationalis* g : *ratiocinativum* G - τὸ λογιστικόν
140.75 *et* g : *autem* G - δὲ? καὶ?
140.76-77 *disgregatae* g : *discretae* G - διακεκριμένων
140.82-83 *id est* [*idem* To] g : *hoc est* G - τουτέστι
140.85-86 *substantiam* g : *essentiam* G - οὐσίαν

2. Same word, different inflections

- 133.28 *sit* g : *est* G - ἔστιν
133.36-37 [*postquam* ...] *dixerit* g : [*cum*] *dixisset* G - εἰπὼν
133.37-38 *ostendat* g : *ostenderet* G - δείξει
135.86-87 *solis* ... *dicti* g : [*de* ...] *dicto sole* G - τοῦ ... φερομένου ἡλίου
135.94 *esset* g : *sit* G - ἔστι? Or rather no Greek counterpart?
135.94 *haec* g : *hoc* G - τὸ
135.99 *diceremus* g : *dicemus* G - εἴπομεν
135.8 *diceret* g : *dicat* G - λέγοι
136.22-23 *in promptu habentem* g : *in promptu habens* G - προχειριζόμενον
136.30-31 [*quando* ...] *fit* g : [*cum* ...] *fiat* G - γένηται
136.55-56 *dubitabit* [*dubitav'* To] g : *dubitaret* G - ἀπορήσειεν
137.62-63 *suspiciabitur* g : *suspicaretur* G - ὑποπτεύσειεν? ὑπονοήσοι? ὑπονοήσειεν?
137.63-64 *dicit* g : *diceret* G - λέγει
137.82-83 *est* g : *sit* G - ἔστιν
138.11-12 *dicebamus* g : *diximus* G - ἐλέγομεν
138.13-14 *proprium* [sc. *actum*] g : *propriam* [sc. *operationem*] G - οἰκείαν
139.60 *appellaret* g : *appellabit* [*appellavit* codd.] G - προσαγορεύσειεν
140.82-83 *separatum* g : *separata* G - χωριστόν

3. Deliberate additions or omissions by the translator

- 133.18-19 *intellectu* add. g
133.23 *est* add. g
133.30 *in* add. G
133.45 *et* g : om. G - καὶ
133.45 *videtur* add. g
134.56 *et* g : om. G - καὶ
134.76 *est* add. G [*est etiam* g? (vide P)]
135.86 *et* g : om. G - καὶ
135.87 *de* add. G
135.88 *solare* add. g
135.1 *existentis* add. G
135.2 *qui* G : om. g - ὁ
135.13 *quidem* add. g
135.14 *quidem* g : om. G - -περ
136.54 *est* add. g
137.82 *est* add. G
138.11 *quidem* g : om. G - -περ
139.34 *cum* add. G

- 139.48 *referendo* add. g (an *ut referendo ad intellectum* add. g et *ut ad intellectum* add. G?)
 139.51 *morion ... id est* add. G
 139.54 *quidem* g : om. G - -περ
 139.68 *est* add. G
 140.72 *sit* add. g
 140.79 *quod dicitur* g : om. G - τὸ
 140.81 *quod dicitur* g : om. G - τὸ

4. Different word order

Two preliminary notes:

By '(~ R)' we indicate that the word order of the reconstructed Greek text agrees with that of the immediately preceding quotation from g or G.

In addition to that, we indicate by '(~ R*)' that the word order is confirmed by one of the Greek sources (quotation from Aristotle, scholia, Sophonias).

