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Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism:
A Study and Analysis of the Trinitarian Florilegium
in MS British Library Add. 14532

Bishara Ebeid*

Abstract
This paper aims to study and analyse the Trinitarian doctrine of a Syriac Patristic florilegium of Trinitarian content found in MS London, British Library, Add. 14532, in an attempt to understand the reasons that led to its composition. It will include an analysis of the development of Miaphysite metaphysics during the sixth and the seventh centuries, when the Miaphysites had to deal with various internal controversies, and an analytical presentation of the florilegium and of its contents, with an identification of the patristic quotations used by the compiler. The study of the theology and metaphysics of this florilegium will go on to demonstrate that the Miaphysites, starting from their Christology and the problems it created in their Trinitarian doctrine, formulated a metaphysical system based on a new comprehension of “substance”, “hypostasis”, “property” and “monarchy” and developed what I call “Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine”.

Introduction

The paradox of the Christian faith is to believe in one God and to affirm that this one God is Triune. In Eastern Christianity, Trinitarian doctrine was a main topic of discussion in three moments: 1) during the first four centuries and with a culmination in the fourth century, when the Trinitarian dogma was first formulated; 2) in the sixth and early seventh centuries, during the Christological controversies, when the question of Tritheism emerged among Miaphysites, and 3) under Islamic rule, when Christians had to explain again that their doctrine of Trinity is not tantamount to Tritheism.

Whole libraries have been written on all these topics. With this paper, however, I aim to highlight the long-term consequences of Tritheism in the Miaphysite church, which, for reasons that still have to be determined, was still composing dogmatic patristic florilegia against Tritheism under Abbasid rule. The present paper aims to study and analyse the Trinitarian doctrine of a florilegium of Trinitarian content found in MS BL Add. 14532 and in a number of other places, in an attempt to understand the theological reasons behind its composition. This florilegium, like others, was composed and copied after the second moment of Trinitarian debates mentioned above and used by Syriac and Arabic Christian authors during the third phase.

I shall start by summarizing some major and well-known points of the early development of Trinitarian dogma, based mainly on the Trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocian fathers.

*This article resulted from research funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (GA No 758732 – FLOS. Florilegia Syriaca).
This summary is necessary to understand the subsequent developments during the following phases of the Trinitarian controversies and will help the reader better understand the solutions offered. Then, after a presentation of the florilegium and of its content, including an identification of the patristic quotations used by the compiler, I shall analyse the theology and metaphysics of the florilegium in relation to the Trinitarian discussions of the sixth and seventh centuries.

I shall demonstrate that the Trinitarian content of this florilegium has Miaphysite Christology as its starting point and could therefore be called a Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine. In addition, it will be shown that this florilegium offers a new formulation and synthesis of the metaphysical terms and concepts used by Miaphysites in their Christological and Trinitarian doctrine. As such, it was used as a major building block of Miaphysite works against Chalcedonians and Nestorians written during the eighth and ninth centuries, in Syriac and Arabic. At the same time, the content of this florilegium should be seen as an important reference for Miaphysite apologetic writings produced during the third phase of Trinitarian debates, that is, with Muslim scholars.

1. The Cappadocians and the Establishment of the Trinitarian Dogma: A Short Summary

On the eve of Nicaea, Christian theologians sought to use metaphysical concepts to explain the relationship between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.1 The Council of Nicaea established that the Son is true God (from) begotten of true God; generated by the Father; of the same substance (consubstantial) as the Father “ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί”; and that he is Creator. However, the Council did not clarify the difference between the metaphysical terms “substance” (ousia) and “hypostasis” (ὑπόστασις), nor did it sufficiently explain what consubstantiality means.2

The Cappadocian Fathers, Basil the Great (d. 379), Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390) and Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), contributed a great deal to the clarification of the metaphysical terminology (substance/ousia, nature/physis,3 hypostasis/ὑπόστασις, person/πρόσωπον and consubstantial/ὁμοούσιο) in response to the challenges of Arians, Eunomians, Sabellians, Pneumatomachians (Macedonians)4 and Apollinarists,5 who understood the same metaphysical

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3 It must be noted that the term nature “φύσις” was not as frequently used by the Cappadocians as was the term substance “ousia”; both terms are used interchangeably in the work of the Cappadocian Amphilochius of Iconium, see Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), p. 255.
5 The Trinitarian doctrine of Apollinaris of Laodicea was characterized by a radical subordination in the Trinity. On his Trinitarian doctrine see E. Mühlenberg, Apollinaris von Laodicea, Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, Göttingen 1968 (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Band 23), pp. 230-7; on the accusations against him see B. Ebeid, La Tunica di al-Masīḥ. La Cristologia delle grandi confessioni cristiane dell’Oriente nel X e XI secolo, Valore Italiano-Edizione Orientalia Christiana, Roma 2019, pp. 250-5.
terms in different ways. By resorting to the Aristotelian distinction between second and first substance, and having as background Stoic interpretations of the Aristotelian categories, the Cappadocians distinguished between the general or common, the “κοινόν”, and the particular or specific, the “ἴδιον”. In this way the substance, an abstract reality, is the common and general, and is not identified with the particular and singular, which is the hypostasis, the concrete realization of the abstract. An analogy from the created world helped Basil clarify his thought: the “common” element of all human beings is their nature, which is equal in each one; the individuals belonging to this same common nature, however, are distinguished from one another: each individual is the specific, or the particular of the same common nature. Participating in, and belonging to, the same nature and substance means consubstantiality. As a result, by applying this line of reasoning to his Trinitarian doctrine, Basil, with the other Cappadocians, arrived at the formula “God is one substance (in) three hypostases”. It must be noted that as far as created and material substances are concerned, each hypostasis is considered as an individual, a single substance with its specific and determined qualities. In the case of the uncreated God, however, and since the divine substance is simple and immaterial, the divine hypostases cannot be considered as individuals, even if according to Cappadocian thought hypostases are concrete substances. This was, as it were, one of the main weak points of their metaphysical system.

If this doctrine was developed by Cappadocians in their response to the doctrines of Arians, and especially Eunomians who did not accept that the Father and the Son participate in the same substance, in defining orthodoxy against the challenge of Sabellians they had to clarify the relationship between the terms hypostasis and person. In order to define the Trinity against the doctrine of the Sabellians, Basil used the term πρόσωπον, but did not understand it in the classical meaning of mask, used by Sabellius himself and his followers;

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8 It was Gregory of Nyssa who developed this Aristotelian distinction, see L. Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, Oxford U.Ps, Oxford - New York 2005 (American Academy of Religion, Academy Series); Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), p. 204.
11 See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 63-4.
12 See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 45-56, 67-74 and 76-82; Ch. A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God. In Your Light We Shall See Light, Oxford U.P., Oxford - New York 2008 (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), pp. 220-4. It must be noted that for the Cappadocians consubstantiality must be always seen with the monarchy of the Father; we will come back to this last topic in a while.
13 See Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), pp. 203-4; Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), p. 222.
he rather identified it with the term hypostasis.\textsuperscript{14} In this case the υπόστασις gives essence to the general nature and manifests it perfectly in a particular and concrete nature; the πρόσωπον personalizes the general nature and makes it determined, so that these two terms acquired almost the same meaning and metaphysical function.\textsuperscript{15}

It was also necessary to explain the relationship of the hypostases with the common substance, and of the hypostases with one another. These questions were the result of the reflection on how the three hypostases should not be considered as three deities. In fact, for the Cappadocians the affirmation of one common nature in God and of three consubstantial hypostases was not enough to demonstrate that Trinity is not tantamount to Tritheism. Therefore, the three divine hypostases had to have one and unique cause “αἰτία”, principle “ἀρχή” and source “πηγή”, not in a chronological, but in an ontological sense. For them, this cause is the same Father. In this way, the Father, as hypostasis and essence,\textsuperscript{16} is the one who maintains the uniqueness in the Trinity.\textsuperscript{17} He is the eternal cause of the eternal generation of the Son; he is also the eternal cause of the eternal procession of the Spirit. The Father, then, is the cause of the Trinity being a hypostasis and essence without being identified with the general substance, common to the three divine hypostases. He, unlike the other two hypostases, is uncaused. He gives existence to the other two divine hypostases, which are co-eternal to him, participate in the same divine general substance, however, they are caused. For the Cappadocians, and especially for Gregory of Nazianzus, the monarchy of the Father is, on the one hand, the cause and root of the unity of the divine essence, and on the other, the reason for the distinct identities of the three hypostases.\textsuperscript{18}

Therefore, consubstantiality cannot be understood without the monarchy of the Father. In fact, it is the Father who fully conveys his divinity to the Son and the Spirit.\textsuperscript{19}

To explain the relationship between substance and hypostasis, Basil develops the concept of property “ἰδιότης” and idiom “ἰδίωμα”. The hypostasis of the unbegotten Father results from the joining of the general divine substance to the property of unbegottenness; the hypostasis of the Son, eternally begotten by the Father, results from the adding of the idiom of the eternal begottenness to the same general substance; while the hypostasis of the Spirit, eternally proceeding from the Father, results from the joining of the idiom and property of the procession to the divine substance. Thus, the idiom has a metaphysical role distinct from that of the hypostasis, but through it the hypostasis is recognized and distinct from the other hypostases of the same common substance. In other words, idiom and property are related to the hypostasis, while the hypostasis is related to the substance.\textsuperscript{20} This distinction was essential in the polemic against the Eunomians, who identified the property with the substance and hypostasis and affirmed that knowing that the property of the Father is different from that of the Son reveals that their substances are different. In fact, Basil and the other Cappadocians

\textsuperscript{14} See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 82-92.


\textsuperscript{16} See Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), p. 212.

\textsuperscript{17} See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 66-7.

\textsuperscript{18} See Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), pp. 201-17; Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 67-74 and especially 96-8.

\textsuperscript{19} See Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), p. 206.

\textsuperscript{20} See S. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), p. 92.
also intended to highlight that the divine substance remains unknown and incomprehensible. Thus, the Son, being begotten by the Father, is in relationship with the Father, and this relationship is called “filiation”. The Spirit, proceeding from the Father, is in relationship with him, and this relationship is called “procession”. As a consequence, the Father is in relationship with the Son and the Spirit through his “paternity”. The relationship is the distinctive character of the hypostasis (character of the hypostasis) or the idiom of each hypostasis, or also the mode of existence, τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως or ὑποστάσεως.

Thus, the Cappadocians established a Christian metaphysical system, called by some scholars like J. Zachhuber “Patristic Philosophy”, a system that can be summarized in the following points, without, however, entering into detail on the differences between the single Cappadocians:

1) substance, if conceived as a common and universal reality, cannot exist without its instantiations; only the concrete realities are real, since they have their existence through the hypostasis, or in other words the substance, which is an immanent reality, is instantiated in its hypostases;
2) the hypostases of the same substance are consubstantial since they share the same substance and perfectly manifest the properties predicated of their common substance; 3) each hypostasis has its own property and idiom that distinguishes it from the other hypostases of the same substance; 4) a hypostasis can be considered as a single substance, since it manifests the general and common substance concretely and perfectly, but cannot be identified with the general substance; 5) in created and material beings hypostases are individuals, while in uncreated beings, i.e. in the Godhead, and since divine substance is immaterial and spiritual, hypostases are not seen as individuals; therefore 6) in Trinitarian doctrine it is better to avoid calling the hypostases “single/particular substances”; 7) the

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21 On this topic see Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea (above, n. 7); T. Stepien – K. Kochańczyk-Bonińska, Unknown God, Known in His Activities. Incomprehensibility of God during the Trinitarian Controversy of the 4th Century, Peter Lang, Berlin 2018 (European studies in theology, philosophy and history of religions, 18).
22 See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 67-8.
23 See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 59-67; Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), p. 203.
25 One must mention that Gregory of Nyssa’s position is quite different from his brother Basil since he, in his highlighting the oneness of the substance, accepts, in some way, the existence of the common substance (realism) refuting, in this manner, the risk of considering it as simple concept in mind (nominalism), for more details see C. Erismann, L’homme commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Age, J. Vrin, Paris, 2011, pp. 149-85, and J. Zachhuber, “Universals in the Greek Church Fathers”, in R. Chiaradonna – G. Galluzzo (eds.), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2013, pp. 425-70, especially pp. 436-47. See also D. Krausmüller, “A Conceptualist Turn: The Ontological Status of Created Species in Late Greek Patristic Theology”, Scrinium 16 (2020), pp. 233-52.
26 On these topics in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, especially concerning the relationship between, from one hand, the substance as universal and common and, from the other, the hypostases as particular substances, calling them as such, as well as concerning whether there is a distinction between substance and nature, see J. Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance, Brill, Leiden 2000 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 46); J. Zachhuber, “Once again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals”, Journal of Theological Studies 56 (2005), pp. 75-98; R. Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa
oneness of the divine substance, the monarchy of the Father, the consubstantiality of the hypostases and the simplicity and immateriality of the divinity is what ensures unity in the Godhead, which for the Cappadocians is the correct way to understand Monotheism;\(^\text{27}\) and finally 8) on the one hand, substance and nature have the same meaning, and on the other hand, hypostasis and person are identified as metaphysical principles.

2. Christological Controversies and Metaphysical Developments among the Miaphysites

This metaphysical system became part of their heritage for all Christians who accepted the first two ecumenical councils of Nicaea and Constantinople. However, it created a problem during the Christological controversies, when Christians tried to apply it to the explanation of how humanity and divinity were united in Christ as one single subject.\(^\text{28}\)

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\(^\text{27}\) On the understating of Monotheism by the Cappadocian fathers see Jacobs, “On ‘Not Three Gods’” (above, n. 9), pp. 342-51.

