Sophistical Refutations *33:*
Three Arabic Translations and the Greek Original

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Abstract

New editions of the three extant Arabic translations of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* are indispensible for a good understanding of the philosophical and textual history of that work. In this contribution we present new editions of chapter 33 of the *Sophistical Refutations*, for the three Arabic translations as well as for the Greek original, with a full critical apparatus for the Arabic translations and an apparatus to the Greek original that fully registers the readings plausibly underlying in the final Greek exemplars of these translations. We add comments on the Arabic texts elucidating our editorial decisions, and finish with a discussion of the relevance of these editions of chapter 33 for the history of the text.

In "The Arabic Tradition of Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi*" (henceforth: "Arabic Tradition"), published in volume 10 (2020) of this journal, the first comprehensive comparative study of the three extant Arabic translations of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*, Gerhard Endress showed, also by suggesting many improvements and emendations in selected passages, that the existing editions of them, those by ʿAbdurraḥmān Badawī and by Farid Jabre (Farīd Ǧabr), leave much to be desired – "A new edition of these three translations is thus called for", he concluded ("Arabic Tradition", p. 62). The first aim of this contribution is to heed this call and show by way of example what kinds of improvements such a new edition would offer. To this purpose we present a preliminary new edition of chapter 33 of the *Sophistical Refutations* for all three translations. The reason for choosing this particular chapter is that it constitutes a well-demarcated unit on the issue how difficult it is to deal with arguments that cause trouble, which brings together several important themes from the *Sophistical Refutations*, but which at the same time seems not excessively difficult for translators into Arabic – except, perhaps, for the jokes presented in it, which are a challenge for translators into any language.

In addition we have as a second aim to show, again by way of example, how much the study of the Arabic translations of Greek works of philosophy and science has to profit from a comprehensive understanding of the Greek side of the history of the text and of the interpretative possibilities regarding the content of the text, but also how much the study of the Arabic translations may contribute to our understanding of the history of the text as a whole. We shall show that the differences between the three Arabic translations of the *Sophistical Refutations* can to a large extent be traced back to changes in, additions to and omissions from the text in the Greek phase of the transmission up to the Greek exemplars of the respective translations, and that they can frequently be traced back to changes, additions and omissions which occur more often in the textual tradition. On the other hand, we shall also discuss the relevance of the information provided by the three translations for the textual

history and the constitution of the text of the *Sophistical Refutations*. Also in these respects we develop lines of research which were initiated in close cooperation by Gerhard Endress and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper in "The Arabic Tradition".

The contribution is structured in the following way: after a brief introduction, we first present a newly edited text of chapter 33 of the *Sophistical Refutations* for all three Arabic translations, but also for the Greek original, with an apparatus accompanying the Greek text which indicates what Greek variants the Arabic translations would correspond to; then individual problematic passages in the Arabic translations are analysed and discussed; finally, the information provided the three Arabic translations is discussed within the context of the textual transmission of the *Sophistical Refutations* as a whole.

§ 1. Introducing the three Arabic translations of the Sophistical Refutations

In the case of the *Sophistical Refutations* the famous manuscript *Par. arab*. 2346, containing Arabic translations of the whole *Organon*, together with Porphyry's *Eisagôgê* and the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, transmits to us not one, but three translations of Aristotle's work on fallacies. According to the manuscript, these three translations are:

naql Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: "version of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī" (d. 974), based on the Syriac version of Athanasius of Balad (d. 687);
naql ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa: "version of ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa" (d. 1008), also based on the Syriac of Athanasius;
naql qadīm mansūb ilā l-Nāʿimī: "old version attributed to al-Nāʿimī", *scil*. Ibn Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī (fl. 835).

Though it is clear that the third translation is older than the first two, the attribution to Ibn Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī cannot be correct, as has been established by Endress ("Arabic Tradition" [above, p. 00], pp. 64-7). Hence we refer to this translation as the *translatio vetus*. Endress assumes reasonably that it is, as is usual for these early translations, based upon a Syriac intermediary, but there is still no direct proof of this. The translation by ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa is presented as a revision of the translation by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī – which at places it is indeed –, but for his revision Ibn Zurʿa also made use of other sources than the Syriac translation by Athanasius, notably of Theophilus, whose Syriac translation can be found in Arabic in marginal notes accompanying Ibn Zurʿa's translation (see "Arabic Tradition" [above, p. 00], p. 74, for a good example of Ibn Zurʿa following Theophilus), but probably not limited to Theophilus.

Thus the three Arabic translations bear witness to the Greek tradition of the text of the *Sophistical Refutations* in not quite straightforward ways: while the translation by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī and the *translatio vetus* go back to the Greek exemplars of their respective Syriac sources, leaving thus more room for distortion due to the translation process, the translation by ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa in addition functions as a kind of mixed manuscript, since it combines at least two different sources. Further, both the *translatio vetus* and the Syriac translation by Athanasius go back to exemplars which already at the Greek stage of the transmission have been contaminated, though the *translatio vetus* more so than Athanasius' translation (see "Arabic Tradition", pp. 93-5).

The stemmatic assessment of the exemplars of the three Arabic translations is made significantly easier due to the fact that they share a common ancestor which is situated within

the stemma in such a way that it is completely independent from all other sources. Endress and Hasper ("Arabic Tradition" [above, p. 00], pp. 89-92) argue for this thesis on the basis of a small number of common clearly erroneous readings unique to the three translations, and find further support in the covariation of the three translations. On the basis of the new editions for *Sophistical Refutations* 33, we will in § 4.1 adduce further evidence for this thesis.

Moreover, this common ancestor is to be situated high up in the stemma for the *Sophistical Refutations*. In outline the stemma for *Sophistical Refutations* looks as follows[1] (for the *sigla* used here, see the overview in § 2.1):

where it should be made clear that the group of manuscripts DCcuehi does not seem a stemmatically unitary group, but merely a group of manuscripts which feature both readings which are characteristics for the φ branch and readings deriving to the χ branch, but not necessarily all the same readings. For example, manuscripts ehi probably together do constitute a stemmatic group which shares readings, including errors, with group VGb, but which in e and hi separately are so heavily contaminated from the χ branch that their 'original' position in the stemma can hardly be recognised. Also D shares readings, including errors, with the VGb group, but has been contaminated separately.

Now the common ancestor Ψ* of all three Arabic translations is to be situated at the χ side of the stemma, because it shares errors which must have originated at that side of the stemma, but also features probably correct readings which are unique to the χ side, notably with Λ, i.e. Boethius' exemplar (see Endress–Hasper, "Arabic Tradition" [above, p. 78], pp. 91-2). In *Sophistici Elenchi* 33 we have found no evidence for or against this, but we did find a nice case in *Sophistici Elenchi* 7:

169a33 ἐπισπᾶται Ψ* : ἐπίσταται ABVGbDCcuehi : ἐπιστήσεται Λ

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[1] In fact, the *Sophistici Elenchi* seem to share the basic stemma with the *Topica*, though the distribution of manuscripts over the groups may vary somewhat: see P.S. Hasper, "'Those Searching for Gold Dig up a Lot of Earth' – On Contamination and Insertion in the Early Manuscript Tradition of the *Organon*. The Case of the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*', in A.P. Mesquita – R. Santos (eds.), *New Essays on the Organon*, Routledge, London 2023 (Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies), pp. 279-311, and the more developed stemma for *Topica* 8 in: P.S. Hasper, "A New Edition of the Eight Book of Aristotle's *Topics*", *ibidem*, pp. 312-38.

Poste had already proposed to emend the grammatically problematic ἐπίσταται into ἐπισπᾶται,[2] which is now confirmed by the consensus of the three Arabic translations. The fact that Boethius renders ἐπιστήσεται and not the only slightly divergent ἐπίσταται (differing only by a single stroke) is easily explained as due to a marginal or supralinear correction in his exemplar (or in one of its ancestors), thus suggesting that the erroneous ἐπίσταται had its origin in the φ side of the stemma.

This position of the common ancestor Ψ* at the χ side of the stemma, but independent from both Λ and the group of mixed manuscripts, makes its readings extremely important for the constitution of the text, in at least two ways: (i) any reading found in Ψ* and in part of the φ branch of the stemma should in principle be accepted as the reading of the archetype, except if it is not really possible; (ii) any reading found in Ψ* and in part of the χ branch should still have a good chance of being the reading of the archetype, because of the amount of contamination in the χ branch from the φ branch. As we shall see below, in *Sophistici Elenchi* 33 we find a clear example for (i) at 182 b 37 – see the note in § 4.3. For (ii) there are no examples in *Sophistici Elenchi* 33, but elsewhere in the *Sophistici Elenchi* there are some nice ones:

167 b 18   εἴ τι ABGbDCcuehi : ὅ τι Λ[*quicquid*]Ψ*
170 a 2   μὴ ABVGbDChi M^p[73.23] : om. ΛcueΨ*

In either case the evidence from the consensus of Ψ* and part of the χ branch has to be taken very seriously – actually, in neither case would a decision be straightforward.

However, there might also be a third way in which the stemmatic position of the common ancestor Ψ* makes it of great importance for the constitution of the text. This way becomes clear if it can be shown that either the Greek exemplar of Athanasius' Syriac translation or the *translatio vetus* has been contaminated from other parts of the tradition, for if one can demonstrate such contamination, it becomes possible that either Athanasius' translation or the *translatio vetus* (or occasionally even only Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's translation, if Ibn Zurʿa were to use another source) alone transmits the reading of Ψ*. In order to determine whether this possibility holds, we have to study the readings underlying the three Arabic translations against the rest of the extant tradition, and now also against the fragments of the commentaries by Herminus and Alexander identified by Victor Gysembergh in the commentary on the *Sophistical Refutations* by Augostino Nifo.[3] Endress and Hasper, "Arabic Tradition" (above, p. 00), pp. 93-5, already try to assess the respective extents of contamination and correction from elsewhere in each of the three translations, the impression being that the *translatio vetus* has taken up more of it than Athanasius' Syriac translation, and that Ibn Zurʿa's translation, because of his use of external sources, contains more of it than Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's. As we shall see in § 4.2, these impressions are confirmed for *Sophistici Elenchi* 33. A consequence of this fact is that if there is a reading which only occurs either in the *translatio vetus* or in

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Athanasius' translation (or sometimes even only in Yaḥyā's translation, if Ibn Zurʿa uses a further source), but can also be found in part of the φ branch of the stemma or in sources belonging to the χ branch which do not belong to those parts of the tradition which frequently serve as sources of contamination (as, for example, *Vat. gr.* 1024 and *Basil.* F II 21), this reading must equally be taken seriously for the constitution of the text. In *Sophistici Elenchi* 33 there is a good example of this way at 182 b 39 – see § 4.3.

What is more, it is in principle not to be excluded that many contaminations coincide: in the whole of the group DCcuehi, in Boethius' exemplar, and either in Athanasius or in the *translatio vetus* – that is, it is not in principle to be excluded that one Arabic translation alone transmits the reading of the archetype, because the alternative reading has taken over the whole extant tradition. The case of 169 a 33 ἐπισπᾶται was already close to it, but we believe there is a clear example of this scenario in *Sophistici Elenchi* 33, namely at 183 a 1-2 – see below, in § 4.3. Of course, most unique readings in one of the Arabic translations, or in Ψ* for that matter, are erroneous, but that need not be true for all of them.

