

Studia graeco-arabica

13

2023

PISA
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

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Subscription orders

Information on subscription rates for the print edition of Volume 13 (2023), claims and customer service: press@unipi.it.

Web site: <http://learningroads.cfs.unipi.it/sga>

Service Provider: Università di Pisa, ICT - Servizi di Rete Ateneo

ISSN 2239-012X (Online)

ISBN 978-88-3339-881-5

Registration at the law court of Pisa, 18/12, November 23, 2012.

Editor in Chief: Cristina D'Ancona (cristina.dancona@unipi.it)

Mailing address: Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere, via Pasquale Paoli 15, 56126 Pisa, Italia.

Italian Scientific Journals Ranking: A (ANVUR, Classe A)

Indexing and Abstracting; ERIH PLUS (SCH ESF); Index Islamicus (Brill Bibliographies); Scopus (Elsevier)

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www.pisauniversitypress.it

Studia graeco-arabica. Vol. 1 (2011)- . - Pisa : Pacini editore, 2011- . - Annuale. Dal 2021: Pisa : Pisa university press.

180.05 (23.)

1. Filosofia araba - Periodici 2. Filosofia greca - Periodici

CIP a cura del Sistema bibliotecario dell'Università di Pisa

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Cover

Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 300, f. 1v; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1853, f. 186v

A Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul by Ibn Suwār

Sara Abram*

Abstract

This article presents the edition and translation of the *Treatise on the Immortality of the Rational Soul of Man According to Aristotle's Opinion* (*M. fī baqā' al-naḥs al-nāṭiqa min al-insān 'alā ra'y Aristūṭālis*) by the Christian philosopher and physician Abū al-Ḥayr al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (942-post 1017). Its importance lies in the fact that: (i.) it provides the sole testimony concerning the doctrine of the immortality of the soul developed by a philosopher who was a significant representative of the intellectual life of his day; (ii.) it constitutes concrete evidence of the fact that the philosophical activity of the Baghdad Aristotelians did not concern only Aristotle's logic, physics, and metaphysics, but also psychology and noetics; and (iii.) it transmits literal quotations from lost Arabic translations, representing their earliest testimony: three lemmata from Aristotle's *De Anima* and one from Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Anima* in Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn's (830-911) translations.

Abū l-Ḥayr al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā ibn Bihnām (or Bahrām),¹ also known as Ibn al-Ḥammār (942-post 1017), was a Christian philosopher, a physician, and a prolific translator from Syriac to Arabic born and raised in Baghdad.² He studied Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology with Ibn al-Samḥ³ and 'Īsā ibn Zur'a,⁴ under the guidance of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī,

*I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers, as well as my colleagues, who had the patience to read a first draft of this contribution and discuss its contents with me, although I alone remain responsible for it.

¹ Ibn Suwār's genealogy has been transmitted differently by biographers: Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, I-II, Verlag von F.C.W. Vogel – Maisonneuve & Co., Leipzig – Paris 1871-1872, vol. 1, p. 265 and Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Ta'riḥ al-ḥukamā'*, ed. J. Lippert, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig 1903, p. 164 write "Bahrām"; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *A Literary History of Medicine. The 'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā' of Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'ah*, eds. E. Savage-Smith – S. Swain – G. J. van Gelder, I-V, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2020 (Handbuch der Orientalistik, Section 1, vol. 134), ch. 11.8 and 'Alī ibn Zayd al-Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, ed. R. al-'Aḡam, Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, Bayrūt 1994, p. 37 give "Bihnām", as in the source examined in this article.

² On the life of this author see W. Madelung, "Abu 'l-Ḳayr b. al-Ḳammār", *Encyclopædia Iranica*, I.3, pp. 330-1; an updated version is available online at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abul-kayr-b> [accessed on April 2022]; J.L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam. The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age*, Brill, Leiden – New York – Köln 1992, pp. 123-30; G. Endress, "Ibn al-Ḥammār", in U. Rudolph – R. Würsch (eds.), *Philosophie in der islamischen Welt*, Vol. 1, 8-10. *Jahrhundert*, Basel, Schwabe 2012 (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie), pp. 333-41 (English version in: U. Rudolph – R. Hansberger – P. Adamson (eds.), *Philosophy in the Islamic World*, Vol. 1: 8th-10th Centuries, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2017 [Handbook of Oriental Studies, 115.1], pp. 480-90) and O.L. Lizzini, "Ibn Suwār (Ibn al-Khammār)", in K. Fleet – G. Kramer – D. Matringe – J. Nawas – E. Rowson (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam: Three*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2018, pp. 88-92.

³ They are mentioned together on several occasions, see S.M. Stern, "Ibn al-Samḥ", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 88.1-2 (1956), pp. 31-3.

⁴ Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, *Kitāb al-Imtā' wa-l-mu'ānasa*, 3 voll., ed. A. Amīn – A. al-Zayn, Maṭba'a laḡna a-ta'lif wa-l-tarḡama wa-l-naṣr, al-Qāhira 1953 [or. ed. 1939-44], pp. 14 and 38.

the head of the circle of the Baghdad Aristotelians.⁵ Besides becoming a teacher himself,⁶ he became a prominent witness to the cultural and exegetical life of his day, in which scholars did not merely produce Arabic translations of Aristotle's works or revise existing ones but annotated and discussed them together to gain a better textual and doctrinal understanding. Ibn Suwār is remembered as the author of the antigraph of the famous *Parisinus arabus* (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, *arabe* 2346),⁷ his personal copy of Ibn 'Adī's autograph manuscript of the "extended" copy of Aristotle's *Organon* (also including Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and the *Poetics* and *Rhetorics* based on Ibn al-Samḥ's autograph manuscript).⁸ He is also known for recording the exegesis – in the form of marginal glosses, notes, and corrections – of late-antique commentators and of the Baghdad masters, including himself, not to mention his references to earlier translations of Syriac or Greek origin. In addition to this editorial work, according to our bio-bibliographical sources Ibn Suwār translated texts from Syriac into Arabic⁹ and wrote

⁵ Ibn al-Nadīm describes him as "one of the best of the logicians who studied under Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, having the greatest intelligence, comprehension, and ability for the sciences of his associates", see Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* (above, n. 1), p. 250 (English translation in: B. Dodge, *The Fihrist of Ibn Al-Nadīm: A Tenth-century Survey of Muslim Culture*, I-II, Columbia University Press, New York – London 1970, vol. 2, p. 632). On the circle of the Baghdad Aristotelians see G. Endress – C. Ferrari, *Die Bagdader Aristoteliker*, in *Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt* (above, n. 2), pp. 290-362 (English version in: *Philosophy in the Islamic World* (above, n. 2), pp. 421-525), and *The School of Baghdad (4th-5th/10th-11th cent.) and Its Achievements: Mattā ibn Yūnus, Yahyā ibn 'Adī, Ibn Zur'a, Ibn Suwār, Ibn al-Samḥ: Texts and Studies*, ed. F. Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main 2000 (Publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science. Islamic philosophy, 83).

⁶ His pupils in medicine and philosophy include the Christian Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib (m. 1048) and the Shiite Abū l-Faraḡ ibn Hindū (m. 1019/1032). On the former's life and works see C. Ferrari, *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Faraḡ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2006 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus 19), pp. 17-42 and Ead., "Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib", in Rudolph–Hansberger–Adamson (eds.), *Philosophy in the Islamic World* (above, n. 2), pp. 496-506; on the latter see S. Ḥalīfāt, *Abū al-Faraḡ 'Alī. Sīratuhu, āra'uhu al-falsafīyya, mu'allafātuhu* (*Biography, Philosophy and His Works*), I-II, al-Ġāmi'a al-Urdunniyya – 'Imādat al-baḥṭ al-'ilmī – Kullīyyat al-ādāb, 'Ammān 1995, vol. 1, pp. 81-7.

⁷ On Paris, BnF, *ar.* 2346 see Kh. Georr, *Les Catégories d'Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes*, Institut français de Damas, Beyrouth 1948, pp. 183-200; R. Walzer, "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle", *Oriens* 6.1 (1953), pp. 91-142. (repr. with additions, in R. Walzer, *Greek into Arabic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy*, Cassirer, Oxford-Cambridge [MA] 1962, pp. 60-113); H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Une ancienne 'édition' arabe de l'*Organon* d'Aristote: problèmes de traduction et de transmission", in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les problèmes posés par l'édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux*, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve 1992 (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales. Textes, études, congrès, 13), pp. 139-57; Id., "Remarques sur la tradition arabe de l'*Organon*, d'après le manuscrit Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, *ar.* 2346", in Ch. Burnett (ed.), *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, The Warburg Institute. University of London, London 1993 (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, 23), pp. 19-28.

⁸ See U. Vagelpohl, *Aristotle's Rhetoric in the East: The Syriac and Arabic Translation and Commentary Tradition*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2008 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 76), pp. 39-58.

⁹ He translates Theophrastus' *Questions* and *Meteorologica*, Aristotle's *On Ethics*, *On the Four Books of Logic* (including *Isagoge*, *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*) and two books of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*, see Kraemer, *Humanism* (above, n. 2), p. 126. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' (above, n. 1), ch. 11.8 also copies the following title: *Taqāsīm Isāgūḡī wa-Qātāḡūriyās li-Alīnūs al-Iskandarānī, mimmā naqalahu min al-suryānī, wa-sarāḡahu 'alā ṭarīq al-ḥawāṣī* (*The Divisions of the Isagoge and the Categories by Alīnūs of Alexandria, Translated from Syriac into Arabic by al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā, Who Also Wrote a Marginal Commentary on It*) from the original book (*dastūr*) handwritten by Ibn Suwār.

original works about logic,¹⁰ physics,¹¹ ethics,¹² and theology.¹³ He was also well-respected as a physician – a “second Hippocrates” according to one biographical source¹⁴ – and as the author of numerous medical texts, now lost, including one devoted to the Ḥwārazm-Šāh Abū l-‘Abbās Ma’mūn II of Gurgānġ (r. 1009-1017).¹⁵ Al-Bayhaqī provides some valuable information on the subsequent stage of Ibn Suwār’s life and career, after his departure from Baghdad. He reports that when the physician was getting on in years, he was at the Ḥwārazm court, and when Maḥmūd of Ġazna conquered Ḥwārazm, Ibn Suwār met the same fate as al-Bīrūnī, among other scholars:¹⁶ he was taken to the conqueror’s court, where he spent the last days of his life and converted to Islam.¹⁷ The date of his death is unknown.

An Iranian manuscript dated to around the 17th century preserves – on ff. 12r-19r – a work titled *Maqāla al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā ibn Bihnām fī baqā’ al-nafs al-nāṭiqā min al-insān ‘alā ra’y Aristūṭālīs* (*Treatise by al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā ibn Bihnām on the Immortality of the Rational Soul of Man According to Aristotle’s Opinion*).¹⁸ The title of this

¹⁰ In addition to the glosses on the *Categories* contained in Paris, BnF, ar. 2346 (see Kh. Georr, *Les Catégories d’Aristote* (above, n. 7), pp. 149-82 [French trans.] and pp. 361-86 [Arabic text]), Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘*Uyūn al-anbā’* (above, n. 1), ch. 11.8 and Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* (above, n. 1), p. 250 list *An Explanatory (mašrūb)* and *An Abridged (muḥtaṣar) Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge*.

¹¹ *M. fī anna dalīl Yahyā al-Nahwī ‘alā ḥadaṭ al-‘ālam awlā bi-l-qabūl min dalīl al-mutakallimīn aṣlan* (*That John Philoponus’ Proof for the Createdness of the World is Rather to be Accepted than That of the [Islamic] Theologians*), in *Al-Aflātūniyya al-muḥdata ‘ind al-‘arab*, ed. ‘A. Badawī, Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, al-Qāhira 1955, pp. 243-47; see B. Lewin, “La notion de *muḥdat* dans le *kalām* et dans la philosophie. Un petit traité du philosophe chrétien Ibn Suwār”, *Orientalia Suecana* 3 (1954), pp. 84-93. About meteorology: *M. fī l-Āṭār al-mutaḥayyila fī l-ġaww* (*On the Effects Observed in the Atmosphere*), in *Aristotle’s Meteorology and Its Reception in the Arab World, with an Edition and Translation of Ibn Suwār’s Treatise on Meteorological Phenomena and Ibn Bājja’s Commentary on the Meteorology*, ed. P. Lettinck, Brill, Leiden – Boston 1999 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 10).

¹² *M. fī Ṣifat al-raġul al-faylasūf* (*On the Description of the [True] Philosopher*), French trans. by B. Lewin, “L’idéal antique du philosophe dans la tradition arabe: un traité d’éthique du philosophe bagdadien Ibn Suwār”, *Lychnos* (1954/55), pp. 267-84; there are also the titles: *M. fī l-Ṣadāqa wa-l-Ṣadiq* (*On friendship*), *M. fī l-Sa‘āda* (*On Beatitude*), see Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘*Uyūn al-anbā’* (above, n. 1), ch. 11.8.

¹³ The title of his lost work *K. al-wifāq bayna ra’y al-falāsifa wa-l-naṣārā* (*On the Agreement between the Opinions of the Philosophers and the Christians*), see Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* (above, n. 1), p. 250, shows that he belongs to the Christian apologetic tradition of his master Ibn ‘Adī.