- 132.9-10 *anima vegetativa* g : *vegetativa anima* G (~ R)
 133.17-18 *secundum habitu(m) vocato* [+ *intellectu*] g (~ R) : *vocato secundum habitum* G
 133.26-27 *in his inquirere* g : *inquirere in his* G (~ R)
 133.36-37 *postquam prius ... dixerit* g : *prius cum dixisset* G (~ R)
 133.43-44 *non in omnibus consideret(ur) intellectus* g (~ R) : *intellectus non videtur in omnibus* G
 133.51-52 *in ipsis his* g (~ R) : *in his ipsis* G
 134.57 *animae potentiis* g (~ R) : *potentiis animae* G
 134.65-66 *ab evidentioribus eadem intentione* g : *eadem intentione ab evidentioribus* G (~ R)
 134.79 *animae genus alterum* g (~ R*) : *alterum genus animae* G
 134.82-83 *partem totius animae rationalem* g (~ R*) : *totius animae rationalem ... partem* G
 135.88-89 *quod in aere provenit* g (~ R*) : *factum in aere* G
 135.00-1 *huius aequivocae vocis "Aiax"* g : *huius vocis "Aiax" aequivocae* [+ *existentis*] G
 135.11-12 *ait Aristoteles esse intellectum* g (~ R) : *intellectum ait esse Aristoteles* G
 136.26-27 *actus sine potentia* g : *sine potentia actus* G (~ R*)
 136.40-42 *pronuntiat separatam esse hanc particulam animae* g (~ R) : *separatam esse hanc partem animae enuntiat* G
 136.44-45 *his quae hic dicuntur resistere* g (~ R) : *contrariari his quae hic dicuntur* G
 136.46 *esse* [et codd.] *putans* g : *putans esse* G (~ R)
 137.57-58 *de intellectu dixit ipso* g (~ R) : *de ipso intellectu dixit* G
 137.67-68 *maxime corrumpetur utique* g (~ R*) : *maxime utique corrumpetur* G
 137.71-72 *actu intellectum* g (~ R) : *intellectum actu* G
 137.74-75 *potentia in nobis* g : *in nobis potentia* G (~ R)
 137.80-83 *est non dicere quod ... iste est* g (~ R) : *est dicere quod ... non sit ille* G
 137.82 *iste est* g : *sit ille* G
 137.89-90 *Alexander autem suspicatus fuit actu intellectum ab Aristotele dici conditorem* g (~ R) : *Suspicatus autem fuit Alexander actu intellectum conditorem dici ab Aristotele* G
 138.98-3 *hoc quod* [inv. : *quod hoc To*] *dicitur de actu intellectu ... quomodo Aristoteles dicat de divino intellectu* g : *de intellectu actu hoc dictum ostendens non de intellectu divino Aristotelem dicentem* G (~ R)
 138.4-6 *non aiunt nunc dici ab Aristotele intellectum conditorem* g (~ R) : *conditorem intellectum* [quidem codd.] *non aiunt nunc dici ab Aristotele* G
 138.14-15 *ipsum ait esse particulam* g : *partem ipsum esse dicat* G (~ R)
 139.33 *est neutri generis* g : *neutri generis est* G
 139.35 *masculine ipsum* g (~ R) : *ipsum masculine* G
 139.54-55 *partium anime videlicet* g (~ R) : *videlicet partium anime* G
 140.81-83 *intelligendum pro magnitudine* g (~ R) : *pro magnitudine intelligendum* G

B. Alternative readings

1. The reconstructed Greek text agrees with G against g - and vice versa

Two preliminary notes:

In cases where we suppose that Mbkg and Mbkg translate different Greek readings, we give the alternative Greek reading in square brackets: '[~ λέξις]'. By 'different Greek readings' we do not mean variants in Mbkg's Greek exemplar but different readings in Mbkg's mind, leaving it open how Mbkg - and vice versa Mbkg - came to translate the reading which (we think) is more likely to be correct, whether based on palaeographical evidence or by conjecture.

Accidental omissions and additions are given in a separate list, as it is difficult to determine whether they originated in g/G or the transmission of g/G (see below B.2.).

1a. The reconstructed Greek text agrees with G against g

133.19 *palam* [~ δηλον] g : *insinuat* G - δηλοῦ

133.52-53 *primo* [~ πρώτον] g : *tertio* G - τρίτον

134.58-59 *quando* [~ ὅτε] g *secundum* To [at vide P: *quoniam*] : *quia* G - ὅτι

135.90 *inferiorem* To P [an *illuminatum* g?] : *illuminatum* G - πεφωτισμένον? φωτιζόμενον? καταφωτιζόμενον?