§ 2. The Editions

§ 2.1 Apparatus and notes to the Greek text

The apparatus to the Greek text follows the Bekker numbering inserted in the text. In it, the following sources are referred to:

A	*Vat. Urb. gr.* 35	(ca. 900)
B	*Marc. gr.* 201	(954)
V	*Vat. Barb. gr.* 87	(X)
G	*Gud. gr.* 24	(XII)
b	Durham C.I.15	(XV)
Λ	Exemplar translationis factae a Boethio[4]	(ca. 500)
D	*Par. gr.* 1843	(XII)
C	*Coisl.* 330	(XI)
c	*Vat. gr.* 1024	(ca. 1000)
u	*Basil*. F.II.21	(XII)
e	*Conv. Soppr.* 192	(XII)
h	*Marc. gr.* IV.53	(XIII)
i	New College 225	(XIV)
Ψʸ	Lectio cognita e translatione arabica facta a Yaḥyā	(X)
Ψᶻ	Lectio cognita e translatione arabica facta ab Ibn Zuʿra	(X)
Ψᵛ	Exemplar translationis arabicae veteris	(IX)

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[4] Including a few references to manuscripts for Boethius' translations, in case the textual tradition of the translation is divided as well – see B.G. Dod (ed.), *De Sophisticis Elenchis. Translatio Boethii, Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi et Recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeke, Aristoteles Latinus* VI.1-3, Brill – Desclée de Brouwer, Leiden-Brussels 1975.

Ψ^Σ	Exemplar translationis syriacae factae ab Athanasio (VII) ut cognitum per lectiones communes in translationibus arabicis factis a Yaḥyā et Ibn Zuʿra
Ψ⁎	Manuscriptum postulatum ut fons communis cognitus per lectiones communes in Ψ^Σ et Ψ^v
Ψ^{alt.-x}	Lectio transmissa in codice *Par. arab.* 2346 ex aliquo altero fonte, transmissa cum translatione x
Theoph.	Lectiones e translatione facta a Theophilo transmissae cum translatione facta ab Ibn Zuʿra in margine codicis *Par. arab.* 2346
H[apud N]	Fragmenta commentarii Hermini cognita e commentario Niphi
A[apud N]	Fragmenta commentarii Alexandri cognita e commentario Niphi
A[]	Citatio ex aliquo altero commentario Alexandri Aphrodisiensis
M^{l/c/p}[]	Lemma/citatio/paraphrasis e commentario Michaelis Ephesi (raro citatur)[5]
S[]	Paraphrasis facta a Sophonia (ca. 1300) (raro citatur)
N[]	Commentarium Augustini Niphi[6]
[x]	Lectio fontis x abest vel indeterminabilis est

In order not to overburden the apparatus, we mention in the apparatus to the Greek text all variant readings presupposed in Boethius' translation and in any of the three Arabic translations, but usually only those variants which are found in two or more Greek manuscripts, and none of the variants found in correcting hands. Except for the Arabic translations, the apparatus is negative, only mentioning the sources which deviate from the reading adopted.

In order to save space, the following Greek letters are used to refer to groups of sources:

ω	Consensus of all of ABVGbΛDCcuehi
α	AB
β	V + γ
γ	Gb
δ	cu
ε	hi

In the apparatus there are further references in bold to report about previous editions as well as to indicate readings which are to be entertained as alternatives:

B	Bekker	*Aristoteles Graece* (Berlin, 1831)
W	Waitz	*Aristotelis Organon Graece* (Leipzig, 1844)
SW	Strache–Wallies	*Aristotelis Topica cum libro De Sophisticis Elenchis e schedis Ioannis Strache* (Leipzig, 1923)
R	Ross	*Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi* (Oxford 1958)
H	Hecquet	*Aristote: Les Réfutations Sophistiques* (Paris 2019)
edd.	All previous editions	
forsan	Reading which is not to be ruled out definitely for the constitution of the text.	

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[5] See Alexandri quod fertur *In Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos commentarium*, ed. M. Wallies, Reimer, Berlin 1898 (*CAG* II.3)

[6]   Quoted after *Expositiones Magni Augustini Niphi Medicis Philosophi Suessani in libros de Sophisticis Elenchis Aristotelis*, Ioannes Roigny, Paris 1540.

§ 2.2. Apparatus and notes to the three Arabic translations

P   *Par. arab.* 2346 (1027)

Y   Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī and/or his translation
I   ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa and/or his translation
Σ   The author of the Syriac version used by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī and ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa and/or his translation
Q   The author of the *translatio vetus* and/or his translation

B   ʿA. Badawī (ed.), *Manṭiq Arisṭū*, Dār al-Qalam Wikālat al-Maṭbūʿāt, al-Kuwayt-Bayrūt 1980 (Dirāsāt Islāmiyya 7).
J   F. Jabre (ed.), *Al-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-manṭiq Arisṭū. Silsilat ʿIlm al-Manṭiq*, Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, Bayrūt 1999.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ (182 b 6-20)

[182b6]Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατανοεῖν ὅτι πάντων τῶν λόγων οἱ μέν [7]εἰσι ῥᾴους κατιδεῖν, οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι, παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι [8]παραλογίζονται τὸν ἀκούοντα, πολλάκις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνοις [9]ὄντες· τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον δεῖ καλεῖν τὸν παρὰ ταὐτὸ γινόμενον. [b10]ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς [11]δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῖς δὲ παρ᾽ ἕτερον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι [12]διὰ τὸ μεταφερόμενον ἕκαστον μὴ ὁμοίως εἶναι δῆλον. [13]ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος [14]εὐηθέστατος εἶναι τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν [b15]ἐστὶ δῆλα (καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν οἱ γελοῖοι πάντες [16]εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ᾽ἀνὴρ ἐφέρετοκατὰκλίμακος[17]δίφρον᾽,καὶ᾽ὅπουστέλλεσθε᾽·᾽πρὸςτὴνκεραίαν᾽,καὶ᾽ποτέρα[18]τῶν βοῶν ἔμπροσθεν τέξεται;᾽ ᾽οὐδετέρα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπισθεν ἄμφω᾽,[19]καὶ ᾽καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας;᾽ ᾽οὐ δῆτα· ἀπεκτόνηκεγὰρτὸνπτωχὸν[b 20]καὶτὸνὠνούμενον᾽.᾽ἆρ᾽Εὔαρχος;᾽ ᾽οὐδῆτα,ἀλλ᾽ Ἀπολλωνίδης᾽·

b6 καὶ Ψ᷇ : om. βδ Ψ᷂ Ψ᷅? | **b7** τί : τι Ψ᷂ [Ψ᷅] | καὶ Ψ* : καὶ γὰρ βc? | ἐν τίνι : ἔν τινι Ψ᷂ [Ψ᷅] | **b8-10** ἐκείνοις – ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ Ψ᷂ : om. Ψ᷅ | **b8** ἐκείνοις Ψ᷂ : ἐκεῖνοι α [Ψ᷅] | **b9** ὄντες Λ᷆ᴹˣᴬᶻ Ψ᷂ : om. Λ᷆ᶜᵉᵗᵗ [Ψ᷅] | τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ : ταὐτὸν γὰρ e : ταὐτὸ γὰρ Ψ᷂ : τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν β [Ψ᷅] | ταὐτὸ Ψ᷂ : ταὐτὰ γ : αὐτὸ e [Ψ᷅] | γινόμενον Ψ᷂ : λεγόμενον δ Ψ᷅ : γινόμενον λεγόμενον γ [Ψ᷅] | **b12** διὰ Ψ* : om. ε | δῆλον Ψ᷂ : om. Ψ᷅? | **b13** οὖν Ψ᷂ : om. Ψ᷅ Η[apud Ν[106f]]Α[apud Ν[106f]] **forsan** | ὅσπερ Ψ᷂ : ὅπερ γDδ : εἴπερ Ψ᷅? | **b14** εὐηθέστατος Ψ* : συνηθέστατος δ | καὶ Λ᷆ᶜᵉᵗᵗ : πρὸς V : om. Λ᷆ᴬᶻᴮᵒ Ψ᷂? | τοῖς : πᾶσι Ψ᷂? | **b15** οἱ² Ψ* : om. γ [Λ] | **b16** εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν Ψ᷂ : om. Ψ᷅ ‖ **b17** δίφρον Ψ᷅ Α[apud Ν[106h]] : δίφρου Ψ᷂ : διάφορον γ Μᵞᵉ[188.32] [Λ] | ὅπου στέλλεσθε cf. Α[apud Ν[107b]] : ὅπου στέλλεσθαι ΒβDδe : ποι στέλλεται Ψ᷂ : ποῖ στέλλεσθε Μᶜ[189.4, 10]Α[apud Ν[107b]]? Sᵂ R : ποῖ στέλλεσθαι Η : προσστέλλεται Ψ᷅? [Λ] | πρὸς τὴν κεραίαν Ψ᷅ : Καραν vel Καρίαν Ψ᷂ : πρὸς τὴν κερμαν Α[apud Ν[107b]] [Λ] | **b18** τέξεται Ψ᷅ : τάξεται Ψ᷂ | **b19** καὶ Ψ᷅ᵛΨ᷅? Theoph. : γὰρ vel ὅτι Ψ᷂? | καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας Ψ* : om. Λ | **b19-20** οὐ δῆτα – Ἀπολλωνίδης Ψ᷂ Η[apud Ν[107c]] Α[apud Ν[107c]] : om. Λ Ψ᷅ | **b19** ἀπεκτόνηκε Ψ᷅ᵞ Theoph. : ἀπέκτεινε δ Ψ᷂ [Ψ᷅] | **b20** καὶ τὸν ὠνούμενον Ψ᷂ : κατωνωμένον Ross, R [Ψ᷅].

Naql qadīm (182 b 6-20)

[182b6]{376a7}وقد ينبغي أن تعلم أنّ من الكلام كلاماً [7]تسهل معرفتُهُ ومنه ما تصعب معرفتُهُ [8]وكثيراً ما يكون الكلام كلاماً واحداً فيفضّل السامع له فى وجوه كثيرة * * * [b10.2]فمنه ما يكون من اللغة [11]ومنه ما يكون من العارض وقد يكون الاتّصال من غير هذه الجهة [12]أيْ من نقل الأحرف عن مواضعها فلا تكون حال الكلام بما كانت عليه [13]ولا كالاتّصال الذي يكون من اشتراك الأسماء فإنّ ذلك النوع [14]أسخف أنواع الاتّصال. ومنه ما هو معروف عند كلّ مَن سمعه [b15]لا سيّما جميع الكلام الذي يُضحك منه ما خلا ما يسيراً * * * [16.2]كقولك رجُل كان يؤتى به على سُلَّم بكرسيّ، [17] وكان متوثّباً على سِنان الرُمْح، ومن ذلك أن يقول أيّ [18]البقرتين تضع من مقدَّمها وليست منهما واحدة تضع من مقدَّمها بل كلتاهما تضع من خلفها، [19]ومن ذلك قول القائل إنّ الشَّمالَ صافية * * *

فكثيرا P : [وكثيراً B J **b8** تضعف P : [تصعب **b7** كلام P : [كلاماً corr. B J : كلام P **b7** [صعب s.p. P : an نعلم leg.? ‖ [تعلم **182b6** scr. B J ‖ [فيضّل ante فيضّل scr. ..فـ.ـل P (partim illeg.), sed del. **b9-10** * * *] τὸν αὐτὸν ... λόγος non vert. (vel non hab. Ψ᷅) **b16** * * *] εἰσὶ ... λέξιν non vert. (vel non hab. Ψ᷅) **b17** [متوثّباً scr. B J : s.p. P **b18** [خلفها ... كلتاهما corr. B J : كلتيهما تضعان من خلفهما P **b19** [الشَّمالَ] : <ريح> الشمال B : ريح الشَّمال J **b19-21** * * *] οὐ δῆτα ... Ἀπολλωνίδης non vert. (vel non hab. Ψ᷅).