¹⁴ Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat* (above, n. 1), p. 39.

¹⁵ *M. fī imtiḥān al-aṭibbā’* (*On the Examination of Physicians*); Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘*Uyūn al-anbā’* (above, n. 1), ch. 11.8, who lists also *K. fī Ḥalq al-insān wa-tarkīb a‘dā’ibi* (*On Man’s Physique and the Composition of the Parts of His Body*); *M. fī l-marād al-ma’rūf bi-l-kāhinī wa-huwa al-ṣar’* (*On the Illness Known as ‘That of the Soothsayers’ That is Epilepsy*), counts him among the surgeons of the ‘Aḍudī hospital in Baghdad. Ibn Suwār is also to be credited with the account of the Galenic canon’s *Summaria Alexandrinorum*, which his pupil Ibn Hindū integrated into his *Miftāḥ al-ṭibb* (*The Key to Medicine*), making use of his teacher’s translation: see Ḥalīfāt, *Abū al-Faraġ ‘Alī* (above, n. 6), vol. 2, pp. 633-4.

¹⁶ Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat* (above, n. 1), p. 38. The biographer also speaks of Avicenna’s hope of meeting Ibn Suwār, whom he somehow sets apart from his Aristotelian colleagues: “*Wa-qāla Abū ‘Alī ibn Sīnā fī ba‘ḍi kutubihī: Fa-ammā Abū l-Ḥayr laysa min ‘adadi ha’ulā’i wa-la’alla Allāhu ta’ālā yarzaqnā liqā’ibi fa-yakūn immā ifādati wa-immā istifādati*” (“In one of his books, Abū ‘Alī ibn Sīnā states: ‘Since Abū l-Ḥayr is not one of them, perhaps God the Most High will grant us an encounter with him that will be of benefit or profit to us’”). It seems as though this encounter never took place.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ The manuscript is recorded in *Fihrist nusha-hā-yi ḥaṭṭī kitābhāna-yi Maġlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī*, ed. Ġ.Ḥ. Īskurī, *Kitābhāna Mūzih wa Markaz-i Asnād-i Maġlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī*, vol. XX, Tehrān 1389/2010, pp. 337-8, and in *Fihristgān: nusha-hā-yi ḥaṭṭī-yi Īrān (Fanḥā)*, ed. M. Dirāyatī, Sāzmān-i Asnād va Kitābhāna-yi Millī-yi

treatise does not appear in any ancient bio-bibliographical source, but it is quoted literally in the contemporary *Fawz al-asğar* by Abū ‘Alī Miskawayh (d. 1030).¹⁹

The *Treatise* is the only work which bears witness to Ibn Suwār’s interest in the issue of the soul and its immortality, no other surviving texts attest to his doctrine on this topic. Moreover, the *Treatise* provides concrete evidence of the fact that the Baghdad Aristotelians’ philosophical activity was not limited to Aristotelian logic, physics, and (to a lesser extent) metaphysics – which certainly remained their main focuses – but also extended to psychology and noetics, always reflecting the same close attention and faithfulness to the Aristotelian text as they reserved for the other branches of philosophy. Indeed, the *Treatise* transmits literal quotations from lost Arabic translations, representing their earliest testimony. More specifically, it preserves three lemmata from Aristotle’s *De Anima* and one from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *De Anima*. Judging from a comparison between the lemmata presented by Ibn Suwār and the corresponding ones found in the Arabic translation of Themistius’ Paraphrase of *De Anima*,²⁰ as well as those preserved in a new manuscript witness of Avicenna’s *Marginal Glosses on De Anima* (*Ta’līqāt ‘alā ḥawāṣī Kitāb al-naḥs*), it is evident that they stem from

Ğumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān, vol. VI, Tehrān 1390/2011, p. 88. It was recently mentioned in a contribution focusing on Ibn Suwār’s ethics, in particular considering the *M. fī Ṣīfat al-rağul al-faylasūf* (cf. above, n. 12): ‘A.S. ‘Aṭīya Ġād Allāh – M.M. al-Sayyid Mişbāh, “Maqāla sīrat al-faylasūf li-Abī al-Ḥayr al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (Ibn al-Ḥammār): dirāsa wa-taḥqīq”, *Namā’ li-‘Ulūm al-wahy wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Insānīya* 15 (2021), pp. 56-71, part. p. 70, n. 2. When my paper was already in proof, I became acquainted by M.M. al-Sayyid Mişbāh (*per litteras* 23/01/2023) that a book entitled *Ibn al-Ḥammār wa-turātuhu al-falsafī: dirāsa wa-nuṣūṣ*, Markaz Ihya’ li-l-Buḥūt wa-l-Dirāsāt, al-Qāhira 2023, is not yet available, but it will be distributed at the Cairo International Book Fair 2023. The volume contains the edition of the *M. fī baqa’ al-naḥs al-nātiqa min al-insān ‘alā rāy Aristūṭālīs* together with other treatises by Ibn Suwār. Due to the concurrence of publications, I have not yet been able to read this work.

¹⁹ Miskawayh mentions Ibn Suwār twice in *Fawz al-asğar*, in the first and fourth chapters of the second question *Fī l-naḥs wa-ahwālīhā* (*On the Soul and Its States*), see Ş. ‘Uḍayma (ed.), *al-Fawz al-asğar li-Miskawayh ḥaqqaḥabū wa-qaddama labū*, French trans. by R. Arnaldez, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-l-kitāb Maison Arabe du Livre, Tūnis 1987, p. 62 and pp. 76-7. In the first case he is listing the various reasons why matters pertaining to the soul are a difficult issue, and one of them is the disagreement among the leading Aristotelian commentators, such as Alexander and Themistius, in their exegesis of *De Anima*. The author sets out to clarify things and praises the efforts made by Ibn Suwār, who in addition to faithfully following Aristotle’s teaching, collected and translated the Syriac books on the topic as well as the commentators’ works. Miskawayh, however, has no access to this material (*ba‘īd ‘annā*). In the second case, the author not only mentions Ibn Suwār by name, but quotes the treatise edited in this article verbatim. More specifically, he provides an exact quotation of the entire first lemma of *De Anima* examined by Ibn Suwār (*De An.*, I 4, 408 b 18-25), whose commentary he summarises, introducing it with “*tafsīr ḥadā al-kalām li-Abī l-Ḥayr yaqūlu...*”; at the end of this summary he then quotes part of the second lemma selected by Ibn Suwār (*De An.*, II 2, 413 b 25-29). Note that Miskawayh also borrows from Ibn Suwār the theme of disagreement among late-antique commentators. Ibn Suwār’s *tafsīr* of the first lemma (which also includes part of the second lemma), as reported by Miskawayh, runs as follows (exact quotes from the treatise are highlighted):

تفسير هذا الكلام لأبي الخير يقول: لو كان العقل من الإنسان فاسداً بفساد جسمه لضعف بضعف بدنه إذا عرضت له الشيخوخة وليس يضعف في تلك الحال، فهو إذا غير فاسد. فأما ما ذكره في حال السكر والمرض فإنه يريد الحال العارضة للعقل في الشيخوخة من التقصير في وقت ما، وأنها ليست لضعف العقل في نفس جوهره بل لأن البدن غير قابل لفعل العقل كما يعرض في حال السكر والنوم، فإن السكران والنائم إذا قصر في التمييز والعقل فليس ذلك لتقصير في العقل بل لعرض عرض لآكلة من الخيارات. ثم قال أرسطو في المقالة الثانية من هذا الكتاب، فأما العقل فقد يشبه أن يكون جنساً آخر من النفس ويكون لهذا حده فظاهر من أمرها أنها ليست مفارقة كما يدعي قوم.

²⁰ This translation has been preserved, almost in its entirety, in a manuscript from the library of the al-Qarawiyyīn Mosque in Fez and has been edited by M.C. Lyons, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, Cassirer, Oxford 1973; see also E. Coda, *Pensiero divino, anime umane. L’aristotelismo di Temistio e la filosofia pre-moderna*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2022 (Philosophica 285).

the same Arabic translation: the one by Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, which is largely lost today.²¹ The literal quotation from Alexander's *De Anima* is probably also drawn from Iṣḥāq's Arabic translation of this work, now completely lost.²²

²¹ The issue of Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn's Arabic translation(s) of Aristotle's *De Anima* is rather complex and continues to be debated. Various interpretations have been formulated of the earliest and most complete bio-bibliographical testimony on the matter, namely Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* (above, n. 1), p. 251. More specifically, scholars have been debating the existence of a second, complete and revised translation by Iṣḥāq, in addition to the incomplete one, some fragments of which have been reconstructed by R.M. Frank, "Some Fragments of Iṣḥāq's Translation of the *De Anima*", *Cahiers de Byrsa* 8 (1959-58), pp. 231-51 on the basis of the literal quotations in Avicenna's *Marginal Glosses* (see 'A. Badawī, *Aristū 'inda al-'arab. Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣ ḡayr manṣūra*, Dirāsāt Islāmiyya, Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, al-Qāhira 1947, pp. 75-116) and, more recently, by A. Treiger, "Reconstructing Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn's Arabic Translation of Aristotle's *De Anima*", *Studia graeco-arabica* 7 (2017), pp. 193-211 on the basis of the Hebrew and Latin translations of Iṣḥāq's Arabic version, as well as of Themistius' Paraphrase of *De Anima*, also translated by Iṣḥāq. On this debate see also H. Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam*, C. Winter, Heidelberg 1971, pp. 20-7; A. Elamrani-Jamal, "De Anima. Tradition arabe", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques (=DPhA)*, CNRS-Éditions, Suppl., Paris 2003, pp. 346-58; M. Geoffroy, "Aristotle, Arabic", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Springer, Dordrecht 20202, pp. 188-203, part. pp. 195-6; A.L. Ivry, "The Arabic Text of Aristotle's *De Anima* and its Translator", *Oriens* 36 (2001), pp. 59-77. As just mentioned, this translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* also survives in an Arabic-into-Hebrew version: *Aristotle's De Anima Translated into Hebrew by Zerabyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Hen. A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Index* by G. Bos, Brill, Leiden 1994 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 6); and in an Arabic-into-Latin one, preserved in the lemmata of Averroes' Long Commentary on the *De Anima*, see F.S. Crawford (ed.), *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros*, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge MA 1953; English trans.: R.C. Taylor – Th.-A. Druart, *Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, Yale U.P., New Haven CT 2009. Only a short time ago, part of Iṣḥāq's Arabic translation was discovered in a new Iranian manuscript witness (Tehrān, Kitābhāna-yi Maḡlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, *Tabatabā'ī* 1367) of Avicenna's *Marginal Glosses (Ta'liqāt)*, which, in addition to Avicenna's glosses, includes the lemmata from Iṣḥāq's translation in an almost continuous succession from *De An.* I 1 to the beginning of *De An.* II 2 (the last preserved lemma is for *De An.* II 2, 412 a 22 - 413 b 27, see *Tabatabā'ī* 1367, p. 127). The rediscovery of Avicenna's work in this form, which is in the process of being edited by J. Jabbour, is bound to overturn some entrenched ideas about this work's textual transmission (see D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works. Second, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Including an Inventory of Avicenna's Authentic Works*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2014 [Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies 89], pp. 144-55). The lemmata provided in the *Ta'liqāt* and in Ibn Suwār's treatise do not settle the issue, yet lend support to the hypothesis put forward by various scholars according to which, despite what the *Fihrist* seems to suggest, a second, complete, and revised translation was never produced by Iṣḥāq, since the new witnesses all draw upon the same incomplete translation. This would appear to have been the only translation that was circulating, along with a complete, yet earlier, one (pseudo-Iṣḥāq's, cf. *infra*, n. 30) and a Syriac-Arabic supplement by one Abū 'Isā ibn Iṣḥāq, who has been identified with Ibn Zur'a: both of these translations were used precisely in order to complete Iṣḥāq's version.

²² Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* is known only by some fragments gathered by P. Moraux (see P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*, Faculté de philosophie et lettres – E. Droz, Liège – Paris 1942 [Bibliothèque de la Faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège, 99] pp. 205-21). This commentary is studied and problematized in P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, Vol. III, *Alexander von Aphrodisias*, ed. J. Wiesner, De Gruyter, Berlin – New York 2001, pp. 320-53 and more recently in I. Kupreeva, "Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aristotle's 'De Anima': What's in a Commentary?", *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 55/1 (2012), pp. 109-29. Another text on the topic by Alexander is known in its original language: it is a sort of essay or monograph on the soul. According to scholars (see e.g. P.L. Donini, "Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica", in I. Temporini –

In what follows I provide a succinct description of the codicological features and contents of the manuscript Tehrān, Kitābḥāna-yi Maḡlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 6906 preserving Ibn Suwār's treatise.

Dated 11thH/17th cent. CE, paper, 168 × 95 mm; 17/18 ll., ff. I + 106 + III'.

This is a miscellaneous codex made of Oriental paper, acephalous and mutilated at the end, yet in an excellent state of preservation. It is written entirely in Arabic and contains five treatises, always beginning on the *recto*: the first, third, and fifth are philosophical, while the second and fourth are astrological and mystical, respectively.