135.92-93 *vellemus dicere* g : *hoc dicimus* G - τοῦτο φαμεν? τοῦτο λέγομεν?

135.6 *idem* [~ αὐτὸ] g *secundum* To [at vide P: *ipsum*] : *ipsum* G - αὐτὸ

135.11 *primum* [~ πρώτον] g : *triplicem* G - τριπλὸν

136.33-34 *transit* To [an *transitivum* g?] : *transitivum* G - μεταβατικὴν

136.35-37 *autem* [~ δὲ] g : *itaque* G - δὴ

138.98-3 *hoc quod* [inv. : *quod hoc* To] *dicitur de actu intellectu ... quomodo Aristoteles dicat de divino intellectu* g : *hoc ... de intellectu actu hoc dictum ostendens* [lg. *ostendit?*] *non de intellectu divino Aristotelem dicentem* G - τὸ ... περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεία νοῦ τοῦτο λεγόμενον δείκνυσιν οὐ περὶ τοῦ θείου νοῦ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην λέγοντα

138.23-24 *reducuntur* [~ συνήρηνται?] g : *dividuntur* G - διήρηνται

138.25 *enim* To P [an *autem* g?] : *autem* G - δὲ

138.26-29: *hunc ... prudentem ... qui ... habet* g : *hoc ... prudentiam ... gerere* G - τοῦτο ... φρόνησιν ... τὸ ... εἶπράττειν

139.49 *dicit* g : *dicens* G - λέγων

139.49 *morion*, *id est particula* [~ μόριον] g : *solum* G - μόνον

139.50-51 *dicit* [~ λέγει?] g : *dico* G - λέγω

139.61-62 *ostensum est quod Aristoteles vult* g : *ostensus est velle* G - δέδεικται βούλεσθαι

139.68-69 *secundum litterae expositionem* g : *verbi expositio* G - ἡ τῆς λέξεως ἐξήγησις

1b. The reconstructed Greek text agrees with g against G

133.36-37 *ipsorum* [~ αὐτῶν] codd._G [an *ipsius* G?] : *ipsius* g - αὐτοῦ

133.44-45 *sicut* codd._G [an *si ut* G? ~ εἰ ὡς] : *in quibus* g - ἐν οἷς

133.49 *ipsa* [~ αὐτὰ] codd._G [an *ipsa* G?] : *ipsa* g - αὐτὰ

138.14-15 *sortitum* [~ ἀπολαχόντα] G : *assumentem* g - ἀπολαβόντα

138.14-15 *sive* [~ εἴτε] G : *siquidem* g - εἴ γε

139.50-51 *autem* [~ δὲ] G : *igitur* g - δὴ

2. Accidental omissions and additions (whether in g/G or in the transmission of g/G)

Preliminary note: Since the source of the omission or addition is often difficult to determine - was it Mbkg himself or a later copyist? -, we just quote the omissions and additions without attributing them either to g/G itself or the transmission of g/G. '<' stands for 'omitted', '+' for 'added'.

2a. Omissions and additions in g or in the transmission of g

- 133.16 < *nunc* - νῦν
 133.26 < *quaedam* - τινα
 133.34 < *inest* - ὑπάρχει
 134.56 < *quidem* - μὲν
 134.83 < *esse* - εἶναι
 136.32 + *aliqua*liter
 137.58 < *Aristoteles* - ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης
 137.59-60 < *non* - οὐ
 137.60-61 < *utique* - ἄν
 137.67 < *utique* - ἄν
 137.74-75 + *potentia*
 137.88 < *autem* - δὲ
 139.53 + *partem qua*