Indeed, if one applies this system, and affirms that in Christ two natures are united, and since these two natures are not abstract and universal realities, one implies that they are concrete natures, that is, hypostases. In this case, Christ would be two hypostases, i.e. a duality of persons, which destroys the oneness of the subject of Christ. As a result, the Cappadocian system had to be modified. Chalcedonians, Miaphysites, and Nestorians developed different metaphysical systems to solve the Christological question: Chalcedonians affirmed that Christ is two substances/natures united in one hypostasis and one person; Miaphysites taught that Christ is one substance/nature and one hypostasis/person and this unique substance/nature is from (or composed of) two substances/natures; Nestorians, instead, said that Christ is two substances/

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As I said elsewhere, see B. Ebeid, “Christology and Deification in the Church of the East. Mar Gewargis I, His Synod and His Letter to Mina as a Polemic against Martyrius-Sahdona”, Cristianesimo nella Storia (Studies in History, Theology and Exegesis) 38 (2017), pp. 729-84, here pp. 731-2, when I use the term “Nestorian Church” I mean the Church of the East after 612, i.e. after applying the doctrine of the two hypostases (giōme) in its Christology. We cannot say, in fact, that this Church had accepted a “Nestorian” Christology before the year 612. It is clear, however, that such doctrine was not real Nestorianism, i.e. teaching two Christs and two Sons, but the texts of this Church (like the document of the synod of 612), and some of its theologians (like Elias of Nisibis and 'Abdisho' bar Brikhi), adopted this title for themselves, making it a synonym of orthodoxy, and for this reason I use the term in this paper. It must be said that there is a tendency today among scholars not to call this Church or its doctrine “Nestorian” due to the negative connotation this term had over the centuries. For the Miaphysites, I accept the distinction scholars make between Miaphysites, i.e. the Severians and moderate Monophysites, and the radical one, calling the latter Monophysites. It must be noted, however, that the texts of the Chalcedonian and Nestorian Churches did not distinguish clearly between them as two different groups, always calling them by one technical term “Monophysites”.


natures, two hypostases and one person.\(^{32}\) It must be noted that some scholars today avoid translating the Syriac term \(\text{ܩܢܘܡܐ} \) (\(\text{kúmā}\)) used by Syrians to translate the Greek \(\text{ὑπόστασις}\), as “hypostasis”, leaving it transliterated.\(^{33}\) Even if such method is acceptable, I prefer to use


the English translation “hypostasis” also for the Syriac qaumō (ܩܢܘܡܐ), highlighting that hypostasis, either in Greek as ὑπόστασις or in Syriac as qaumō (ܩܢܘܡܐ) or even in Arabic as أقنوم (uqnum), was used as a technical term by all Christian confessions of the East with different metaphysical meanings, especially in Christological doctrine.35

What is important for us in this paper is to outline the specificity of the metaphysical development that occurred in the Miaphysite field, in order to understand the reasons for the appearance of new Trinitarian controversies among them in the sixth and seventh centuries. As mentioned above, the Miaphysites affirmed that Christ is one substance/nature and one hypostasis/person, and that this unique substance/nature is from two substances/natures and realities, divine and human; therefore, the one subject is also called composite substance/nature. According to the metaphysics of the Cappadocians, an abstract substance cannot exist, and only a concrete substance exists, i.e. the hypostasis. Christ really existed, he was one subject and not two; he, however, was not just divine nor just human, but both realities together, and therefore he was called the incarnate Logos of God. For Miaphysites, then, it was vital that Christ be affirmed as one concrete substance/nature that really existed, that is, a hypostasis/person. In this way they highlighted the oneness of subject. In addition, this one substance/nature was special insofar as it was composed of two substances/natures, divine and human. With the doctrine of the composition, Miaphysites highlighted and saved the duality of the two components from which Christ derived.

The Cappadocians had distinguished between substance/nature and hypostasis/person as between general-common and particular-singular, and in their Trinitarian doctrine they had avoided considering the three hypostases as three single substances, i.e. as three individuals. Miaphysite Christology, however, did not make any clear distinction between substance/nature and hypostasis/person; instead, it considered these two metaphysical categories as almost synonymous.36 Once transposed back to the Trinitarian level, such a development gave rise to two questions: 1) was the whole substance of the Trinity incarnated? 2) are the three divine hypostases three substances?

3. Miaphysite Christology and the Controversy concerning Tritheism

Indeed, a new Trinitarian controversy did occur in the second half of the 6th century among the Miaphysites in Syria. A group which relied on the works of the Alexandrian Miaphysite John Philoponus (d. 570), who was considered by his opponents as the ‘heresiarch of the Tritheists’,37 applied the metaphysical innovation discussed above, i.e. the identification of

35 See Ebeid, “Christology and Deification” (above, n. 29), p. 732.
36 According to Erismann, Miaphysites to avoid a duality of subjects in Christ, i.e. two hypostases/individuals, had highlighted the principle according to which ‘hypostasis’ is comprehended a ‘particular substance/nature’ and from this perspective one shall understand the identification they made between hypostasis and nature, see C. Erismann, “Non Est Natura Sine Persona: The Issue of Uninstantiated Universals from Late Antiquity to the Early Ages”, in M. Cameron – J. Marenbon, (eds.), Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, Brill, Leiden 2011, pp. 75-91, here pp. 81-2.
hypostasis/person and substance/nature, to the Trinitarian doctrine, with the result that the three hypostases/persons\textsuperscript{38} were considered as three divine substances/natures. Therefore, their opponents called them Tritheists. Triteism began to spread not just in Syria, but also in Constantinople and Alexandria, and the works of John Philoponus started to circulate in Greek and in Syriac translation; all attempts at a reconciliation between the supporters and the adversaries of the doctrine of the three substances failed.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, the controversy resulted in a division between the Tritheists and the other Miaphysites.

Van Roey argues that the starting point of the Tritheists was purely philosophical and that only later did they add patristic arguments.\textsuperscript{40} According to scholars such as van Roey,\textsuperscript{41} Grillmeier,\textsuperscript{42} Hainthaler,\textsuperscript{43} and Lang,\textsuperscript{44} the Tritheists based their doctrine on certain metaphysical and logical principles. Following the metaphysical system of the Cappadocians as well as some Neoplatonic doctrines, they 1) considered the hypostasis as an individual concrete substance/nature, and since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three hypostases, they are consequently three concrete individual substances/natures; 2) the general substance is

\textsuperscript{38} See Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), pp. 112-31, on his Trinitarian doctrine pp. 131-8.

\textsuperscript{39} Thus, the controversy resulted in a division between the Tritheists and the other Miaphysites.

\textsuperscript{40} See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 276-80.

\textsuperscript{41} See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum. Anti-Tritheist Dossier, Departement Oriëntalistiek, Leuven 1981 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 10), p. 27; see also the note by Hainthaler who underlines that for Philoponus person (πρόσωπον) is sometimes distinguished by hypostasis acquiring the meaning of relationship (σχέσις) of some to one another, see Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 120.

\textsuperscript{42} See Lang, “Patristic Argument” (above, n. 40).


\textsuperscript{44} See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 25-33.
an abstract reality, it has no real existence and exists only in the mind;\textsuperscript{45} 3) being supporters of the Miaphysite Christological formula, i.e. of one nature from two, they considered the one composite nature and hypostasis of Christ as different from those of the Father and the Spirit; 4) therefore, it is not the whole Trinity that was incarnated, but only the Son, in his individual nature, i.e. hypostasis; 5) with their doctrine they could avoid Sabellianism, but they sacrificed the unity and oneness of the divine substance by introducing division; 6) therefore, for them, the unity in the Godhead is seen only in mental abstraction, i.e. at the level of the general substance, which, however, has no real existence; 7) the three divine hypostases and natures are three consubstantial divinities 8) since each of them is a concrete “copy”\textsuperscript{46} of the general substance,\textsuperscript{97} each is “God in a different way”;\textsuperscript{48} 9) consubstantiality, then, occurs between individual substances, without taking into consideration the properties of each substance-hypostasis;\textsuperscript{49} 10) each concrete “copy” of the general substance differs from the other “copy” on account of its own characteristics, i.e. idioms and properties; and finally 11) the different species or “copies” of this general divine substance are designated through the addition of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’, i.e. the idioms and properties.\textsuperscript{50}

4. The Miaphysite reactions against Tritheism

Tritheists were attacked and anathematized by the other Miaphysites from the outset.\textsuperscript{51} The most important reactions were those of Theodosius of Alexandria on the one hand and of Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicum on the other, the latter two in turn being engaged in reciprocal controversy.

4.1. The reaction of Theodosius of Alexandria

During the first phase of the controversy, the patriarch Theodosius of Alexandria (d. 567), who was in exile in Constantinople, disagreed with the doctrine of the first Tritheists, but did not regard it as a heresy. Although he believed that the point at stake was a disagreement about words and concepts, he wrote a long treatise on the question known as \textit{De Trinitate}.\textsuperscript{52} In his work Theodosius

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} On the universals in John Philoponos see Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 463-5.
\item \textsuperscript{46} The idea of a concrete “copy” of the general substance is developed by John in his \textit{Diatetes seu Arbiter}. John, it seems, did not use a technical term that corresponds to “copy”; the latter term was used by Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 134. In chapters 16, 22, 23 and 24 of the \textit{Diatetes} one can find this idea expressed in other terms, especially in the conclusion of chapter 24: “ܢܫܐ ܗܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܟܕ ܐܝܬ ܠܟܝܢܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܒܢܝ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܒܗ ܡܠܬܐ”, “For the nature of each single one of the human beings has the common concept of the nature [ὁ τῆς φύσις λόγος κοινός] in the same way”, Iohannis Philoponi, \textit{Opuscula Monophysitica}, ed. A. Sanda, Beirut 1930, Syriac text p. 23. English translation is mine.
\item \textsuperscript{47} See Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 134.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ebied, van Roey and Wickham, Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 29. See also Lang, “Patristic Argument” (above, n. 40), pp. 91-99.
\item \textsuperscript{49} As mentioned above for John Philoponus and his followers, hypostasis sometimes differs from the individual nature, which is a concrete copy of the general abstract reality without its special properties, therefore hypostasis is considered an individual nature with proper characteristics, idioms and properties. This, in fact, is the reason why, for Tritheists, consubstantiality can be between individual and concrete substances and not between hypostases. For more details see Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), \textit{Peter of Callinicum} (above, n. 38), pp. 27-31.
\item \textsuperscript{50} See also the chapter dedicated on Philoponus’ doctrine in Zachhuber, \textit{The Rise} (above, n. 24), pp. 145-69, esp. pp. 155-67.
\item \textsuperscript{51} See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 268-276; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), \textit{Peter of Callinicum} (above, n. 38), pp. 20-1.
\item \textsuperscript{52} This work is preserved only in Syriac translation, see J.B. Chabot (ed.), \textit{Documenta ad origines monophysit-
maintained that each divine hypostasis, when considered individually, is a certain substance and nature.\(^{53}\) This statement kindled the opposition of a group known as the Condobaudites, who affirmed that none of the three hypostases of the Trinity, if seen individually, can be considered as a substance, and therefore it was the common divine nature and substance that was incarnated.\(^{54}\)

Although this doctrine and that of Tritheism were condemned, Miaphysites continued to look for reconciliation,\(^{55}\) but no agreement was reached and the Tritheists established their own hierarchy.\(^{56}\) Very soon, however, they were divided into two groups, one following the doctrine of John Philoponus on Resurrection, and the other, known as Cononites, rejecting it.\(^{57}\)

Theodosius’ arguments against Tritheism were patristic and not philosophical, as ‘Tritheist arguments and principles were.\(^{58}\) Such a patristic approach proved insufficient and in the second stage of the controversy, Peter and Damian had to formulate their arguments in a rational way, even though the patristic material remained an important support.

### 4.2. The Reaction of Peter of Callinicum and Damian of Alexandria

The second important reaction against Tritheism came from two important Miaphysite figures of the second half of the sixth century, namely Peter of Callinicum, the patriarch of Antioch (d. 591), and Damian of Alexandria (d. 605), two friends who became enemies because of the different Trinitarian doctrines they espoused in opposition to Tritheism. This is not the place to mention the context of their reaction, and the development of the controversy, which have already been studied in depth.\(^{59}\) What interests me here is to present how each of them tried to respond to Tritheism and why they disagreed.

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55. See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 272-4; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 20-5.
57. See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 22-3.
58. See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 33.
During the negotiations for a reconciliation between Miaphysites and Tritheists, Damian wrote a work, known as Adversus Tritheitas, against certain chapters composed by some Tritheists, which summarized their doctrine. Damian sent this work to his friend Peter and asked for his opinion. Peter, however, found its doctrinal basis to be quite similar to Sabellianism. He conveyed this to Damian, who in turn accused him of being an Eunomian and a Tritheist. The controversy began and eventually led to a schism between Antioch and Alexandria that ended years after the death of both patriarchs, in 616, when Damian’s teachings were rejected by all Miaphysite churches.

The works written by Peter against Damian have survived only in Syriac translation and unfortunately in partial form,\(^6\) while Damian’s work against the Tritheists and his letters to Peter have not survived. What we have today are just those quotations that Peter culled from them in his major three-volume work against the patriarch of Alexandria, known as Contra Damianum. An analysis of these quotations and of other indirect sources helped scholars reconstruct Damian’s doctrine.

Through this work of reconstruction scholars such as van Roey,\(^61\) Krausmüller\(^62\), and Zachhuber\(^63\) presented the main metaphysical principles of Damian’s doctrine as follows: 1) clear distinction between substance and hypostasis; 2) substance is the common and constituent element of being and 3) it exists concretely and not only in the mind; 4) hypostases are identified with the characteristic (also called hypostatic) properties; as a consequence, 5) there is no distinction between “name” and “things”; 6) hypostases are distinct and incommunicable, but 7) each becomes substantial through participation in the substance, i.e. the common and constituent element of being, and 8) it consequently gains a substantial component; therefore, 9) it is not an abstract reality. In conclusion, Damian’s metaphysics works on two levels: that of the substance and that of the hypostases-properties, where the hypostases, as substantial properties, have their ontological origin in the substance as the ‘true’ one.

Applying these principles to the Trinitarian doctrine implies that 1) oneness in God is seen in the oneness of the divine substance as an entity distinct from the three divine hypostases, which are identified with three properties: 2) the hypostasis of the Father is the divine unbegottenness-fatherhood, the hypostasis of the Son is the divine begottenness-sonship and the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is the divine procession; thus, 3) the distinction between hypostasis and substance and the identification of hypostasis and hypostatic property allow Damian to avoid multiplying the constituent element of the Trinity, i.e. the substance. 4) Even if hypostasis is distinct from substance, however, in reality it exists only insofar as it

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participates in the substance, so that in the Trinity there are not two different constituent elements; thus, 5) consubstantiality is interpreted in the light of the latter statement.