Flyleaves: one flyleaf at the beginning of the codex and three flyleaves at the end of the codex: ff. I and III' are of the same paper, while ff. I' and II' are made from different types of paper.

Foliation: one partial and one almost complete modern sequence of Persian numerals are written in black and blue ink in the upper left-hand corner of each *recto*. The flyleaves are not numbered. Gaps are found in both foliation sequences. First foliation: 1-3, unnumbered folio, 4-8, 10-36, 37 not marked but included in the computation, 38-106; second foliation: 64, 67, 70, 75, 80, 85, 89, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 95, 101.

Blank folios: ff. I; 11v; 19v; 25v; I'r; II'-III'.

Support: oriental paper.

Quires: not visible because of the tightness of the binding.

Binding: brown leather binding with no flap or fore-edge flap, stiffened at the edges with slightly reddish leather. Some geometrical fillets impressed on the outer surface of the binding on both the upper and the lower boards.

Conservation status: the codex has been restored.

Page dimensions and writing surface: 168 × 95 mm; ~25 [121] ~22 × ~13 [60] ~22 (f. 13r).

Layout and number of lines: the text is arranged on a single column of 17/18 ll.

Ruling: not visible.

Copyist and dating: the codex is written in *nash* and *nasta'alīq* script, probably by the same copyist. In the colophon of the first and second treatises (ff. 11r and 19r), the scribe indicates that he used an autograph codex by 'Abd al-Bāqī Tabrīzī (d. 1038 H/1629 CE) as a model.²³ On f. 19r, at the end of the treatise edited in this article, the

W. Haase (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II 36.7, De Gruyter, Berlin – New York 1994, pp. 5045-56; Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, traduzione, introduzione e commento a cura di P. Accattino – P.L. Donini, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1996, pp. VII-XI) the author draws upon part of his own commentary on *De Anima*, either literally or in an abridged form. The Arabic text of Alexander's *De Anima* is lost but, according to some manuscript witnesses, there existed a Hebrew translation made from Ishāq's Arabic version by Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles in 1323 then reworked probably in 1340; see Alexandri Aphrodisiensis *Scripta minora. 1: Alexandri de Anima cum mantissa*, ed. I. Bruns, G. Reimer, Berlin 1887 (*CAG Suppl.* II.1), pp. XIV-XVI (parts of the Hebrew translation of Alexander's *De Anima* are available in German translation as footnotes to Bruns' edition, made by M. Steinschneider, see pp. 82.16-91.12; for an overview of the Hebrew translations, see M. Zonta, "Greek Texts Translated into Hebrew", in Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (above, n. 21), pp. 666-74, part. pp. 670-1). Although the Arabic translation has not reached us, it was certainly known and used by *falāsifa* (al-Fārābī, Avicenna, Ibn Bāḡḡa, Averroes; see at least Gätje, *Studien* [above, n. 21], p. 26 and pp. 69-73); however, Ibn Suwār is the first author to consciously provide literal quotations from it.

²³ One of the most brilliant calligraphers of the Safavid period, an expert in *tulut*, *nash*, and *nasta'alīq* scripts.

copyist writes: “*Naqaltu min nusḥati nusḥat min nusḥati bi-ḥaṭṭi al-faqīri ‘Abd al-Bāqī Tabrīzī al-Mawlawī*, I have transcribed [this work] from a copy that had been transcribed from a copy handwritten by the faqīr ‘Abd al-Bāqī Tabrīzī al-Mawlawī”. Based on this evidence, the *terminus post quem* for the manuscript could be around the end of the 10th H/16th cent. CE or the beginning of the 11th H/17th cent. CE. Notes, marginal corrections, and rubrications can also be attributed to the same hand as the main text. Except for the rubrications, the codex has no decorative elements. A small circle with a dot inside is sometimes used to indicate a full stop.

History of the manuscript: three seals are visible. The blue-ink round one, located on ff. 1r, 49r, 106v, is by the Mağlis Library, which holds the manuscript today. The other two seals, in black ink, are placed at the beginning and/or the end of the treatises. The oval seal on ff. 20r, 26r is by ‘Abd al-Rāğī Rağab ‘Alī, while the rectangular one [357: CBL Ar 4377, f. 1r] occurs on ff. 11r, 12r, 20r, 26r and is dated 1185 H/1772 CE, the manuscript’s *terminus ante quem*. On f. I’v there are three different notes in Persian, one of which is an ownership note dated 1313 H/1895 CE.

The Contents of the manuscript Tehrān, Kitābhāna-yi Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 6906

1.

ff. 1r-11r: Anon., <*Risāla fī l-falsafa*>²⁴

Inc. f. 1r l. 1:

فإن هذه الجملة بذواتها مبراة من المادة وقسم ثان وهو أن يحتاج العقل أن يفعل به فعلاً ينتزعه
من حامله

Expl. f. 11r l. 6:

السابع الجسم الفادي النامي المولد المتحرك بإرادة الناطق وهو الإنسان وهو نوع الانواع

2.

ff. 12r-19r: Ibn Suwār, *M. al-Hasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā ibn Bihnām fī baqā’ al-nafs al-nātiqa min al-insān ‘alā ra’y Aristūṭālīs*

Inc. f. 12r l. 4:

قال إن أرسطوطاليس لما قال في كتاب النفس في المقالة الأولى منه فأما العقل فيشبهه أن يكون
جوهرًا ما

Expl. f. 19r l. 12:

وبما قلناه من صحة نظمها نتیجته وهي أن النفس الناطقة من الإنسان غير فاسدة وأبدية وهو الذي
اردنا بيانه

His fame reached Šāh ‘Abbās I (r. 1588-1629), who commissioned him to execute the inscriptions of the Šāh Mosque (*Masğid-i Šāb*) in Isfahan, which can still be seen today. He himself wrote about Qur’anic exegesis, mysticism, and poetry, see ‘A. Kārang, “‘Abd-al-Bāqī Tabrīzī”, *Encyclopædia Iranica*, I.1, p. 105; an updated version is available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abd-al-baqi-tabrizi-religious-scholar-of-azerbaijan-d-1629-30> [accessed on April 2022].

²⁴ The work is acephalous.

3.

ff. 20r-25r: Ibn Suwār, *M. al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā ibn Bihnām fī dīker al-mubtadi' bi-ilm al-ḥkām al-nuḡūm katabahā ilā raḡul min ihwānīhi sa'alahu dālīka*²⁵

Inc. f. 20r5:

قال سألتني وفقك الله للصواب عن المبتدئ بعلم احكام النجوم ورسمت تلخيص ذلك لك
وايضاحه

Expl. f. 25r17:

وكان من اليونانيين ولست أعرف الزمان الذي كان فيه فهذا ما وقفت عليه من هذا كن سعيداً

4.

ff. 26r-57v: Šihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī, *al-Alwāḥ al-Imādīyya*

Inc. f. 26r2:

تبارك اسمك اللهم وتعالى ذكرك وعظمت قدرتك وعلت كلمتك لك الحمد في البدء والرجعى
ولك الحمد

Expl. f. 57v17:

أي حواسه الظاهرة والباطنة كما قيل اخلع نعليك ويثني رأى ناراً قوله من جانب الطور

Edited: Al-Suhrawardī, *al-Alwāḥ al-Imādīyya, Kalimat al-Taṣawwuf, al-Lamaḥāt*, ed. H. Naḡafqulī, *Manšūrāt al-Ġamal*, Bayrūt 2014, pp. 7-108. This codex is not considered by the editor. The work is mutilated at the end: it stops on p. 102 of the above-mentioned edition, probably due to a loss of folia.

5.

ff. 58r-106v: <Miskawayh>, *al-Fawz al-aṣḡar*

Inc. f. 58r1:

فإن هذه المسائل الثلاث لما كانت غاية ما ينتهي إليه البحث ونهاية ما يحرص عليه العقل

Expl. f. 106v16:

فلا يكون له فيها صنع ولا تغيير وتلك <إنما هي أمثال> وتشبيهات موافقة للحقائق مطابقة لها
وإن اختلفت ألفاظها

Edited: Ş. 'Uḡayma (ed.), *al-Fawz al-aṣḡar li-Miskawayh ḥaqqaqahū wa-qaddama lahū*, French trans. by R. Arnaldez, *al-Dār al-'arabiyya li-l-kitāb – Maison Arabe du Livre*, Tūnis 1987. This manuscript, which preserves Miskawayh's work in its entirety except for the last lines and the introduction (pp. 29-30 l. 9), is considered neither in Brockelmann's list (see C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, Suppl. I*, Brill, Leiden 1937, p. 584) nor in the above-mentioned edition of the work (see pp. 18-25).

The Treatise and the Lemmata of De Anima

The treatise's title announces a discussion of the topic of the immortality of soul based on Aristotle's authority. In the pages that follow, this intention is accurately fulfilled in terms of

²⁵ The edition and translation of this astrological work by Ibn Suwār are in progress by L. Farina and myself.

the general approach, yet not when it comes to the substance of the Stagirite's psychological doctrine. Indeed, while the reference to Aristotle's authority is preserved, the author does not provide a running commentary on *De Anima* or one of its books; instead, on the basis of what might have been his broader familiarity with the topic and the text,²⁶ in the first part of the treatise he performs a careful selection, privileging and expounding upon those passages from *De Anima* which deal with the intellect's particular status and which strike him as more compatible with the doctrine he intends to affirm.²⁷ The outcome of this process of reduction is an exposition that is not only selective, but also somewhat simplistic in relation to this specific aspect of Aristotelian psychology: for it lacks the more obscure or uncertain aspects of *De Anima*, in which the issue is addressed in a way that is notoriously ambiguous and never conclusive.

Ibn Suwār selects three lemmata of Aristotle's *De Anima* for his treatise, which he quotes verbatim.²⁸ The table below shows the Arabic translation of the lemmata selected for the treatise, along with: Aristotle's original formulations, the corresponding passages recorded in the Arabic translation of Themistius' Paraphrase of *De Anima*, and those found in the newly discovered Iranian manuscript of Avicenna's *Marginal Glosses*, which – unlike the Cairo manuscript witness on which the previous edition by 'A. Badawī²⁹ is based – contains the lemmata from *De Anima* and not just Avicenna's comments. Precisely in the Cairo manuscript of the *Marginal Glosses* one finds a gloss by Avicenna in which he notes that, up until *De An.* III 7, 431 a 14, he has been using Ishāq's Arabic translation, and that from that point onward he will be drawing on what he regards as a qualitatively inferior translation, which scholars nowadays identify as pseudo-Ishāq's one.³⁰

²⁶ Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

²⁷ Furthermore, it is possible that Ibn Suwār was influenced by the previous Peripatetic or Neoplatonic exegetical literature on the topic and that he drew upon the same passages as other commentators: out of the three lemmata discussed, for instance, two also occur in Themistius' Paraphrase of *De Anima* (where only ten passages or so are quoted verbatim), and this can hardly be a coincidence. It cannot be ruled out that Ibn Suwār also had the Arabic text of the Paraphrase at hand – indeed, various clues suggest that this was the case: see e.g. the reference to the same passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

²⁸ In the manuscript the lemmata are marked out, initially through some *qāla* that can clearly be distinguished, along with the number of the book from which each has been drawn and, towards the end, via punctuation (a circle containing a dot). The first lemma is also rubricated. As he paraphrases or explains these lemmata, Ibn Suwār often quotes shorter sections, but these are not marked out like the entire lemmata.

²⁹ See *Aristū 'inda al-'arab* (above, n. 21).

³⁰ Avicenna notes: "*Nuṣbat al-faṣṣ kān ilā hābunā naql Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn, wa-min hābunā naql āḥar bi-iṣlāḥāt kaṭīra li-l-mufasssīr*, The version of the commented text was, until now, that from Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn's translation; henceforth, it is another translation with several corrections by the commentator (i.e. Avicenna)". See *Aristū 'inda al-'arab* (above, n. 21), p. 109 n. 1. The fact that the translation used by Avicenna up that point is indeed Ishāq's has been confirmed by Frank, *Some Fragments* (above, n. 21), p. 233 through a comparison between the vocabulary and style of the fragments found in the *Marginal Glosses* and the other translations by Ishāq to have reached us. From *De An.* III 7, 431 a 14 onwards, Avicenna draws upon another translation of *De Anima*, see *Fī al-naḥs, al-Ārā' al-ṭabī'iyya al-mansūb ilā Flūṭarḥas, al-ḥāṣṣ wa-al-maḥṣūṣ li-Ibn Ruṣd, al-nabāt, al-mansūb ilā Aristūṭālīs*, ed. 'A. Badawī, Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, al-Qāhira 1954 (Islamica, 16), which is attributed to Ishāq in the manuscript preserving it, but scholars agree that this is a less accurate and non-literal translation, closer to a paraphrase, that is probably older and associated with al-Kindī's circle: see Gätje, *Studien* (above, n. 21), pp. 28-44. This is the *alia translatio* which Averroes draws upon in his Long Commentary on the *De Anima*, lamenting its poor quality, just like Avicenna.

	Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i>	Ibn Suwār, <i>M. fi baqā' al-nafs</i> ³¹	Avicenna, <i>Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥawāṣī</i> <i>Kitāb al-nafs</i> ³²	Themistius, <i>In De An. <Arabic></i> ³³
I 4, 408 b 18-25	μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθίρειτ' ἄν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτερος ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἄν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γήρας οὐ τῷ τῆν ψυχῆν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστίν.	فأما العقل فيشبه أن يكون جوهرًا ما يكون في الشيء ولا يفسد فإنه لو كان يفسد لكان حرثيًا بذلك خاصّة عن الكلال الذي يكون في الشيخوخة لكننا نجد ما يعرض كما يعرض في الحواس فإنّ الشيخ لو قبل عينًا مثل عين الشاب لأبصر كما يبصر الشاب فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالًا انفعلت فيها النفس شيئًا ما لكن حال هي فيها كما تكون في حال السكر وفي حال المرض والتصور بالعقل والنظر يخلقان بأن يفسدا خلا شيء ما آخر فأما هو نفسه فلا علة به	فأما العقل فيشبه أن يكون جوهر ما يكون في الشيء ولا يفسد فإنه لو كان يفسد لكان حرثيًا بذلك خاصّة عن الكلال الذي يكون في الشيخوخة لكننا نجد ما يعرض يعرض في الحواس فإنّ الشيخ لو قبل عينًا مثل عين الشاب لأبصر كما يبصر الشاب فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالًا انفعلت فيها النفس شيئًا لكن حال هي فيها كما تكون في حال السكر وفي حال المرض والتصور بالعقل والنظر يخلقان بأن يفسد داخلا شيء ما آخر وأما هو في نفسه واعلا به	فأما العقل فيشبه أن يكون جوهرًا ما يكون في الشيء ولا يفسد فإنه لو كان يفسد لكان حرثيًا بذلك خاصّة عن الكلال الذي يكون في الشيخوخة لكننا نجد ما يعرض فيه هو ما يعرض في الحواس فإنّ الشيخ لو قبل عينًا مثل عين الشاب لأبصر كما يبصر الشاب فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالًا انفعلت فيها النفس شيئًا ما لكن حال هي فيها كما يكون في حال السكر وفي حال العلة والتصور بالعقل والنظر فخلقان بأن يفسدا فيما احسب بشيء ما آخر فأما ما هو في نفسه فلا علة به
II 2, 413 b 25-29	περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' εἶοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἄιδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ τινὲς φασιν.	فأما العقل والقوة النظرية فلم يتبين بعد شيء من امره لكن قد يشبه أن يكون جنسًا آخر من النفس ويكون هذا وحده قد يمكن أن يفارق كما يفارق الأبدى الفاسد فأما سائر أجزاء النفس فظاهر عن هذا أنها ليست مفارقة كما يقول قوم	فأما العقل والقوة النظرية فلم يتبين بعد شيء من امره لكن قد يشبه أن يكون جنسًا آخر من النفس ويكون هذا وحده قد يمكن أن يفارق كما يفارق الأبدى الفاسد	فأما العقل والقوة النظرية فلم يتبين بعد شيء من امره لكن يشبه أن يكون جنسًا آخر من النفس ويكون هذا وحده قد يمكن أن يفارق كما يفارق الأبدى الفاسد
III 4, 429 a 22-29	ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἢ ψυχῆ) οὐθὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν· διὸ οὐδὲ μεμιχθῆναι εὐλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἄν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμὸς, καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἶη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἔστιν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τῆν ψυχῆν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὄλη ἀλλ' ἢ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη.	فالشيء إذن من النفس المسمى عقلًا وأعني بالعقل الشيء الذي به تمييز النفس وترتأي ليس هو بالفعل شيئًا من الأشياء الموجودة قبل أن يعقل ولذلك صار بالواجب ليس هو مخالطًا للبدن فإنه لو كان مخالطًا لكان يضر بحال ما إما حارًا وإما باردًا وكان يكون له آلة كما للحساس إلا أنه الآن ليس هو على شيء من ذلك فقد أصاب القائلون بأن النفس موضع الصور إلا أنها ليست بأسرها بل العاقلة	/	/

³¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 194–5.

³² Tehrān, Kitābhāna-yi Maḡlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, *Tabatabā'ī* 1367, pp. 107.21-108.6 (first lemma), p. 125.12-13 (second lemma).

³³ Them., *In De An.* (above, n. 20), pp. 21-22 Lyons (first lemma), p. 59 (second lemma).

From the table it is possible to infer that the lemmata quoted by Ibn Suwār come from the same Arabic translation used for the lemmata or references to Aristotle’s text in the works by Themistius and Avicenna, namely Ishāq’s translation. The first two lemmata are identical across these three texts, except for some minor variants (highlighted in the table). It may also be argued that Ibn Suwār drew directly upon Ishāq’s translation of *De Anima* rather than only upon the references recorded in the Arabic version of the Paraphrase, based on the fact that Themistius’ text lacks the last sentence of the second lemma, which instead appears in Ibn Suwār’s treatise (underlined in the table). Moreover, the variants of the first two lemmata are practically identical between Ibn Suwār and Avicenna, and differ from those found in Themistius. For example, in the first lemma Ibn Suwār and Avicenna provide a correct translation of *De An.* I 4, 408 b 23–24, “ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις, *fī ḥālī l-sukri wa-fī ḥālī l-marādī*”, whereas Themistius’ text reads “*fī ḥālī l-sukri wa-fī ḥālī l-‘illati*”.

As regards the third lemma recorded by Ibn Suwār, it is the only source attesting to Ishāq’s translation of this Aristotelian passage insofar as it occurs neither in the Paraphrase nor in the Iranian manuscript preserving Avicenna’s *Ta’līqāt*, which is mutilated at the end. However, if one compares this lemma to fragments 38–40 of *De Anima* as reconstructed by R. Frank in 1958 on the basis of the Greek text and of the *Ta’līqāt* in their previous edition, it is possible to notice a few overlaps.³⁴ If Avicenna’s work had been fully preserved by MS *Tabatabā’ī* 1367, along with the rest of Ishāq’s translation, we would therefore find a degree of correspondence similar to the one we find in the first two lemmata. The table below presents the fragments reconstructed by R. Frank alongside Ibn Suwār’s third lemma.

<i>De An.</i> III 4, 429 a 22–29	Frank, <i>Some fragments</i> , p. 245
فالشيء إذن من النفس المسمى عقلاً وأعني بالعقل الشيء الذي به تمييز النفس وترتأي ليس هو بالفعل شيئاً من الأشياء الموجودة قبل أن يعقل ولذلك صار بالواجب ليس هو مخالطاً للبدن فإنه لو كان مخالطاً لكان يضر بحال ما إما حاراً وإما بارداً وكان يكون له آلة كما للحاس إلا أنه الآن ليس هو على شيء من ذلك فقد أصاب القائلون بأن النفس موضوع الصور إلا أنها ليست بأسرها بل العاقلة .	38. 429a 23 = Gl. 100, 5 بها يرتأي وينظر في المعقولات . (ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει)
	39. 429a 24 = Gl. 100, 13 ليس شيئاً من الأشياء . (οὐθέν ἐστιν...τῶν ὄντων)
	40. 429a 24 f. = Gl. 101, 8 f. فلذلك صار بالواجب ليس مخالطاً للبدن . (διὸ οὐδὲ μεμιχθαι εὐλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι)

The treatise and the lemmata it features stress three fundamental characteristics of the human intellect, which is: incorruptible and impassive, separable from the body, and not mixed with the body. The treatise starts out *ex abrupto*, without any introduction, from lemma *De An.* I 4, 408 b 18–25, which first of all specifies the intellect’s ontological status: it is a substance (*ḡawḥar*). In addition to affirming its substantiality, in support of the incorruptibility and impassiveness of the intellect the lemma presents the famous analogy

³⁴ See Frank, *Some Fragments* (above, n. 21), pp. 231–51.

of psychic and physical weakening in old age: this condition is due to the corruption of the body and not of the intellect, which is influenced in its activity by its connections with the body but is impassive in itself.

After a first argument in support of the intellect's incorruptibility, Ibn Suwār reports a second lemma³⁵ that seems to acknowledge its separability: the intellect is a different kind of soul which, unlike the soul's other parts or faculties, seems capable of having a separate existence, independent from the body and thus everlasting. This, however, remains notoriously an open question in *De Anima*. Ibn Suwār agrees with what he takes to be Aristotle's view of the soul: a single entity with several faculties that is immortal in its rational part. All the other faculties of the soul, which exercise their function in connection with a bodily organ, are not separable and may be regarded as accidents.

From the third lemma onwards, Ibn Suwār focuses on how the intellect, in its specific activity (namely thinking), is not mixed with the body but is free from any physiological dependence on corporeal organs, which is why it may be regarded as immortal. The principle of non-mixture, along with the likely reference to other Aristotelian passages (*De An.* I 1, 403 a 10-11; II 1, 413 a 5-7), leads the author – an Aristotelian by training who sees the method of syllogistic demonstration as the ultimate way of solving philosophical issues – to formulate the following first-figure syllogism: “The rational soul, which is the human intellect, does not require a bodily organ in its specific activities, and anything which in its specific activity does not require a bodily organ is incorruptible and eternal. In conclusion the rational soul, which is the human intellect, is incorruptible and eternal”.³⁶ Ibn Suwār maintains that Aristotle's argument on the immortality of the soul implies precisely this syllogism; hence, one only needs to demonstrate the truthfulness of the premises. The demonstration of the premises – particularly the minor premise, to which Ibn Suwār devotes much more space compared to the major one, which he only discusses on the last page – is the cornerstone of the whole treatise and the chief foundation of the argument leading to that which the author wishes to demonstrate.

From a general perspective, the author's primary aim is to explain and clarify – in linguistic and doctrinal terms – a specific Aristotelian text by remaining close to what he takes to be its arguments while embarking on a few digressions, always starting from Aristotle's words. Ibn Suwār guides the reader along this argumentative path by addressing all the terminological questions he has set himself, for example: what is meant by “intellect”, what the meaning of each component is in its definition (“*ḡawhar basiṭ mudrik li-l-umūr idrākan wāḥidan wa-bi-l-sawīyya*, a simple substance that grasps things all at once”), what its specific activity is, whether this requires a bodily organ, what is meant by “bodily organ”, and – finally – what the different (material and immaterial) objects of the intellect are and how it apprehends them.

As regards the nature of the commentary on these lemmata and its subsequent argumentative developments, the picture that emerges is a varied one: it ranges from purely lexical and grammatical discussions to logical and explanatory ones, ultimately extending to paraphrastic and doctrinal arguments, which certainly present a more interpretive character. This kind of exegetical activity presupposes extensive training on both the

³⁵ See Arist., *De An.* II 2, 413 b 25-29.

³⁶ Cf. *infra*, p. 197.

philosophical level and the philological and textual one, which points to the treatise having been drafted within a sophisticated intellectual milieu. This is suggested not just by the author's approach to the Aristotelian text and by his expert selection of lemmata, but also by the use of detailed textual references, technical examples, and doctrines, as well as subtle arguments formulated through a correct use of philosophical terminology: elements that could only be appreciated by a readership that was not merely erudite, but specialised, technically well-prepared, and directly engaged in the translation and study of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

The choice of drawing upon lemmata from *De Anima* and their commentary is not as common on the eastern side of medieval Arabic philosophy's history before Avicenna, and usually it is explicitly associated with the work of the Baghdad Aristotelians. This serves to further confirm the treatise's attribution to Ibn Suwār insofar as such an approach to the Aristotelian text is perfectly consistent with the intellectual and philosophical context in which this scholar lived and operated, a context in which practising philosophy also – and indeed chiefly – meant interpreting Aristotle's works. Although what we have is not a commentary on the whole work, it should be viewed as part of the commentary tradition on *De Anima* rooted in Late Antiquity. This treatise on the immortality of the intellect, based on a commentary on lemmata from Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, is certainly part of a broader project in which Ibn Suwār was involved, and also of a broader exegetical tradition with which he identified. His work thus represents an important testimony to this tradition as well as being an expression of 10th/11th-century Baghdad's intellectual life.

