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Editor in Chief: Cristina D'Ancona (cristina.dancona@unipi.it)

Mailing address: Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere, via Pasquale Paoli 15, 56126 Pisa, Italia.

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Università di Pisa

Piazza Torricelli 4 - 56126 Pisa

P. IVA 00286820501 · Codice Fiscale 80003670504

Tel. +39 050 2212056 · Fax +39 050 2212945

E-mail press@unipi.it · PEC cidic@pec.unipi.it

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Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 300, f. 1v; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1853, f. 186v

That In Virtue of Which Something Is a Being

Note on Damascius, De Principiis II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink

Roberto Granieri*

Abstract

At *De Principiis* II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink, Damascius states that ‘Being will be that which provides being itself to each thing, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστὶ’. The modern reference translation of the *De Principiis*, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders the phrase left here in Greek as ‘et selon ce qu’elle est comme être’. Combès interprets it by stating that being is here conceived of as the constitutive unity of each form, at once responsible for both its essence and existence. I argue that both a translation and an interpretation of καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστὶ of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and I defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s *Sophist* – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of *De Principiis* II, pp. 56-99 Westerink.

At *De Principiis* II, p. 75.10-11¹ Damascius writes:

Ὅν τοίνυν ἔσται τὸ παρεχόμενον ἐκάστῳ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστὶ. 10

11 ὄν s.u. B (= *Marcianus gr.* 247) : ἄν A (= *Marcianus gr.* 246)

The modern reference translation of the *De Principiis*, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders these lines as follows (emphasis mine):

L’être sera donc ce qui procure à chaque chose le fait même d’être, et selon ce qu’elle est comme être.

Combès glosses this translation by affirming: ‘[l’être est] l’unité interne constitutive de chacune [*scil.* chaque forme], à la fois dans son existence et dans son essence’.²

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¹ I use Westerink’s edition of the Greek text of the *De Principiis*, as printed in Damascius, *Traité des premiers principes*, texte établi par L.G. Westerink et traduit par J. Combès, 3 vols., Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1986-1991 (Collection des Universités de France). Translations are mine.

² Damascius, *De Principiis*, II, p. 75 n. 2 (*Notes complémentaires*, p. 249).

I propose in this note to show that both a translation and an interpretation of $\kappa\alpha\theta' \delta \tau\iota \delta\upsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and to defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s *Sophist* – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of *De Principiis* II, pp. 56-99.

Translation Issues

Combès’ translation encounters three main difficulties:

1. It suggests that δ at p. 75.11 is a case of relative pronoun with omitted antecedent (‘selon ce qu’elle’).³ Combès can thus interpret this pronoun as referring to the essential determination that makes each being what it is, which is not mentioned in or near ll. 10-11. Relative pronouns with omitted antecedent are of course a perfectly clear and standard construction in ancient Greek, but its application to these lines is both unnecessary and unnatural: in all likelihood, the antecedent of δ is not omitted, but is $\delta\upsilon\acute{\nu}$ at l. 10.
2. Combès also questionably renders the indefinite pronoun $\tau\iota$ as if it were an $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ (or a $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$) referring to the previous $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\omega$ (‘selon ce qu’elle’ [*scil.* chaque chose]). Instead, the correct rendering of $\tau\iota$ is, plainly, ‘something’.
3. Finally, Combès interprets, again unnaturally, $\delta\upsilon\acute{\nu}$ at l. 11 not as a predicate nominative, but as a circumstantial participle.

Of the two other main modern translations of Damascius’ *De Principiis*, namely those of Ahbel-Rappe⁴ and Galpérine,⁵ the former renders our passage as follows (emphasis mine):

therefore Being (*on*) will be whatever provides Being (*einai*) to each thing, as well as that according to which it is a being (*on*).

Thus, Ahbel-Rappe’s translation runs into the second of the aforementioned difficulties encountered by Combès’, but neither the first nor the third. In addition it dubiously renders $\tau\acute{o}$ $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\chi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ as ‘whatever provides’, rather than simply ‘what provides’ or ‘that which provides’.