Damian supported his doctrine with patristic quotations, especially from Severus of Antioch and Gregory of Nazianzus.\(^64\) In fact, as Krausmüller notes, Damian especially based himself upon Severus of Antioch’s Trinitarian reflections as expressed in the Contra Grammaticum.\(^65\) Unfortunately, having no more than fragments from the work of Damian, we cannot know how much he used the fathers, and how exactly he read and interpreted them. On the contrary we know that Peter abundantly quoted the fathers, such as the Cappadocians, and those Miaphysite authors who had developed the Miaphysite metaphysics in relation to Christology, such as Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, and Theodosius of Alexandria. Peter used these authorities in support of his doctrine, accusing Damian of incorrect reading of the fathers.\(^66\)

Although we do not yet have a systematic study of Peter’s thought and Trinitarian doctrine we can present his metaphysical system as follows:\(^67\) 1) substance is the sum of all hypostases belonging to its species; 2) each hypostasis participates in the sum of all hypostases, i.e. the common substance; 3) the hypostases of the same common substance share the same attributes of the substance, therefore they are consubstantial; 4) the substance, then, is participated and shared while the hypostasis is the participant and sharer; 5) each hypostasis, however, has its own characteristic property; 6) the characteristic property is the specific mode of being of each hypostasis; 7) through its characteristic property, or hypostatic property, each hypostasis is distinct from the other hypostases of the same common substance; therefore, 8) hypostasis is not the substance itself nor the characteristic properties themselves; it is the individual, which includes both aspects; and finally, 9) each hypostasis taken individually is considered as a particular substance and nature, which manifests its consubstantiality through the attributes it shares with the other hypostases of the same substance and species, while it manifests its particularity through its own characteristic properties. Differently from Damian’s metaphysics, then, Peter’s solution distinguishes three metaphysical levels: the substance, the hypostasis, and the property.

This tripartition allowed Peter to demonstrate that: 1) God is one in word and reality; 2) oneness means that there is only one divine substance; 3) the divine substance is the sum of the three divine hypostases; 3) these three hypostases are consubstantial since each shares in the totality of the substance and Godhead; 4) each hypostasis differs from the others through the characteristic property of the hypostasis or hypostatic property, i.e. unbegottenness—fatherhood, begottenness—sonship and procession, which manifests the way each hypostasis exists; 5) each hypostasis seen individually is a concrete substance with its own characteristic property; therefore, 6) Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three complete and existing realities; and finally, 7) it is God the Word alone who was incarnated, not the whole Trinity. As Ebied notes, the disagreement between Damian and Peter was a real dilemma, and resorting to patristic heritage on Trinity, used by both in a “genuinely puzzling way”, could not solve


\(^{65}\) In fact, the whole of Dirk Krausmüller’s paper “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62) sets out to demonstrate this relationship between the Trinitarian doctrine of Severus and Damian.


\(^{67}\) See also Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 179-81.
the problem. As mentioned above, the disagreement turned into a schism between the two Miaphysite sees of Alexandria and Antioch, and although reconciliation was achieved after the rejection of Damian’s doctrine, this does not mean that Damian’s metaphysical system, i.e. his distinction between hypostasis and substance on the one hand and the identification between hypostasis and property on the other, nor his particular reading of the patristic Trinitarian doctrine, disappeared among Miaphysites.

5. Tritheism, Damian’s Trinitarian Doctrine and other Christian Confessions

The Cappadocian metaphysical system was not the exclusive heritage of the Miaphysite Church; it was a common tradition shared with the other Christian confessions, namely Chalcedonians and East Syrians, who also applied it to Christology with analogous problems and looked for solutions, as I have already explained.

Chalcedonians distinguished between substance/nature and hypostasis/person; they also distinguished between natural characteristics and attributes, common to all hypostases of the same nature/substance, and hypostatic properties and characteristics, proper to each hypostasis. Such distinction, for example, was underlined, as Hainthaler pointed out, by the Chalcedonian patriarch of Constantinople Eutychius in his polemical treatise against Tritheists written between 568 and 577. The Chalcedonians’ starting point was also Christological. In another text of the 8th century, the Epistula Apologetica written by the Miaphysite Eliya to Leo, the synecculus of the Chalcedonian bishop of Harran, the Miaphysite author accuses the Chalcedonians of identifying the hypostasis with its characteristic property. In fact, this view of the Chalcedonian doctrine reflects the metaphysical developments that occurred among Chalcedonians after Chalcedon, i.e. so-called neo-Chalcedonianism, especially those authors who tried to give a metaphysical answer to the challenge of John Philoponus. It can be argued that Miaphysites saw a similarity between the doctrine of Damian and the metaphysical developments of the Chalcedonian doctrine.

In addition, some East Syrian theologians such as Babai the Great (d. 628) had a metaphysical background similar to that of John Philoponus. I mentioned above that Tritheists made no

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69 It is interesting to mention that many Christian theologians, Miaphysites and others, used Damian’s identification between hypostasis and property in their Trinitarian doctrine expressed and developed in response to Islamic accusations of Tritheism, see R. Haddad, La Trinité divine chez les théologiens arabes 750-1050, Beauchesne, Paris 1985 (Beauchesne Religions, 15); the part on Elias of Nisibis’ Trinitarian doctrine in Ebeid, La Tunica di al-Masib (above, n. 5); see also the introduction in Elias of Nisibis, Commentary on the Creed, ed. B. Ebeid, UCOPress CNERU-Éditiones de l’USJ CEDRAC, Cordova - Beirut 2018 (Series Syro-Arabica, 9).
distinction between substance and hypostasis; however, they also affirmed that abstract reality, i.e., the common and universal substance, exists only in the mind, while the existing reality is the concrete copy of abstract reality. It was also noted that Tritheists sometimes called hypostases the copy of abstract reality with its characteristic property. One might suppose that the approach of John Philoponus and the Tritheists was not purely Aristotelian, but closer to that of some Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle who developed the doctrine on the three states of substance,73 and applied it into their Trinitarian and Christological doctrines.74 I think then, that one might find some common points with the doctrine of the Nestorian Babai the Great, who distinguishes between abstract reality, which he calls nature (ܩܢܘܡܐ, qnōmā), concrete reality without characteristic properties, which he calls hypostasis (ܩܐܨܡܐ, qenāmā), and concrete and individualized reality, i.e. hypostasis with its characteristic properties, which he called person (ܡܡܘܛܐ, parsōpā).75 It can be argued, then, that Miaphysites could see a similarity between the doctrine of Nestorians with that of John of Philoponus and his followers, thing that Chalcedonians, like Leontius of Jerusalem, who also polemicized Tritheism and its followers, have also noted.76

I am not affirming a direct relationship or influence between Damian and the Chalcedonians or between Tritheism and Babai’s thought. What I am trying to say is that according to the Miaphysite metaphysical system such doctrines share common points, and to polemicize them one might use the works written by Miaphysite tradition during the controversy against Tritheism and against Damian. Even if Tritheism and Damian’s doctrine did not completely disappear77 in the following century, i.e. before the advent of Islam,78 the main concern for Miaphysites under Islam was not the divisions within their own confession, but the debate with Chalcedonians and Nestorians.

73 We mean the distinction between general substance, partial substance, and particular substance, for more details, see L. Benakis, “The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Thoughts”, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Norfolk 1982, pp. 75-86.

74 Already Hainthaler compared in one point John Philoponus and Leontius of Byzantium concerning their use of this doctrine, see Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 125. It must, however, be, mentioned that Leontius of Byzantium followed this doctrine on substance and applied it also in his Christology, see Krausmüller, “Making Sense” (above, n. 30). For the reception of the theory on the three states of the universal in Byzantium, see C. Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and the Particular Substances: Philoponus and Rescelin”, Traditio 53 (2008), pp. 277-305, here 277-85.


76 In fact, Krausmüller had noted that also for the Chalcedonian Leontius of Jerusalem there is a similarity between both Nestorians’ and Philoponos’ Trinitarian doctrines, see Krausmüller, “Under the Spell” (above, n. 72), pp. 639-41.

77 See J. Block, “Philoponian Monophysitism in South Arabia at the Advent of Islam with Implications for the English Translation of ‘Thalātha’ in Qur’an 4.171 and 5.73”, Journal of Islamic Studies 23 (2012), pp. 50-75. One also might mention the doctrine of an anti-Tritheist Trinitarian florilegium, copied centuries after the controversy between Damian and Peter, which understands the common divine substance as Aristotle’s first substance and identifies the hypostases with the properties, see G. Furlani, “Un florilegio antitriteistico in lingua siriaca”, Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti IX, 8[83] (1924), pp. 661-77.

78 As Penn has demonstrated, the first writings of Syriac Christians on Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries do not consider it new religion. They also reveal that their knowledge of Islamic doctrine was not deep, see M.Ph. Penn, Envisioning Islam. Syriac Christians and Early Muslim World, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2015 (Divinations: Reading Late Ancient Religion).
6. Composing and Copying Miaphysite Trinitarian Florilegia

During the first centuries of Islamic rule in the East, the Miaphysites started to compose and copy different dogmatic florilegia on the Trinity and Christology based on patristic quotations categorized in thematic order, divided in groups where each group has a specific title. Such florilegia were probably used for the theological formation of West Syrian Christians.

The Trinitarian Florilegium on which the present paper focuses was composed neither to oppose Tritheists nor against Damian’s doctrine. As mentioned above, and since it treats mainly metaphysical topics, this and other florilegia were also important to prepare good theologians that could debate with Chalcedonians and Nestorians. The fact that these florilegia were copied during the first centuries of Islamic rule confirms that Miaphysites in that period still saw Chalcedonians and Nestorians as their main adversaries. In addition, one might note that the Miaphysite writings against Chalcedonians and Nestorians composed in that period, firstly in Syriac and then in Arabic, made a direct and indirect use of these florilegia.

When Islam began to be felt as a real intellectual and religious threat, however, such florilegia started also to be useful for Miaphysites in their apologetic works against Muslims who saw the Christian Trinity as an expression of Tritheism and could not accept God’s incarnation. Though the Church fathers were quoted directly in Miaphysite writings against Chalcedonians and Nestorians, since all three of them shared a respect for the fathers as foundational authorities, the florilegia were used indirectly and without mentioning the fathers in the Miaphysite Arabic writings against Islam.

6.1. The Trinitarian Florilegium in BL Add. 14532

One of these dogmatic florilegia, which is Trinitarian in content, is found in the following manuscripts of the British Library: Add. 14532, ff. 94vb-133va; Add. 14533, ff. 73r-89r; with some additions at the end in Add. 14538, ff.119v-133v; and with other additions at the beginning and the end in Add. 12155, ff. 2va-32va.

A critical digital edition of this florilegium, with other florilegia, will soon be available online. In this paper I shall study the florilegium according to Add. 14532 and I shall present 1) the titles given for each group of patristic quotations; 2) the fathers mentioned in each group, their quoted works and an identification of these quotations; and 3) the main topics treated in these patristic quotations. After this presentation I shall provide an analysis of the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium and study the new understanding of the metaphysical terms and concepts that emerges from their juxtaposition.

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80 I am preparing a paper on Abū Rāʾiṭah al-Takrītī’s use of the content of such florilegia in his writings in relation with Islam, esp. on his understanding of the concept “hypostasis” and whether it can be identified with attribute or property.
81 See also A. van Roey, “Un florilege trinitaire syriaque tire du Contra Damianum de Pierre de Callinique”, Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 23 (1992), pp. 189-203.
82 See the website of the ERC-project FLOS, at https://www.unive.it/pag/40548/.
83 I have already checked the florilegium in the four given manuscripts; it is identical in Add. 14533 (with just one small addition); in Add. 12155, however, this florilegium is found in ff. 13ra-23va, while the rest of the folios, i.e. ff. 2ra-13ra and 23va-32va, contain additions that are not copied in Add. 14532 and 14533. I have noted that the copyist of Add. 12155 follows another order for the patristic groups, and that in ff.13ra-32va there are some groups that are not copied in the other manuscripts. It must be mentioned too that in Add. 14532 there is a missing folio and I completed it through Add. 14533 and Add. 14538. Finally, it is worthy of note that the opinion of Wright, followed by Furlani, according to which the Trinitarian florilegium in BL Add. 14532 is copied in ff. 94v-186r, is wrong, see Furlani, “Un florilegio” (above, n. 77), p. 661 and footnote 3 on the same page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syriac title</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Fathers and their works</th>
<th>Main topics</th>
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| 1 (94vb-97vb) | Demonstrations of the holy fathers who teach that the substance and the nature of the Holy Trinity, which is the Godhead, is the three hypostases of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that the substance is not one thing, which is the Godhead, and the hypostases are another thing | Bas. Caesar, *De Fide* | Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the uncreated nature, one Godhead, one God, one power. 
Trinity is one God. The one Godhead is the three and the three are the one Godhead. The oneness is according to the concept (λόγος) of the substance or Godhead. 
One substance and Godhead in three hypostases. The hypostases are distinguished: no confusion between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the Godhead is united on account of the identity of the substance. |

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84 It must be noted that BL *Add.* 14532 and BL *Add.* 12155 follow a different numeration that depends on the general numeration of the patristic quotations of all the florilegia that each manuscript contains, while BL *Add.* 14533 in this florilegium does not follow any numeration. BL *Add.* 14538 follows the same numeration we find in BL *Add.* 14532 and probably it is a copy of it. Thus, the numeration followed here is mine.