Naql Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (182 b 6-20)

[182b6] {376b3}ويجب أن نتأمّل أنّ من جميع الكلمات أمّا هؤلاء [7]فهُنّ سهل أن يُرَين وأمّا هؤلاء فأصْعَب [8]ويُضللن السامعَ بإضافة شيء وبالشيء أيضاً كثيراً إذ هُنّ بأعيانهنّ [9]موجودات لتلك . وذلك أنّه يجب أن تُدعا الكلمة بعينها التى نحوها تقال . [b10]فالكلمة بعينها أمّا لهؤلاء فمن اللفظ وأمّا لهؤلاء [11]فمن العرض وأمّا لهؤلاء فيُظنّ أنّها من قِبَل [12]من أُخرى إذا تغيّرت وانتقلت كلّ واحدة لا تكون معلومةً على مثال بعينه . [13]فإنّه بمنزلة ما أنّ اللواتي مِن اتّفاق الاسْم النحو الذي يُظَنّ [14]من هؤلاء الضلالات ⟨بأن⟩ تكون أكثرَ خطأً أمّا هؤلاء فلجميع اللواتي تعرض [b15]هُنّ معلومات وذلك أنّ جميع الكلمات المهزوء بها أيضاً إلّا قليلاً إلّا [16]هُنّ مِن اللفْظ . مثال ذلك رَجُل كان ينتقل على سُلّم [17]كُرسيّ، فأرْسَلَه ⸓فاران⸓ إلى مكان، وأمّا [18]مِن الثَورَين رُتِّبَ أماماً ولا واحد منهما بل كلاهما مِن خلفٍ، [19]وَأَينقَى الشماليّ ⟨أُ⟩وداطا وذلك أنّه قتل المسكيَن [b20]والذي يُباع، أَترى أوْوَرْكوس ⟨أُ⟩وداطا لكن أفولُنيديس .

[182b6 نتأمّل] P s.p. **b8** السامعَ [+ الذي يسمَع supra lin. P ‖ وبالشيء – بإضافة] scripsi (= παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι) : **b9** وبشيء وبإضافة J B : يدعا P s.p. : scripsi : تُدعا] وبشيء وبإضافة supra lin. P : in textu + وبالشيء **b12** أنّها] J B : scripsi ‖ تغيّرت] P s.p. : يغترب J B **b14** بأن ... تكون an) supplevi) ‖ يُظَنّ ... δοκεῖ = (εἶναι ... δοκεῖ) : om. P J B ‖ أنه J : om. P ‖ **b14-15** تعرض هُنّ] J B s.p. : يعرض⟨ف⟩هن P s.p. : فلجميع] scripsi ‖ ولجميع J B P : يكون] J B s.p. : تكون P : scripsi ‖ **b16** المهزوء بها] P : المميز وبها B : المميز وبها J بها scripsi (= οἱ γελοῖοι) : المهزوبها] **b17** فأرْسَلَه ... مكان] J ينتقل P s.p. ‖ فاران] sic pro κεραίαν? (cf. transl. Ibn Zurʿa) **b18** رُتِّبَ] scripsi (= τάξεται, cf. transl. Ibn Zurʿa) إلى أين ؟ – إلى السارية] scr. B J ‖ رنب P : رأيت] B J ‖ أماماً P : اماما B : إماما] J إماما ‖ كلاهما] كـ..بهما P¹ corr. B J : كلايهما corr. **b19** وَأَينقَى الشماليّ] كلامهما scr. P², sed. del. et والفى الشمالي P : والنفى ريح الشمال) scripsi (= καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας: بع) ‖ **b20** كلا] scr. B J يُباع : يبيع P s.p. ‖ ⟨حأ⟩وداطا] scripsi (= οὐ δῆτα) كلا scr. B J ‖ أوْوَرْكوس] J ارورکوس : B corr. ‖ ⟨حأ⟩وداطا] صافية scr. B J ‖ ⟨حأ⟩وداطا] scripsi (= οὐ δῆτα) كلا scr. B J ‖ أفولُنيديس] أفولنيدس P B J.

Naql ʿĪsā b. Zurʿa (182 b 6-20)

[182b6] {376b18}وينبغي أن نتأمّل أن جميع الأقاويل فإنّ منها [٧]ما يسهل الوقوف عليه ومنها ما يعسر ذلك فيه جدًّا وقولنا نحو شيء وفي شيء [8]شديدة التضليل للسامع إذا قيلت في أشياء واحدة بأعيانها . [9]وذلك أنّا ينبغي أن نُسمّي الكلمة واحدةً بعينها بما إليه تُنسَب . [b10]وقد تكون الكلمة الواحدة بعينها أمّا عند بعض الأمور فمن الصوت وفي بعضها [11]من العرض ويُظنّ ببعضها أنّها من معنى آخر [12]من قِبَل أنّ كلّ واحد من هذه إذا أُتِيَ به مختلفاً لم يكن ما يُفهَم منه على مثال واحد [13]بمنزلة ما في هذه التي تكون من الاشتراك في الاسم النحوُ المظنونُ من الضلالات [14]أشدُّ خطأً [فـ]أمّا هذه فتكون معلومةً في جميع التي من العرض [b15]وذلك أنّا قد نجد جميع الأقاويل المضحكة إلّا الشاذّ منها إنّما [16]يكون من الصوت . مثال ذلك أنّ رَجُلًا كان يصعد على سُلّم [17]الكُرسيّ، وكانَ ⸓فاران⸓ قد أنفذَه إلى بعض المواضع، وأيّ [18]الثورين رُتِّبَ قُدّام ولا واحد منهما بل جميعاً مِن خلفٍ، [19]وذلك أنّ الشماليَّ الخالصُ ⟨أُ⟩وداطا ⟨إ⟩نّما يقتل المسكين [b20]والذي كان يباع، ⟨أَ⟩هو أوْوَرخوس ⟨أُ⟩واطـا ⟨أو⟩داطـا بَل هو ⟨أُ⟩فولُنيدس .

[182b6 نتأمّل] P s.p. **b8** واحدةً] scripsi : الواحدة J B P [إذا] **b12** إلى] P : corr. B J **b14** فـ] P supra lin. ‖ يُفهَم [+ علم P supra lin. P] + يُفهَم ‖ **b15** إنّما] hab. P B J : seclusi (cf. transl. Yaḥyā) **b16** أيضاً) leg.? (= καί) (cf. transl. Yaḥyā) [الصوت + التى فى القول] P **b17** المواضع ... وكانَ] P : السارية – إلى أين ؟] scr. B J ‖ فاران] sic pro κεραίαν? (cf. transl. Yaḥyā) ‖ يصعد [+ يرقى P supra lin. ‖ رأيت P : رنب B **b18** رُتِّبَ] scripsi (= τάξεται, cf. transl. Yaḥyā) واتى P ‖ وأيّ] B J corr. **b19** الخالص ... وذلك] P : خالصة الشمال ⟨ريح⟩ وهل ; و : scr. B J ‖ ⟨أُ⟩وداطا] scripsi (= οὐ δῆτα) كلا P : وداطا B J **b20** مما P : مما أنه B J scr. ⟨إ⟩نّما] scripsi (= γάρ, cf. *GALex* vol. 1) ‖ يُباع] P s.p. : يبيع B J ‖ ⟨أَ⟩هو] B J ‖ ⟨أو⟩داطـا بَل هو] P ‖ أوْوَرخوس] ارورحوس P : corr. B J و : هو P : هو scr. B J (cf. transl. Yaḥyā أُترى = ἆρ', cf. =) ‖ كلا، بل هو : داد P : scripsi (= οὐ δῆτα ἀλλ') scr. B J.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ (182 b 21-36)

[21]τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι), [22]τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν (σημεῖον [23]δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, [24] οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸ σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ [b25]τὸ ἕν, ἢ ἕτερον· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταὐτὸ σημαίνειν τὸ ὂν [26]καὶ τὸ ἕν, οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι [27]διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἕν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν) – ὁμοίως [28]δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων [29]ἕκαστον οἱ μὲν ἔσονται ῥάους ἰδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι τῶν [b30]λόγων, καὶ λαβεῖν ἐν τίνι γένει, καὶ πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ [31]ἔλεγχος, οὐ ῥάδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων.

[32]Ἔστι δὲ δριμὺς λόγος ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα· [33]δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα. ἀπορία δ' ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν [34]τοῖς συλλελογισμένοις, ὅ τι ἀνέλῃ τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἡ [b35]δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς εἴπῃ τις τὸ προταθέν. διόπερ ἐν [36]τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς οἱ δριμύτεροι λόγοι ζητεῖν μᾶλλον ποιοῦσιν.

b21 σχεδὸν Ψ^Σ : om. Ψ^v? | **b23** τούτων Ψ^Σ : τούτου δ S^WR [Ψ^v] | **b24** ταὐτὸ Ψ^ZΨ^v : τοῦτο V : ταῦτα γD : om. Ψ^Y? | **b24-25** κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν Ψ* : τὸ ἕν κατὰ πάντων καὶ τὸ ὂν δ : κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ τόν γ | **b24** κατὰ Ψ* : καὶ γ | **b25** τοῖς – σημαίνειν Ψ* : om. ε | **b25-26** τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν οἱ Ψ* : τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔνιοι e : καὶ ἓν δ : καὶ ἔνιοι D : καὶ ἕν οἱ V : καὶ τὸ οἱ γ? : om. ε | **b26** λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι Ψ^Σ : καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι λόγον βδ [Ψ^v] | **b27** διὰ Ψ^Σ? : παρὰ γδ [Ψ^v] | φάναι Ψ^Σ : φαίνεται δ Ψ^v? | ἓν ... ὄν Ψ* : ὂν ... ἕν Cε | **b28** καὶ : καὶ <τῶν> Forster, R | περὶ ... περὶ : παρὰ ... παρὰ Poste, S^WR | περὶ¹ Ψ^v? : παρὰ δ | τὸ συμβεβηκὸς Ψ^Σ : τοῦ συμβεβηκότος αγDCεe BWH [Ψ^v] | καὶ περὶ² Ψ^Σ : καὶ ε : om. Ψ^v | **b29** ἕκαστον Ψ^Σ : om. ε Ψ^v? | δὲ Ψ* : ε ε | **b30** καὶ Ψ^v : om. Ψ^Σ? Theoph.? | **b31** οὐ – πάντων Ψ^Σ : om. Ψ^v | ὁμοίως : ὁμοίως δὲ Ψ^Σ? S[65.1]? [Ψ^v] | **b32** ὅστις Ψ* : ὅτις γ | **b33** ἡ Ψ* : om. γ | **b34** ὅ τι : ὅτις Ψ^ZΨ^v : om. Ψ^Y | τις : τίς τι Ψ^v : τι Ψ^Σ | ἐρωτημάτων Ψ^Σ : ἀπορημάτων Ψ^v? | **b35** ἐριστικοῖς Ψ^YΨ^v : ἑτέροις Ψ^Z | εἴπῃ Ψ* : εἴποι ui | προταθέν Ψ* : προταχθέν γ | **b36** λόγοι Ψ* : λόγου ε | μᾶλλον Ψ^ZΨ^{alt.-v} : om. Ψ^YΨ^v.

Naql qadīm (182 b 21-36)

[21]وأكثر هذا الكلام بهذا النحو معروفة سخافته . [22]ومنه ما يغبى على المَهَرَة . وعلامة [23]ذلك أنّهم ربّما ناقض بعضهم بعضاً فى الأسماء [24]مثال ذلك أنّهم يسألون فيقولون{376a15}/{377a7} إذا قال قائل هو وقال أيضاً [25]واحد فهذان دلالتهما واحدة فى كلّ معنى أو كلّ واحد له دلالة غير دلالة صاحبه . فقد ظنّ أقوام أنّهما يدلّان على شيء واحد [26]وظنّ آخرون ما قال زينون وبَرمَنيدس إنّه [27]بقَدْر ما صارت [له] جهات الواحد بقَدْر ذلك يُتصرَّف الذي هو لأوجه كثيرة . وكذلك [28]سائر الكلام منه [29]ما سهلت معرفة ما يعرض فيه ويُتصرَّف له ومنه ما عسرت معرفته، [b30]والمعرفة فى أيّ جنس هو وهل يجب أن يكون مضلّلًا أو غير [31]مضلّل * * *.