³ Perhaps Combès was also encouraged in this by the comma following $\tau\acute{o}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, originally placed by Ruelle (Damascii *Successoris Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis*, In *Platonis Parmenidem*, ed. C.E. Ruelle, 2 vols., Klincksieck, Paris 1889-99, I, p. 134.17) and maintained by Westerink, which is neither necessary nor erroneous, but whose removal may improve the text’s readability.

⁴ *Damascius’ Problems & Solutions Concerning First Principles*, translated with introduction and notes by S. Ahbel-Rappe, Oxford U.P., New York 2010 (Religion in Translation Series).

⁵ Damascius, *Des premiers principes. Apories et résolutions*, introduction, notes et traduction par M.-C. Galpérine, Verdier, Lagrasse 1989 (Philosophie).

Galpérine's translation is the most accurate of the three, runs into none of the difficulties encountered by Combes' and goes as follows (emphasis mine):

Donc sera étant ce qui procure à chacun l'être même et selon quoi chacun est étant.⁶

However, ἐκάστω is certainly neutral and Galpérine should have translated it as 'chaque chose' rather than 'chacun'. Further, Galpérine does not translate $\tau\iota$ at all; and she also takes the subject of ἔστω to be an implicit ἕκαστον, which is possible (see below) but, again, should have been rendered as 'chaque chose' rather than 'chacun'.

The translation I propose is:

Accordingly, being will be that which provides each thing with being itself and in virtue of which something is a being.

Unlike Galpérine, I take $\tau\iota$ to be the subject of ἔστω. An alternative construction takes an implicit ἕκαστον to be the subject of ἔστω and $\tau\iota$ to modify ὄν,⁷ which results in a translation along these lines 'and in virtue of which each thing is a certain being'. Although I do not favor this translation, it remains possible, provided that we do not interpret it as meaning that Being is that in virtue of which each thing is (not just, generically, a certain being but) the specific kind of being it is, i.e. as meaning that Being is that which metaphysically explains what something is (more on this later).

Further, unlike Combes, Galpérine and Ahbel-Rappe, unanimous in (legitimately) translating κατά as 'according to' or 'selon', I give this preposition a causal shade of meaning,⁸ because I interpret the phrase καὶ καθ' ὃ $\tau\iota$ ὄν ἐστω as drawing an implication from what precedes in the passage: since being is what provides being itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι) to each thing, then it is that in virtue of which something is a being.⁹ Thus, the first part of the passage (until

⁶ Galpérine translates l. 11 according to the correction (*supra lineam*) ὄν of the *Marc. gr. Z. 247*, instead of ἄν of the *Marc. gr. Z. 246*. This correction is also adopted by Westerink, but not by Ruelle. Regrettably, however, Galpérine fails to mention this in her list of 'corrections apportées au texte du *Marcianus graecus 246*' (Dam., *Des premiers principes*, p. 806 Galpérine). It is worth notice that the same paleographical mistake (ἄν instead of ὄν) is found in the *Marc. gr. Z. 236* = Ioannes Philoponus, *De Aeternitate mundi*, ed. H. Rabe, Teubner, Leipzig 1899 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), p. 607.26. The *Marc. gr. Z. 246* (Damascius) and the *Marc. gr. Z. 236* (Philoponus) both belong to the famous 'Philosophical Collection'. Westerink mentions the confusion α/ο in the list of the 'Fautes d'ordre paléographique' of the *Marc. gr. Z. 246* he gives in Dam., *De Principiis*, I, p. LXXXVI, and explains that it is probably due to "une copie intermédiaire en minuscule".

⁷ For the locution $\tau\iota$ ὄν, cf. e.g. Dam., *De Principiis* I, p. 66.17 Westerink; II, p. 164.9 Westerink; *Commentaire du Parménide de Platon*, texte établi par L.G. Westerink, introduit, traduit et annoté par J. Combes avec la collaboration de A.-Ph. Segonds (et C. Luna pour le tome IV), 4 vols., Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1997-2003 (CUF), III, p. 189.18.