85 PG 31, 465.22-42.
87 PG 35, 742.1-5.
88 PG 36, 320.18-28.
90 PG 35, 1252.29-40.
92 Two quotations: PG 26, 1000.17-25 and PG 26, 1001.28-29.
94 PG 60, 767.34-768.2.
96 PG 68, 412.42-55.
97 PO 36, 34.25-28.
98 Two quotations: PO 14, 12 and 14,13-14.
99 PO 12, 214.
100 *Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century*, ed. A. van Roey – P. Allen, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (Orientalia Lova-
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Page</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 (97vb-99rb)</td>
<td>On the fact that we say that the united one and the separated one is the same, and that the three are one according to Godhead and the one is three according to properties and that He is one and not one, and that the same is numbered and escapes from number.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 (99ra-99rb)</td>
<td>On the fact that one hypostasis is not the whole substance and Godhead.</td>
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<td>4 (99rb-99vb)</td>
<td>The whole substance of the Godhead is the Holy Trinity.</td>
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<sup>102</sup> Section 9.12-16, ed. Barbel.
<sup>103</sup> PG 35, 1160.30-38.
<sup>104</sup> PG 35, 1221.43-46.
<sup>106</sup> Section 3.5-10, Grégoire de Nyssse, Discours Catéchétique, ed. E. Mühlenberg, Cerf, Paris 2000 (Sources chrétiennes, 453).
<sup>107</sup> PO 12, 18.9-19.11.
<sup>108</sup> Two quotations: PO 12, 215 and 215-216.
<sup>111</sup> PG 36,424.3-7.
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<th>References</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>The fact that each of the hypostases participates in the substance does not mean it is the whole substance.</td>
<td>Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>¹¹² Each hypostasis, although it participates fully in the substance, is not the whole substance which collectively comprises all the hypostases. God the Word is a hypostasis and not a substance in the sense of the common substance, even if He possesses the Godhead's substance.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>What participates is the hypostasis, what is participated is the substance.</td>
<td>Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>¹¹³ The common substance is the participated, which holds all the hypostases participating in it. Even if each of the hypostases participates in the substance it is not called a substance in the sense of a common substance, but a hypostasis. The participant (sharer) is not identified with the participated (shared).</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>On the fact that God the Father and God the Son and Word are hypostases, and not the participated and the participant.</td>
<td>Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunomium</em>¹¹⁴ Cyril. Alex., <em>Commentarii in Joannem</em>¹¹⁵ Sev. Antioch., <em>Ep. ad Constantinum episcopum Seleuciae Isauriae</em>¹¹⁶ Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>¹¹⁷ Sev. Antioch., <em>Ep. ad Maronem</em>¹¹⁸ The hypostasis of the Son is distinguished from the hypostasis of the Father and of the Spirit. The Father and Son and Spirit are equal in divinity and Godhead. Neither the Father, nor the Son nor the Spirit are identified with the common substance. Even if the Son is begotten by the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father, the latter is not the common shared substance. The hypostasis of the Son, who is one of the three divine hypostases, was incarnated; this means that He was united to flesh with a rational soul.</td>
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¹¹³ Ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), pp. 191.21-192.1.
¹¹⁴ PG 29, 621.23-31.
¹¹⁷ Five quotations: p. 56.4-6; p. 56.13-16; pp. 147.27-148.6; p. 148.9-12 and p. 203.12-14, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
¹¹⁸ PO 12, 198.5-6.
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<td>8 (101rb-102ra)</td>
<td>On the fact that Eunomius believed what he called “substances” were hypostases. Greg. Nys., <em>Contra Eunomium</em>&lt;sup&gt;119&lt;/sup&gt; Greg. Nys., <em>Ad Eust. de sancta trinitate</em>&lt;sup&gt;120&lt;/sup&gt; Eunomius Cyz., quoted in Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunomium</em>&lt;sup&gt;121&lt;/sup&gt; Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunomium</em>&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt; Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>&lt;sup&gt;123&lt;/sup&gt; Dam. Alex., <em>Ep. prolixa seu Apologia prima</em>&lt;sup&gt;124&lt;/sup&gt; Eunomius said that “begottenness” is the name of the substance of the Son. Consequently, he affirmed three different substances for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. They are, however, not three substances, but three hypostases. Hypostasis is a substance, but not according the meaning and definition of the “common substance”. Severus proves it through Basil, who says that the “substance of the Son” means the “hypostasis of the Son”, differently from Eunomius’ understanding. Damian refuses to consider the hypostases as substances, considering such doctrine as Eunomian.</td>
</tr>
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<td>9 (102ra-102vb)</td>
<td>On the fact that it sometimes happens that the holy fathers interchange the nature of the Father or of the Son with the hypostasis of the Father or the Son. Cyril. Alex., <em>Comm. in Joannem</em>&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt; Cyril. Alex., <em>Quod unum sit Christus</em>&lt;sup&gt;126&lt;/sup&gt; Theod. Alex., <em>De Trinitate</em>&lt;sup&gt;127&lt;/sup&gt; Cyril. Alex., <em>Apologia xii anathematismorum contra Theodoretum</em>&lt;sup&gt;128&lt;/sup&gt; Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>&lt;sup&gt;129&lt;/sup&gt; Cyril says that the Son is from the “nature and the substance of the Father” while Severus affirms that the Son is from the “hypostasis of the Father”. Theodosius quotes Gregory of Nazianzus to show that Gregory calls the Father and the Son natures and substances, and that the three are one Godhead and nature.</td>
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<sup>120</sup> Section 6.11-15, Gregorii Nysseni *Opera dogmatica minora*, ed. F. Müller, vol. 1, Brill, Leiden 1958.

<sup>121</sup> *PG* 29, 584.4-8.

<sup>122</sup> Two quotations: *PG* 29, 588.17-26 and 589.8-11.

<sup>123</sup> Cfr. p. 82.9-1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, *Syr. 58*), 5.

<sup>124</sup> Lost in the Greek original.

<sup>125</sup> Not identified in the original Greek.


<sup>129</sup> Cfr. p. 63. 3-10, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, *Syr. 58*).
| 10 | (102vb-104ra) | On the fact that each of the hypostases, of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, when it is seen by itself and for itself (that is regarded on its own), is confessed by the holy fathers as God, substance, and nature. | Theod. Alex., De Trin. \(^{130}\) Bas. Caesar., Adv. Eunomium \(^{131}\) Ioh. Chrysost., Hom. in Ioannem \(^{132}\) Theod. Alex., De Trin. \(^{133}\) Greg. Naz., De Spiritu sancto (or. 31) \(^{134}\) Theod. Alex., De Trin. \(^{135}\) The three hypostases are God because of the monarchy, and each of the three, if taken separately, is also God because of their consubstantiality. The Word is a hypostatic (\(\chiα\)ν\(\omega\)μ\(\iota\)α / \(e\nu\)υπ\(\o\)σ\(\tau\)τ\(\i\)ο\(\i\)ς) substance. The hypostasis of the Word is called substance by the holy fathers. Each hypostasis is substance because the substance is not un-hypostatic and hypostasis is not empty of substance and is an existing thing – otherwise it would be an accident. |
| 11 | (104ra) \(^{36}\) | On the fact that “unbegottenness” or “begottenness” are not substance or God. | Bas. Caesar., Adv. Eunomium \(^{136}\) Cyril. Alex., Thesaurus de sancta consub. trinit. \(^{138}\) Theod. Alex., De Trin. \(^{139}\) A substance is acknowledged to each of the divine hypostases. This substance manifests separately whatever is predicated of the one Godhead as common substance. |
| 12 | (104vb-106ra) | On the fact that “unbegottenness” or “begottenness” are not substance or God. | Bas. Caesar, Ad. Eunomium \(^{140}\) Bas. Caesar, Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomoeos \(^{141}\) Bas. Caesar, Ad. Eunom. (Ps) Bas. Caesar, Contra Anomoeos \(^{142}\) Greg. Nyss., Contra Eunom. \(^{144}\) Greg. Naz., De Filio (or. 29) \(^{145}\) Affirming that the substance or God is “unbegotten” and “begotten” means different substances, which destroys the consubstantiality and introduces polytheism. Since “unbegotten” is opposite to “begottenness”, considering them as two substances is tantamount to teaching two opposite gods, that is, Manicheism. |

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\(^{131}\) Two quotations: PG 29, 524.43-525.9 and 605.21-28.

\(^{132}\) PG 59, 47.31-34.

\(^{133}\) Cfr. p. 162.75-81; p. 197.73-80, ed. van Roey-Allen.

\(^{134}\) Two quotations: sections 6.3-6 and 6.12-13, ed. Barbel.


\(^{136}\) In BL Add. 14532 the copyist gives a number without a title for this group of patristic quotations; however, in both BL Add. 14533 and BL Add. 12155 there is no numeration or a given title and these patristic quotations belong to the previous group, i.e. no. 10 in our list. BL Add. 14538 gives it a number and title: “\(\chiα\)ν\(\omega\)μ\(\i\)τ\(\i\)α/\(\i\)ε\(\nu\)υπ\(\o\)σ\(\tau\)τ\(\i\)ο\(\i\)ς\) α\(\i\)ο\(\i\)τ\(\i\)η\(\i\)ς\) α\(\i\)ν\(\i\)γ\(\i\)ων” that is “That also the Holy Spirit is called nature by the doctors of the Church”, see folio 123r.

\(^{137}\) Two quotations: PG 29, 649.45-652.4 and 728.42-729.3.

\(^{138}\) PG 75, 592.37-43.


\(^{140}\) PG 29, 512.15-22.

\(^{141}\) PG 31,605.43-52.

\(^{142}\) Two quotations: PG 29,520.23-28 and 29,520.40-521.5.


\(^{144}\) Three quotations: book 1, sections 510.1-6; 512.1-8 and 514.3-515.1, ed. Jaeger.

\(^{145}\) Section 12.7-13, ed. Barbel.
13
(106ra-107rb)

On the fact that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity subsist by themselves and for themselves (i.e. καθ’ ἑαυτὰ)

| Bas. Caes., Ep. 210 |
| Epiph. Constant., Ancoratus 147 |
| Greg. Nys., Contra Eunomium 148 |
| Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad Sergium Grammaticum 149 |
| Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad presb. et archimandritas Iohannem et Iohannem et alios 150 |
| Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad Simum Scrinium 151 |

The names are indicative of the realities; the realities have full proper being; so Father, Son and Holy Spirit are existing realities. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are subsistent (ἐνυπόστατον, literally “having a hypostasis” ἔχουσιν). Each hypostasis subsists in itself.

14
(106vb-107rb)

On the fact that the properties of the hypostasis are characteristics that do not subsist by themselves and for themselves (i.e. καθ’ ἑαυτὰ)

| Cyril. Alex., De sancta trin. dialogi I-VII 152 |

’Begottenness’ and ‘unbegottenness’ are not things existing individually and hypostatically, they are indicative names (indicating properties) of the hypostases. They do not subsist on their own but take up concrete existence only in the subsisting hypostases to which they pertain.

15
(107rb-108ra)

On the fact that the fathers recognize the properties in three ways

| Greg. Naz., Contra Arianos et de seipso (or. 33) 153 |
| Greg. Naz., De Filio I (or. 29) 154 |
| Cyril. Alex., De Sancta trinitate dialogi I-VII 155 |
| Greg. Naz., De Filio I (or. 29) 156 |

“The unbegotten” and “the begotten” do not mean “unbegottenness” and “begottenness”.
“The unbegotten” and “the begotten” are properties subsisting in individualized form, i.e. as hypostases.

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146 Section 4.20-28, ed. Courtonne.
147 Chap. 6, sections 4-6, Epiphanius, Ancoratus und Panarion, ed. K. Holl, vol. 1, Leipzig 1915 (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 25).
148 Book 3, chapter 1, section 94.1-9, ed. Jaeger.
150 PO 12, 216.1-7.
151 PO 12, 195.3-5.
153 PG 36, 236.3-9.
154 Section 10.9-17, ed. Barbel.
155 Two quotations: 434.2-9 and 434.37-39, ed. de Durand.
156 Section 10.17-18, ed. Barbel.
“Unbegottenness” is to be reckoned as something existing in the concept of the hypostasis of God the Father. It belongs to Him. Property is not the hypostasis itself, but an indicative name of the hypostasis. There are properties for the whole Godhead (common to all hypostases) such as invisibility, impalpability and infinity.

Distinction between hypostasis and property. Property is innate and present in each hypostasis. The hypostasis gets its name through the property: fatherhood in the Father, sonship in the Son, procession in the Spirit. Even if the hypostases share the same common substance, each hypostasis is distinguished through a specific property: the Father remains Father and not Son or Spirit, the Son remains Son and not Father or Spirit, and the Holy Spirit remains Holy Spirit and not Son or Father.

Property follows its hypostasis externally, i.e. from outside: unbegottenness follows God externally; what is outside God is not His substance. Property is seen in the hypostasis: when we say “this one is begotten” or “this one is not begotten”, by the subject of the sentence we mean the substrate, while by the predicate we mean what is viewed as pertaining to the substrate. Property is mixed with the hypostasis: it is inseparable from it. Property is added to the hypostasis: distinction between the common characteristics of the substance-substrate and the added and innate property of each hypostasis.