Note to the present Edition

The edition closely follows the manuscript (M), however the orthography of the text (*hamza, yā'/alif maqṣūra, tā' marbūṭa/hā'*) has been tacitly normalised to the use of modern Arabic.

| بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
رَبِّ يَسَّر

مقالة الحسن بن سوار بن بابا بن بهنام
في بقاء النفس الناطقة من الإنسان على رأي أرسطوطاليس

- 5 قال إنّ أرسطوطاليس لما قال في كتاب النفس في المقالة الأولى منه فأما العقل فيشبه أن يكون
جوهرًا ما يكون في الشيء ولا يفسد فإنه لو كان يفسد لكان حريًا بذلك خاصّة عن الكلال
الذي يكون في الشيخوخة لكننا نجد ما يعرض كما يعرض في الحواس فإنّ الشيخ لو قبل عينًا
مثل عين الشاب لأبصر كما يبصر الشاب فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالًا انفعلت فيها النفس
شيئًا ما لكن حال هي فيها كما تكون في حال السكر وفي حال المرض والتصور بالعقل
10 والنظر يخلقان بأن يفسدا خلا شيء ما آخر فأما هو نفسه فلا علة به .
وكان معناه في هذا الكلام هو هذا كأنه يقول إنه لو كان العقل من الإنسان فاسدًا لكان
يضعف بضعف البدن العارض في الشيخوخة فهو إذن غير فاسد وإذا كان هذا هكذا كان الجزء
من النفس المسمّى عقلاً جوهرًا ما موجودًا في شيء هو النفس غير فاسد ولما كنا قد نشاهد فعل
العقل في الهرم ضعيفًا جدًّا وعلى غاية الاضطراب وكان كالمفسد لما قدّمه واصلّه وهو الذي بنا
15 عليه قياسه قال لكننا نجد ما يعرض كما يعرض في الحواس فإنّ الشيخ لو قبل عينًا مثل عين
الشباب لأبصر كما يبصر الشاب فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالًا انفعلت فيها | النفس شيئًا 12v
ما لكن حال هي فيها كما تكون في حال السكر وفي حال المرض يعني أنّ هذه الحال العارضة
في الشيخوخة من تقصير فعل العقل ليست لضعف العقل في نفس جوهره بل لأنّ البدن غير
قابل لفعل العقل فكما أن الحس بالبصر من الشيوخ يضعف لا لأنّ القوّة المدركة قد ضعفت
20 بل لضعف الآلة الباصرة وغلظ الرطوبة البردية لغلبة البرد على المشايخ ولأنّ الآلة التي بها تكون
الابصار من المشايخ لو كانت كآلة التي بها يكون الابصار من الشباب لأبصر الشيخ كما يُبصر
الشباب كذلك الحال في فعل العقل فإنه إمّا يضعف في المشايخ لضعف البدن الذي هو الآلة لا
لضعف النفس في جوهرها فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالًا انفعلت فيها النفس شيئًا ما لكن
حال هي فيها كما تكون في حال السكر وفي حال المرض فإنّ السكران من الناس والمريض
25 لا تكون أفعال العقل منه منتظمة وليس ذلك لتغيره في نفس جوهره بل من الآلة كذلك الحال
في المشايخ فقد بان أن أرسطوطاليس يرى أنّ الجزء من النفس وهو المسمّى عقلاً شيء غير فاسد
وأبديّ ومّا يعضد ذلك ويوكده قوله في المقالة الثانية من كتاب النفس وهو هذا .

| *In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate*
May the Lord smooth the way

12r

Treatise by al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn Bābā ibn Bihnām
On the Immortality of the Rational Soul of Man According to Aristotle's Opinion

[Ibn Suwār] said that in the first book of *De Anima* Aristotle stated: **As for the intellect, it seems to be a certain substance that finds itself within the thing and does not become corrupt. If it did become corrupt, it would be exposed to this particularly on account of the weakening that occurs in old age, but we know that things do not happen as with sense organs. If the old man were to receive an eye like the eye of the young man, he would see just as well as the young man. Old age is therefore not a state in which the soul is subject to a certain affection, but a state in which it finds itself, just as it might find itself in the state of drunkenness or disease. Conceptualising and thinking via the intellect is different, because these become corrupt when a certain other thing falls away, whereas it [i.e. the intellect] is impassive in itself.**¹

The meaning of this argument was: it is as though he were stating that if the human intellect were corruptible, it would grow weak through the weakening of the body that occurs in old age; hence, it is incorruptible. If this is the case, then that part of the soul called “intellect” is a certain substance that finds itself in a thing, namely the incorruptible soul. Since we have ascertained that the intellect’s activity in old age is very weak and in a marked state of confusion, and since it is like the corrupting thing when it progresses and takes root, [this] is what he has based his analogy on. He said: *but we know that things do not happen as with sense organs. If the old man were to receive an eye like the eye of the young man, he would see just as well as the young man. Old age is therefore not a state* | *in which the soul is subject to a certain affection, but a state in which it finds itself, just* 12v *as it might find itself in the state of drunkenness or disease.* It means that this condition which occurs in old age through some deficiency in the intellect’s activity is not due to any weakness in the intellect itself, but to the fact that the body does not receive the intellect’s activity. Therefore, elderly people’s sight grows weak not because the faculty of perception has weakened, but because of the weakening of the organ of sight and the thickening of the lens² caused by their being overwhelmed by the cold, as well as the fact that if the organ by which seeing occurs in elderly people were like the organ through which seeing occurs in the young man, then the old man’s sight would be like that of the young man: such, too, is the condition of the intellect’s activity. Indeed, it grows weaker in the elderly on account of the weakening of the body, which is the organ, and not on account of any weakening of the soul in itself. *Old age is therefore not a state in which the soul is subject to a certain affection, but a state in which it finds itself, just as it might find itself in the state of drunkenness or disease.* The activities of the intellect of a drunk or sick person are not orderly, and this does not occur through any alteration of the soul itself, but because of the organ: such, too, is the condition of the elderly. It is clear by now that Aristotle regards that part of the soul which is called “intellect” as something incorruptible and eternal. He asserts this and verifies his argument through this [reasoning] in the second book of *De Anima*.

قال فأما العقل والقوة النظرية فلم يتبين بعد شيء من أمره لكن قد يشبه أن يكون جنساً آخر من النفس ويكون هذا وحده قد يمكن أن يفارق كما يفارق الأبدي الفاسد فأما سائر أجزاء النفس فظاهر عن هذا | أنها ليست مفارقة كما يقول قوم. 13r

وهذا الكلام من الفيلسوف يدل دلالة بينة أنه يرى أن العقل هو من قوى النفس وأنه وحده من بين سائر القوى التي لها يمكن أن يفارق ويكون أبدياً بعد مفارقتها وذلك أنه لما كان المفارق 5 منه ما يصح أن يبقى بعد المفارقة قائماً بذاته ومنه ما لا يمكن ذلك فيه كالأعراض زاد فقال إن العقل يمكن أن يفارق كما يفارق الأبدي الفاسد ليعلمنا أن العقل وأن فارق فهو ابدى وأيضاً فإنه يقول في المقالة الثالثة من كتاب النفس.

هكذا قال فالشيء إذن من النفس المسمى عقلاً وأعني بالعقل الشيء الذي به تمييز النفس وترتأي ليس هو بالفعل شيئاً من الأشياء الموجودة قبل أن يعقل ولذلك صار بالواجب ليس 10 هو مخالطاً للبدن فإنه لو كان مخالطاً لكان يضر بحال ما إما حاراً وإما بارداً وكان يكون له آلة كما للحاس إلا أنه الآن ليس هو على شيء من ذلك فقد أصاب القائلون بأن النفس موضع الصور إلا أنها ليست بأسرها بل العاقلة.

وهذا القول من أرسطاطاليس يتبين منه بياناً تاماً أنه يريد بالعقل ههنا العقل المسمى الإنساني لأنه قال فالشيء إذن من النفس المسمى عقلاً ولم يقل العقل مطلقاً بل زاد الذي من النفس ليعلمنا 15 أن العقل الذي يريده في هذا الموضع هو العقل الإنساني لا الذي من خارج على ما ظنه قوم | فإن العقل الذي من خارج ليس هو جزء من النفس وأيضاً فإن قوله وأعني بالعقل الشيء الذي به تمييز النفس وترتأي ليس هو بالفعل شيئاً من الأشياء الموجودة قبل أن يعقل من أوكد البيانات على أنه إنما أراد بالعقل ههنا العقل الإنساني فإن العقل الذي من خارج ليس يرتأي وليس هو في حال 20 من الأحوال بالقوة بل هو ابداً موجود بالفعل يعقل فلذلك لا يصح أن يقال فيه أنه ليس هو شيئاً من الأشياء الموجودة قبل أن يعقل وإذا كان الذي يريده بالعقل ههنا العقل الإنساني وكان قد قال في العقل أنه غير مخالط البدن فإنه لو كان مخالطاً لقد كان له آلة وليس له آلة على ما يقوله فهو إذن غير مخالط ومفارق ولذلك يكون أبدياً ويظهر من كلام أرسطوطاليس هذا الذي ذكرناه الآن أنه يسمى هذا الجزء من النفس نفساً عاقلة وهي التي نسميها نحن ناطقة فإنه لما قال فقد أصاب 25 القائلون بأن النفس موضع للصور إلا أنها ليست بأسرها قال بل العاقلة فإن قوله العاقلة إشارة منه إلى نفس عاقلة وهي النفس الناطقة إن شئت فقل أو العقل الإنساني أو كيف ما اخترت أن تسميته فلا مشاحة في الأسماء فقد بان بما ذكرناه أن أرسطوطاليس يرى أن النفس الناطقة من الإنسان غير فاسدة وأبدية والحق يرى فإن كلامه هذا الذي حكيناه | يتضمن بالقوة البيان على صدق الحكم 14r ببقاء النفس فإن كلامه الذي أوردناه قبيل قوته قوة قياس يتبين به بقاء النفس الناطقة من الإنسان على هذه الصفة كأنه قال النفس الناطقة وهي العقل من الإنسان لا تحتاج في أفعالها الخاصة بها 30 إلى آلة جسمانية وكل ما لا يحتاج في فعله الخاص إلى آلة جسمانية فهو غير فاسد وأبدي فالنفس

He said: As far as the intellect and the theoretical faculty are concerned, nothing is clear, but it seems as though it is a different kind of soul and that it alone can separate itself as the eternal separates itself from the corruptible. It is evident from this that the other parts of the soul | are not separable, as some people argue.³

13r

This argument of the philosopher's clearly shows that he regards the intellect as one of the faculties of the soul, that it alone – among the other faculties – can separate itself, and that it is eternal after its separation. As for the thing that separates itself, it is correct [to argue] that a certain part of it remains after the separation, being self-subsistent; and that for a certain part of it this is not possible, as with accidents. He added and stated that the intellect *can separate itself as the eternal separates itself from the corruptible*, in order to instruct us that it is the intellect which separates itself and is therefore eternal. Furthermore, he states this in the third book of *De Anima*.

He said: That part of the soul which is called “intellect” – and by “intellect” I mean that whereby the soul discerns and apprehends – is not actually any of the existing things before it thinks [them]. For this reason, it cannot be mixed with the body: if it could be, it would deteriorate into a certain state, warm or cold, and it would have an organ like the sensory faculty – except, it has nothing of all this. So those who state that the soul is the place of forms are right, even though it is not the soul as a whole that is such, but only the intellective one.⁴

From this argument of Aristotle's it becomes quite clear that what he means here by “intellect” is that type of intellect which is called “human”, for he states *that part of the soul which is called “intellect”* and does not speak of the intellect in absolute terms, but adds that it is *part of the soul*, to instruct us that the intellect he means in this passage is the human intellect and not the intellect from outside, as some have hypothesised.⁵ | Indeed, the intellect from outside is not part of the soul. Furthermore, his statement *and by intellect I mean that whereby the soul discerns and apprehends, [it] is not actually any of the existing things before it thinks [them]* is among the surest proofs of the fact that what he means by “intellect” here is the human intellect. The intellect from outside does not apprehend anything and does not find itself in any potential state but, always actually existing, it thinks. It would therefore be incorrect to say that it is none of the existing things before it thinks [them]. And if what he means here by “intellect” is the human intellect, and what he states about the intellect is that it is not mixed with the body – for if it were mixed, it would have an organ, but according to what he says it does not have an organ – then it is not mixed and it is separable, and hence eternal. From Aristotle's argument what we have mentioned now becomes clear, namely that this part of the soul is called the “intellective soul” and that it is what we call “rational”. For when he says *so those who state that the soul is the place of forms are right, even though it is not the soul as a whole that is such, he says but only the intellective one*: his saying *intellective* is a reference on his part to the intellective soul, which is the rational soul. If you wish to call it “human intellect” or in any other way you prefer, there is no dispute over names. It is clear from what we have mentioned that Aristotle regards man's rational soul as incorruptible and eternal, and he grasps the truth. That argument of his that we have laid out | potentially includes a truthful demonstration of the thesis of the soul's immortality. The strength of his argument that we have just laid out is that of a syllogism which demonstrates the immortality of the human rational soul on the basis of this attribute. It is as though he had said: “The rational soul, which is the human intellect, does not require a bodily organ in its specific activities, and anything which in its specific activity does not require a bodily organ is incorruptible and eternal.”