[32]وأصعب الكلام ما كان مضطرًّا إلى الشكّ فيه [33]لأنّ ذلك من الكلام †صهو† عميق عَفص . والشكّ شكّان أحدهما [34]فيما أُلِّفَ من الكلام فإنّ ذاك إذا رفع منه أحدٌ شيئاً كان مشكوكاً فيه، [b35]والشكّ الآخر يكون فى أهل الشَغَب عند مماحكة بعضهم بعضاً كيف ينبغي أن يقول القائل مقدّمته . من أجل ذلك [36]العِضاض من الكلام فى المقاييس يوجب الفحصَ جدًّا .

b24 مثال] scripsi : من (= οἷον) scripsi = P¹ : وكثيرة : كثيرةً scripsi **b25** كلّ¹] P supra lin. **b27** له] P BJ : seclusi ‖ كثيرة] B : بقَدَر : بقدر B : يُتصرَّف ‖ del. P² : ر P¹ : لعدر scripsi : بقَدْر] P²,J : كثيرة B ‖ **b29** معرفة] P ينصرف : BJ scripsi : s.p. P ‖ **b30** هو] BJ ‖ وينصرف : BJ scripsi (scil. الكلام) : هى P BJ **b31** * * *] transl. οὐ ‖ معرفته P BJ : s.p. P : ويُتصرَّف] scripsi ‖ **b33** رَّبْدָּ ... πάντων om. P ‖ صهو] P وهو : scr. BJ ‖ عميق] P عويص : scr. BJ ‖ عَفص] vel sim. P : s.p. P (parum clare) : عَفَص P ‖ scripsi [العِضاض] om. (secl.?) BJ **b34** كان] P supra lin. B : فكان P in textu J **b35** فى] P in textu J : من P supra lin. **b36** العِضاض] scripsi OméHd om. P¹ in textu : rubre suppl. P² supra lin. (vix leg.). ‖ جدًّا] BJ القصاص : P العَضاض : P (= οἱ δριμύτεροι)

Naql Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (182 b 21-36)

[21]وعلى هذا النحو بعينه ولهؤلاء الأُخَر إلّا قليلاً كثيرةٌ . [22]وهؤلاء الذين هم مجربون أكثر يُرين أنّهن مذهول عنهن . والدليل [23]على هؤلاء من قِبَل أنّهم يخاصمون كثيراً بسبب الأسماء [24]أيْ إنّما أيدُلُّ الموجود والواحد على جميعهن [b25]أو على آخر . وذلك أنّه أمّا هؤلاء فإنّ الموجود والواحد يُظنّ أنّه يعرّف واحداً بعينه [26]وأمّا هؤلاء فيحلّلون كلمة زنون وفرمانيدس [27]من قِبَل أنّهم يقولون إنّ الواحد والموجود يُقالان على أنحاء كثيرة . وعلى هذا المثال [28]وفى العرض ومن قِبَل كلّ واحد من تلك الأُخَر [29]أمّا هؤلاء من الكلمات فيكنّ سهلةً أن يُرين وأمّا هؤلاء فأصعب [b30]إذا أُخذَ في جنسٍ ما أتُرى تبكيتاً أم ليس [31]تبكيتاً ليس ويسهل وعلى هذا المثال في جميعهن .

[32]والكلمة الحادّة السديدة هي التي تصير أنْ يتشكّك أكثرَ [33]وذلك أنّ هذه تلذع أكثرَ . والشكّ هو ثنائيّ أمّا ذاك [34]فيرفع شيئاً من السؤالات فى هذه المؤلّفات وأمّا ذاك [b35]ففي هؤلاء المرئية أنّ كيف يقول إنسان التي مَدَّت . ﴾وَ﴿من قِبَل هذه [36]الكلماتُ الحادّاتُ يجعلن أن نطلب فى القياسات ﴾أكثرَ﴿ .

فيجعلون : P **فجعلون** [فيحلّلون B J] : scripsi (= λύουσι) أبدل : s.p. P : أيدُلُّ [أيدُلُّ = πότερον … σημαίνει) **b24** scripsi (= πότερον … σημαίνει) : أيدُلُّ] ... **b24** أنّهم ... هؤلاء من [B] 27-29 أن [إنّ B ‖ ومن P J : ومن قِبَل] scripsi (= δὶὰ) : **b28** B (secl.?) om. الأُخَر] [B] **b27-29** من قِبَل B J scripsi (= τῶν ἄλλων) : الأحرا P : [الأجزاء B] J [فيكنّ] scripsi : s.p. P : فتكنّ B : فتكنّ J وَأَتُرى **b30** an (= κὰι وَأُرى) : s.p. P **b35** سمهم J B .corr : [المرآئية] scripsi (= τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς) : s.p. P : المرائية J B ‖ ﴾من قِبَل﴿ **b31** leg.? يسهل] πότερον : om. P B J. scripsi (= διόπερ, cf. transl. Yaḥyā 172b2, 183b33) : من قِبَل P B J **b36** أكثرَ] supplevi (= μᾶλλον) :

Naql ʿĪsā b. Zurʿa (182 b 21-36)

[21]وعلى هذا النحو بعينه يكون في أكثر الأشياء الأُخَر إلّا اليسير منها . [22]وقد يضلّ بهذه الأشياء القوم الذين يُظنّ بهم أنّ لهم دُربةً . ويدلّ على [23]هؤلاء أنّهم كثير﴾اً﴿ ما يختصمون في الأسماء [24]أعني هَل الموجود والواحد يدلّان على جميع الأشياء دلالةً واحدةً بعينها [b25]أو مختلفةً . وذلك أنّ هؤلاء الذين يظنّون أنّ الموجود والواحد يدلّان على شيء واحد بعينه [26]هم الذين ينقضون قولَ زينٍ وبرمانيدس [27]بأنّ هذين يقولان إنّ الواحد والموجود يُقالان على معان كثيرة . وعلى هذا المثال [28]يجري الأمر في التي من العرض ومن قِبَل كلّ واحد من تلك الأُخَر . [29]فأمّا بعض هذه فالنظر فيها يكون من أوائل سهلة وبعضها من التي هي عسرة جدّاً [b30]إذ﴾ا﴿ أُخذَت في جنسٍ ما وليس أن ينظر في أن هل هذا تبكيت أو ليس [31]بتبكيت ممّا يسهل والنظر في جميعها يكون على هذا المثال .

[32]والكلام الحادّ السديد هو الذي يجعلنا كثيري التشكُّك [33]وذلك أنّ هذا هو خاصّةً {377a1} الذي نَهَشَ . والتشكُّك يكون إمّا مُثنّى وإمّا مضاعفا أمّا ذاك [34]فبأن يُرفع من التي قد ألّفَت شيء من السؤالات وأمّا هذا [b35]ففي هذه الأشياء الأُخَر وكيف يقول القائل الأقاويل التي قد امتدّت . ولهذه العلّة [36]تكون الأقاويل الحادّة في القياسات خاصّةً هي التي تبعَثُنا على البحث .

b23 إذا [J B لان P : لان P J B **b30** لان [لان J B **b27** بأنّ] scripsi (= δὶὰ) نقل scr. B J **b24** هَل] P (= πότερον) **b23** كثيراً] corr. B J : كثير P ‖ P : نمس : [نَهَشَ] scripsi (= δάκνει) **b33** leg.? فَليس an : إذ vel اذ إذ J B ‖ وليس] P B J : إذ J B scripsi (= transl. Yaḥyā) : يمس B J [والتشكُّك ‖ والتشكيك B J ‖ مضاعفاً إمّا مُثنّى وإمّا [مُثنّى وإمّا مضاعفاً] s.p. P : sic ex interpolatione var. transl. pro διττῄ, ergo secl. وإمّا مُثنّى [إمّا (cf. 176a23 transl. Ibn Zurʿa) B J : مضاعف P **b34** شيء [شيئا] scripsi : شيا P : شيئا B J.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ (182 b 37 - 183 a 13)

[37]ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς λόγος δριμύτατος ἂν ἐξ [38]ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ. εἷς γὰρ [39]ὧν ὁ λόγος μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἅπαντας ὁμοίως [183a]ἕξει. [ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον [2]ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει] διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. [3]μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἴσου τὸ συμπέρασμα [4]ποιῶν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ ἐξ ἁπάντων ὁμοίων. [a5]οὗτος γὰρ ὁμοίως ποιήσει ἀπορεῖν ὁποῖον τῶν ἐρωτημάτων [6]ἀναιρετέον. τοῦτο δὲ χαλεπόν· ἀναιρετέον μὲν γάρ, ὅ [7]τι δ᾽ ἀναιρετέον ἄδηλον. τῶν δ᾽ ἐριστικῶν δριμύτατος μὲν ὁ [8]πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἄδηλος πότερον συλλελόγισται ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον [9]παρὰ ψεῦδός ἢ διαίρεσίν ἐστιν ἡ λύσις· δεύτερος δὲ τῶν [a10]ἄλλων ὁ δῆλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσίν ἐστι, [11]μὴ φανερὸς δὲ ὢν διὰ τίνος τῶν ἠρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἢ [12]διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πότερον αὕτη παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα [13]ἢ παρά τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστίν.

b37 λόγος γ Ψ* : μὲν λόγος AVΛDCδee **edd.** : λόγος μὲν B | **b38** μάλιστα² Ψ^Σ : om. Ψ^v | δοκούντων Ψ* : δοκούντων ἐνδόξων Vδ : δ᾽ οὐ τῶν ἐνδόξων γ | ἀναιρῇ Ψ^Σ : ἀναιρῇ καὶ κατασκευάζῃ Vδ Ψ^v : ἀναιρῇ τις ἢ κατασκευάζῃ γ | **b39** ὁ Ψ* : om. bD [Λ] | ἀντιφάσεως Ψ^v : προτάσεως Ψ^Σ | ἅπαντας Ψ^Σ : om. Ψ^v | ὁμοίως Λ Ψ^Σ M^c[191.30] : ὁμοίους αγDCδee Ψ^v? **edd.** | **183a1-2** ἀεὶ – ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει expunxi : hab. ω **BWS^WH** : ἀεὶ – ἀναιρήσει Ψ^Σ Colli, **R** : om. Ψ^v | **a1** ἀεὶ : δεῖ γ Ψ^Σ [Ψ^v] | ἐνδόξων Ψ^Σ : ἑνός γ [Ψ^v] | ἔνδοξον : ἔνδοξα Ψ^Σ [Ψ^v] | **a4** τοῖς Ψ* : om γC [Λ] | δὲ Ψ* : om. Cε | **a5** ἐρωτημάτων Ψ^v : ἐρωτημάτοιν Ψ^ZΨ^v | **a6** δὲ Ψ^v : γὰρ Ψ^Σ? | **a6-7** ἀναιρετέον Ψ^v : ἀναιρεῖν vel ἀναιρῶν Ψ^Σ | **a6** γάρ : γάρ ἐστιν β [Ψ*] | **a6-7** ὅ τι Ψ* : ὅτι Di | **a8** πρῶτον Ψ* : πρῶτος Gce | πότερον1 Ψ^YΨ^v : πρός τι οὖν Ψ^Z | ἢ οὔ Ψ* : om. γ | καὶ Ψ^Σ : καὶ εἰ συλλελόγισται VΨ^v | **a9** παρὰ : παρὰ τὸ c?D [ΛΨ*] | ἐστιν Ψ^Y : om. ΛD [Ψ^YΨ^v] | **a9-12** ἡ λύσις – λυτέος ἐστί Ψ^Σ : om. Ψ^v | **a10** ὁ δῆλος : ὁ δῆλον γ [Ψ*] | ἢ ἀναίρεσίν Ψ^Σ : ἡ ἀναίρεσις δ [Ψ^v] | **a11** ἠρωτημένων : ἐρωτημάτων Vee [Ψ^ΣΨ^v] | **a11-12** ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν ἀλλὰ Ψ^Σ : ἀναίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ γ : om. V [Ψ^v] | **a12** ἀλλὰ Ψ* : om. Ψ^v Ross, **R** : ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Wallies, S^W | λυτέος Ψ^Σ : λυτέον Dc [V][Ψ^v] | πότερον Ψ* : καὶ πότερον β Ψ^v | αὕτη Ψ* : om. Λ | **a13** om. Ψ^Σ : παρὰ Ψ^v.