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157 Cfr. p. 434.30-37, ed. de Durand.
159 Cfr. pp. 86.24-87.1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 119, Syr. 64).
160 Two quotations: p. 170.9-12 and p. 64.7-16, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
161 Section 5.28-34, ed. Courtonne.
162 Section 4.38-43, ed. Courtonne.
163 Three quotations: the first two are not identified; the third quotations: Book 3, chapter 5, section 56.7-12, ed. Jaeger.
165 PO 25, 747.6-748.5
166 Book 3, chapter 8, section 25.1-12, ed. Jaeger.
167 Cfr. p. 641.6-14, ed. de Durand.
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| 17   | (110ra-110rb) | On the fact that every hypostasis is known with its property, and every hypostasis exists in the substance of the Godhead with its distinctive character | Greg. Naz., *De Dogmate et constitut. episcop.* (or. 20) 168  
| 18   | (110rb-110vb) | On the fact that union, mixture, and connection are understood in different ways | Bas. Caesar., *Adv. Eunomium* 170  
Bas. Caesar., *In Principio erat Verbum* 171 | The meanings of union, mixture, and connection are different. |
| 19   | (110vb-112rb) | On the fact that sometimes “existence” (ὕπαρξις) is understood by the holy fathers as “substance” and sometimes as “one hypostasis” | (Ps.) Athan. Alex., *De Salutaris adventu Jesu Christi et adversus Apollinarium* 172  
Athan. Alex., *Ep. I ad Serapionem* 173  
Sev. Antioch., *Contra impium Grammaticum* 174  
Sev. Antioch., *Ep. ad Simum Scrianiarium* 175  
Sev. Antioch., *Contra impium Grammaticum* 176  
Bas. Caesar., *In Principio erat Verbum* 177  
Cyril. Alex., *Comm. in Ioannem* 178 | The word “being” (essence) can indicate the general and common substance when it is said without determination, while with determination and conjoined with a particular distinction, it indicates a hypostasis, that is, a particular being. |

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168 *PG* 35, 1072.42-45.  
169 Six quotations: *PG* 29, 588.33-44; 600.15-16; 600.24-27; 601.36-42; 605.30-39 and 625.7-10.  
171 *PG* 31, 476.18-20.  
172 *PG* 26, 596.15-21.  
173 *PG* 26, 1149.25-27.  
174 Three quotations: pp., 61.20-62.11; pp. 73.28-74.10 and p. 73.5-11 ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).  
175 *PO* 12, 194.6-195.5.  
177 *PG* 31, 477.42-46.  
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<td>20</td>
<td>(112rb-113ra)</td>
<td>On the fact that the hypostasis is substrate (ὑποκείμενον) if its properties are seen on it</td>
<td>Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), Ep. 38(^{179}) Bas. Caesar., Ep. 210(^{180}) Greg. Naz., De Dognate et constitutione episcoporum (or. 20)(^{181}) Greg. Naz., De filio 1 (or. 29)(^{182}) Greg. Nys., Contra Eunomium(^{183}) Thinking of the hypostasis does not mean thinking of the substance indefinitely, but delimiting the common substance within a precise reality, by means of the properties appearing on it. Hypostasis is a substrate, i.e. a concretely existing reality, with particular properties that distinguish it from other hypostases: how could the Father be distinguished from the Son without the particular property of fatherhood or of sonship?</td>
</tr>
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<td>21</td>
<td>(113ra-113va)</td>
<td>On the fact that the substance is one thing and the hypostasis is another thing</td>
<td>Sev. Antioch.s, Contra impium Grammaticum(^{184}) Bas. Caesar., Ep. 236(^{185}) quoted in Sev. Antioch., Contra impium Grammaticum(^{186}) Cyrilillus Alexandrinus, De Sancta trin. dialogi I-VII(^{187}) The meaning of substance is common and general (σομα), while the meaning of hypostasis is particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον). The difference between substance and hypostasis is that substance is comprehensive (περιεκτική) of each hypostasis belonging to it.</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>(113va-113vb)</td>
<td>On the fact that each of the hypostases participates in the concept (λόγος) of the substance and in the common [concept] of the substance</td>
<td>Sev. Antioch., Contra impium Grammaticum(^{188}) Bas. Caesar., Ep. 214(^{189}) Sev. Antioch., Contra impium Grammaticum(^{190}) Each hypostasis participates in the concept (λόγος) of the substance, that is, manifests the common characteristics of the substance to which it belongs, and in addition it manifests its particular properties.</td>
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\(^{179}\) Section 3.1-12, ed. Courtonne.

\(^{180}\) Section 5.25-34, ed. Courtonne.

\(^{181}\) PG 35,1072.42-45.

\(^{182}\) Section 10.12-14, ed. Barbel.

\(^{183}\) Two quotations: book 3, chapter 5, section 56.7-12 and section 58.1-9, ed Jaeger.

\(^{184}\) Two quotations: pp. 210.23-211.2 and 211.22-212.10 ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

\(^{185}\) Section 6.1-3, ed. Courtonne.

\(^{186}\) Cfr. p. 67.7-10, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

\(^{187}\) Cfr. p. 408.31-33, ed. de Durand.


\(^{189}\) Section 4.9-15, ed. Courtonne.

\(^{190}\) Cfr. p. 162.15-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
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| 23   | 114rb | On the fact that those [hypostases] that have [and participate in] the concept (λόγος) of the one substance are equal in substance (i.e., consubstantial) | Greg. Nys., *Contra Eunomium*<sup>191</sup>  
Greg. Naz., In *Sancta lumina* (or. 39)<sup>192</sup>  
Greg. Nys., *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii*<sup>193</sup> | The hypostases that participate in the same concept (λόγος) of substance have the same natural characteristics in common but are differentiated through their particular properties. |
| 24   | 114va | On those things whose concept (λόγος) is other and whose nature is different | Greg. Nys., *Ad Eust. de sancta trinitate*<sup>194</sup>  
Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), *Ep.* 38<sup>195</sup> | If two things belong to different substances, and thus manifest different concepts (λόγος) of substance, this means that they are different as to their nature. |
| 25   | 114vb | On what the division of the substance is | Sev. Antioch., *Contra impium Grammaticum*<sup>196</sup> | Hypostases do not divide the substance.  
Even if each divine hypostasis, taken separately, is called God, this does not mean that the Godhead is divided. |
| 26   | 115ra | That this is “not dividing and not cutting the substance”: understanding and predicating the hypostases as not different in all [their natural properties] | Sev. Antioch., *Contra impium Grammaticum*<sup>197</sup> | We can affirm that the hypostases do not divide the substance only when they belong to the same substance and manifest the same concept (λόγος) of substance (i.e., common natural properties). |
| 27   | 115va | On the fact that God is seen in one substance and [one] Godhead, but in three hypostases, and that each person exists in a true hypostasis | Sev. Antioch., *Hom. cathed.* 123<sup>198</sup>  
Theod. Alex., *De Trin.*<sup>199</sup>  
Bas. Caesar., *Ep.* 210<sup>199</sup> | God is one, exists and is known in one substance and three unconfused hypostases.  
Each of the three divine persons exists in true hypostases.  
Even if there are three hypostases, God is one in substance and divinity (i.e., in the concept of substance).  
In the Trinity there is one beginning, the Father, from whom the Son and the Holy Spirit come. |

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<sup>191</sup> Book 3, chapter 1, section 74.8-75.3, ed. Jaeger.  
<sup>192</sup> *PG* 36, 345.39-45.  
<sup>193</sup> Sections 5.8-6.2, ed. Jaeger.  
<sup>194</sup> Section 14.12-16, ed. Müller.  
<sup>195</sup> Section 3.26-30, ed. Courtonne.  
<sup>196</sup> Two quotations: p. 156.21-30 and p. 159.6-11, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).  
<sup>198</sup> *PO* 29, 148.12-22.  
<sup>199</sup> Two quotations: pp. 152.126-153.130; p. 188.131-135 and p. 159.319-321; pp. 194.320-195.322, ed. van Roey-Allen.  
<sup>200</sup> Section 5.35-36, ed. Courtonne.
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>(115va)</td>
<td>ἀνέλαβεν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ πατρί καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ καὶ ἐν ὁμοούσῃ καὶ ἐν ὁμοούσῃ ὁ ἅγιος πνεῦμα.</td>
<td>On the fact that three hypostases are seen in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.</td>
<td>Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>&lt;sup&gt;201&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>There is one common substance of the Godhead and three hypostases particularly, which are seen as definite and unconfused in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>(115vab)</td>
<td>ἵνα δὲ τὸ τρία ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ καὶ ἐν ὁμοούσῳ ὁ ἅγιος πνεῦμα.</td>
<td>That the Holy Trinity is known in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit.</td>
<td>Cyril. Alex., <em>Comm. in Joannem</em>&lt;sup&gt;202&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>There is one Holy Trinity known in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God is not divided; He is simple, even if the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are numbered.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>(115v b - 116ra)</td>
<td>ὅτι “πατέρα” καὶ “γιον” εἶναι ἐπὶ δύο ἁπάντων (πράγματα)</td>
<td>That “Father” and “Son” are called “two things” (πράγματα)</td>
<td>Alex. Alex., <em>Hom. festalis</em>&lt;sup&gt;203&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are known in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.</td>
</tr>
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<td>31</td>
<td>(116ra)</td>
<td>ἵνα “πατέρα” καὶ “γιον” εἴη ἐπὶ δύο ἁπάντων (ὑποκειμένα)</td>
<td>That “Father” and “Son” are called “two substrates” (ὑποκειμένα)</td>
<td>Greg. Nys., <em>Contra Eunomium</em>&lt;sup&gt;204&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The Father and the Son are two substrates and they are united as to nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>(116ra)</td>
<td>ἵνα “πατέρα” καὶ “γιον” καὶ “ἁγίου πνεύματος” εἴη ἐπὶ τρισθαλάστῳ (ὑποκειμένα)</td>
<td>That “Father”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirit” are called three substrates (ὑποκειμένα)</td>
<td>Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra Felicissimum</em>&lt;sup&gt;205&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three hypostases and three substrates. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist in three separate and unconfused hypostases.</td>
</tr>
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<td>33</td>
<td>(116rb - 116va)</td>
<td>ἵνα ἑνὸς ἑνὸς ἁπάντων (ὑποκειμένον) οὐκ ἔστω ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἅγιου πνεύματος</td>
<td>That “one substrate” (ὑποκειμένον) is not predicated of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.</td>
<td>Bas. Caesar., <em>Ep. 214</em>&lt;sup&gt;206&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three hypostases and three persons, therefore they are three substrates and not one substrate. This does not mean that they are dissimilar with regard to substance (ζύγισμα).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>(116va)</td>
<td>ἵνα οὐ λέγοις τὸ πατρὶ καὶ τὸ υἱὸ καὶ τὸ ἅγιο πνεῦμα ἑνὸς ἑνὸς (πρᾶγμα)</td>
<td>That we do not say the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit “one thing” (πρᾶγμα)</td>
<td>Bas. Caesar., <em>Ep. 210</em>&lt;sup&gt;207&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Affirming that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one thing, that is one hypostasis, means rejecting the economy of salvation realized by the Son and the role of the Spirit in it.</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>(116vab)</td>
<td>On what is often posited instead of the [preposition] “with” (σύν). Bas. Caesar., <em>De Spiritu sancto</em>&lt;sup&gt;210&lt;/sup&gt; Sometimes in Scripture the preposition ἐν is used instead of μετά and sometimes instead of σύν.</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>(&lt;116vb - 117a&gt;)</td>
<td>It is necessary to confess the Holy Trinity as one substance in word and reality. (Ps.) Athan. Alex., <em>De Fide</em>&lt;sup&gt;212&lt;/sup&gt; Cyril. Alex., <em>De Sancta trin. dialogi I-VII</em>&lt;sup&gt;213&lt;/sup&gt; The substance of the Holy Trinity is acknowledged as one both in thought and reality. It is one substance because of the unity of nature and of being identical in every natural aspect. Therefore, the Son is acknowledged to be consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>(117rab)</td>
<td>That the fathers confess the Holy Trinity eminently as one God and one Godhead and one substance. Greg. Nys., <em>Ad Ablabium quod non sint tres dii</em>&lt;sup&gt;214&lt;/sup&gt; The divine nature is one, therefore the Trinity is one God and one Godhead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>(&lt;117r b - 117va&gt;)</td>
<td>That the name of substance is mainly an indicator of the common meaning. Sev. Antioch., <em>Contra impium Grammaticum</em>&lt;sup&gt;215&lt;/sup&gt; The Fathers sometimes interchange the terms hypostasis and substance. In this case, and especially in Christological contexts, “substance” does not indicate the general meaning comprehendings a plurality of hypostases but the individual meaning of a concretely existing thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>(117vab)</td>
<td>That the Son is God in a proper sense; but this is evident for the Father and the Holy Spirit, too. Greg. Naz., <em>De Filio I</em> (or. 29)&lt;sup&gt;216&lt;/sup&gt; Whatever shares in a concept is called by the same name. The Son shares the concept of Godhead (the common meaning of the substance) with the Father therefore He is called God, not by homonymy and sheer participation in an appellation, but in a proper sense and in reality.</td>
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<sup>210</sup> Chapter 25, section 58.5-14, Basile de Césaré, *Sur le Saint-Esprit*, ed. B. Pruche, Cerf, Paris 1968 (Sources chrétiennes,17 bis.).

<sup>211</sup> PO 12, 213.6-8.

<sup>212</sup> Not preserved in the original Greek.

<sup>213</sup> Cfr. p. 641.6-11, ed. de Durand.

<sup>214</sup> Section 57.8-13, ed. Müller.