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14r

الناطقة إذن وهي العقل من الإنسان غير فاسدة وأبدية فهذا هو القياس الذي يتضمن قوّة كلام
 أرسطوطاليس المذكور آنفاً ولأنّ هذا القياس مؤلف من مقدّمتين احديهما القائلة إنّ النفس غير
 محتاجة في أفعالها الخاصة بها إلى آلة جسمانية وهي صغرى القياس والأخرى القائلة وكل ما هو
 غير محتاج في أفعاله الخاصة به إلى آلة جسمانية فهو غير فاسد وأبدى وهي كبراه وكان وجوب
 النتيجة عنه والتصديق بها إنّما يحصل بعد بيان صدق كل واحدة من مقدّمته إذ كان اقترانه لا
 5 شك في صحته وإنّما ذكرت هذا لئلا يسبق إلى الوهم من لا يدرب بالقياس أنّ هذا الاقتران غير
 قياس لظنه أنّ صغراه سالبة وهو في الشكل الأوّل وليس الأمر كذلك فإنّ مقدّمته الصغرى لم
 تؤخذ على أنّها سالبة وذلك أنّ حرف السلب الموجود فيها لما أخذ مع باقي القول وصير الجميع
 موضوعاً في مقدّمته الكبرى صار في الصغرى جزءاً من المحمول لا رافعاً له ولذلك لا تكون سالبة
 10 بل موجبة وهذه حال جميع المقاييس | التي تجرى هذا المجرى وأيضاً فإنّه إن عبّر عن هذا القياس
 بعبارة أخرى كان أقرب في زوال الشبهة وهو أن يُقال إنّ النفس غير محتاجة في أفعالها الخاصة
 بها إلى آلة حسابانية وكل ما هو غير محتاج في أفعاله الخاصة به إلى آلة جسمانية فهو غير فاسد
 وأبدى فالنفس إذن غير فاسدة وأبدية لأنّه ليس في واحدة من مقدّمته حرف سلب مضافاً إلى
 ما يقوم بمقام يوجد ولذلك يكون هذا الاقتران في الضرب الأوّل من الشكل الأوّل ومثال هذا
 15 الاقتران مثال الاقتران الذي بين به أرسطوطاليس أنّ جرم السماء ليس بثقيل ولا خفيف وهو
 قوله الجسم المتحرك على استدارة ليس يتحرك إلى فوق وإلى أسفل وكل ما ليس يتحرك إلى
 فوق وإلى أسفل فليس بثقيل ولا خفيف ونتج عن ذلك أنّ الجسم المتحرك دوراً ليس بثقيل ولا
 خفيف ومثال الاقتران الذي بين به افلاطون أنّ الله ليس يفعل شيئاً من الشرور وهو إن قال إنّ الله
 ليس بضار وكل ما ليس بضار فليس يفعل شيئاً من الشرور فالله إذن ليس يفعل شيئاً من الشرور
 20 فالعلة في صحة هذه الاقترانات واحدة وهي أنّ حرف السلب فيها ليس مضافاً إلى حرف يوجد
 بل هو جزء من المحمول فإذا كان الاقتران الذي أوردناه في بقاء النفس قياسياً لم يبق في وجوب
 نتيجته ولزومها والتصديق بها إلا تبين صدق مقدّمته فنحن آخذون في تبين كل واحدة منها
 ونبدأ بالصغرى منها وهي القائلة | إنّ النفس الناطقة وهي العقل من الإنسان لا تحتاج في أفعالها الخاصة
 15r بها إلى آلة جسمانية والنظر الشديد يوجب علينا أولاً أن نذكر ما الذي نريده بقولنا ههنا عقل ثم ننظر
 هل ذلك المعنى موجود أو غير موجود وإن كان موجوداً فما هو وما الفعل الخاص به فإذا فرغنا ذلك بحثنا
 25 هل يحتاج في فعله الخاص به إلى آلة جسمانية أم لا يحتاج في فعله إلى آلة جسمانية بعد أن نذكر ما
 الذي نريده بقولنا آلة جسمانية فنقول إنّنا نريد بقولنا ههنا عقل الشيء الذي به تميّز النفس وترتأي وما اظن
 بنا كثير حاجة إلى تكلف قول يبين أنّ في الإنسان شيئاً به يميّز ويرتأي ويعرف العلوم والصنائع ويعلم
 ويتعلم لظهور ذلك وبيانه فأما هو فإننا نقول أنّه قوّة هي جوهر بسيط مدرك للأموار إدراكاً واحداً وبالسوية

In conclusion the rational soul, which is the human intellect, is incorruptible and eternal”.⁶ This syllogism encapsulates the strength of the argument by Aristotle that has just been mentioned, and since this syllogism is made up of two premises – one of which states that “the soul does not require a bodily organ in its specific activities”, and it is the minor [premise] of the syllogism, while the other states that “anything which in its specific activity does not require a bodily organ is incorruptible and eternal”, and it is the major [premise] – the necessary character of its conclusion and of the assent to them [i.e. the two premises] is obtained after the demonstration of the truthfulness of each of its premises, if there is no doubt about the correctness of the connection between them. I have recalled this in order to overcome the incorrect hypothesis of someone who is unfamiliar with syllogisms and according to whom this connection is not a syllogism, because he thinks that its minor [premise] is negative and belongs to the first figure, but this is not the case.⁷ For the minor figure should not be regarded as negative: the negative particle it contains, when viewed within the rest of the argument, makes the whole the subject of the major premise, [whereas] in the minor it becomes a part of the predicate that does not negate it. Therefore, it is not negative but affirmative, and this is the general condition of syllogisms | that work like this. 14v Moreover, if he were to express this syllogism through a different formulation, he would be closer to extinguishing uncertainty, because in neither of the two premises is the negative particle added to something that functions as “is”: this [different formulation] would be to say that the soul “is far from requiring”⁸ a bodily organ in its specific activities and that anything that “is far from requiring” a bodily organ in its specific activity is incorruptible and eternal, [meaning] in conclusion [that] the soul is incorruptible and eternal. This connection therefore falls within the first type of the first figure. One example of this connection is that [syllogism] by which Aristotle has demonstrated that the body of the heavens is neither heavy nor light, and this is his argument: “The body that moves in circles does not move either upwards nor downwards, and anything that moves neither upwards nor downwards is neither heavy nor light, from which it follows that the body which moves in circles is neither heavy nor light”;⁹ as well as the example of connection by which Plato has clarified that God does not do any evil, which is indeed him to say: “God is not harmful and anything that is not harmful does not do evil, hence God does not do evil”. There is one reason for the validity of these connections, and that is the fact that the negative particle in them is not in relation with a particle that is present, but is part of the predicate. Hence, if the connection we have been speaking of in relation to the soul’s immortality is syllogistic, for the necessity of its conclusion, for its implication, and for assent to it, we only need to demonstrate the truthfulness of its premise. Let us consider each of them for the demonstration. Let us start from the minor [premise], that which says that | the rational soul – which is the human 15r intellect – does not require a bodily organ in its specific activity. For a rigorous study, we must first of all mention what we mean here by “intellect”, then [we must] examine whether this meaning exists or not and, if it is, what it is and what its specific activity is. If we solve this, we can investigate whether it requires a bodily organ for its specific activity or not, after mentioning what we mean by “bodily organ”. So we shall say that what we mean by “intellect” here is that thing by virtue of which the soul discerns and apprehends, and I do not think it is really necessary to embark on an argument to demonstrate that in man there is a thing by which he discerns, apprehends, and understands the sciences and arts and that he knows and learns, because such a thing is manifest and clear. As regards this thing, let us say that it is a “faculty”: a simple substance that grasps things all at once and equally.

ولكنّها يتبين صدق هذا القول ينبغي أن نذكر أولاً المراد بكل من الالفاظ المأخوذة في وصف ماهيته فنقول أننا نريد بقولنا قوّة الإمكان والاستعداد والتهيؤ لقبول امر ما ونريد بقولنا جوهر ما ليس بعرض أعني ما ليس بموجود في شيء لا كجزء منه ولا يمكن قوامه خلواً مما هو فيه ونريد بقولنا بسيط ما لا تركيب فيه بتّة ونريد بقولنا مدرك أي متصور للأمر أعني أن صورة الأمور الموجودة تحصل فيه حصولاً واحداً وبالسوية فلا يكون إدراكه لبعضها وتصوره أولى من إدراكه لبعض ولا قبوله لشيء منها أسرع من قبوله لشيء بل يقبل جميعها قبولاً واحداً وبالسوية معاً وإذ قد بان المراد بكل واحدة من الالفاظ المأخوذة في وصف العقل المذكور فلنأخذ في تبين وجود ما يدل عليه هذه الالفاظ للإنسان فإنّه يتبين ببيان ذلك وجود هذا المعنى له فنقول أمّا إن في الإنسان شيئاً موجوداً هذه حاله فإن ذلك يتبين بأدنى تأمل وذلك أنا نرى الإنسان زيدا مثلاً غير عالم بأشياء ثم يصير عالماً بها فمصيره عالماً بها بعد أن لم يكن عالماً هو لا محالة لتهيؤ فيه واستعداد لقبول ذلك العلم فإنّه لو لم يكن فيه امكان وتهيؤ واستعداد لقبول علم ذلك الشيء لم يكن قابلاً له فإنّه لما كان ما ليس فيه امكان وتهيؤ واستعداد لقبول العلم والمعرفة لا يكون قابلاً لهما بتّة مثل الحجر الذي لما لم يكن فيه امكان لقبول العلم والمعرفة لم يكن قابلاً لهما بتّة وجب أن يكون القابل للعلم والمعرفة في امكان وتهيؤ واستعداد لقبول العلم والمعرفة وذلك من امره بين ففيه إذن امكان وتهيؤ واستعداد لقبول العلم والمعرفة وهو ما أشرنا بقولنا قوّة فقد بان أن في الإنسان قوّة قابلة للعلم والمعرفة ومنزلة هذه القوّة عندما تقبله من العلوم والمعارف منزلة قوّة الابصار عندما يقبله من الألوان فكما أن إدراك العين الألوان إنّما يكون منها بالقوّة الباصرة كذلك إدراك النفس الإنسان المعقولات يكون بلقوّة العقلية وكما أن حصول المرئيات في العين يكون بانفعال القوّة الباصرة وحصول صورة المرئي فيها كذلك حصول المعقولات والمعلومات للإنسان يكون بانفعال العقل وحصول صور المعقولات فيه وكما أن الأشياء المرئية تحصل في البصر حصولاً واحداً وبالسوية كذلك العقل تحصل فيه الأشياء المعقولة حصولاً واحداً وبالسوية فكما أن الابصار وإن نسيت فقل المرآة ليست موجودة بالفعل قبل قبولها الصور شيئاً من الصور القابلة لها بل هي عادمة لجميعها وكالهواء الذي لما كان قابلاً لكل لون وبالسوية قبولاً واحداً كان عادماً لكل لون كذلك العقل ليس هو بالفعل شيئاً من الأشياء التي يقبلها وذلك واجب لأن القابل لأمر ما من الأمور فهو لا محالة قبل قبوله اياه عادم له ولغيره ولما كان العقل يقبل صور جميع الأشياء الموجودة قبولاً واحداً كالבصر الذي يقبل صور جميع الأشياء المرئية لزم أن لا يكون في نفسه واحداً من الأشياء الموجودة التي يعقلها وألا يكون له صورة مختصة سوى أنّه قابل لكل صورة وليس هو شيئاً له الإمكان والقبول بل هو نفسه الإمكان والقبول والاستعداد والتهيؤ وذلك لازم فإنّه لو كانت له صورة تخصّه لم يكن قابلاً لكل صورة كالصور المباينة لصورته

However, in order to demonstrate the truthfulness of this argument, it is necessary to say first of all what we mean by each of the expressions considered in describing its essence. So we shall say that by “faculty” we mean the possibility, preparedness, and predisposition to receive a certain thing. By “substance” we mean what is not an accident, i.e. what is not in a thing as part of it and cannot be self-subsistent, if not in that in which it finds itself. By “simple” we mean that in which there is absolutely no composition. By “that grasps” we mean anything that conceptualises things, i.e. that the form of existing things is acquired within it all at once and equally. Hence, its grasping and conceptualising of certain things is not more appropriate than its grasping of others, nor is it faster in receiving one thing than another, for it receives them all together at once, | equally. What we mean by each of the expressions considered in describing the aforementioned intellect is clear by now. Let us therefore consider these expressions in order to explain to man what they indicate, for the meaning becomes clear to him by explaining this. Indeed, we say that in man there is a thing – this is his condition. This becomes clear through even the smallest reflection. For if we see a man – say, Zayd – who does not know certain things, but then becomes aware of them, i.e. becomes aware of them after being unaware, then he must have a predisposition and preparedness to accept this knowledge. For if he lacked a possibility, predisposition, and preparedness to receive knowledge of this thing, he would not receive it. For when he lacks a possibility, predisposition, and preparedness to receive science and knowledge, he does not receive these two [things] at all, like a stone which, lacking the possibility to receive science and knowledge, does not receive them at all. It is necessary for there to be a possibility, predisposition, and preparedness to receive science and knowledge in that which is to receive science and knowledge. And this is clear in the case [of man], so within him there is the possibility, predisposition, and preparedness to receive science and knowledge, and this is what we have indicated by speaking of a “faculty”. It is therefore clear that in man there is a faculty which receives science and knowledge. When it receives science and knowledge, this faculty is of the same type as the faculty of sight when it receives colours. So just as the eye’s perception of colours occurs by means of the faculty of sight, so the human soul’s grasping of intelligibles occurs by means of the intellective faculty. And just as the acquisition | of visions in the eye occurs by means of the affection of the faculty of sight and the acquisition of the visible form within it, so man’s acquisition of intelligibles and notions occurs by means of the affection of the intellect and the acquisition of the forms of intelligibles within it. Just as visible things are acquired by sight all at once and equally, so intelligible things are acquired within the intellect all at once and equally. So just as the faculty of sight – and if this is eluding you, consider a mirror – is not in actuality with respect to any of the forms it receives before it has received them and lacks them all; and just as air lacks any colour when it receives each colour equally all at once, so the intellect is not in actuality in any of the things it receives. This is necessary because what receives a certain thing must necessarily lack it and all others before it receives it. Given that the intellect receives the forms of all existent things all at once, just as the sense of sight receives the forms of all visible things, it is necessary that none of the existent things that it thinks be found within it and that it lacks a form of its own, while nonetheless receiving all forms.¹⁰ And it is not something that has the possibility and the reception, but it is itself the possibility, the reception, the preparedness, and the predisposition, and this is necessary. For if it had a form of its own, it would not receive all forms as forms different from its own,