Naql qadīm (182 b 37 - 183 a 13)

[37]والعِضاض فى المؤلّف من الكلام هو الذي يكون من [38]الذي يُظنّ كثيراً أنّ المحمود منها يُرفَع {377a14}/{378a6} ويُبطَل . لأنّ هذا [39]القول وإن كان قولاً واحداً إذا نُقِلَت مناقضةً مقدّمته [183a1]كان تأليفه واحداً. [* * *] [2.2]ومن أجل ذلك تجب المسئلة والحيرة فيه بالاضطرار . [3]فهذا القول خاصّةً وما كان مثله عِضاضﻬﹰ⟩ [و]هو الذي [4]يجعل النتيجةَ مساويةً للمسائل. والقول الذي فى مرتبة ثانية من الصعوبة هو الذي يجعل النتيجةَ من الكلّ شبيهةً به . [a5]فإنّ هذا القول أيضاً يُلجِئنا إلى أن نسأل في أيّ المقدّمتين [6]يُبطَل . وذلك عسر صعب لأنّ إبطال أحدهما واجب [7]فأمّا أيّهما يُبطَل فليس بمعروف . وأمّا الصعب من كلام أهل الشَغَب ⟨فَﻬﹷﻼّ [8]يكون استبان بصدْر الكلم أَلَّفَ منه المقياس أو لم يؤلَّف وإن كان [9]⟨ب⟩بتأليفٍ أَمِن كذب تأليفه أم من قسمته * * * [a12.2]ومن أجل النتيجة كان ذلك [13]أو من أجل المقدّمات .

b37 [العضاض] scripsi (= δριμύτατος) : القصاص P : الفُضاص vid. P : [يكون] *BJ* ‖ يوجب vel يُلزم an .? leg. **b38** [منها] بقَب : [نقَب] scripsi (= μετατιθεμένης) : نُقِلَت P *BJ* **b39** [ويُبطَل] scripsi (يُرفَع ويُبطَل) = ويوضع (= ἀναιρῇ): [منهما] *BJ* ‖ [يُبطِل] P : منهما P (parum clare) : بقيت *BJ* **183a1-2** [* * *] ἀεὶ … κατασκευάσει non vert. (vel non hab. Ψ^v) **a3** [عِضاضاً] scripsi (= δριμύς): [أيضاً] أيضاً post أيضاً scr. هـ...ا (illeg.) P, sed del. **a7** [وأمّا] P *BJ* : seclusi **a5** [مقياس] *J* ‖ [مَضاءَ] B : مَضاءٌ P : مضاص (= δριμύς): [بصدْر الكلم أَلَّفَ] scripsi (= πρῶτον εὐθὺς … πότερον συλλελόγισται) : [وأمّا …فَ] (= δ᾽) **a8** ‖ [فَ] *BJ* P : فأما P ‖ supplevi (= ἀλλὰ) om. (hom.? [scil. non vert. ἀλλὰ]) Ψ^v **a9-12** [* * *] ‖ [تأليف] *BJ* ‖ تأليفاً P : بتأليف، [المالف] scripsi : التالف P : نصف أو كل ما ألف P : نصرف اوكل مالف (ἀλλὰ) om. (hom.? [scil. non vert. ἀλλὰ]) Ψ^v.

Naql Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (182 b 37 - 183 a 13)

[37]أمّا الكلمة القياسيّة {376b16}/{377b2} التي هي أحدُّ فهي إن [38]كان يُرفَع من أكثرُ من هؤلاء اللواتي تُظنّ من قِبَل الأكثر التي تُرى. وذلك أنّه [39]إذ الكلمة هي واحدة ويُغَيَّر موضع المقدّمة تكون موجودات لها على هذا المثال بعينه جميعُ [183a1]هؤلاء المؤلَّفة. ويجب أن تُرفَع من اللواتي تُرين على هذا المثال بعينه التي هي مشهورة [2]ومن قِبَل هذا يضطرّ أن يشكك. [3]فأمّا التي هي أحدُّ فهي التي تصيّر النتيجةَ [4]في السؤالات من المساوية، وأمّا الثانية فالتي من جميع اللواتي يشبهن [a5]وذلك أنّ هذا يصيّر أن يتشكّك على مثال واحد [أن] أيّما من السؤالات [6]يُرفَع، وذلك أنّ هذا صعب [و]أمّا أنْ يُرفَع فهو أنّ [7]أيَّ لا يُعلَم وأمّا من هؤلاء المُرآئيات فإنّ الأحدَّ التي [8]ليست معلومةً من وقته ‹أمؤلَّفةٍ› أم لا وإنْ [9]الحلّ من الكذب هو أم من القسمة. وأمّا الثانية من هؤلاء [a10]الأُخَر فالتي هي معلومة هل من القسمة هي أم من الرفع، [11]وليست مبصرةً [أن] بتوسّط أيّ السؤالات [12]يجب أن يحلّ بالرفع أو بالقسمة لكن ايّما هذا من النتيجة [13]أو من شيء من السؤالات هو.

b38 تُظنّ [scripsi : s.p. P : يظن BJ ‖ تُرى [P : المشهورة supra lin. **b39** ويُغَيَّر موضع [scripsi (= μεταχιθεμένης) :
البقدّمة [P in textu : التناقض supra lin. **183a1** تُرفَع [scripsi : s.p. P : يرفع BJ ‖
‖ ونوضع [P : وتُغَيَّر وتوضع P : وتُغَيَّر BJ ‖ المقدّمة [P in textu : وبغير
BJ المشهورات [P in textu **a5** أن [supra lin. **a6** و[seclusi : habent P BJ **a7** أيَّ [scripsi]
(= τι) ان [أمّا الأحدُّ فالتي [P : واما الاحد فالتي : P فأمّا الأحدُّ فالتي [BJ إذ [P : إذ BJ ‖ اذ vel ان
a8 أمؤلَّفة [scripsi : مؤلف P BJ **a9** وإنْ الحلّ [scripsi (= καὶ πότερον ... ἡ λύσις) : وانا الحل : P (+) النقض supra lin.) :
BJ بتوسّط [scripsi (= διὰ) : بتوسّط P : سوسّط BJ ‖ **a11** ان P : أن corr. BJ : أم [BJ **a10** وبالحل
a12 يجب أن يحلّ [scripsi (= λυτέον ἐστίν) : يجب أن يوحد : P يوجد BJ.

Naql ʿĪsā b. Zurʿa (182 b 37 - 183 a 13)

[37]وأمّا القول القياسيّ الحادّ جدًّا فهو الذي [38]إنّما يكون على {377a3}/{377b19} الأكثر من الأمور المظنونة بأنّه إنّما يَرفَع على الأكثر الرأيَ المشهورَ. وذلك أنّ [39]القول الواحد إذا تُغيَّر وضع المقدّمة فيه كانت جميع [183a1]التأليفات الكائنة عنه على مثال واحد لأنّه من الواجب أن يكون رفعنا للأقاويل المشهورة بأقاويل مثلها مشهورة [2]ولهذه العلّة نضطرّ إلى التشكّك. [3]فأمّا الأقاويل الحادّة جدًّا فهي التي تنتِج بالسؤال عن الأمور المتساوية. والثاني هو الذي ينتج من جميع الأشياء المتشابهة [a5]وذلك أنّ هذه تجعل تشكّكنا على مثال واحد في أمر السؤالَين وأيِّهما نرفع. [6]وذلك أنّ هذا صعب لأنّه ليس نعلم أيّما منهما إذا رفعناه [7]يكون قد يضطرّنا. وأمّا الحادّ جدًّا من الأُمور المرآئية فهو الذي [8]لا يُعرَف من التي تُقال أوّلاً عندَما تُقال نحو ماذا يكون التأليف أو لا يكون وهل [9]النقْض من الكذب أو من القسمة. والثاني من تلك [a10]الأُخَر فهو الذي قد عُلمَ أنّه يكون من القسمة أو من الرفْع [11]إلّا أنّه ليس يظهر من أيّ السؤالات يكون النقض أبالرفع يكون أم [12]بالقسمة بل النظر في أن من أيّ هذين يكون هذا هل هو من الجمع [13]أو من بعض المسائل.

b38 بأنّه [scripsi : لانه P : لأنه BJ **a2** نضطرّ J : يضطرّ BJ الأقاويل [P : للأقاويل BJ **183a1** الأقاويل BJ الأقاويل [P **a6** نعلم [s.p. P : يعلم BJ **a7** يكون BJ
[وأمّا ... النقْض J BJ **a7-9** نكون قد نقضنا P : (parum clare) نكون قد نعضنا [in ἀναιρεθέντ] -τέον (=) : scripsi] نعصنا [قد يضطرّنا
a8 التأليف + القياس P supra lin. الرفْع + النقض [P **a10** supra lin. **a8** BJ (secl.?) om.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ (183 a 14-26)

[14]Ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν ὁ μὴ συλλογισθεὶς λόγος εὐήθης ἐστίν, [a15]ἐὰν ᾖ λίαν ἄδοξα ἢ ψευδῆ τὰ λήμματα· ἐνίοτε δ᾽ οὐκ [16]ἄξιος καταφρονεῖσθαι. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων [17]ἐρωτημάτων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος καὶ δι᾽ ὅ, καὶ μὴ προσλαβὼν [18]τοῦτο καὶ μὴ συλλογισάμενος εὐήθης ὁ συλλογισμός. [19]ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἔξωθεν, οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος, ἀλλ᾽ [a20]ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπιεικής, ὁ δ᾽ ἐρωτῶν ἠρώτηκεν οὐ καλῶς.

[21]Ἔστι τε, ὥσπερ λύειν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁτὲ δὲ [22]πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς οὐδέτερον [23]τούτων – ὁμοίως καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ἔστι καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς [24]τὴν θέσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, [a25]ὅταν ᾖ πλείονος χρόνου δεομένη ἡ λύσις ἢ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ [26]τὸ διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν λύσιν.

a14 μὴ Ψ[alt.-Z] : om. Ψ* | εὐήθης Ψ[Z]Ψ[v] : om. Ψ[Υ] | **a15** λίαν ἄδοξα Ψ[Σ] : ἄδοξα λίαν G : ἄδοξα Ψ[v] | ἄδοξα post hoc desinit manus vetus codicis e | **a17** περὶ Ψ[Σ] : παρὰ Ψ[v] | οὗ Ψ*? : ὅ V : ὧν γi : ἄ Ross, **R** | δι᾽ Ψ* : περὶ V : παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ δι᾽ γ | ὅ Ψ[v] : οὗ Di : οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί β : ὃ ὁ λόγος ἐστί Ψ[Σ] : ἄ Ross, **R** | καὶ[2] Ψ[v] : om. Vh Ψ[Σ]? **R** | προσλαβὼν Ψ* : προλαβὼν ε | **a19** δὲ Ψ[Σ] : δὲ οὐ τούτων ἀλλὰ Ψ[v] | οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος Ψ* : οὐ καταφρόνητος γ | ἀλλ᾽ Ψ* A[N78] : οὐδαμῶς ἀλλ᾽ αΛDCε edd. : οὐ κακῶς ἀλλ᾽ γ | **a20** ἠρώτηκεν Ψ[Σ] : ἠρώτησεν αDCε **W**S[W]**H** [ΛΨ[v]] | **a21** τε Ψ* : δέ βDδ **R** | ὥσπερ Ψ* : ὅπερ ε | **a22** οὐδέτερον Ψ[v] : οὐδ᾽ ἕτερον Ψ[Σ] | **a23** ὁμοίως Ψ* : ὁμοίως δὲ δ | **a24** πρὸς[1] Ψ* : om. ε | **a25-26** πλείονος χρόνου – τὴν λύσιν Ψ[Σ][partim] : ἡ λύσις Ψ[v] | **a25-26** δεομένη ἡ λύσις ἢ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ : om. Ψ[Σ] [Ψ[v]] | **a25** ἢ : exp. Ross, **R** [Ψ[v]*] | **a26** τὸ διαλεχθῆναι – λύσιν Ψ[Σ] : exp. Waitz, **S**[W] [Ψ[v]].