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<td>41 (118ra-118va)</td>
<td>That the indicative modes of the property will not damage the condition of simplicity [of God] and that the characteristic properties are understood outside of the substance. Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunomium</em> 217. Petrus Callinic., <em>Contra Damian</em> 218. The characteristics and properties with which God is described, like light, goodness etc., are understood outside of the substance; therefore, God is simple and not composite. The same is applied to the properties of the hypostases, but not to the hypostases themselves. Therefore, those who acknowledge the characteristic properties of the hypostases as hypostases must say that the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit are not light, life or goodness at all, but merely accompany the light, being understood outside of the substance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 (118vab)</td>
<td>That the “Not-begottenness” is not the substance of God the Father at all, but only a predicate that means, for those who hear, that the Father was not begotten. Cyril. Alex., <em>De Sancta trin. dialogi I-VII</em> 219. Unbegottenness does not indicate the Father’s substance; it is a word that indicates His not having been begotten as an appropriate concept and property concerning God the Father, not the substance itself of God.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 (118vbb-119va)</td>
<td>That those which are indicators and those which are indicated, and those which are depicted and those which depict, and those which enable to be known and those which are known, are not the same things. Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunomium</em> 220. Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), <em>Ep. 38</em> 221. Bas. Caesar. Ep. 210 222. Greg. Naz., <em>In Sancta luminis</em> (or. 39) 223. Greg. Nys., <em>Contra Eunomium</em> 224. Greg. Nys., <em>Ref. conf. Eunom</em> 225. Cyril. Alex., <em>Thesaurus de sancta consubst.trin.</em> 226. Sev. Antioch., <em>Hom. cath.</em> 227. Theod. Alex., <em>De Trin.</em> 228. Names are indicative of substances and are not themselves substance. Amongst the names of God, some are indicative of what belongs to Him and others of what does not belong to Him. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have the same nature and share in the one Godhead; therefore, they share the name “God” that indicates the divine reality. They have, however, different proper names, which indicate different definite and complete realities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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217 PG 29, 640.18-641.2.
220 Because of a missing folio in BL *Add.* 14532 this group of quotations is integrated through the other manuscripts, precisely BL *Add.* 14533, f. 83rv; BL *Add.* 14538, f. 128rv and BL *Add.* 12155, f. 17v.
221 Two quotations: PG 29, 681.40-41 and 533.40-45.
222 Two quotations: sections 3.2-8 and 3.17-22, ed. Courtonne.
223 Section 4.20-31, ed. Courtonne.
224 PG 36, 348.7-19.
225 Book 3, chapter 1, section 87.3-88.4, ed. Jaeger.
226 Section 14.6-13, ed. Jaeger.
228 PO 37, 70.32-72.2.
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>(119vab)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>(119vb-120rb)</td>
<td>That no accident is to be thought of in God</td>
<td>Cyr. Alex., <em>De Sancta trinitate dialogi</em> I-VII</td>
<td>Accidents or things naturally present in the substances of certain things, are not conceived as existing on their own as distinct and individual beings but they are rather seen as belonging to the substances of existent things, or in them. No accident is to be thought of in God.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>(120rb-121va)</td>
<td>That the Father is not God insofar as He is Father; it is evident that this is not so for His Son either</td>
<td>Cyr. Alex., <em>De Sancta trinitate dialogi</em> I-VII</td>
<td>The Father is not God because of His being Father and the Son is not God because of His being Son.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>(121va-122b)</td>
<td>On how we preserve the confession of one God and of three hypostases</td>
<td>Greg. Naz., <em>De Dogmate et const. episcop.</em> (or. 20)</td>
<td>Distinction between substance and hypostasis. One substance and three hypostases are professed in the Godhead. The hypostases are unconfused, they differ through the properties of fatherhood, sonship and procession. Unity in God is maintained because of the one common and shared substance. Unity in God is not divided through the hypostases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>(122rb-122vb)</td>
<td>On how Basil conceives of the community of the substance (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας)</td>
<td>Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunomium</em></td>
<td>The three divine hypostases share the same substance; therefore, the characteristics of the divine nature, such as light, goodness etc. can be said of all three.</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>(119vab)</td>
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<td>The three divine hypostases share the same substance; therefore, the characteristics of the divine nature, such as light, goodness etc. can be said of all three.</td>
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</tbody>
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232 PG 35, 1072.42-1073.15.  
235 PG 29, 637.21-44.  
236 Two quotations: *PG* 29, 556.1-30 and 629.12-30.  
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>On the fact that sometimes substance and Godhead receive a meaning</td>
<td>The hypostases are based in the substance and are included in the general meaning; therefore, they share to the same degree what is perceived to be within the common meaning of substance. The substance and the general meaning are inclusive of the hypostases. In God, the substance and general meaning is the Godhead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>If the difference is not placed from outside, the nature is not divided into a duality of Father and Son, and the nature is expanding [by the properties of the hypostases]</td>
<td>The divine nature is simple and not composite, and is expanded by the properties and the distinction of persons and names. Each hypostasis shares the same nature; the difference between hypostases is not in nature but outside of nature, therefore the nature is not divided into a duality of Father and Son.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>It is not possible to understand the proper concept of “Father” and of “Son” without addition of properties</td>
<td>The concepts of “Father” and “Son” can be real only through the addition of the property of “unbegottenness” and “begottenness” to the substance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>That the divinity of the Father is that of the Son</td>
<td>The Father is God and the Son is God, but they are not two gods because they are not dissimilar with regard to substance. The Father and the Son share in the same divinity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>That the divinity of the Father and of the Son is one</td>
<td>One and the same divinity is in the Father and in the Son.</td>
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</table>


239 PG 75, 141.29-36.

240 Cfr. p. 641.6-14, ed. de Durand.

241 PG 29, 640.11-17.


244 Two quotations: PG 31, 605.10-17 and 605.40-44.

245 Not identified in the original Greek.
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>(124ra-124va) That Eunomius repudiated the community of substance of Father and Son. Greg. Nys., <em>Contra Eunomium</em>&lt;sup&gt;246&lt;/sup&gt; Dam. Alex., <em>Adv. Tritheitas</em>&lt;sup&gt;247&lt;/sup&gt; Teaching that “unbegottenness” and “begottenness” indicate the substance means that there are different substances in God, one for the Father and another for the Son, and still another for the Holy Spirit. Affirming different substances is tantamount to polytheism. Only by affirming the community of substance of the three hypostases does one destroy polytheism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>(124va-125rb) It is necessary to confess each one of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity as substantial (ἐνούσιος). Bas. Caesar., <em>Adv. Eunom.</em>&lt;sup&gt;248&lt;/sup&gt; Athan. Alex., <em>Tomus ad Antiochenos</em>&lt;sup&gt;249&lt;/sup&gt; Cyril. Alex., <em>Commentarii in Joannem</em>&lt;sup&gt;250&lt;/sup&gt; ‘Unsubstantial’ (ἀνούσιος, ἀνυπόστατος) and ‘non-subsistent’ (ἐνυπόστατος, ἀνυπόστατος) mean a non-existent nature. ‘Substantial’ (ἐνούσιος, ἐνυπόστατος) and ‘subsistent’ (ἐνυπόστατος, ἐνυπόστατος) mean an existing hypostasis. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit truly exist, therefore they are subsistent and substantial. Insofar as the Son is consubstantial with the Father, he has his being in the Father and with the Father.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>(125ra-125vb) That each of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity is God by nature, and not by participation. Indeed, the latter thing is said of the creatures. Athan. Alex., <em>Ep. ad episcopos Aegypti et Libyae</em>&lt;sup&gt;251&lt;/sup&gt; Theoph. Alex., <em>Ep. festalis prima</em>&lt;sup&gt;252&lt;/sup&gt; Cyril. Alex., <em>Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali trinitate</em>&lt;sup&gt;253&lt;/sup&gt; Christ is God by nature and not by participation. The Holy Spirit is holy by nature. Rational creatures can have holiness by participation. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are God by nature and not by participation.</td>
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<sup>246</sup> Two quotations: book 1, sections 479.1-7 and 483.6-484.2, ed. Jaeger.<br>
<sup>247</sup> Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinicensis *Contra Damianum*, vol. 3, chapter XXX, 328-335, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.<br>
<sup>248</sup> Two quotations: *PG* 29, 749.16-22 and 713.24-31.<br>
<sup>250</sup> Cfr. vol. II, pp. 47.24-48.8, ed. Pusey.<br>
<sup>251</sup> Section 13, subsection 3, ed. Hansen-Metzler-Savvidis.<br>
<sup>252</sup> Two quotations: Not preserved in the original Greek.<br>
<sup>253</sup> Three quotations: *PG* 75, 137.22-25; 137.27-32 and 528.33-39.
57
(125vb-127va)
Refutation of what Damian said, that those who say that each of the hypostases is God do not escape from the accusation of being Tritheists
Greg. Naz., *De Spiritu sancto* (or. 31)\(^{254}\)
Epiph. Constant., *Panarion* \(^{255}\)
Cyril. Alex., *Comn in Joan* \(^{256}\)
Cyril. Alex., *Contra Diokomon Theodomon* \(^{257}\)
Cyril. Alex., *Thesaurus de sancta consubst. trin.* \(^{258}\)
Sev. Antioch., *Hom. cath.* \(^{259}\)
Sev. Antioch., *Ep. ad Victor.* \(^{260}\)
Petr. Callinic., *Contra Dam.* \(^{261}\)

The Spirit is God, since He is called Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ etc. The Spirit is God since it proceeds from the Father. Christ is God by nature. He is God from God and became flesh. Christ is called the likeness of God. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are truly God, Life and Light by nature and not metaphorically or by grace or participation.

58
(127va-128rb)
On the fact that Damian confesses the “non-begottenness”, since it participates in the substance, as substance, nature and God, and similarly the “begottenness” and the “provision”

Dam. Alex., *Adv. Tritheitas* \(^{262}\)
Dam. Alex., *Ep. prol. seu Apologia prima* \(^{263}\)

“Property” is called “hypostasis” when it subsists in the substance. Properties are not natures but belong to the nature, i.e. they participate fully in the substance. However, each property-hypostasis is named “nature” because it participates fully in the nature.

59
(128rb-128vb)
That Damian confesses the characteristic properties, i.e. “fatherhood”, “sonship”, or “unbegottenness” and “begottenness” and “provision”, as hypostases of the Holy Trinity

Dam. Alex., *Adversus Tritheitas* \(^{264}\)
Dam. Alex., *Ep. prol. seu Apologia prima* \(^{265}\)

“Properties”, if seen in the common substance, are called “hypostases” and are considered as realities. The Father, being the Father and not the Son or the Holy Spirit, has the unique characteristic of the fatherhood which is called his “hypostasis” or “property”; the same is applied to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Property is a hypostasis when it subsists in the substance and has reality in the common. Property is substantial since it fully participates in the substance and is not an aggregate of substance and property.

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\(^{254}\) Section 29.12-14, ed. Barbel.


\(^{256}\) Two quotations: the first one not identified in the original Greek; the second: pp.700.24-701.3, ed. Pusey.


\(^{258}\) *PG* 75, 609.50-612.2.

\(^{259}\) *PO* 8, 353.1-8.

\(^{260}\) *PO* 14, 120.


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<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>(128vb-129va)</td>
<td>On the fact that Damian confesses the substance of the Godhead to be something, and the hypostases something else, i.e. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The fact that the divine nature is “seen in three persons” and that the three properties “subsist in the divine substance” implies that the concept of “property” or “person” is one thing and “nature” or “substance” another thing. The characteristic properties, when seen in the substance, subsist as three perfect persons and three hypostases; they are substantial but not substances, otherwise the three hypostases would be three gods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>(129va-130vb)</td>
<td>On the fact that the hypostasis as to its signification (meaning), i.e. its concept, is not at all substance or nature or God, as Damian’s impiety wants. Damian’s doctrine: Each hypostasis is named, and is, substance not by its own signification but because it participates in the common nature. Distinction between what “substance and nature in the full sense” is, and what has been called “nature in a metaphorical sense”. “Father” and “Son” are names that do not indicate the substance but are exclusively indicative of properties. However, since the substance of the Godhead in the full sense belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of them is in the full sense both God and substance, as being truly substantial. Peter’s doctrine: Unbegottenness, begottenness or procession are neither called ‘substance’ or ‘God’ nor are substance and God by participating in the substance and Godhead. If “hypostasis” is identified with “property” it cannot be considered substance or nature. The fact that Damian teaches that the properties, recognized as hypostases, are one thing in their own concept (ὅντα) and the substance of Godhead is another thing; and that he also teaches that each of the properties is not God or substance or nature in its own concept, means that he does not truly think of the three hypostases as ‘God’, ‘substance’ or ‘nature’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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268 Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XLI.61-75 and 77-81, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
269 Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XLI.84-97, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
270 Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XLVI.51-78, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
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62 (130vb-131ra) How it is necessary to understand what Damian said regarding the substance, that it is something different in its concept; or regarding the hypostasis, that it is not substance

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<th>Quote</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Damian's doctrine</td>
<td>Distinction between “the concept (διάδοσα) of nature or substance” that indicates the natures and substances in themselves, and “the concept of hypostasis” that indicates the hypostases themselves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter's doctrine</td>
<td>If the hypostasis does not indicate the substance in its own concept, it cannot be indicative of substance either in full sense or metaphorically.</td>
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</table>

63 (131rb-131va) On the fact that Damian does not understand God the Father only as hypostasis

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Damian's doctrine</td>
<td>“God the Father” means the common joined to the property, it is not a simple hypostasis but a substantial hypostasis: saying “God” indicates the substance and the common; the denomination “Father” indicates the hypostasis and the property of the prosopon. The substance is never unhypostastic (ܩܝܡܬܐ), nor is the hypostasis unsubstantial (ܠܐ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ). God the Father is both participant and participated, i.e. He is a substantial hypostasis and not simply the characteristic of a hypostasis. Therefore, one must distinguish the meanings of substance and hypostasis in the full sense that is, one must separate hypostasis from substance and maintain their meanings unconfused.</td>
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</table>

64 (131va-132va) That Damian celebrates the “fatherhood”, that is named in the Godhead, as God the Father

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Damian's doctrine</td>
<td>“Fatherhood” or “unbegottenness” are not separated from the Godhead, i.e. do not subsist on their own apart from the substance. “Fatherhood” is substantial in the Godhead since it is joined to the substance. “Fatherhood” indicates the property-hypostasis; “God the Father” indicates the substantial property-hypostasis existing in the Godhead. Hypostasis is the participant; substance is the participated. “God the Father” is a substantial hypostasis and not simply a hypostasis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter's doctrine</td>
<td>Rejection of the identification of property and hypostasis made by Damian.</td>
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</tbody>
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273 Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 3, chapter XXXII.152-156 and 157-163, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham. The Apologia secunda is a letter sent to Peter of Callinicum through Zachariah at Paralos (Epistula per Zachariam allata): Peter was waiting to meet Damian.


How it is necessary to understand the words of Saint Eustathius the Bishop regarding the common and particular names of the hypostases of the Trinity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eustathius’ doctrine</th>
<th>Peter’s understanding/interpretation</th>
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<tr>
<td>The person is one thing and the nature is another thing. If the name ‘God’ were indicative of the person, saying “three persons” would mean “three Gods”. Properties belong to natures and indicate natures but are not natures, therefore, one cannot say “three gods” or “three natures”, but “one nature of three persons”. “Father”, “Son” and “Holy Spirit” indicate the persons and not the common nature, otherwise the persons would be confused. “God” indicates the common nature and not the persons, otherwise one would affirm “three gods”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eustathius does not define the Godhead as one thing and the hypostases of the Godhead as another thing (as Damian and others do). Eustathius says that the name ‘God’ is not indicative of a distinct person. Some of the names are common, some proper: the common ones show the invariableness of the substance, the proper ones characterize the properties of the hypostases. “Father”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirit” are proper to each hypostasis, whereas ‘God’ and ‘Lord’ are common.</td>
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6.2. Analysis of the Content of the Florilegium

An examination of the titles shows that the florilegium deals with the following main metaphysical topics, related to the Trinitarian doctrine: 1) the relationship between substance and hypostasis; 2) the relationship between hypostasis and property; and 3) the relationship between substance, hypostasis, and property. That the compiler of the florilegium had to deal once again with these topics was, I believe, the consequence of the metaphysical dilemma created during the controversy between Damian and Peter, which had not been resolved with the reconciliation after the schism between Alexandria and Antioch.