ولا كان قبوله أيضاً للصور قبولاً واحداً بل كان قبوله لما لجانس صورته أكثر ولما يبانها أضعف
 16v وأقل فلا به قابل لكل صورة بالسواء | وجب أن يكون عادماً لكل صورة ولأنه عادم لكل صورة
 ما يجب أن يكون ضرورة أن تكون بسيطاً فإن الأشياء المركبة لكل واحد منها صورة تخصه ولما
 كان العقل ليس له صورة تخصه كما بينا لم يكن مركباً وإذا لم يكن مركباً فهو بسيط وهو بين ممّا
 قلناه أنه ليس بعرض وذلك أنه لو كان عرضاً لكان بوجه ما إما حاراً وإما بارداً وإما رطباً وإما يابساً
 5 أو مكيفاً بكيفية ما أخرى أو منعوتاً بواحدة ما من النعوت الباقية وللزم من هذا أن يكون قابلاً لما
 يجانس تلك الكيفية أو النعت غير قابل لما يبانها أو ينافيها وكان لما يناسب تلك الحال أكثر قبولاً
 ولما لا يناسبها أقل وليس هذه حال العقل فليس هو إذن عرضاً وإذا لم يكن عرضاً فهو جوهر فقد
 بان بما ذكرناه أن في الإنسان قوة هي جوهر بسيط مدرك للأمر إدراكاً واحداً وبالسوية وهو الذي
 اردنا بيانه وهو بين ممّا قلناه ما الفعل الخاص بالعقل وهو إدراك الأمور إدراكاً واحداً وبالسوية وقد
 10 نبين الآن أن ننظر هل العقل يحتاج في شيء من فعله هذا إلى آلة جسمانية أم لا يحتاج فيه إلى
 آلة جسمانية وأريد بالآلات الجسمانية أشياء ما حادثة عن امتزاج الأسطقسات الأربعة ولما كان
 القول بأن العقل يحتاج في فعله إلى آلات جسمانية شديد الإقناع رأينا إيراد ما لقائل بقوله يروم
 17r أن يبين به أن العقل لا يتم شيء من فعله الخاص به إلا بالآلة جسمانية | وهو أن مبادئ العلوم كلها
 هي الحواس كما قال أرسطوطاليس في مواضع آخر فإذا كانت مبادئ العلوم هي الحواس لم يمكن
 15 أن يدرك العقل شيئاً من الأشياء الموجودة إلا بعد أن يأخذ مبادئ العلم به من الحواس فالحواس
 الآت له وهي جسمانية والعلّة في ذلك أن الأمور الموجودة كلها لما كان ليس شيء منها مفارقة
 للتهيؤ في أو المادة بتة سوى الباري تعالى و كان الشيء إنما يدرك الأشياء الملائمة له لا المبانة
 والمنافية وجب أن يكون العقل ملائماً للأشياء الهيولانية وملائمية اياها إنما تكون بمشاركته اياها
 20 ومشاركته اياها تكون بأن نأخذ من الحواس مبدئ لا دراك المعقولات فتكون الحواس كالألات له
 وهذا القول ليس بالصغير ولا بالهين في ابطال القول بأن العقل من الإنسان لا يحتاج في فعله
 الخاص به إلى آلة جسمانية فنقول إن الغلط في هذا القول إنما دخل من قلة العلم بالنحو الذي
 عليه يكون التصور بالعقل ومن الوهم بأن الأشياء الموجودة كلها ليس منها شيء تفارق الهيولى
 والمادة سوى الباري تعالى و أن العقل لا يعقله وهذا محال فإنه قد توجد أشياء مفارقة للهيولى
 وهي جميع الأشياء التي يروم أرسطوطاليس أن يحصرها تحت عدد في كتابه فيما بعد الطبيعيات
 ويعتقد أنها غير فاسدة وسرمدية فإن هذه الأشياء نقول أنها مفارقة للمادة والطينة وهي عقول
 17v الأشياء العالية | على †...† وإن فرضنا أن الامر على ما ذكر في الشك وهو أنه ليس في الموجودات ما
 هو مفارق للمادة والطبيعة سوى الباري تعالى فإننا نبين مع تسليم هذا أن للعقل فعلاً يتم بغير آلة

nor would its reception of the forms occur all at once, but its reception of what is of the same kind as its own form would be greater, whereas [its reception of] what differs from it would be weaker and lesser, so it would not receive all forms equally. | It is necessary for it to lack any form and, given that it lacks any form, it is necessary for it to be simple. For each composite thing there is a specific form, and since the intellect does not have a specific form, as we have clarified, it is not composite. And if it is not composite, then it is simple. From what we have said, it is clear that it is not an accident: if it were an accident, it would somehow be hot or cold, or moist or dry, or a certain other quality, or it would be described through one of the remaining categories, and hence it would be necessary for it to receive what belongs to the same kind as that quality or category, without receiving what is different from or contrary to it. The receptiveness would be greater towards what is in accordance with that condition, whereas it would be lesser for what is not [in accordance with that condition], but this is not the condition of the intellect, so it is not an accident. If it is not an accident, then it is a substance. It is now clear, from what we have said, that in man there is a faculty which is a simple substance that grasps things all at once and equally, and this is what we wished to demonstrate: it has become clear from what we have said about what the intellect's specific activity is, namely grasping things all at once and equally. We can now clarify whether the intellect requires a bodily organ for something of its specific activity or not, and what I mean by "bodily organs" are certain things that are generated through the mixing of the four elements. Since the argument according to which the intellect requires bodily organs for its activity is strongly persuasive, we have seen what the reference is through which the person who is speaking intends to demonstrate, through his argument, that the intellect does not accomplish anything of its specific activity if not by means of a bodily organ, | namely [the claim] that "the principles of all knowledge are the sensory organs", as Aristotle states in other passages.¹¹ If the principles of knowledge are the sensory organs, it is impossible for the intellect to grasp any of the existing things, if not after having obtained the principles of knowledge by means of the sensory organs. The sensory organs are therefore instruments for it, and they are corporeal: the reason for this is that since none of the existing things are absolutely separate from matter for thought – except for the Creator, the Most High¹² – and since the thing grasps things in conformity with it and not those that are different and contrary [to it], it is necessary for the intellect to be in conformity with material things; and its [= the intellect's] conformity to them is due to the fact that it is associated with them; and it is because it is associated with them that we obtain the principles from the sensory organs and not through the grasping of intelligibles. Therefore, the sensory organs are like instruments for it. This is no trifle or negligible argument when it comes to disproving the argument that the human intellect does not require a bodily organ for its specific activity. Let us say that the fallacy in this argument derives from a lack of knowledge about the way in which conceptualisation occurs by means of the intellect, from the incorrect hypothesis that none of the existing things separates itself from *hayūlā*, matter,¹³ except the Creator, the Most High, and that the intellect does not think Him; but this is impossible. For there are things separate from matter, and these are all the things that Aristotle lists in his *Metaphysics*,¹⁴ and which he regards as incorruptible and eternal. Let us say, then, that these things – the intellects of heavenly things – are separate from matter and nature. | If we suppose that the thing is such as has been mentioned in the objection – i.e. that no existent thing is separate from matter and nature except the Creator, the Most High – then, by granting this, we show that the intellect accomplishes its activity, namely grasping what is not material, without any organ.

وهو إدراكه الشيء الذي ليس بهيولاني فإن إدراكه لهذا يكون من دون آلة وكذلك إدراكه ذاته يكون بغير آلة هكذا نقول أنّ الموجودات منها هيولانية ومنها غير هيولانية فالعقل يدرك الأمور الهيولانية وغير الهيولانية لكنّه ليس يدرك هذين بنحو واحد وذلك أنّه يدرك الأمور الهيولانية على غير النحو الذي يدرك الأمور غير الهيولانية وذلك أنّ العقل إذا طلب معرفة الأمور غير الهيولانية انبسط انبساط الراجع إلى ذاته فأدركها وإذا طلب معرفة الأشياء الهيولانية عرض له شبيه بالانعكاس إلى الحس فأخذ من الحس مبدأ الإدراك المعقولات فهو يستعمل الحواس في إدراك الأمور الهيولانية كآلات يقتدر بتوسطها على اكتساب الصور وذلك أنّه من دون الحواس لا يمكنه تصور الأمور الهيولانية البتة فإنّ الآلة لا يمكنه تصور الألوان فأما في إدراكه الأمور غير الهيولانية فإنّه لا يحتاج إلى آلة بتّة بل يدركها بنفسه ولست أعرف خلافاً في هذا وها الاسكندر الذي يظهر منه مخالفة ما نحونا في هذه المقالة .

يقول هكذا فالعقل ليس يأخذ الصور على أنّه يصير هيولى لها ولا أنّ تلك الصور مع هيولى كما يجرى الأمر في التي | تدرك بالحس لكنّها يأخذها أنفسها وعلى حياله بإفراده لها وتلخيصه اياها من كل ما يصورها من الهيولى وينظر فيها وذلك أنّه في تصويره الأبيض ليس يتصوره على أنّه مع شكل أو مع عظم والسبب في ذلك أنّه ليس يحتاج في إدراك المعقولات إلى أن ينضم إليها آلة أصلاً جسمانية لكنّه مكيف بنفسه لنفسه في تعرّف ما يعقله .

ويتضح ما قلناه وضوحاً أكثر بما نحن قائلوه وهي أنّ الأمور منها هيولانية وهي جميع الأمور التي لا تفارق الهيولى لا في الوجود ولا في المعنى وهذه هي جميع الصور التي تؤخذ في حدودها الموضوعات كالعطسة التي لا تفارق الأنف الذي هو موضوعها وذلك أنّه إنّما يدركها انعقاد في الأنف فلا يحصلها من دون الأنف البتة ومنها غير هيولانية وهذه على وجهين فمنها ما هو مفارق للهيولى في الوجود والمعنى جميعاً كالباري تعالى فإنّه في الوجود مفارق لكل هيولى ومادة ولا ينطوي في معناه شيء من الهيولى البتة لأنّ الهيولى أو المادة ليست موضوعة له بوجه التتمة ومنها ما هو مفارق في المعنى غير مفارق في الوجود وهذه هي جميع الصور التي لا تؤخذ في حدودها الموضوعات لها بل العقل يحصلها ويفهمها من دون الهيولى كالسطح والخط والنقطة فإنّ هذه لا توجد مفارقة للمادة البتة والعقل يفهم معناها وحقيقتها من دون الهيولى فإنّه يجد السطح والخط من دون الهيولى والموضوع ويحصل أنّ السطح لم متصل ذو طول وعرض | والخط طول لا عرض له فنحصل فيه معقولة صور محضة مجردة من الهيولا فإنّ سلم في تحصيل العقل لهذه الصور المفارقة في المعنى لا في الوجود أنّه لا يكون بالآلة جسمانية لأنّ عند تجريده لها لا يحتاج فيه إلى حس وإلى آلة فقد بلغنا المراد وإن امتنع من ذلك وظنّ أنّ يلخص العقل الصور من المادة إنّما يكون بعد إدراكه المركب

Its grasping therefore occurs without any organ and, likewise, its grasping of its essence occurs without any organ. So we shall say that, among existing things, some are material while others are immaterial. The intellect grasps material and immaterial things, but does not grasp them in the same way, for it grasps material things in a different way compared to how it grasps immaterial things. If the intellect seeks knowledge of immaterial things, it becomes increasingly simple and returns within itself,¹⁵ and thus grasps them; if instead it seeks knowledge of material things, it undergoes something similar by turning to sensation, and thus obtains from sensation the principle of the grasping of intelligibles. It therefore uses sensations to grasp material things, as the organs, and succeeds in acquiring the forms through their mediation: without sensations, it is absolutely incapable of conceptualising material things. Were it not for the organ, it could not conceptualise colours. As for its grasping immaterial things, it has absolutely no need for any organ, but grasps them in themselves; and – as far as I know – there is no disagreement on this. Take Alexander, who would appear to be the source of a disagreement we have covered in this treatise.