2b. Omissions and additions in G or in the transmission of G

- 133.49 + *in ipsis*
 134.71 < *partis* - τοῦ μορίου
 137.58 < *autem* g - δὲ
 137.72-73 < *et ait ... esse* - καὶ φησι ... εἶναι
 138.11 + *in*
 138.15 < *ut* - ὡς
 138.29 < *haec autem sunt agibilia* - ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ πρακτά
 139.34 < *intermedia* - μεταξὺ
 139.38 < *actum* - ἐνέργειαν
 139.51 + *neutraliter*

3. Errors in the Latin tradition

3a. Errors in the transmission of g

- 133.18 *habitu* To [lg. *habitu* g] : *habitu* G - ἕξις
 133.20 *autem* To [lg. *anima* g] : *anima* G - ἡ ψυχὴ
 133.43-44 *consideret* To [lg. *consideretur* g] : *videtur* G - θεωρεῖσθαι? ὁρᾶσθαι?
 134.66 *fecit* To P [lg. *facit* g] : *facit* G - ποιεῖται
 135.2 *id est* To P [lg. *sicut* g?] : *quasi* G - ὡς
 136.46 *et* To [lg. *esse* g] : *esse* G - εἶναι
 137.64-65 *corporaliter* To [lg. *totaliter* g] : *totaliter* G - ὅλως
 137.67-68 *corrump' r* To [lg. *corrumpetur* g] : *corrumpetur* G - ἐφθείρετο
 137.88-89 *vero* To [lg. *ergo* g] : *ergo* G - ἄρα
 138.00-1 *qualis* To [lg. *qualiter* g] : *qualiter* G - πῶς
 139.43 *idem* To [lg. *quidem* g] : *quidem* G - μὲν
 139.50 *h' [hoc ?]* To [lg. *hic* g] : *hic* G - ἐνταῦθα
 140.82-83 *idem* To [lg. *id est* g] : *hoc est* G - τουτέστι
 140.88 *separatae* To [lg. *separari* g] : *separari* G - χωρίζεσθαι

3b. Errors in the transmission of G

- 133.35 *no' T ideo* CV [lg. *hic* G] : *hic* g - ἐνταῦθα
 135.4-5 *idem* codd._G [lg. *est idem* G] : *est idem* g - ἐστὶν ὁ αὐτός
 136.25-26 *quidem* VT [lg. *quod* G] : *quod* g - τὸ
 136.35-36 *dicunt* codd._G [lg. *dico* G] : *dico* g - λέγω
 138.5-6 *quidem* codd._G [lg. *intellectum* G] : *intellectum* g - τὸν ... νοῦν
 139.53-54 *quia* codd._G [lg. *quam* G] : *quam* g - ὅπερ
 139.60 *appellavit* codd._G (lg. *appellabit* G) : *appellaret* g - προσαγορεύσειεν

3c. Errors in both traditions

- 132.7 *sit* [lg. *fit*] - γίνεται
 138.13 *ā* To [lg. *ait* g] : *dicit[ur]* G - φησὶ