⁸ Cf. H.G. Liddell-R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Rev. and augmented throughout by Sir H.S. Jones, with the assistance of R. McKenzie, Clarendon Press, Oxford 19409, s.v. B IV.

⁹ For the sake of clarity, the translation 'according to' or 'selon' remains possible (and could be paralleled, cf. e.g. Plot., *Enn.* III 7 [45] 2.17-9 Henry-Schwyzler²) and I do not rest anything heavy on my chosen rendering as 'in virtue of'. Compare also e.g. Aristot., *Cat.* 8, 8 b 25 Minio-Paluello: ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται; *EN Z* 10, 1142 b 34-1143 a 1 Bywater: Ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνετοὺς; Euclidis *Elementa*, ed. J.L. Heiberg - E.S. Stamatis, 4 vols., Teubner, Leipzig, 1969-1973 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), VII def. 1.1 (vol. II, p. 40): Μονάς ἐστω, καθ' ἣν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν λέγεται, quoted by Iamblichus *In Nicomachi arithmeticae introductionem liber*, ed. H. Pistelli - U. Klein, Teubner, Stuttgart 1975 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), p. 11.5-6.

αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι) describes the providing of being by focusing, so to say, on the active pole (what provides being); the rest of the passage (καὶ καθ' ὃ τι ὄν ἐστι) by focusing on the passive pole (what is provided with being).

Based on this translation, I want to defend the following interpretation: being – that is, as we shall see, the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion Damascius draws from Plato's *Sophist* – is here conceived of by Damascius as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal will turn out to fit better with the broader context of the argument of *De Principiis* II, pp. 56-99, a section aptly entitled in the Westerink-Combès edition 'De l'Unifié comme être'.

The Argument of De Principiis II, pp. 56-99 and The Property of Being

1. The Unified, the meanings of ὄν and the Kind Being

Starting from II, p. 56,¹⁰ Damascius pursues an investigation into the third principle of his metaphysical hierarchy, 'the Unified' (τὸ ἡνωμένον),¹¹ but regarded no longer according to its conception as mixed and unified (οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ μικτοῦ καὶ ἡνωμένου), which was the topic of pp. 44-50, but as being and substance (ὄν καὶ οὐσία). Syrianus and Proclus had conceived of the third metaphysical principle in these terms,¹² and Damascius thinks it worthwhile to assess this view.

This investigation begins with a work of semantic clarification of the term ὄν (pp. 56.9-57.11), of which Damascius distinguishes four meanings:

1. Being as one of the kinds of being (p. 56.10: ἐν τι τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος), i.e. the five simple or generic forms (p. 56.12: εἰδῶν τῶν ἀπλῶν; 56.14-5: τοῖς γενικοῖς εἶδεσιν) of Plato's *Sophist*. This being is therefore form-like (p. 56.12: εἰδητικόν);
2. Being as the entire plenitude of kinds (p. 56.15-6: τὸ ὀλοφρὲς πλήρωμα τῶν γενῶν), which is properly called substance (p. 56.16: οὐσίαν ἰδίως καλοῦμεν);
3. Being as what subsists before the soul (p. 56.18-57.1: τὸ πρὸ ψυχῆς ὑφεστώς);
4. Being as summit of the intelligible all (p. 57.4-5: τὸ ἄκρον τοῦ νοητοῦ παντός), that which is intelligible in an absolute way (p. 57.5: ὁ δὲ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ νοητόν).

The question then arises as to which of these meanings (σημαινόμενα) or conceptions (ἔννοιαι) is the one relevant to the notion of the third principle as being and substance (p. 57.12-3). In fact, not all of these four meanings will equally be scrutinized by Damascius and the first two are evidently prominent in his analysis.¹³

¹⁰ Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, references to the *De Principiis* are to Volume II of Westerink's edition (above, n. 1).