Naql qadīm (183 a 14-26)

[14]وربّما كان القول الذي فيه تأليف جاهلاً أهْلاً [a15]إذا كانت مقدّماته إمّا كاذبة وإمّا غير محمودة . وربّما لم[16] يستأهل التهاوُن لأنّه إذا كان ينقص شيء من [17]المسائل التي كهذه إمّا عند سامع القول وإمّا من قائله فلم يستدرك [18]ذلك ولم يؤلّفه فذلك القياس جاهل . [19]وإذا كان ذلك لا بنقْص القول بَل من الذى خارج من القول فليس القول بأهل أن يُحتَقَر لكن [a20]القول مذهب لينّ والسائل قد سأل ولم يجُد .

[21]فكما أنّه يجوز لنا مرّةً أن ننقض عند القول ومرّةً [22]عند المسائل أو المسئلة وربّما لم يجز ذلك ولا عند واحد [23]منهما بقدْر ذلك يجوز لنا أن نسأل وأن نؤلّف بقدْر [24]وضع الكلام والمجيب فيه وبقدْر الزمان [a25]إذا أمكننا أن ننقض فيه * * *

a14 أظنّه مجهول [أهْلاً corr. *B J* : اهل P **a16** ينقص] scripsi (= ἐλλείπῃ) : s.p. P : ينقض *B J* **a18** جاهل] + اهل P supra lin. corr. P[2] in **a19** بنقص] scripsi : نصد vel نصر P : بضدّ *B J* ‖ لكن] scripsi (= ἀλλ᾽) : لأن P : لاّ *B J* **a25** أن ننقض textu et in marg. : النقض (parum clare) P[1] *B J* ‖ * * *] ἢ … λύσιν (a25-26) non vert. (vel non hab. Ψ[v]).

Naql Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (183 a 14-26)

[14]فإنّه موجود حيناً الكلمة التي أُلِّفَت ﴿خطأ﴾[a15]إنْ كانت المأخوذات عن المشهورات أو الكاذبات كثيرة، وتوجد حيناً لا [16]يستحقّ أن يستهان بها . وذلك أنّه إذا كان ناقضاً شيء من هذه [17]السؤالات اللواتي كهذه نحو الذي الكلمة وللذي هو موجود للكلمة إذ لم يُرَدّ فيؤخَذ [18]هذا ولم يؤلّف فالقياس خطأ . [19]وأمّا إذا كان من هؤلاء اللواتي من خارج فليس يسهل أن يستهان به لكنّ [a20]الكلمة ليّنة وأمّا الذي سأل فلم يسأل جيّداً .

[21]وَموجود بمنزلة ما أنْ يحلّ موجودٌ أمّا حيناً فنحو الكلمة وأمّا حيناً [22]فنحو الذي يسأل ونحو السؤال وأمّا حيناً فَوَلا نحو آخر [23]من هؤلاء وعلى هذا المثال يوجد أنْ يسأل وأنْ يؤلّف نحو [24]الموضوعة ونحو الذي يُجيب ونحو الزمان أيضاً [a25]متى كان زمان كثير***[26]أن يتكلّم نحو الحلّ .

a14 موجود [BJ موجوداً = ἐὰν) scripsi [إنْ a15 .om. P BJ (= εὐήθης, cf. transl. Yaḥyā 183a18) : خطأ] supplevi BJ ‖ scripsi [شيء a16 ويوجد BJ ‖ الموجودات s.p. P : المأخوذات] P BJ ‖ فإن) : cf. transl. Ibn Zurʿa = τι) : سيا P : شيئاً BJ a17 الكلمة] للكلمة P BJ ‖ يُرَدّ فيؤخَذ scripsi = προσλαβὼν) : BJ موجوداً ما موجوداما P : موجود أمّا BJ a21 يحلّ] P ينقض supra lin. ‖ يرد فيأخذ : P نزد فآحد BJ a25 الحلّ] P in textu النقض supra lin. ‖ *** δεομένη ... καιροῦ non vert. (vel non hab. Ψᴱ).

Naql ʿĪsā b. Zurʿa (183 a 14-26)

[14]وربّما كان القول الذي أُلِّفَ ركيكاً [a15]إنْ كانت المأخوذة فيه إمّا بعيدةً من الشهرة جدّاً أو كاذبة وربّما كان لا [16]يستحقّ أن يستهان به . فإذا كان القول عادماً لشيء من أمثال هذه [17]المسائل نحو أيّ شيء كان القول ولأنّ المتكلم لم يأخذه مع ما أخذ [18]ولا ألّف فإنّ القياس يكون ركيكاً، [19]وإذا كان من الأشياء التي من خارج فليس يسهل أن يستهان به بل [a20]يكون القول رقيقاً وإن الذي سأل لم يسأل حسناً .

[21]وهذا مثل أن يُجعَل النقض أمّا أحياناً فمصروف إلى القول وأحياناً [22]مصروف إلى السائل وإلى السؤال وليس يكون في وقت من الأوقات مصروفاً إلى غير [23]هذه . وكذلك إذا سألنا فإنّ أن يسأل وأن يؤلّف يكون بحسب [24]الموضوع وبحسب المجيب وبحسب الزمان [a25]إذا كان الزمان * * * [26]الذي يُتَكلّم فيه في النقض زماناً طويلاً .

a14 أُلِّفَ] P in textu لم يولف الذى P supra lin. ‖ J (.secl.?) مع ما] J معما : P corr. a17 لم] BJ ‖ P B : om. لم يؤلّف] P B : om. (secl.?) J ‖ معما : P corr. a20 وإن] B على ما scripsi (= δ᾽, cf. *GALex* vol. 1) : فإن P BJ ‖ حسنا] + حيدا (.i.e جيّداً) P supra lin. a23 فإنّ] scripsi : زمان طويل BJ : corr. P. a25 * * * δεομένη ... καιροῦ non vert. (vel non hab. Ψᴱ) a26 زماناً طويلاً] زمان طويل BJ : corr. فإذ P : فان BJ.

§ 3. Notes on the Arabic translations

The following remarks provide some additional information on the three Arabic translations and concern partly issues that could not be formalised for the purposes of the critical apparatuses or would have blown them up inappropriately, and partly data irrelevant for the critical establishment of the text in the proper sense, yet of interest for questions of translation technique or text transmission. Furthermore, we mention here two critical notes added in ms. P in red ink underneath ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa's translation.

182 b 7 While **Q** paraphrases παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι through في وجوه كثيرة ("in many ways"), **Y** and **I** point to παρά τι καὶ ἕν τινι (or a Greek text lacking diacritics).

182 b 9 (i) The reason for the omission in **Q** is not quite clear. A reflect of τὸν αὐτὸν may be found in the clause وكثيراً ما يكون الكلام كلاماً واحداً ("and often the argument is one and the same"), tolerably paraphrasing a phrase like πολλάκις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκεῖνοι[ς] ὄντες τὸν αὐτὸν, so that we may assume an omission of γὰρ λόγον … ὁ αὐτός in Ψᵛ (hom. αὐτὸν … αὐτὸς).

(ii) Interestingly, **I** confirms the reading γινόμενον, whereas تُدعا in **Y** points to λεγόμενον (= ms. γ). For *nusiba* c. *ilā* as equivalent of ontological παρά with acc. in **I**, cf. *SE* 179 a 7 (similarly in Ps.-Isḥāq's translation of *De Anima* II 9, 421 a 23f). Similar divergences occur in 182 b 19 and 182 b 35 (see Endress-Hasper, "Arabic Tradition" [above, p. 77], pp. 70-1).

182 b 12 The reading أنّها (instead of أنه in P, adopted by Jabre, deleted or omitted by Badawī) in **Y** is required by the antecedent هؤلاء and by the predicate لا تكون معلومةً.

182 b 13 While ὥσπερ οὖν corresponds perfectly with فإنّه بمنزلة ما in **Y**, οὖν is not explicitly reflected in **I**. It was definitely missing in Ψᵛ, which is why **Q** took the ὥσπερ-clause as a continuation of the preceding one and reiterated the preceding negating (μὴ 182 b 12) لا … ولا كَ ("not … and not like/insofar as …").

182 b 14 أمّا هذه (= consecutive τὰ μὲν) in **I** is a continuation of the preceding thought (similar to أمّا هؤلاء in **Y**). The prefixed *fa-* in P is due to the error of a copyist, who either took a misplaced *Hamza* (in خطأ) for *fa-* or did not understand the syntactical structure of the sentence.

182 b 15-16 لا سيّما for καὶ γάρ in **Q** is strange. On the other hand, this adverb is used in **Q** in various, partly rather inadequate, ways (e.g. = εἰ δὲ 175 b 24, = εἴπερ 175 a 18, 177 b 3, = ἐπείπερ 178 a 5, = μάλιστα 169 a 33, = καὶ 168 b 19, = μᾶλλον γάρ 174 b 4). At the present place, it can be taken as an indicator for the fact that the absence of any Arabic equivalent of εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν is due to, not an omission in the Arabic transmission, but rather a lacuna in Ψᵛ which leaves the clause without predicate and the translator baffled as to the function of καὶ γάρ.

182 b 17 (i) متوثّباً (**Q**) without any diacritics in P, probably correctly conjectured by Badawī. Alexander, in Nifo 107 b, and in his wake also Michael of Ephesus, *In Sophisticos Elenchos* 189.4-16, took this example to be one of ambiguity between the passive and medial meaning of στέλλεσθαι, **Q** choosing the medial meaning "to rush/head towards s.th." (*tawaṭṭaba* c. ʿalā), and **Σ** choosing the passive meaning "to be sent/dispatched to [a place]"; (= *arsala* in **Y**, *anfaḏa* in **I**), cf. the alternative rendition in Michael of Ephesus, *In Soph. El.* 189.4-16 and now also Alexander (in Nifo 107 b). Moreover, **Σ** took κεραία (whose primary meaning is "horn", and metaphorically stands for anything which resembles a horn in some way, e.g. "*antenna*" (of insects), anything projecting like a horn, including the relevant meaning here: "yard-arm" – see

LSJ ad locum – = سنان الرُّمْح "projecting part of a lance" in **Q**) as a proper name of the person mandating this mission which, as a consequence, is not translated but transliterated (badly preserved in the Syro-Arabic transmission). Strikingly, also Alexander misread κεραία, namely as κερμαν (Nifo 107b), but it is unlikely there is a connection. (The correct ambiguity of the example concerns the lexical meaning of στέλλεσθαι, which in a highly specialised nautical context, e.g. πρὸς τὴν κεραίαν, "to the yard-arm", means "to take in the sails and attach them to", while it normally means something along the lines as understood by Alexander – see *LSJ ad locum*). [1]

(ii) Furthermore, **Σ** read ποι (= *ilā makān* Y, *ilā baʿḍi l-mawāḍiʿ* I) instead of ὅπου. The Arabic versions **Y** and **I** of the entire example (καὶ ὅπου ... κεραίαν) have been replaced with ugh fantasy texts in Badawī and Jabre.