III. Conclusions

(1) The relationship between g and G

Did Moerbeke for his second version G use his earlier version g, seeking to improve it, or did he start his new version from scratch without looking at his first attempt? Verbeke argued that G could not be a revision of g, as it is difficult to understand why a translator would introduce in his revision so many “modifications anodines” (p. XCIII) such as *ait quia* into *dixit quod*, *iterum* into *rursum*, *sicut* into *quemadmodum*, *praecedentibus* into *prioribus*, etc. According to Verbeke, these ‘unintentional’ variations are better explained if one assumes that MbK translated G without using g.⁷³ Against Verbeke’s supposition one may point to the fact that, apart from some vocabulary differences, changes in word order and other variations we discussed in our text analysis, the two versions are so similar that it is implausible that the same translator would have made the second version without using the first as its substrate: large text portions are identical in both versions. Moreover, we find in both versions singular or less common expressions for Greek terms such as *prudentiare* for *φρονεῖν* (132.2, 133.21, 138.19), *convenientiam* (133.36) for *κοινωνίαν*, *in quibus ... in ipsis* (133.49–52) for *καθ’ ἃ ... καθ’ αὐτὰ*, *eadem intentione* (134.65–66) for *τῇ αὐτῇ τά(σ)ει*, *dictae* (135.85) for *φερομένης* (cf. also 135.87 *dicti g: dicto G*), *Troiano* (135.5) for *Ὀυλέως*, *econtra* (136.39–40) for *ἄντικρυς*, *attrahere* (136.47–48) for *συγκατασπᾶν*, *veritas autem neque hoc* (138.9–11) for *τὸ δὲ ἄληθές οὔτε τοῦτό*, *per perfectionem* (137.82–84) for *διὰ τοῦ τελείου* (?), *neutraliter* (138.30–139.31) for *οὐδετέρως*. As for the so-called ‘nonintentional changes’ in vocabulary, we will see under (2) that many are ‘intentional’. Finally, in the two other cases where we have a twofold version (Arist., *Pol.*; Simp., *In Cael.*), the conclusion of the editors is evident: Moerbeke undoubtedly used his first version in his later version.⁷⁴

(2) Translation style

The most noticeable modifications in the second version are changes in vocabulary (see the above list “A. Alternative translations - 1. Different words/word sequences”). As said, Verbeke sought here an argument against the hypothesis that G is “une correction consciente de la version précédente (*sc. g*)” (XCIII). But one finds similar shifts in vocabulary in the complete version of Simplicius’ *De Caelo* Commentary versus the fragmentary translation⁷⁵ and in the complete translation of the *Politica* versus the incomplete. A similar practice is found in Moerbeke’s revisions of his translations of Aristotle. An explanation for these modifications may be that Moerbeke, throughout the long period he was translating (from around 1260 until his death in 1286), refined his vocabulary and came to prefer certain terms over others. F. Bossier even used the shifting vocabulary as an argument for a chronology of the non-dated translations.⁷⁶ However, Bossier himself had to admit that in many cases there is no linear change in terminology, but a fluctuation whereby a particular term, after having been out of preference, may come back with more frequency later.

⁷³ See Verbeke, pp. XCIII–XCIV. Vuillemin-Diem–Acerbi (above, n. 3) do not question this conclusion (see p. 104).

⁷⁴ “Es kann kein Zweifel darüber bestehen, dass Wilhelm für seine vollständige Politikübersetzung die sog. *translatio imperfecta* benutzt hat, die nach einhelliger Überzeugung aller Forscher ebenfalls von Wilhelm stammt” (B. Schneider, Introduction to the edition of the *Politica*, in preparation).

⁷⁵ See Bossier (above, n. 1), pp. XXXIII–XXXVIII.

⁷⁶ See F. Bossier, “Méthode de traduction et problèmes de chronologie”, in J. Brams – W. Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d’études à l’occasion du 700^e anniversaire de sa mort (1286)*, Leuven U.P., Leuven 1989, pp. 257–94.