¹¹ 'Damascius' rendering of the 'one being' (*hen on*) that underlies the second hypothesis of the Parmenides' (G. Van Riel, "Damascius", in L.P. Gerson [ed.], *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, 2 vols. Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2010, II, pp. 667-96, in part. p. 680).

¹² For a first approach to Proclus' views on being, cf. C. D'Ancona, "La doctrine néoplatonicienne de l'être entre l'Antiquité tardive et le Moyen Age", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 59 (1992), pp. 41-85 (repr. in Ead., *Recherches sur le Liber De Causis*, Vrin, Paris 1995 [Études de philosophie médiévale, 72], pp. 121-53).

¹³ One may be tempted to think that this is because the last three meanings end up boiling down to the same

Damascius begins with the first candidate, which seems a plausible one on account of its simplicity (p. 56.14-5: ἀπλοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄν) and the consequent suitability of its own ἔννοια to the first Being. Presumably Damascius reasons that since a Form is in itself purely the property its name names, the Kind or Form of Being is in itself purely being. This makes the notion of a Kind Being apparently suitable for the first being (p. 57.15: πρέπουσαν... τῷ πρώτῳ ὄντι), viz. the Unified.¹⁴ However, the Kind Being is indeed just one among the Kinds (cf. also p. 84.11-2); whereas the Being-Unified is a totality encompassing all things in an undifferentiated way (p. 57.19: πάντα ἀδιακρίτως; cf. also III, pp. 120.20-121.4). Thus, it embraces all Kinds and cannot consequently be identical with any of them, including the Kind Being (p. 57.13-21; p. 58.13-4; p. 64.12-5).

One is thus invited to conclude that the first candidate meaning of ὄν should be rejected; and the second (being as the whole totality of Forms) has good chances of capturing the meaning of ὄν relevant to the Unified. Yet, Damascius' solution is more subtle and complex; and the notion of being related to the Kind Being is not simply jettisoned. Remember that Damascius has taken care of emphasizing that the Unified is all things, but in an undifferentiated way (p. 57.19); and he has also pressed, on the one hand, that the second meaning of ὄν is that of the full plenitude of Forms; on the other, that the main reason for choosing the first candidate to capture the meaning of ὄν relevant to the Unified was the simplicity of the notion of being proper to the Kind Being (p. 57.13-6). On these premises, Damascius submits the following solution (pp. 57.22-58.1): perhaps we should not choose one or the other meaning of ὄν, but we must bring them together (p. 57.22: συλλαβεῖν; p. 57.25: κατ' ἀμφοτέρα), and take the notion of simplicity from the former (Being as a Kind) and that of totality from the latter (Being as the plenitude of Forms). Thus, the Kind Being accounts for the simplicity of the Unified (p. 57.22-3: τὸ μὲν ἀπλοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς γένους) and is therefore that in virtue of which we call the Unified ὄν and all beings ὄντα (cf. p. 64.20-1;¹⁵ and p. 84.11-3), whereas Substance, namely the complete world constituted by all beings, accounts for the plenitude and totality of the Unified (p. 57.23-4: τὸ δὲ σύμπαν καὶ ἀμπληρες ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ πάντων συντεθειμένης οὐσίας). It is therefore in this more sophisticated sense that the third metaphysical principle receives the names of ὄν and οὐσία.

To be sure – Damascius immediately warns (pp. 59.15-65.2) – since the Unified is an original uni-multiplicity in which there is as yet no distinction between the various determinations, and since names, by contrast, designate determinate properties, it follows that no name is stricto sensu truly attributed to the Unified (p. 59.15: οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα κατὰ ἀλήθειαν; cf. p. 66.13: ὄνομα μὲν οὐκ ἔχον ἴδιον), and all names are ascribed to it only by allusion (p. 63.18: κατὰ ἔνδειξιν).¹⁶ Still, with this caveat in mind, the fact remains that we call the Unified 'Being' from

(viz. the whole domain of the intelligible Forms, as opposed to that of perceptible entities, the realm of 'becoming'). See also Simplicii *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria*, ed. H. Diels, Reimer, Berlin 1882 (CAG IX), p. 136.21-27, closely echoing various points made in this sections of *De Principiis II*, as I argue in R. Granieri, "Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato's Conception of Not-Being", *Méthexis* 35 (2023), pp. 185-200.