182 b 18 Instead of رُتِّبَ in **Y** and **I** the manuscript has in both cases only the rasm. Badawī and Jabre propose the reading رأيت which can hardly be derived from the Greek τέξεται. More likely (and without necessitating any modification of the rasm) is the assumption that **Σ** read some form of τάσσω (probably τάξεται) for which we often find some form of رَتَّبَ ("to arrange, put in order") in Arabic translations, e.g. Arist., *Metaph.* VI 2, 1026 b 15, *De Partibus anim.* I 1, 641 b 18, *EN* III 12, 1119 b 17, *EN* IV 5, 1125 b 35; Ptol., *Almagest* I 1, pp. 512.15, 543.11 in the translation ascribed to Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn/Thābit b. Qurra; Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, p. 48.8 Morani, etc..

182 b 19-20 (i) **Q** omits οὐ δῆτα ἀπεκτόνηκε ... Ἀπολλωνίδης either because he did not understand the Greek or because he deemed the previous examples sufficient for the illustration of Aristotle's point.

(ii) Due to the difficulty of the contents the transmission of versions **Y** and **I** is corrupt at many places (see the critical apparatuses), while Badawī and Jabre again provide self-made fantasy texts. The beginning of this passage in version **I** (وذلك أنّ) is marked with a *signe de renvoi* in red ink referring to the following text on the next page of the manuscript (likewise in red ink and probably by the same hand as of the main text):

في نقل ثاوفيلا والريح الشمال صافية لا بل وذلك أنّها قتلت المسكين والذي كان يشترى وأتُّرى أرحوس لا بل لكنّه أفولونيدس .

The note removes the incomprehensibility of ʿĪsā's version caused by the (miswritten) transliterations of οὐ δῆτα. However, it may likewise aim at pointing to the fact that وذلك أنّ does not correspond with καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας (rather reflecting ὅτι καθαρὸς ...). Again **Y** and **I** seem to affiliate with different branches of Greek manuscripts (cf. 182 b 9, b 35). While يُقتل in **I** corresponds to ἀπέκτεινε (= ms. δ), **Y** and Theophilus' translation quoted in this interspersed note (قتل / قتلت) support ἀπεκτόνηκε as in the remaining Greek manuscripts.

182 b 21 يكون in **I** lacks a subject. Should the following في be deleted or أمْرُ (or else الأمْرُ في) be read instead?

182 b 22 Σ did not realise the contrastive bias of τὰ δὲ. Therefore, both **Y** and **I** render the clause introduced by τὰ δὲ as a sort of explication on the afore-mentioned fallacies (τῶν ἄλλων [γενῶν]).

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[1] See Aristote, *Les réfutations sophistiques*, trad. et comm. par L.-A. Dorion, Vrin - Presses de l'Université Laval, Paris-Laval 1995, p. 402, n. 446.

182 b 23 رُبّما for πολλάκις in **Q** seldom, yet not unprecedented (cf. 175 a 22, Artemidor, *Oneirocr*. II, chap. 68, l. 30; Galen, *Quod animi virtutes*, p. 50.1).

182 b 26-27 The text in **Q** does not match the Greek. For διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἓν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν it says: "as (بقَدْر) the ways of [being/predicating] one become multiple (or: occur as a multiplicity) to the same extent (بقَدْر ذلك) being is used in multiple ways/senses". In the following chapter **Q** uses coordinated بقَدْر ذلك ... بقَدْر to translate comparative ὅσῳ ... τοσούτῳ (183 b 23f., similarly كَما ... بقدر ذلك for ὥσπερ ... ὁμοίως below, 183 a 21-23). The reason why he introduced such a comparative structure at the present place is not clear. In all likelihood, **Q** had some variant reading for λύουσι διὰ in front of him (**Q** uses بقَدْر c. gen. also for Greek prepositions, yet not for διὰ, cf. 168 a 23 κατά with acc., 170 a 28 παρά with acc., 183 a 22f. πρός with acc.). Furthermore, he may have read φαίνεται (≈ صارَت) as in ms. δ instead of φάναι, whereas λύουσι διὰ and φάναι are confirmed by **Y** (= من قبَل ... ومن قبل يحلّلون [sic leg. pro P]) and at leastly partly by **I**.

182 b 28 καὶ περὶ² was probably missing in Ψᵛ, thus causing the paraphrastic rendering of τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον in **Q**. While **I** translates περὶ¹ und περὶ² consistently with من, **Y** has في in the first case and من قبَل in the second. However, this does not necessarily mean that he had access to a variant reading παρά ... περί (= ms. δ), as he uses elsewhere various prepositions to render περί with acc., among them في (166 b 6, 167 b 4), على (165 a 25, 183 b 26), and لدي (170 b 26, 170 b 28).

182 b 29-31 (i) **Q** lacks a translation of οὐ ῥάδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων. The Arabic sentence is incomplete, which points to an omission in the Arabic transmission.

(ii) **Y** and **I** reflect a Greek text omitting καὶ¹ (182 b 30, present in **Q**), thus subordinating the λαβεῖν-clause to the preceding one.

(iii) وبعضه (= οἱ δὲ 182 b 29) in version **I** is marked with a *signe de renvoi* in red ink referring to the following text underneath ʿĪsā b. Zurʿa's translation (likewise in red ink and probably by the same hand as of the main text):

<div dir="rtl">

ثاوفيلا ويعسر أن يستدرك من القول في أيّ شيء قيلت

</div>

The reason for this note may be threefold. Firstly, it points out that ʿĪsā's explanatory addition من التي هي عسِرة جدًا is without correspondence in the Greek text and not supported by Theophilus' Syriac version. Secondly, it shows that Theophilus read καὶ λαβεῖν ... and translated this correctly as independent coordinated clause. Finally, it may be supposed to indicate that Theophilus correctly read ἐν τίνι (182 b 30) as opposed to ἕν τινι (γένει) read by **Σ** and translated by **Y** and **I** (= في جنْس ما). In all likelihood, the quotation from Theophilus' version should read في أيّ جنْس instead of في أيّ شيء.

182 b 33 إمّا مُثَنَّى وإمّا مضاعَفاً for διττή in **I** is odd and may trace back to a marginal variant reading (either مضاعَفاً for مُثَنَّى or vice versa) which at a certain point of the transmission has been interpolated into the main text. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa aimed at differentiating between two meanings of διττή, (i) of two mutually exclusive kinds and (ii) in two respects by its own nature. At 176 a 23 ʿĪsā uses مضعَّف for διττόν.

182 b 35 في هذه الأشياء الأُخَر in **I** clearly reflects the reading ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις instead of ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς (confirmed by **Q** and **Y**).

183 a 1-2 The dubious phrase ἀεὶ γὰρ … ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει is entirely absent from **Q**, whereas it is confirmed (except for the problematic part ἢ κατασκευάσει) by **Y** and **I** – see § 4.3. Instead of ἀεὶ Ψ^Σ (accordingly **Y** and **I**) read δεῖ (= ms. γ), but this shared error seems a mere coincidence.

183 a 6-7 (i) أمّا أن يُرفع in **Y** and إذا رفعناه in **I** point to a (circumstantial) participle form of ἀναιρέω (ἀναιρῶν? instead of ἀναιρετέον) in Ψ^Σ, cf. *GALex* I, *idā* 3.2, an 4.1, D. Gutas, *Theophrastus, On First Principles (Known as his Metaphysics)*, Brill, Leiden 2010 (*Philosophia Antiqua* 119), p. 436.

(ii) أيّا in **I** corresponds to ὅ τι and justifies the reading أيَّ for undotted اى or اد in **Y** (read as إذ by Badawī and Jabre).

183 a 9-12 The lacuna in **Q** is probably caused by a saut du même au même in the Arabic transmission (ending in قسمة/قسمته = διαίρεσιν). The following وَمِن أجْل points to καὶ πότερον (= ms. β) rather than ἀλλὰ πότερον.

183 a 14 μὴ is missing in all three Arabic versions. However, the copyist and editor of the Paris manuscript had access to another version which preserved a translation of μὴ. In order to make the reader aware of this, he elongated the horizontal stroke of the letter *Fā*' in أُلِّفَ = συλλογισθεὶς in such a way that he could add on top of it الذي لم يؤلّف = μὴ συλλογισθεὶς. Since he did so while copying ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa's version, he probably drew on Theophilus' translation, variant readings of which are usually noted in connection with **I**.[6]

183 a 17 **Q** takes οὗ in περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος as referring to the addressee of the speech (hence: سامع القول "he who listens to the speech/the argumentation") and analogously the following ὁ as referring to the person presenting the argument (قائلُهُ). Σ hits Aristotle's intention in the first case, but takes διά in δι' ὁ in a causal sense.

183 a 25-26 The transmission of the final clause of this chapter (ὅταν … τὴν λύσιν) is fragmentary in all Arabic versions. **Q** read the words ὅταν, ἡ λύσις, and probably one or two further words and fabricated the meaning "when we are able to solve it" (وإذا أمكننا أن ننقض, where أن ننقض is difficult to read in the manuscript and corrected twice, once *in textu* and again clear *in margine*, nevertheless النقض in Badawī and Jabre), while the passage δεομένη … καιροῦ was omitted in Ψ^Σ or ignored by **Σ**.

§ 4. Information provided by the three Arabic translations about the history of the text

§ 4.1. The common ancestor of all three Arabic translations

One of the theses about the three Arabic translations formulated by Endress-Hasper is that they share a common ancestor which is not the archetype or sub-archetype of the extant manuscript tradition. With the present edition of chapter 33 of the *Sophistici Elenchi* in the three Arabic translations, we may add more uniquely shared errors to the list:

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[6] Cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Contributions syriaques aux études arabes de logique à l'époque abbasside", *Aram* 3 (1991) 193-210, and Endress–Hasper, "The Arabic Tradition" (above, p. 77), pp. 70-4.

182 b 14 τοῖς : πᾶσι Ψ* ?
182 b 34 τις : τίς τι Ψ^Y : τι Ψ^Σ
183 a 14 μὴ Ψ^{alt.-Z} : om. Ψ*

Especially 183 a 14 is very convincing, but also the other two cases are suggestive: the chances that at 182 b 14 all three Arabic translations render a generalising use of the definite article here with 'all', whereas we have not found other such cases, are rather slim, while at the same time the shift from ⲧⲟⲓⲥ to ⲡⲁⲥⲓ is in uncial script quite possible; and at 182 b 34 all three translations feature the incorrect τι, while the variant τίς τι in the old translation is in likelihood due to correction from elsewhere. Moreover, there are also the following three cases, which provide corroborating evidence:

182 b 15 ὅπου στέλλεσθε AChi : ὅπου στέλλεσθαι BβDδe : ποι στέλλεται Ψ^Σ : προσστέλλεται Ψ^Y ? [Λ]
182 b 36 μᾶλλον ω Ψ^ZΨ^{alt.-v} : om. Ψ^YΨ^Y
183 a 5 ἐρωτημάτων ω Ψ^Y : ἐρωτημάτοιν Ψ^ZY^v

Though at 183 a 5 the corruption of ⲱ into ⲟⲓ is a familiar one, the fact that both Ψ^Z and Ψ^v feature the dual form is striking; it is quite possible that Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī did not render the dual form accurately, because he saw that it did not make good sense. At 182 b 15 not only are the three Arabic translations unique in reading the third person singular, but also the reading προσστέλλεται plausibly underlying the *translatio vetus* is most probably a corruption of the reading ποι στέλλεται, which we only find in Athanasius.

Thus the evidential base for the claim that they share a common ancestor which is not the archetype of the whole tradition has become much more solid. We may now treat it as an established fact.