A survey of the differences in vocabulary between g and G reveals two main and partially overlapping motivations, semantic considerations on the one hand, and stylistic preferences on the other. Semantic considerations are most clearly visible when MbK is faced with highly ambiguous philosophical terms such as οὐσία (cf. p. 135.12 *substantia* g : *essentia* G, 140.85-86 *substantiam* g : *essentiam* G), ὁμοούσιος (~ *consubstantialis* g, which is three times replaced with the Greek transliteration *homousios* in G⁷⁷), or διανοητικός (cf. p. 133.15-16 *ratiocinativo* g : *meditativo* G with comm. *ad loc.*). Semantics is also in play when MbK tries hard to find a Greek word for which there is no exact Latin synonym. A nice example is the variation p. 136.44-45 *resistere* g : *contrariari* G, which probably reflects MbK's struggle to find a Latin counterpart for ἀντιβλέπειν/ἀντιβλέπειν (or, alternatively, ἀντιτάξασθαι/ἀντιτάττεσθαι). But even more familiar terms like διακρίνω and διάκρισις pose semantic challenges, which explain significant shifts in vocabulary between g and G: *distinctio* (g) is 2x replaced with *discretio* in G, *disgregatio* (g) 1x replaced with *segregatio* in G. In the complete translation of the commentary on III 4-8 in G we find 8x *discretio*, 2x *distinctio*. In MbK's earlier translations *distinctio* is the dominant term; in later translations MbK prefers *discretio* over *distinctio*. Thus, in his last translation (*In Prm.*), we find 2x *distinctio* against 48x *discretio*. Maybe MbK found *discretio*, a term involving a judgment of discrimination (as in the *discretio bonorum et malorum*) more appropriate for διάκρισις than just *distinctio*. The same observation can be made about διακρίνω: *distinguo* (g) is replaced 3x with *discerno* in G; in the whole translation of G *distinguo* is used only once against 17x *discerno*. In later translations his preference goes clearly to *discerno*. Thus, we find in *In Prm.* 4x *distinguo* against 63x *discerno*.

While these changes of vocabulary are likely motivated by semantic considerations, other cases are less conspicuous, falling into a rather vague field between properly semantic reasons and 'merely' stylistic preferences. Take e.g. the translation of διαλέγομαι: *dissero* (g) is 3x replaced with *disputo* in G, and in the translation of the whole commentary on III 4-8 *disputo* is dominant (13x) against *dissero* (1x). In the contemporary translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Anima* one finds *dissero* (2x), no *disputo*. It seems that, contrary to MbK_g's practice, MbK_G's preference is leaning towards *disputo*. In later translations, however, both terms are used without clear predominance of either one (cf. *In Prm.*). Other changes point to a similar ambiguity between semantic and 'merely' stylistic reasons. Why does *pronuntio* in g become 2x *enuntio* in G (whereas all other 8 cases in G are forms of *pronuntio*)? Why is *inferiorem* changed to *demissioem*? Why *melioem* to *dignioem* and vice versa? Why *omnino* to *totaliter* and vice versa? Why *practicus* to *activus* (2x), though *practicus* is used 11 times in the complete translation G (against 3x *activus*)? In 137.66 g has *vero*, which MbK_G changed to *autem*, as usual in MbK, but he left in p. 134.59 *vero* without change. Another interesting example is *particula* (μόριον), which - despite the predominance of *pars* in both g and G - makes a few appearances in g but just one in the corresponding part of G (sc. up to p. 140.87 = 6.36): one may understand that MbK came to dislike this diminutive when talking about the soul:⁷⁸ he replaced it 3x with *pars*, omitted one case (p. 139.50), but left one case unchanged (p. 134.72) and kept it 8x in the whole commentary. Though there seems to be a trend away from *particula*, it is hard to discern consistency, let alone system in the choice of *pars* vs. *particula*.

⁷⁷ It remains difficult to explain why. Maybe Moerbeke found the theologically sounding *consobstantialis* a bit odd in this context. These are the only three cases of *homousios* in Moerbeke's translations. In his translation of *In Prm.*, p. 948.20 Steel [= p. 948.23 Luna-Segonds] he uses again *consobstantialis*, but in an acceptable theological sense: *neque animam diis consobstantialem supponendum* (~ οὔτε ὁμοούσιον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποθετέον τοῖς θεοῖς).

⁷⁸ We are saying 'came to dislike' because in his earlier translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Anima*, MbK uses *particula* 28 times.

In some cases, it seems that Mbk_G wanted to be closer to the Greek as in 137.65 (*intus factus* g : *ingenitus* G ~ ἐγγινόμενος), where the use of *ingenitus*, though a more literal translation, is very confusing as this term is regularly used for ἀγένητος. Another rather unhappy attempt to be more literal is 135.88–89 *quod ... provenit* g : *factum* G for γινόμενον.