This dilemma can be seen as a predictable consequence of Severus of Antioch’s Trinitarian reflections in his *Contra Grammaticum*. One might note that both Peter and Damian considered the *Contra Grammaticum* as a basic work for their polemic. In that work, Severus tried to resolve the two above-mentioned questions that Miaphysite Christology had elicited, namely, 1) Was the whole substance of Trinity incarnated? 2) Are the three divine hypostases three substances?

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276 Two quotations: Not preserved in the original Greek.
Severus, as Krausmüller notes, rejects the notion of immanent universal; he makes no clear distinction between the intensional and the extensional meaning of substance, that is, “common (λόγος) concept” and “sum total of all hypostases”; he defines substance just as the sum total of all hypostases; he considers the hypostases as equated with the properties; for him, properties gain their substantial component through participation in a common substance; this common substance, finally, is located above the hypostases and thus different from them. This system was rather unclear. In fact, as Zachhuber notes, Severus was dangerously close from one hand, to suggest that the substance is quantitatively divided between its hypostases, and from the other, to assert that the hypostases are only subsisting properties. Both Miaphysite patriarchs, Damian and Peter, tried to modify Severus’ system so that it could be useful for their anti-Tritheistic polemics, each of them, taking and developing a different part of Severus’ system. In fact, they had divergent understandings of Severus’ system, even if it seems that on some points they agree.

Damian, as again Krausmüller notes, affirmed the reality and concreteness of the common substance. It seems that, to polemicize against the Tritheists’ consideration of the non-existence of the universals, in his doctrine there is no mention of the idea that the particular substance is the concreteness of the abstract reality. He, then, did not take into consideration Severus’ concept of substance as the sum total of hypostases. He identified property with hypostasis and affirmed that properties gain their substantial component through participation in a common substance. Peter, by contrast, considered the common substance as the sum total of all hypostases; he could therefore affirm that since the substance is what each hypostasis shares and has in common, the hypostases participate in this sum total of all hypostases and thus gain their substantial component. In addition, although he affirmed that each hypostasis is a particular substance, he was not interested in clarifying whether the substances in the hypostases could be counted or not.

This florilegium, then, tries to resolve this metaphysical dilemma, adopting a clear position against Damian and, as mentioned above, rejecting his doctrine. Even so, we cannot affirm that the compiler of this florilegium totally shared Peter’s position, since he tried to modify it, resolving the questions that Peter’s system had left open. In order to do this, the compiler read Peters’ Contra Damianum and Severus’ Contra Grammaticum with a critical eye and made a new synthesis based on patristic doctrine and authority. Now let us analyze the metaphysical system underlying the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium.

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278 See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 29.
279 For the relationship between substance as common and hypostasis as particular in Severus’ thought, see also Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 458-62.
282 I think that the main source of this florilegium is Peter’s Contra Damianum. However, some material, especially from a doctrinal point of view, come, at least indirectly, from Severus’ Contra Grammaticum. I aim to prepare a study on the relationship between the patristic quotations in the Trinitarian florilegium and those in Peter’s Contra Damianum, affirming and continuing what already van Roey had sustained, see van Roey, “Un florilège” (above, n. 81).
Relationship between substance and hypostasis

For the relationship between substance and hypostasis the compiler mainly follows the Cappadocian distinction between common and particular (cfr. nos. 21 and 47 where the name of Basil appears in the title): the substance coincides with what is common and participated (cfr. nos. 6, 39, 47, 52, 53); it is an abstract reality, i.e. it does not exist in itself; therefore, it is not considered as a substrate or a thing (cfr. nos. 33, 34); it consists of and exists in hypostases (cfr. no. 36). Consequently, the hypostases are the concrete substances; each is subsistent, i.e. exists in itself and for itself (cfr. nos. 10, 13); they are considered substrates (cfr. nos. 20, 31, 32) and things (cfr. no. 30). Since the hypostases share in the same common substance, they are called consubstantial (cfr. no. 6 where the compiler mainly follows Basil’s understanding of consubstantiality, and nos. 47, 52, 53, 22, 23). As a result, substance is also considered the sum total of all hypostases (cfr. nos. 1, 4), and from this point of view it is one and escapes from number while the numbered are the hypostases themselves (cfr. no. 2). Even if the hypostases are numbered this does not mean that their being numbered divides the substance (cfr. nos. 25, 26). This means that the substance is identified with the sum total of its hypostases; therefore, it could not be affirmed, on the one hand, that the substance is one thing and its hypostases are another (cfr. nos. 1, 4), while on the other hand one hypostasis is not the whole substance, i.e. the sum total of the hypostases (cfr. nos. 3, 5). However, a hypostasis, if seen individually, is a concrete substance, and since it participates in the common substance, is from it and of it, it is called by the name of its general substance and is characterized through its natural characters and attributes (cfr. nos. 9, 10, 13, 19, 40, 48). This does not mean that each hypostasis is denominated with the name of its substance by participation, but by nature, that is, since it is really and concretely substance (cfr. no. 56). As a consequence, one can understand why some fathers interchanged nature, essence, or substance on the one hand, and hypostasis on the other (cfr. nos. 9, 19). In fact, hypostasis is not empty of substance but substantial, that is, it participates in and shares the common substance and through this participation gains its substantial component – it possesses all the characteristics of the concept (λόγος) of the substance to which it belongs (cfr. nos. 55, 56). The substantiality of the hypostases, finally, is the basis of their consubstantiality, since they share and manifest the same concept (λόγος) of the substance (cfr. nos. 23, 55).

It is clear that the florilegium has as basis the Neoplatonic doctrine of collective universal, where species gets two meanings, a predicable concept (universal concept) and an extramental collection of particulars, for the Neoplatonic doctrine see. Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa” (above, n. 26), pp. 374-80. Note that the florilegium, explaining the relationship between substance and hypostasis, as will be cleared through my analysis, cannot accept the idea that the substance, being collective, is divided into its particulars (like the Neoplatonic doctrine), since as common and participated remains indivisible. Such doctrine is seen, in some way, in Gregory of Nyssa’s teaching, in regards see, Zachhuber, Human Nature (above, n. 26), pp. 61-118, especially pp. 64-70; Zachhuber, “Once again” (above, n. 26), pp. 75-98; Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 444-5, 447. See also H. Cherniss, “The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa”, University of California Publications in Classical Philology 11 (1930), pp. 1-92, here p. 33; R.M. Hubner, Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der ‘physischen’ Erlösunglehre, Brill, Leiden 1974, pp. 83-7; D. Balás, “Plenitudo humanitatis: The Unity of Human Nature in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa”, in D. F. Wimslow (ed.), Disciplina Nostra: Essays in Memory of Robert F. Evans, Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, Cambridge 1979 (Patristic monograph series, 6), pp. 115-31, here p. 119-21. This opinion, however, was rejected by Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa” (above, n. 26), pp. 372-410. Personally, I agree with the opinion of Zachhuber which I find more articulated.
**Relationship between hypostasis and property**

Also, for the relationship between hypostasis and property the compiler relied on the Cappadocian doctrine on idiomata, which affirms that without the property added to the substance, a hypostasis cannot be recognized as distinct and particular (cfr. no. 51 where the compiler quotes only Basil as reference). However, our florilegium puts more emphasis, on the one hand, on the distinction between property and hypostasis and on the fact that they cannot be identified, since predicator and predicated are different things (cfr. nos. 15, 42, 43, 59, 64); on the other hand, it emphasizes the fact that hypostasis and property are united and cannot be separated (cfr. no. 16), since a hypostasis without property does not exist and is not a substrate, and a hypostasis gets its particular name precisely through its property (cfr. nos. 16, 20). Property, then, is the distinctive character of each hypostasis (cfr. no. 17); it belongs to the hypostasis, is united and mixed with it, but without any confusion (cfr. nos. 18, 35 where the compiler tries to show that union and mixture do not mean confusion). Finally, if the hypostasis subsists, property exists only in the hypostasis, and is then not subsistent in itself (cfr. n. 14).

**Relationship between substance, hypostasis and property**

As for the relationship between substance, hypostasis and property, the compiler is very careful to highlight that for each hypostasis to have its own property does not imply that the property is mixed with the substance itself, i.e. with the substantial component. Even if it belongs to the hypostasis, property should be understood and seen outside of the substance, i.e. outside of the constituent element (cfr. no. 41). Property does not define the substance but the hypostasis, and the hypostasis is not the substance because of the property (cfr. nos. 45, 58). Therefore, the hypostasis gets its particular name through its property, and its substantial name, i.e. its natural name, through its substance (cfr. no. 65).

**Other metaphysical principles**

Differently from Severus, the compiler of the florilegium makes a clear distinction between the intensional and the extensional meaning of substance. Indeed, this is clear in the title of group no. 22: “On the fact that each one of the hypostases participates in the concept (λόγος) of the substance and in the common [concept (λόγος)] of the substance”. Here the compiler quotes from Severus’ Contra Grammaticum and Basil’s Epistula 214. One can then maintain that the concept of the substance (melltō d-ʾūsīya, ܡܠܬܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ) is the sum total of the hypostases, as already theorized by Severus, which is elsewhere called “the whole substance” (kūllōh ʾūsīya, ܟܠܗ ܐܘܣܝܐ) (cfr. nos. 3,4,5); while the common concept of the substance (ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος κοινός, melltō d-ʾūsīya gawōnītō, ܡܠܬܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ), an expression that comes from Basil, is the substantial component, i.e. the natural properties that are manifested equally in each hypostasis belonging to a certain substance, or, in other words, the constituent element of the substance. In this case, the compiler agrees with Severus’ and not with Peter’s position, making the distinction between the two meanings of substance clearer.

In addition, it is clear that the compiler rejects Damian’s doctrine on the concreteness and reality of the common substance, supporting, instead, Peter’s understanding of abstract and concrete realities, clearly expressed in groups nos. 57-64. The key-concepts one should highlight in these groups are the following: substantial (ἐνούσιος, ἕνοσίαι, ʾūsīyō, ܐܘܣܝܝܐ), un-substantial (ἀνούσιος, ἀνοσία, ἀνοσίας, lō ʾūsīyō, ܠܐ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ), hypostatic/subsistent, i.e. existent.
An existing, real, and concrete substance must be ἐνυπόστατος, which means that it must exist in a hypostasis (cfr. 29, 36) otherwise it is inexistente, that is, without hypostasis and existence. It is notable that both adjectives can describe substances, and that both Syriac terms, ṣnūmōyō (ܩܢܘܡܝܐ) and ṣqaymō (ܩܝܡܐ), are considered here as synonymous. A hypostatic, ṣnūmōyō (ܩܢܘܡܝܐ), substance means an existent and subsistent substance, ṣqaymō (ܩܝܡܐ), that is, ἐνυπόστατος or existing in a hypostasis. Therefore, a hypostasis cannot be empty of substance, it can be only substantial ἐνούσιος, ῥύσιγογος, ἐνούσιος ὅλως, that is, it possesses the substantial component. Consequently, an un-substantial ἀνούσιος, ἀνυπόστατος, ὅλως is the participle ṣqaymō (ܩܝܡܐ), to express the idea of existing.

The concept of participation (μετοχή, ἐνωτορίτοι, ἐνοὐσιαστάς) in our florilegium must also be discussed. Although it comes from the Cappadocian doctrine, we cannot affirm that it is used in the same sense as by the Cappadocians, since substance has both an intensional and an extensional meaning. Our compiler, following Peter of Callinicum, affirms that each hypostasis participates in the substance as a common concept (λόγος) and as the sum total of the hypostases; this does not mean that each hypostasis is the whole substance (cfr. no. 22). I think, however, that the compiler understands the meaning of participation differently from Peter. Since each substance exists perfectly in each hypostasis, this implies that the hypostasis is substance by nature, possessing all the natural characteristics of the common substance. Participation, in this case, means a perfect and equal share in the same common substance with the other hypostases: i.e., the hypostases possess and manifest the common natural characteristics of the substance perfectly and equally to each other. Therefore, the substance is all its hypostases together (sum total), it exists perfectly in each of its hypostases, while the hypostasis is by nature the substance (i.e., the common substance exists within it being its constituent element), but it is not the whole substance (which is the sum total of

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285 That these Syriac terms translate the Greek ones can be evinced from the comparison between the Syriac translation of some quotations from the Greek fathers in our florilegium and their original Greek text (when it exists). Compare for example the Greek original text of Basil’s Adversus Eunomium (ΠΓ 29, 749.16-22) in chapter n. 55 of the florilegium and its Syriac translation: “Πάλιν ἀγέννητον ἀνούσιον νοοῦμεν τὸ μηδαμῆς ὑπάρχοντα ὅτι ὢν ἐνυπόστατος ἐνούσιος ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχοντα λόγος ὃς ἐν υἱῷ ἔδηλωσε, ὑπάρχοντα μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐ

286 On this term and its use in Christian authors see Gleede, The Development (above, n. 72).
the hypostases), and it is by participation that it shares the same common substance (i.e., the common constituent element) with the other hypostases.

Thus, one can now understand why, for our florilegium, the common substance is called “shared/participated” (mšawtāp, ܡܫܬܘܬܦ) and the hypostasis “sharer/participant” (meštawtāp, ܡܫܬܘܬܦ); and secondly, it is now clear how the concept of participation is related to substantiality, that is, to the hypostases gaining the substantial component, and to consubstantiality, that is, to the hypostases sharing and manifesting the same common substance perfectly and equally. Finally, it is evident that, if one follows this line of thought, affirming that each hypostasis is a substance does not imply a multiplication of the constituent element of the substance, which remains one according to its λόγος or concept.