[Alexander] states: **The intellect does not obtain the forms in such a way as to become their matter, nor [does it obtain] those forms with any matter, as happens with that which | grasps [things] through sensation, but it obtains them in themselves, one by one and individually, separating everything it thinks from matter and then contemplating them: when it thinks of white, it does not think of it as conjoined with some figure or magnitude. The reason for this is that in order to grasp intelligibles it does not at all require a bodily organ attached to it, but is sufficient in itself in order to know what it thinks.**¹⁶ 18r

What we have said becomes clearer through what we shall state [now], namely that some things are material, and these are all those things that do not become separate from matter either in existence or in meaning, and these are all those forms whose definitions takes the substrata into account – as with the sneeze, which is not separated from the nose, which is its substratum, for it is grasped through its relation with the nose and in no way is acquired without the nose – while others are immaterial.¹⁷ And these [i.e. the immaterial things] are in two ways: some are what is separate from matter both in existence and in meaning – such as the Creator, the Most High, who in His existence is separate from all *hayūlā*, matter, and whose meaning in no way encompasses anything material, since *hayūlā*, matter, is not a substratum for His perfecting – while others are what is separate in meaning but not in existence, and these are all the forms whose definitions do not take their substrata into account, as the intellect acquires and understands them without matter, as with the surface, the line, and the dot. In these there is absolutely no separation because of matter, and the intellect understands their meaning and truth without matter: for it sees the surface and the line without any matter or substratum, and comprehends that the non-continuous surface has length and width, | 18v whereas the line has length but not width; it therefore follows that within it they are thought of as pure forms, separate from matter. If in acquiring these separate forms the intellect relies on their meaning and not their existence – something which does not occur by means of a bodily organ, since at the moment of abstracting them it does not require sensation and an organ – then we have reached our goal. If instead it were prevented from doing so and it were maintained that the intellect draws the forms from matter after having grasped the composite,

وإدراكه المركب إنما يكون بعد الإحساس به ولذلك لا تم بهذا الفعل من العقل إلا بآلة من الحس فإنّه لا يفارق على أنّ بمنيع وهو مصيب أنّ إدراك العقل الباري تعالى ليس هو بآلة جسمانية وذلك أنّ الباري تعالى موجود والعقل يدرك جميع الأمور الموجودة كما قلنا في حده فالعقل إذن يدرك الباري وإذا كان يدركه وكانت ذات الباري تقدست ليست بمحسوسة وكل ما يدركه العقل بآلة جسمانية فهو محسوس ما يلزم ضرورة أن يكون إدراكه الباري ليس هو بآلة جسمانية وكذلك 5 إدراكه ذاته ليس بآلة جسمانية لأنّ ذاته موجودة وقد قيل إنّه يعقل جميع الأشياء الموجودة فلذلك يلزم أن يكون عاقلًا لذاته وذاته ليست محسوسته وما يعقله بآلة جسمانية هو محسوس فيلزم أن لا يكون العقل يدرك ذاته بآلة جسمانية فقد بان إذن أنّ العقل يدرك اشياء ما من دون آلة جسمانية وهو فعله الخاص به فقد ظهر صدق احدى مقدمي القياس المذكور وهي القائلة إنّ العقل لا يحتاج 10 في فعله الخاص به إلى آلة جسمانية وبقي أن نبين صدق مقدمته الأخرى | القائلة وكل ما لا يحتاج في فعله الخاص به إلى آلة جسمانية فهو غير فاسد وأبدّي بأن نقول إن كان كل ما يحتاج في فعله إلى آلة جسمانية فاسدًا فما ليس بفاقد لا يحتاج في فعله إلى آلة جسمانية وإذا كان هذا لازمًا كان عكسه البسيط واجبًا وهو أنّه ما لا يحتاج في فعله إلى آلة جسمانية ليس بفاقد فأما أنّ كل ما يحتاج في فعله الخاص به إلى آلة جسمانية فاسد فإنّ ذلك يتبين هكذا كل موجود له فعل 15 يخصه فهو موجود من اجل فعله الخاص به فإذا كان يحتاج في فعله الخاص به إلى آلة جسمانية وكانت الآلة الجسمانية منقضية ما يكون فعله منقضيًا فانيًا وكان وجوده من اجل فعله ما يجب إلا يكون موجودًا بل منقضيًا بائدًا لأنّ فعله الذي كان من اجله موجودًا منقضى فالفاعل به آلة جوهره وفعله وآلته متناسبة في البقاء والدوام لأنّ وجود كل واحد منها معلق بالباقية فقد بان صدق المقدمتين المأخوذتين في القياس المذكور وبان ببيان ذلك وبما قلناه من صحة نظمها نتیجته 20 وهي أنّ النفس الناطقة من الإنسان غير فاسدة وأبدية وهو الذي اردنا بيانه

تمّت مقالة الفاضل الحسن بن سوار بابا بن بهنام
في بقاء النفس الناطقة من الإنسان على رأي أرسطوطاليس

and that the grasping of the composite occurs after its perception, then this action on the intellect's part could only be fulfilled by means of the organ of sensation, and it would not become separate insofar as it would be prevented from doing so; but it is correct [to maintain] that the grasping of the intellect of the Creator, the Most High, does not occur by means of a bodily organ. Indeed, the Creator, the Most High, exists, and the intellect grasps all existing things as we have said in its definition. The intellect therefore grasps the Creator, and if its grasping and the essence of the Creator are pure, not sensible, and if everything which the intellect grasps through a bodily organ is a certain sensible, then it is necessary that its [= the intellect's] grasping of the Creator does not occur by means of a bodily organ. In the same way, its [= the intellect's] grasping of itself does not occur by means of a bodily organ, because its [= the intellect's] own essence exists, and it has been said that it thinks all existing things; so it is necessary that it think its own essence, and its essence is not sensible and that which thinks by means of a bodily organ is sensible; hence, it is necessary for the intellect not to grasp its essence by means of a bodily organ. It is clear, then, that the intellect grasps certain things without a bodily organ, and this is its specific activity. The truthfulness of one of the aforementioned syllogism's premises is evident by now, and that is the one which says that "the intellect does not require a bodily organ in its specific activity". What remains to be clarified is the truthfulness of its other premise, | which says: "and anything 19r which in its specific activity does not require a bodily organ is incorruptible and eternal". We shall therefore say that anything which requires a bodily organ for its activity is corruptible, whereas what does not require it does not become corrupt. If this is necessarily the case, then its contrary must be what is simple, namely that which does not require a bodily organ for its activity and which does not become corrupt. As for the fact that anything that requires a bodily organ for its specific activity is corruptible, this become clear in the following way: any being that has a specific activity exists with a view to its specific activity. Therefore, if it requires a bodily organ for its specific activity and if the bodily organ is something which comes to an end, its activity will be something that comes to an end and passes away. And [if] its existence with a view to its activity, it is bound to be not existent, but perishable and mortal, since the activity with a view to which it exists is finite, and thus the agent within it is the organ of its substance, and its activity and its organ are consistent with immortality and eternity, since the existence of each is connected to that of the others. By now the truthfulness of the two premises considered in the aforementioned syllogism is clear, and from this demonstration and from what we have said about the correctness of their order [i.e. of the premises], its conclusion [i.e. of the syllogism] is clear as well, namely that man's rational soul is incorruptible and eternal, which is what we wanted to demonstrate.

Thus ends the treatise by the excellent al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār Bābā ibn Bihnām
On the Immortality of the Rational Soul of Man According to Aristotle's Opinion.

Notes

¹ Arist., *De An.*, I 4, 408 b 18-25.

² i.e. cataracts; see Philop., *In De An.*, p. 161.22-25 Hayduck (CAG XV); M. Meyerhof (ed.), *The Book of the Ten Treatises on the Eye Ascribed to Hunain ibn Ishâq (809-877 A.D.)*:

The Earliest Existing Systematic Text-book of Ophthalmology (Kitāb al-‘aṣar maqālāt fī al-‘ayn al-mansūb li-Hunayn ibn Ishāq (194-264 H), Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Alexandria 2009-2010, pp. 3ss. and p. 189.

³ Arist., *De An.*, II 2, 413 b 25-29.

⁴ Arist., *De An.*, III 4, 429 a 22-29.

⁵ This might be Alexander of Aphrodisias. Our sources, starting from John Philoponus (6th century), mention him as a philosopher who supported the mortality of the human soul as being the form of the corruptible body. According to Alexander, the only separate and incorruptible intellect is the Aristotelian God, and when Aristotle mentions the separability of the intellect, he is actually referring to the ποιητικόν. In commenting on *De An.* I 4, 408 b 18-25, which is to say the first lemma quoted and discussed by Ibn Suwār, Philoponus – drawing upon parts of this lemma and explicitly criticising Alexander – notes that Aristotle is here referring to the human intellect (see Philop., *In De An.*, pp. 159.1-165.2 Hayduck [Reimer, Berlin 1897, CAG XV]). Ibn Suwār does the same with this lemma, because – like Philoponus – he possibly regards Alexander as a typical example of a philosopher who “switches the intellects” to uphold his thesis. To prevent this misunderstanding, which may or may not have originated with Alexander, Ibn Suwār notes that in *De An.*, III 4, 429 a 22-29 what Aristotle is referring to is not the absolute (*mutlaq*) intellect, but the human one. Over the course of his argument, Ibn Suwār makes this same point by quoting the lemma: he stresses that if Aristotle had really meant the absolute intellect, he would not have said that it is “part” of the soul or that it “is not actually any of the existing things before it thinks [them]”. The commentator instead stresses the pure and essential actuality of the ‘aql alladī min ḥāriḡ (lit. the “intellect that comes from outside”), a formula that draws upon the expression νοῦς θύραθεν which Alexander applies to the productive intellect – another clue as to the fact that this “someone” whom Ibn Suwār refers to might be precisely Alexander.

⁶ See Arist., *De An.* I 1, 403 a 3-15; Them., *In De An.*, p. 6.4-10 and p. 6.28-33 Heinze (Reimer, Berlin 1899 [CAG V.3]).

⁷ Ibn Suwār quite shrewdly reduces Aristotle’s argument to an unambiguous and linear syllogism which leads to the indisputable conclusion that the rational soul is immortal. Aristotle divided the syllogism into three figures. In the first, the middle term serves as the subject in the major premise and as predicate in the minor premise, for example: (a) all men are mortal; (b) Socrates is a man; (c) therefore, Socrates is mortal. Ibn Suwār presents a first-figure syllogism by inverting its premises: the major premise – the more universal – comes second. He aims to clarify that the syllogism he has formulated does not violate Aristotle’s rules (according to which a first-figure syllogism with a negative minor premise is inconclusive), because although it formally contains a negative particle, this is not really a negative particle at all. Ibn Suwār stresses that the minor premise of the syllogism is not negative and that the syllogism belongs to the kind of first-figure syllogism in which the premises are universal affirmative propositions, as is the conclusion (i.e. a BARBARA syllogism, see Arist., *An. Pr.*, I 15, 34 a 34-b2). Although a negative particle is formally present, this is not a proposition of the sort “no man is immortal”, but rather a proposition that is *de facto* affirmative, because the negation concerns the specification – it is part of the predicate, not the subject. The middle term, therefore, is not negative. The minor premise is not “no soul...”, but “the rational soul” (affirmative subject) “does not require” (negative predicate); and the major premise is “anything which” (affirmative subject) “does not require” (negative predicate). Only the members of the Baghdad school would have been able to trace this back to the

theory of propositions that are formally negative, but actually affirmative and indefinite, and which – as such – do not violate the rules for first- and third-figure syllogisms. The theory in question must have been discussed in relation to *De Interpretatione* and to the exegetical material related to Ammonius' commentary.

⁸ For the sake of clarity, Ibn Suwār suggests using the expression “غير محتاجة”, lit. “is far from requiring” or “is differently in need of”, instead of “لا تحتاج”, to avoid writing the negative particle *lā* while preserving the meaning.

⁹ Arist., *De Cael.* I 3, 269 b 6. When Aristotle states that “the heavens are not light and not heavy”, he is not formulating a negative proposition, but affirming that the heavens are *neither* light *nor* heavy: the proposition is negative in form, but not in content. Only if the minor premise were a genuinely negative proposition would the syllogism not be valid. The fact that Plato and Aristotle have formulated inferences that take this form does not in any way mean that they violated Aristotle's rules for conclusive syllogisms. As in his own syllogism, in the two examples he provides Ibn Suwār states the minor premise first and then the major one.

¹⁰ See Arist., *De An.* III 4, 429 a 13-22; see also Them., *In De An.*, p. 94.18-34 Heinze.

¹¹ This is not a lemma or a word-for-word quote, but a summary by Ibn Suwār of Aristotelian empiricism, which is explained in “other passages”: see e.g. *De An.* I 1, 403 a 10-11; II 1, 413 a 5-7.

¹² See Georr, *Les Catégories d'Aristote* (above, n. 7), p. 171.12-15 [French trans.] and p. 378.7-8 [Arabic text].

¹³ These two terms, *hayūlā* and *madda*, have the same meaning; perhaps Ibn Suwār writes *madda* after *hayūlā* in order to clarify the meaning of the Greek loan word ὄλη.

¹⁴ Arist., *Metaph.* XII 8, 1073 b 16; Them., *In De An.*, p. 103.13 Heinze.

¹⁵ See O. Bardenhewer (ed.), *Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis*, Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau 1882, p. 87.

¹⁶ Alex. Aphr., *De An.*, p. 84.6-12 Bruns (*CAG Suppl.* II.1).

¹⁷ See Arist., *De An.* III 4, 429 b 10-22; III 7, 431 b 12-16; Them., *In De An.*, p. 114.9-28 Heinze.