At the bottom end of the scale between semantically highly significant and semantically indifferent changes are those cases where the change in vocabulary seems to be nothing but a matter of taste (e.g. *et/etiam* for adverbial καὶ, *ait / dicit* for φησί(ν) [5 times replaced in G, 7 times not]).⁷⁹ Surprising in this context is the variation for καθάπερ in 134.81 *sicut* g : *quemadmodum* G, because it is the only instance of *quemadmodum* in the whole text, whereas *sicut* is found over 150 times.⁸⁰

As far as the order of words is concerned, we can gather from the above list (“1. Alternative translations. 4. Different word order”) that Mbk_g sticks closer to the word order of the Greek, whereas Mbk_G adapted the translation more to Latin style. The explanation of this is quite obvious: Faced with a yet untranslated Greek text, Mbk_g approaches it in a more mechanical fashion than Mbk_G, who is already familiar with it and can make use of his earlier version.

It is not warranted, however, to conclude that Mbk_G's translation style is generally ‘freer’ and ‘less accurate’ than that of Mbk_g. In our note on 139.61–62: *ostensum est quod Aristoteles vult* g : *ostensus est velle* G, we quote a number of passages which indicate, on the contrary, that Mbk_G is less willing than Mbk_g to depart from the Greek text when it comes to syntax and grammar. This again can be explained by the fact that G is a revision of g: Whereas Mbk_g, aiming to produce a first draft of the translation, tends to gloss over textual difficulties (which are mentioned by Mbk_G himself in the colophon, cf. 119.66–69, esp. 67: *ita quod nullatenus legere potui*) and is content with a ‘looser’ representation of the Greek text, Mbk_G appears to try harder to reproduce the linguistic structures of the Greek model and also, if necessary, to restore its original meaning, whether based on palaeographical evidence or conjecture (see his own remark in the *Explicit: quandoque ex sensu supplevi*). This, however, does not prevent Mbk_G from making errors avoided by Mbk_g, either in interpreting the Greek text (cf. 132.7: *qualiter quidem* g : *quomodo quandoque* G and 135.86–87: *solis aequivoce dicti* g : *de aequivoce dicto sole* G) or in reading/restoring it (cf. 138.14–15: *assumentem* g : *sortitum* G and 138.14–15: *siquidem* g : *sive* G, with notes *ad loc.*). And it does not entail, of course, that G is ‘better’ than g in terms of faithfulness to the Greek manuscript tradition; after all, both Mbk_g and Mbk_G had to cope with the defective state of the Greek exemplar.⁸¹

(3) Different Greek models behind g and G?

Did Moerbeke for his second version G use a different Greek manuscript than for the first version? This hypothesis is not very plausible, since it is difficult to assume that Moerbeke had access to two different copies of this extremely rare text. There are, however, several cases where Moerbeke seems to have ‘read’ a different Greek text. On a closer look they may be rather

⁷⁹ Other examples: 133.48–49 *utrisque* g : *ambabus* G - ἀμφοτέρων; 134.62 *ignotiora* g : *magis ignota* G - ἀγνωστότερα; 134.65 *iterum* g : *rursum* G - πάλιν; 136.19 *geometra* g : *geometer* G - ὁ ... γεωμέτρης; 137.57 *praecedentibus* g : *prioribus* G - τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν? τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν?; 137.78–79 *Aristotelis* g : *Aristotelicis* G - Ἀριστοτελικῶν.

⁸⁰ On *sicut* vs. *quemadmodum*, cf. Bossier (above, n. 76), p. 278.