¹⁴ Cf. p. 84.16-8: "Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ὄν ἡνωμένον, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ταυτόν, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆ οὐσία.

¹⁵ With Dam., *De Principiis*, II, p. 64 Westerink n. 6 (*Notes complémentaires*, p. 245).

¹⁶ The point is of course reminiscent of other salient and distinctive aspects of his metaphysics, cf. Van Riel, "Damascius" (above, n. 11), p. 673 for a first approach.

the bare property (p. 62.12: τὰς ιδιότητας ψιλὰς) bestowed by one of its simple constituents, the Kind Being. Accordingly, the Unified is named ‘Being’, not because it is identical with Kind Being (for, since it includes all Kinds, it is identical with none), but only because we apply (by allusion) to the Unified, i.e. the source of all being, the name of the bare property of being, bestowed by the Kind Being to all beings (p. 64.13; p. 84.11-4). But how should this property be conceived of?

2. *The bare property of being*

After a brief discussion of how the third principle derives from the higher two principles, and how his account of the first three principles relates to the revelation of the *Chaldean Oracles*, Damascius returns to further considerations on the property of being. The problem he addresses, starting from p. 74.23, is: what is this bare property?¹⁷ It is here that the passage on which this paper focuses (p. 75.10-11) is located.

Damascius begins his answer in an avowedly tautological way: the property of being is that which signifies the being of each thing (p. 75.1: ἡ τὸ ἐκάστου εἶναι σημαίνουσα).¹⁸ For every property, says Damascius (p. 75.1-10), is most manifest when it is considered for itself and not via the mediation of an intermediary notion (p. 75.1-4: Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν¹⁹ ἄλλως νοεῖν τὰς ιδιότητας, ἢ δι’ αὐτῶν αὐτάς· καὶ ἐναργέστεραί γε εἰσιν δι’ ἑαυτῶν γνωριζόμεναι ἢ δι’ ἄλλων); and this applies all the more to the ‘simpler’ properties (p. 75.7: ιδιότητές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀπλούστεραι), i.e. those bestowed by the simple or first Kinds or Forms (p. 75.5-6: τῶν ἀπλῶν γενῶν; 7-8: τῶν πρώτων εἰδῶν), including, of course, the Kind Being, which comes first among them (III, p. 150.2-3: ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὄν προηγεῖται τῶν ἄλλων). Thus – and here we come to our passage – the property of being, namely the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, is what provides being itself to each thing and in virtue of which something is a being (p. 75.10-1; the point is echoed at III, p. 150.5-7: τὸ εἶναι ὡς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τεταγμένον, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι παρεχόμενον). By making every being a being, then, the property of being is the link (p. 75.13: σύνδεσμος) and the root (p. 75.14: ῥίζα) of each being, what connects all beings insofar as it is common to them all qua beings, and what grounds them insofar as it provides them all with being and therefore subsists before all other things (III, p. 149.22-3: πρὸ παντὸς ἄλλου δεῖ προὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι).

¹⁷ Cf. p. 74.23-4: Φέρε δὲ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ ὄν, τίς αὕτη ἡ ιδιότης. One might contend that πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς should be understood as suggesting that Damascius is starting over his inquiry into being from scratch, i.e. by building on none of the results cashed out throughout pp. 56-75. But note the distinctive way in which Damascius now phrases the question: τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ ὄν, τίς αὕτη ἡ ιδιότης (p. 74.23-4). The fact that the question is asked in terms of ‘property’ (ιδιότης) clearly builds on the result, obtained in the preceding pages, that we call the Unified ‘Being’ (by allusion) from the bare property (p. 62.12: τὰς ιδιότητας ψιλὰς) bestowed by one of its simple constituents, the Kind or Form of Being.