This is the reason why the compiler, following Peter, rejects Damian’s affirmation according to which property is substantial. Such a rejection is a consequence of the refusal to identify property with hypostasis, a doctrine affirmed by Damian, who to some extent follows Severus’ ideas on this matter. Indeed, a careful reading of the titles of groups nos. 61, 62 and 63 leads to recognition that the intention of the compiler is to underline that Damian’s understanding of these concepts is wrong.

In addition, it is worth noting the use of the terms “substrate” (ὑποκείμενον, sīmō, ܣܝܡܐ) and “thing” (πρᾶγμα, sūʿrōnō, ܣܘܥܪܢܐ) as synonyms for “hypostasis” in our florilegium (cfr. nos. 30, 31, 32). These terms were used in the Cappadocian Trinitarian doctrine (cfr. the Cappadocian quotations in the same groups nos. 30, 31, 32, 33), probably through a Stoic influence: a substrate was considered the substance with its particular property, that is, hypostatic and subsistent, or, in other words, a qualified substrate.287 However, they used the term “substrate” also, under Aristotelian influence and Stoic understanding, to indicate the common substance in the sense of an unqualified substrate (qualitiless substrate), that is, the constituent element of the substance, which cannot be comprehended or described.288 Basil applied this meaning to Christ, calling him one in substratum and one substance, thus indicating his divinity as a simple and incomposite nature.289 Our florilegium, however, refuses to use the term substrate for the common substance, preferring to understand it only as a qualified single substance, that is, as a subsistent hypostasis, an existing concrete nature (cfr. no. 33), following Peter’s polemic against Damian’s understanding of substratum as the common substance.290

Finally, I would like to highlight one important consequence of these innovations in the understanding of the Trinitarian doctrine: in our florilegium there is no mention of the relationship between the hypostases of the Trinity. For the Cappadocians, as mentioned above, the doctrine on the monarchy of the Father was essential. In fact, besides the oneness of the divine substance, the consideration of the Father as the unique cause of the Trinity,

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289 See for example Basil’s use of the term substrate which is different from the later use during the Christological controversies. In fact, his use of the term substrate is linked with his understanding of substance and hypostasis related to his anti-Eunomian polemic, see M. Delcogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names. Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 103), p. 141.
290 See chapter 10 of Book 2, see Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 2, chapter X, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
and of the Son and the Holy Spirit as co-eternally caused, was the basis of the Cappadocian understanding of monotheism. Our florilegium does not simply avoid mentioning this doctrine, but as other Miaphysite anti-Tritheistic texts, rejects it. Indeed, in group no. 7, it is affirmed that the relationship between Father and Son is not that between a cause and a caused effect (participated/shared and participant/sharer). Such a statement must be understood in light of the meaning taken up in the florilegium by the terms substance (common concept and sum total), participation, substantiality and consubstantiality. One substantial hypostasis, in our case the Father, cannot be considered as the cause of the other two, since they share in the same substance (common meaning=consubstantiality) and are all together the same substance (sum total), otherwise, the cause would be considered another substance, and the Trinity would become “Tetrade”, a doctrine which some Chalcedonians, like Anastasius of Sinai, proposed into their attempt to challenge John Philoponus’ Tritheism.

Application of these principles to the Trinitarian doctrine

With this in mind, we can now summarize the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium as follows: 1) The Holy Trinity is one God, one substance and one Godhead in word and reality; 2) God is the three hypostases; 3) the Godhead exists in three hypostases; 4) God is seen and recognized in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 5) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, three substantial divine hypostases, equal in substance, that is, consubstantial; therefore 6) the divinity of the Father is the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, all three share the same divinity. 7) Each hypostasis, taken individually, is considered as substance, substrate and thing; therefore 8) each is called God in the full sense; 9) this does not mean division within the Godhead, since the substance, i.e. the constituent element in the Trinity is one and the same in the three hypostases; 10) thus, affirming three hypostases, and each one as a substance, does not imply Tritheism. 11) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not divine because of the property joined to each, namely fatherhood, sonship, and procession, but because they share in the same Godhead; 12) without these characteristic properties each hypostasis cannot be recognized as a distinct and particular reality. 13) The properties in the Godhead, even if they can be conceived outside of the substance, and although they belong to, and exist in, the hypostases, cannot be considered as accidents. 14) The oneness of the Trinity is to be found in the common substance, the one constituent element, not in the cause identified with the Father; in other words, we have here a “monarchy of the substance”.

The florilegium as a metaphysical position against Chalcedonians and Nestorians

The importance of this florilegium lies not only in its Trinitarian doctrine, but also in its reformulation of the metaphysical principles used to express the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas. One of the main aims of this florilegium was to create a metaphysical system through which Miaphysites could answer the accusations of Chalcedonians and Nestorians, by resolving some metaphysical weaknesses.

291 Some texts, written after the anti-Tritheistic work of Theodosius of Alexandria and probably before the compilation of our florilegium, edited and translated by G. Furlani, reject to understand the relationship between the divine hypostases as cause and caused, see PO 14, pp. 716-17, 748.
293 The same idea one might find in the Syriac anti-Tritheistic texts in PO 14, pp. 673-766 (above, n. 291).
What leads me to this conclusion is the mention, in the titles of the florilegium, of the names of two “heresiarchs”, namely, Damian and Eunomius. Why mention them? Were there, at the time when the florilegium was composed, followers of their doctrines? There is no historical evidence for their existence; I am rather inclined to think that behind the mention of the names of Damian and Eunomius one might recognize a link between their doctrines and those of Chalcedonians and Nestorians, as I shall explain in the following paragraphs.

As I said above, Miaphysites had probably seen a Chalcedonian influence in the doctrine of Damian, at least on the metaphysical level. Behind the polemic against Damian in this florilegium one may therefore read an anti-Chalcedonian polemic. Such a hypothesis helps us to better understand the accusations made against Damian, of whose work we possess only a small number of fragments. Indeed, Chalcedonians made a metaphysical distinction between nature-substance and hypostasis-person; they developed a new understanding of the concept of hypostasis, which was quite different from that of the Cappadocians. Therefore, the polemics in groups nos. 1, 2 60, and 61, for instance, could be understood as anti-Chalcedonian. Miaphysites rejected the Chalcedonian understanding of hypostasis, accusing them of identifying it with the characteristic property. Such an accusation can be read behind all polemics of the florilegium concerning this topic, as for example in nos. 42, 43, 58, 59.

In addition, the appearance of the term ἐνυπόστατος in more than one title (cfr. nos. 13, 14), and not just in patristic quotations, may be another proof of this hypothesis. Such term, with all the other technical terms explained above (an-hypostatic, substantial etc.), was a key concept in the metaphysical development of neo-Chalcedonianism, through which Chalcedonians had tried to resolve the Christological question regarding the existence of two natures in one hypostasis. For neo-Chalcedonians, this term was not understood according to its Trinitarian use by previous generations, but according to their new understanding of hypostasis. Our florilegium, then, although it treats the Trinitarian dogma, basically deals with metaphysics, and offers a new understanding of the term “hypostatic/subsistent” (ἐνυπόστατος). While using it mainly in Trinitarian doctrine, the compiler presupposes its application to Miaphysite Christology: the one composite nature from two is one subsistent reality, one hypostasis, having divinity and humanity as its substantial components. These components, however, are not two subsistent realities: through the new understanding of participation, substantiality, and consubstantiality, this one subsistent reality of Christ is consubstantial with the common divine nature, and at the same time it is not all the hypostases of humanity; while through the participation in the common divine nature, it is consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, without affirming that all the Trinity was incarnated.

For the same reason, the florilegium understands the term substrate (ὑποκείμενον, ʿṣmō, ܣܝܡܐ) only as the hypostasis with its property, that is, as a qualified single substance, and not as the unqualified common substance. Affirming that the three hypostases are three substrates, and, on the other hand, that Christ is one substrate, means that it is not the common substance that was incarnated, and that divinity and humanity in Christ are not two substances or substrates. Consequently, one might say that this Trinitarian florilegium

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294 See the references given on neo-Chalcedonism above in footnotes 30 and 72; for the use of the term ἐνυπόστατος and its relation to other technical terms among (neo-)Chalcedonians, see Gleede, The Development (above, n. 72), pp. 45-181 and especially Erismann, “A World of Hypostases” (above, n. 285).
was essential to resolve the open questions Miaphyste Christology had raised, without causing, at least from a Miaphysite perspective, troubles in the Trinitarian doctrine.

The same can be said of the polemics against Eunomius. He was accused, as mentioned above, of having taught three different substances in the Godhead, affirming that the property was indicative of the substance, and that therefore the three hypostases, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, were three different substances. Eunomians were also accused of being Tritheists. In fact, one of the arguments Damian had put forward in his anti-Tritheistic polemic was that Tritheism is Eunomianism (cfr. the quotation from Damian in group no. 8). Damian, as we saw above, also accused Peter of being Eunomian and Tritheist, since Peter considered each hypostasis, individually taken, as a substance. Why, then, does the compiler of the florilegium mention Eunomius twice in his titles (cfr. nos. 8, 54)? I do not think that he is defending Peter from the accusations of Damian. It is likelier that the name of Eunomius hides the Nestorian doctrine.

As already mentioned, Miaphysites could easily see a similarity between Nestorianism and Tritheism. Nestorians, in fact, were accused of being Tritheists because they put considerable stress on the individuality of the hypostases. Their metaphysical system, at least that of Babai and his followers, was understood as divisive. Here one should note the role played in our florilegium by the polemic against teachings that introduce divisions into the Godhead or claim that the three hypostases divide the divine substance (cfr. nos. 25, 26). Such teachings call consubstantiality into question, another typical polemical motif against Eunomius’ doctrine (cfr. no. 54), which might be also read in an anti-Nestorian key.

Another important element that can demonstrate how the compiler takes a stance against the Nestorian doctrine, especially of Babai, is the title of no. 27: “On the fact that God is seen in one substance and [one] Godhead, but in three hypostases, and that each person exists in a true hypostasis”. The term “person” (parsūpō, فرضا), even if it recurs in many patristic quotations in the florilegium, appears in no other title. It must be noted, firstly, that the statement “each person exists in a true hypostasis” comes from the quotation of Basil’s Epistle 210 in the same group, no. 27. As already noted by Turcescu, in this letter, contrasting Sabellius’ understanding of the term person (πρόσωπον) as mask, Basil underlines that if one wants to call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit “persons” (πρόσωπα), one needs to clarify that these persons really exist (ἐν ὑποστάσει ἀληθινῇ ὑπάρχον). Consequently, in this letter Basil understands hypostasis as a subsistent reality. The compiler, I would argue, uses Basil’s quotation and doctrine to contrast the Nestorian position regarding the term “person”. In fact, for Babai each hypostasis is distinguished through its “person” (parsōpā, فرضا). In this case, “person” is identified with the particular property, and distinguished from the hypostasis, which is a single nature without particular properties. Moreover, according to Babai’s doctrine persons belong to hypostases, but can be given and received. Our compiler, then, is taking an opposite stance here. Although he also identifies the person (parsōpā, فرضا) with the particular property, or with the name

of the hypostasis, for him the person exists in and within the hypostasis, and as property it is united to the hypostasis, but without being confused with the substance, i.e. with the constituent element. This means that persons cannot be given or received, as Babai affirms, otherwise they could be understood as masks, and thus reminiscent of the Sabellian understanding of person.

What, finally, confirms this my hypothesis is the version of the florilegium in BL Add. 12155. In fact, the last chapter (fol. 32va) has the title On the anxiety of the Romans and the Easterners concerning the name of “substance” and [the names] of ‘hypostases’ and ‘persons’ (ܢܘܡܐ ̈ܚܝܐܡܛܠܫܡܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܘܕܩ ܕܕܐ ܕܪ̈ܗܘܡܝܐ ܘܕܡܕܢ ܡܛܠ ܦܘܫܟܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܚ ܘܕܦܪ̈ܨܘܦܐ). This title, then, demonstrates that the main opponents for this florilegium are the Chalcedonians and the Nestorians because of their errant use and understanding of the metaphysical concepts of “substance”, “hypostasis”, and “person”.

Conclusion

With this paper I have tried to understand the theological reasons that led Syriac Miaphysites to produce Trinitarian florilegia and to copy them during the first centuries of Islamic rule in the Middle East. It has been noted that the Cappadocian metaphysical system could not function perfectly when applied to the Miaphysite Christological doctrine. Miaphysites, affirming that Christ is one nature and hypostasis, had identified these two metaphysical categories with one another. Such identification resulted into two essential Christological questions: was the whole substance of Trinity incarnated? Are the three divine hypostases three substances? Severus of Antioch had already started reflecting on the understanding of the terms “substance” and “hypostasis” in Christology and Trinitarian doctrine; however, he did not provide a final answer.

The same metaphysical innovation, once applied to Trinitarian doctrine, created other problems to the Miaphysite church. It was the reason behind the Tritheistic controversy among Miaphysites during the sixth century. The attempts of some anti-Tritheistic figures, especially Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicum, evidenced a dilemma on how to understand and use the metaphysical terms which were at stake, not only in the anti-Tritheistic controversy but also in the Christological polemics against Nestorians and Chalcedonians.

To respond to these new challenges, Miaphysites had to develop a unified metaphysical system to be used in their Christology and in their Trinitarian doctrine, so that the latter could not be understood as Tritheism. It is in this light that we have to understand the composition of the Trinitarian florilegium, based on the patristic tradition of the Miaphyiste Church: the Cappadocians, Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, Theodosius of Alexandria, and Peter of Callinicum.

The florilegium tries to make a new metaphysical synthesis between Severus of Antioch’s reflections in his Contra Grammaticum and Peter of Callinicum’s Contra Damianum. Even though it is Trinitarian in content, the main aim of the florilegium is metaphysical. In fact, the reformulation of the Trinitarian doctrine has its starting point in the Miaphysite Christology: therefore, it does not represent the traditional Cappadocian Trinitarian teaching, but a “Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine”. Such a synthesis was an instrument to prove that the Miaphysite Christology implied no risk for Trinitarian dogma.