⁸¹ Given this defective state, it is surprising to see (and might arouse suspicion) that our Greek reconstruction departs in just three cases (134.65–66: *eadem intentione*, 135.5: *Troiano*, 135.14–15: *omnibus*) from g and G. Adopting a rather pessimistic interpretation of this situation, one might be led to think that Mbk (whether Mbk_g or Mbk_G or both) was quite successful in disguising the bad condition of his Greek model.

interpreted as different readings of the same text, which had become in some abbreviations difficult to read. Here are the most important cases (see commentaries *ad locum*):

- 133.19 *palam* g : *insinuat* G] δῆλον / δηλοῖ (~ R)
 133.36-37 *ipsius* g : *ipsorum* codd._G [an *ipsius* G?] αὐτοῦ (~ R) / αὐτῶν
 133.49 *ipsa* g : *ipsum* codd._G [an *ipsa* G?] αὐτὰ (~ R) / αὐτὸ
 133.52-53 *primo* g : *tertio* G] πρῶτον / τρίτον (~ R)
 134.58-59 *quando* g secundum To [at vide P: *quoniam*] : *quia* G] ὅτε / ὅτι (~ R)
 135.6 *idem* g secundum To [at vide P: *ipsum*] : *ipsum* G] ταὐτὸ / αὐτὸ (~ R)
 135.11 *primum* g : *triplicem* G] πρῶτον / τριττὸν (~ R)
 136.35-37 *autem* g : *itaque* G] δὲ / δὴ (~ R)
 138.14-15 *assumentem* g : *sortitum* G] ἀπολαβόντα (~ R) / ἀπολαχόντα
 138.14-15 *siquidem* g : *sive* G] εἴ γε (~ R) / εἴτε
 138.23-24 *reducuntur* g : *dividuntur* G] συνήρηνται (?) / διήρηνται (~ R)
 138.26-29 *hunc... prudentem vocare... qui se habet* g : *hoc... prudentiam vocare... se habere* G]
 τοῦτον... φρόνιμον... καλεῖν... τὸν... εὐπράττοντα/τοῦτο... φρόνησιν καλεῖν... τὸ... εὐπράττειν (~ R)
 139.49-50 *morion, id est particula* g : *solum* G] μόριον / μόνον (~ R)
 139.50-51 *igitur* g : *autem* G] δὴ (~ R) / δὲ

These are the only indications of a different Greek reading, and they are disputable. In some cases, there may be an error in the Latin tradition (see pp. 133.36-37, 133.49, 134.58-59, 135.6). Moreover, one cannot exclude that Moerbeke in the second version made some obvious corrections of what he found to be wrong in his manuscript. As we have seen, Moerbeke himself informed the reader that in some damaged passages he had to supply by conjecture *ex sensu* what was missing or to correct what seemed to be corrupted.⁸² One may consider the change of *μόριον* into *μόνον* (see p. 139.49-50) to be such a conjecture *ex sensu*. The two instances of *primo/tertio* and *primum/triplicem* could also be corrections by the translator; p. 138.14-15 can only be explained from reading the Greek differently; alas, G's reading is wrong. Anyway, there is no one case that should make us assume that Moerbeke used different Greek manuscripts for both versions.⁸³

(4) *Limits of the Greek retroversion*

As we have seen, the twofold translation of the same lost Greek text offers an extraordinary case to test the possibilities and constraints of a retroversion. There is, in fact, even in Moerbeke's literal translation of the Greek a great variety in vocabulary, in word order, in redactional interventions.⁸⁴ The challenge, in this case, was to find a Greek text that could be translated in those different ways. The variation thus paved the way for a more precise identification of a lost Greek phrase, more than is possible when one must start from just one version.⁸⁵

⁸² See the colophon of the translation quoted above in note 4.

⁸³ "En conclusion, aucun exemple ne peut être imputé à un changement de modèle grec" (Acerbi-Vuillemin-Diem [above, n. 3], p. 104).

⁸⁴ For the various limits of a Greek retroversion of MbK's translations see the methodological reflections in Strobel, pp. 14-26.

⁸⁵ Charlton's translation based upon a partial retroversion by F. Bossier shows that this painful philological exercise has some utility. Alas, even Charlton makes an error not confirmed by Moerbeke translating "But believing that the rational soul too is immortal [...]" (cf. p. 136.45-46 *mortalem*, referring to Alexander's view).