¹⁸ Possible objection: should the phrase τὸ ἐκάστου εἶναι not suggest that Damascius is referring to what each thing is? Not quite: ἐκάστου need not be an adnominal genitive and Damascius is naturally interpreted as simply referring to the being that each thing has, which is perfectly consistent with, and indeed corroborated by, the point at p. 75.10-11 that something is a being in virtue of the Kind Being that provides being itself to each thing (ἐκάστῳ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι).

¹⁹ Westerink prints ἔστιν (just like Ruelle, cf. Damascii *Successoris* [above, n. 3], p. 134.10), but it seems a typo for ἔστιν (Combès’ translation is ‘il est possible’). In any event, I correct the mistake in citing the Greek text.

The property bestowed by the Kind Being is then pure being, being itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι), without further qualifications. It is not responsible for what a certain thing is, but only for the fact that it is. If we conflate these two aspects, or make the Kind Being responsible for both, we lose the gist of the argument that Damascius has been developing since p. 56: the property provided by Kind Being is the simple and bare property of being, shared by all beings simply as beings; the various essences (viz. the various ‘what-it-is’) that constitute the eidetic πλήρωμα are not metaphysically explained by the Kind Being.

The foregoing remarks bolster the conclusion that Combès’ interpretation, whereby Being is the unity of each Form, metaphysically responsible for both its essence and its existence,²⁰ is unpersuasive. If by essence we mean, plainly, what something is, and by existence the fact that something is, and if the foregoing considerations are correct, and therefore Damascius states that (the Kind) Being is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is, it follows that in this section of *De Principiis II* Damascius states that Kind Being is responsible only for the existence of an entity.

Of course, the question arises as to whether it is at all appropriate to evoke the essence-existence pair in this context or, for that matter, in discussions of Neoplatonic philosophy more generally. The problem has wide ramifications and has been famously discussed in some seminal contributions by Pierre Hadot; and more recently, in opposition to Hadot, by Riccardo Chiaradonna, also in this journal.²¹ With respect to Damascius, these scholars have mostly focused on the relationship between ὑπαρξίς and οὐσία in some passages of *De Principiis III*, esp. pp. 151.18-154.6. Now it goes obviously beyond the scope of this short note to engage with this controversy. Still, to the extent that Damascius says that ὑπαρξίς and οὐσία differ in the same way as being alone in itself differs from being considered conjointly with other things (p. 152.14-5: ἢ τὸ εἶναι μόνον καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἅμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄρωμένου), and that the relation between ὑπάρχειν and εἶναι is extensively discussed in *De Principiis II*, esp. at pp. 71.25-73.23, pp. 76.22-77.24, then I think it safe to conclude that future discussions about the notion of existence in Neoplatonism, including in Damascius’ thought, will benefit from taking into account other sections of the *De Principiis*, including those discussed in this paper.

²⁰ Cf. Dam., *De Principiis*, II, p. 75 Westerink n. 2 (*Notes complémentaires*, p. 249).

²¹ Cf. P. Hadot, “Existencia”, in J. Ritter (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 2, Schwabe & Co, Basel 1972, coll. 854-856 (repr. in Id., *Plotin, Porphyre. Études néoplatoniciennes*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1999 [L’Âne d’or, 10], pp. 57-61); Id., “L’être et l’étant dans le Néoplatonisme”, *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* 23 (1992), pp. 101-113 (repr. in Id., *Plotin, Plotin, Porphyre*, pp. 71-88); R. Chiaradonna, “Nota su partecipazione e atto d’essere nel neoplatonismo: l’anonimo Commento al Parmenide”, *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), pp. 87-97; Id., “‘Existence’ in Greek Neoplatonism: Remarks on a Historiographical Issue”, in J.-B. Brenet-O. Lizzini (eds.), *La philosophie arabe à l’étude / Studying Arabic Philosophy*, Vrin, Paris 2019 (Sic et Non), pp. 301-15. See also D’Ancona, “La doctrine néoplatonicienne” (above, n. 12).