§ 4.2. Contamination in one or more Arabic translations

On the basis of the fact that the three Arabic translations share a common ancestor one can identify more easily places at which one of these translations has been contaminated from elsewhere. In Endress–Hasper already quite a few places of contamination in any of the three translations have been listed. On the basis of the present editions of *Sophistici Elenchi* 33, we may add the following:

182 b 9 γινόμενον ABVΛDCehi Ψ^Σ : λεγόμενον cu Ψ^v : γινόμενον λεγόμενον Gb [Ψ^v]
182 b 19 ἀπεκτόνηκε ABVGbΛDCehi Ψ^Y : ἀπέκτεινε cu Ψ^Σ [Ψ^v]
182 b 26 φάναι ABVGbΛDCehi Ψ^Σ : φαίνεται cu Ψ^v ?
182 b 31 ὁμοίως ABVGbΛDCcuehi : ὁμοίως δὲ Ψ^Σ ? S[65.1]? [Ψ^v]
182 b 38 ἀναιρῇ ABΛDCehi Ψ^Σ : ἀναιρῇ καὶ κατασκευάζῃ Vcu Ψ^v : ἀναιρῇ τις ἢ κατασκευάζῃ Gb
182 b 39 ὁμοίως VΛ Ψ^Σ : ὁμοίους ABGbDCcuehi Ψ^v ?
183 a 1-2 ἀεὶ – ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει expunxi : om. Ψ^v : hab. ABVGbΛDCcuehi : ἀεὶ – ἀναιρήσει Ψ^Σ
183 a 8 καὶ ABGbΛDCcuehi Ψ^Σ : καὶ εἰ συλλελόγισται V Ψ^v
183 a 12 πότερον ABΛDCcuehi Ψ^Σ : καὶ πότερον VGb Ψ^v
183 a 17 ὅ ABΛCcuh Ψ^v : οὗ Di : οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί VGb : ὃ ὁ λόγος ἐστί Ψ^Σ

What we see is that there is more contamination in the exemplar of the *translatio vetus* than in Athanasius' exemplar, and that the use of an external source caused Ibn Zurʿa's translation to be a more contaminated source than Athanasius' exemplar. Only the readings in Ψ^Υ at 182 b 9 and in Ψ^Σ at 183 a 17 betray clear contamination in Athanasius' exemplar. These results are in line with those described in Endress-Hasper (see above).

§ 4.3. Comments to the Greek text, also in relation to the Arabic translations

182 b 13 ὥσπερ οὖν versus ὥσπερ: The evidential situation is very interesting, since Nifo makes it clear that Herminus and Alexander did not read οὖν, just as the *translatio vetus*, while the whole of the rest of the tradition does have οὖν. There are basically two possibilities: (1) Aristotle wrote οὖν, but it was struck in the part of the tradition known to Herminius and Alexander,[7] and again in the part of the tradition immediately leading up to the exemplar for the *translatio vetus* (whether or not under influence of those commentaries); (2) Aristotle did not write οὖν, but it was very successful in finding its way into the text at an early stage of the tradition, including in the part leading up to Athanasius' translation, but with the exception of the exemplar for the *translatio vetus*. Both scenarios are really possible; this is obvious for (1), but there are enough examples of (2) almost obtaining, also in the case of the *Sophistici Elenchi*. There are not really facts of the matter about the tradition available which make the one scenario more plausible than the other.

There is not much of a difference between the two possibilities, for if possibility (1) obtains, ὥσπερ οὖν is here not used in such a way that it is to be picked up by an explicit or implicit "in this way", but rather as starting an independent sentence, meaning "as indeed" (see *LSJ* and Montanari *ad locum*), in this context getting close to meaning something like "for example" or the contemporarily quite ubiquitous "like". This use is rather frequent in Aristotle: there are further examples, among others, at *Anal. Pr.* I 15, 34 a 22; *Metaph*. III 4, 1000 a 1; *EN* III 8, 1116 b 12; *EN* V 9, 1137 a 2; and *EN* V 11, 1138 b 11.

It may well be that the issue is only going to be decided if we have statistical evidence on the usage of ὥσπερ versus ὥσπερ οὖν, in Aristotle but especially in late antiquity.

182 b 16 ὅπου στέλλεσθε versus ὅπου στέλλεσθαι and ποῖ στέλλεσθε: This is a difficult case. Almost the whole extant Greek tradition has ὅπου στέλλεσθαι, which is problematic for two reasons: why ὅπου, which is normally only used in dependent questions, and why the infinitive στέλλεσθαι? To discuss the verb first, there are several further sources (a citation by Michael of Ephesus, Nifo's report about Alexander) which feature the second person plural form στέλλεσθε, which in late ancient times was not really distinguishable in pronunciation from the infinitive. On the other hand, the third person singular form στέλλεται in all three Arabic translations seems to confirm that the archetype of the extant

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[7]   Gysembergh, *Forgotten Ancient Commentaries* (above, n. 3), p. 74, n. 2, thinks it is possible that Nifo's statement: "*Textum hunc legit Herminius et Alexander sine verbo illo igitur*" might mean that Herminus and Alexander themselves proposed the change of striking οὖν, but we find that difficult to believe because there is no reference whatsoever, however indirectly, to what might be the reason for such a proposal, and because Nifo says that both did not 'read' it – since we may assume Alexander knew Herminus' work, it seems odd to imagine that both introduced the change. Moreover, given that there is in fact not that much of a difference between ὥσπερ and ὥσπερ οὖν (see the main text), it seems difficult to imagine that Herminus and Alexander would want to interfere in the text they found by striking οὖν.

tradition did have the infinitive form – the form στέλλεται may well be an attempt to solve the problem with the infinitive. If we assume that Alexander's commentary is older than the archetype of the extant tradition, it is open to us to adopt the form στέλλεσθε, and to express our surprise that in the extant manuscript tradition the infinitive form was subject to correction to such a small extent.

As to the interrogative pronoun, the evidence of the Arabic translations points to ποῖ rather than ὅπου, for it seems impossible that Athanasius' translation "to somewhere" translates ὅπου, whereas it can translate ποι without accent. Also the corruption προσστέλλεται presumably underlying the *translatio vetus* points in the direction of ποῖ, since, due to the similarity between uncial ϲ and ι, poi only differs clearly from ΠΡΟϹ by the letter Ρ, which after the strokes of Π and before the round Ο is not such a big deal. If then, however, ὅπου is to be a corruption of ποῖ, one may wonder where it came from, for the initial Ο is a real addition. The only scenario seems to be that ποι was corrupted to που, and since this did not make sense given the answer, it was corrected into ὅπου, but would not a correction back into ποῖ be much easier?

It is therefore worthwhile to consider an alternative scenario, namely one in which ὅπου is the original reading. Even though ὅπου normally only features in indirect questions, this seems possible, namely when a question context is understood; there is an example in Aristophanes, *Nubes*, v. 214, also mentioned by Montanari *ad locum*. As it seems anyway unlikely that Aristotle himself made up the examples, we can easily imagine him taking over the question in isolation from the question context. Readers of the text, however, could easily have thought that ὅπου was incorrect and thus have introduced ποῖ, as someone writing a commentary, like Alexander, is almost forced to do in the paraphrase anyway.

182 b 19-20 οὐ δῆτα – Ἀπολλωνίδης: The fact that this stretch is both missing in the exemplar of Boethius' translation and in that of the *translatio vetus* cannot be traced back to the archetype, since Alexander seems to have read it.

182 b 37 λόγος versus μὲν λόγος: The deviant position of μὲν in B, after λόγος, is best explained by μὲν having been added. Thus the reading of the sub-archetype for ABVGb is without μὲν, since both the ancestor of B and the ancestor of Gb do not have it. The absence of μὲν in all three Arabic translations establishes now conclusively that the archetype did not feature it.

182 b 39 ὁμοίως versus ὁμοίους: There is not that much of a difference in content between the adverb and the adjective, as with both readings the sentence says that a single argument contains, on the basis of contraposition, "all similar deductions" or "all deductions similarly" (for the meaning of that claim, see the next comment). These arguments are all similar or are contained all similarly in that each of them have acceptable premises and a conclusion which is the negation of an acceptable proposition. The reading ὁμοίως seems to be that of the sub-archetype of the one branch of the stemma, because it is found in Athanasius and Boethius, but also occurs in the other branch of the stemma, namely in V and in *Ambr. gr.* D 82 sup., a 14th century manuscript closely related to Gb. While ὁμοίως is the *lectio difficilior*, the reading ὁμοίους is thus a successful simplification which took over almost the whole of the extant tradition, including Gb and probably Ψᵛ.

183 a 1-2 ἀεὶ – ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει expunxi: As it is, the text of all extant Greek sources as well as Boethius' exemplar is logically incorrect. The sentence at issue is meant

to elucidate the claim just above that "a deductive argument is most aggressive if it destroys something that is most acceptable on the basis of things that are most accepted": a valid argument A with premises p_1 and p_2 and conclusion not-q, with p_1, p_2 and q all being equally acceptable. Aristotle first elucidates this claim by saying that A will contain, by contraposition, all [other] deductions on an equal footing: p_1, p_2, therefore not-q is equivalent to p_1, q, therefore not-p_2 is equivalent to p_2, q, therefore not p_1. If there is no way to prefer one of p_1, p_2 and q over any of the others, such an argument (including its equivalents) will produce a puzzlement which one cannot escape from, because any two of the three propositions is shown to be inconsistent with the third. It is this idea that the line at issue should spell out: "For all the time [i.e. every one of these equivalent arguments] it will destroy or establish on the basis of acceptable things something which is equally acceptable". However, it does not do so correctly, because the point that such an argument "will establish" cannot apply, as it is crucial for contraposition that there is a negation.

There are basically two ways in which one might respond to this problem. The first is chosen by Ross (on a proposal by Colli), but can already be found in the Syriac translation by Athanasius: strike the problematic ἢ κατασκευάσει as a later addition. By itself, however, that is not enough, for if the sentence without ἢ κατασκευάσει were the original text, one would need to explain how this addition became part of the manuscript tradition in the first place – and that seems very difficult, especially because it would have to be inserted at least two times, once for each main branch of the stemma (for the common ancestor of ABVGb and at least for Boethius' exemplar, it being unclear from which side of the stemma manuscripts DCcuehi get this reading).

The second way to solve the problem is to take one's lead from the *translatio vetus* and argue that the whole sentence is to be struck. In this way it is easier to explain how the erroneous part arose: the whole sentence started its life as a gloss by someone who did not quite understand the situation, and then this gloss was deemed attractive enough (as it for the most part is) to take over the whole extant manuscript tradition – with the exception of the translation by Athanasius or its exemplar, where the troublesome words were struck again. And one can see that it is a gloss, for it does not add any information which is not already formulated explicitly in the previous sentence: ἐξ ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον covers ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον and also ὁμοίως, and is even less informative; ἀναιρήσει covers ἀναιρῇ; and ἀεὶ is present in ἅπαντας … τοὺς συλλογισμούς. Also for understanding the next sentence the sentence at issue is superfluous.

183 a 19 εὐκαταφρόνητος versus εὐκαταφρόνητος οὐδαμῶς: Before the evidence from the three Arabic translations and Nifo's reports about Alexander became available, one might still have thought that οὐδαμῶς was the reading of the archetype, but was struck in Vcu because it does not add that much to the content. It now appears to be the other way round: οὐδαμῶς is an early addition to the text which was very successful in conquering much of the extant manuscript tradition.

183 a 20 ἠρώτηκεν versus ἠρώτησεν: In terms of content there is not much to choose between the perfect and the aorist here, and also paleographically uncial κ and c resemble each other (the stroke being the difference), frequently the one being mistaken for the other. The evidence of Athanasius' translation tips the scales for the perfect.