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Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 300, f. 1v; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1853, f. 186v

Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism: A Study and Analysis of the Trinitarian Florilegium in MS British Library Add. 14532

Bishara Ebeid*

Abstract

This paper aims to study and analyse the Trinitarian doctrine of a Syriac Patristic florilegium of Trinitarian content found in MS London, British Library, *Add. 14532*, in an attempt to understand the reasons that led to its composition. It will include an analysis of the development of Miaphysite metaphysics during the sixth and the seventh centuries, when the Miaphysites had to deal with various internal controversies, and an analytical presentation of the florilegium and of its contents, with an identification of the patristic quotations used by the compiler. The study of the theology and metaphysics of this florilegium will go on to demonstrate that the Miaphysites, starting from their Christology and the problems it created in their Trinitarian doctrine, formulated a metaphysical system based on a new comprehension of “substance”, “hypostasis”, “property” and “monarchy” and developed what I call “Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine”.

Introduction

The paradox of the Christian faith is to believe in one God and to affirm that this one God is Triune. In Eastern Christianity, Trinitarian doctrine was a main topic of discussion in three moments: 1) during the first four centuries and with a culmination in the fourth century, when the Trinitarian dogma was first formulated; 2) in the sixth and early seventh centuries, during the Christological controversies, when the question of Tritheism emerged among Miaphysites, and 3) under Islamic rule, when Christians had to explain again that their doctrine of Trinity is not tantamount to Tritheism.

Whole libraries have been written on all these topics. With this paper, however, I aim to highlight the long-term consequences of Tritheism in the Miaphysite church, which, for reasons that still have to be determined, was still composing dogmatic patristic *florilegia* against Tritheism under Abbasid rule. The present paper aims to study and analyse the Trinitarian doctrine of a florilegium of Trinitarian content found in MS BL *Add. 14532* and in a number of other places, in an attempt to understand the theological reasons behind its composition. This florilegium, like others, was composed and copied after the second moment of Trinitarian debates mentioned above and used by Syriac and Arabic Christian authors during the third phase.

I shall start by summarizing some major and well-known points of the early development of Trinitarian dogma, based mainly on the Trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocian fathers.

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This summary is necessary to understand the subsequent developments during the following phases of the Trinitarian controversies and will help the reader better understand the solutions offered. Then, after a presentation of the florilegium and of its content, including an identification of the patristic quotations used by the compiler, I shall analyse the theology and metaphysics of the florilegium in relation to the Trinitarian discussions of the sixth and seventh centuries.

I shall demonstrate that the Trinitarian content of this florilegium has Miaphysite Christology as its starting point and could therefore be called a Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine. In addition, it will be shown that this florilegium offers a new formulation and synthesis of the metaphysical terms and concepts used by Miaphysites in their Christological and Trinitarian doctrine. As such, it was used as a major building block of Miaphysite works against Chalcedonians and Nestorians written during the eighth and ninth centuries, in Syriac and Arabic. At the same time, the content of this florilegium should be seen as an important reference for Miaphysite apologetic writings produced during the third phase of Trinitarian debates, that is, with Muslim scholars.

1. *The Cappadocians and the Establishment of the Trinitarian Dogma: A Short Summary*

On the eve of Nicaea, Christian theologians sought to use metaphysical concepts to explain the relationship between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.¹ The Council of Nicaea established that the Son is true God (from) begotten of true God; generated by the Father; of the same substance (consubstantial) as the Father “ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ”; and that he is Creator. However, the Council did not clarify the difference between the metaphysical terms “substance” (οὐσία) and “hypostasis” (ὑπόστασις), nor did it sufficiently explain what consubstantiality means.²

The Cappadocian Fathers, Basil the Great (d. 379), Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390) and Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), contributed a great deal to the clarification of the metaphysical terminology (substance/οὐσία, nature/φύσις,³ hypostasis/ὑπόστασις, person/πρόσωπον and consubstantial/ὁμοούσιον) in response to the challenges of Arians, Eunomians, Sabellians, Pneumatomachians (Macedonians)⁴ and Apollinarists,⁵ who understood the same metaphysical

¹ See M. Simonetti, *La crisi Ariana nel IV secolo*, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 1975 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 11); B. Lonergan, *The Way to Nicaea. The dialectical development of trinitarian theology*, Darton, Longman and Todd, London 1976.

² See B. Studer, *Dio Salvatore nei Padri della Chiesa. Trinità-Cristologia-Soteriologia*, Borla, Roma 1986 (Cultura Cristiana Antica, Studi, 6), pp. 150-5 and 158-9. For more on the doctrine of the Council see L. Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy. An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2004.

³ It must be noted that the term nature “φύσις” was not as frequently used by the Cappadocians as was the term substance “οὐσία”; both terms are used interchangeably in the work of the Cappadocian Amphilochius of Iconium, see Studer, *Dio Salvatore* (above, n. 2), p. 205.

⁴ On all these heresies and their doctrines see M. Simonetti, *Studi di Cristologia postnicena*, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 2006 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 98); F. Dünzl, *A Brief History of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Church*, T&T Clark, New York 2007; H. Newman, *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene OR 1996.

⁵ The Trinitarian doctrine of Apollinaris of Laodicea was characterized by a radical subordination in the Trinity. On his Trinitarian doctrine see E. Mühlenberg, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, Göttingen 1968 (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Band 23), pp. 230-7; on the accusations against him see B. Ebeid, *La Tunica di al-Masih. La Cristologia delle grandi confessioni cristiane dell'Oriente nel X e XI secolo*, Valore Italiano-Edizione Orientalia Christiana, Roma 2019², pp. 250-5.

terms in different ways.⁶ By resorting to the Aristotelian distinction⁷ between second and first substance,⁸ and having as background Stoic interpretations of the Aristotelian categories,⁹ the Cappadocians distinguished between the general or common, the “κοινόν”, and the particular or specific, the “ἴδιον”. In this way the substance, an abstract reality, is the common and general, and is not identified with the particular and singular, which is the hypostasis, the concrete realization of the abstract.¹⁰ An analogy from the created world helped Basil clarify his thought: the “common” element of all human beings is their nature, which is equal in each one; the individuals belonging to this same common nature, however, are distinguished from one another: each individual is the specific, or the particular of the same common nature.¹¹ Participating in, and belonging to, the same nature and substance means consubstantiality.¹² As a result, by applying this line of reasoning to his Trinitarian doctrine, Basil, with the other Cappadocians, arrived at the formula “God is one substance (in) three hypostases”.¹³ It must be noted that as far as created and material substances are concerned, each hypostasis is considered as an individual, a single substance with its specific and determined qualities. In the case of the uncreated God, however, and since the divine substance is simple and immaterial, the divine hypostases cannot be considered as individuals, even if according to Cappadocian thought hypostases are concrete substances. This was, as it were, one of the main weak points of their metaphysical system.

If this doctrine was developed by Cappadocians in their response to the doctrines of Arians, and especially Eunomians who did not accept that the Father and the Son participate in the same substance, in defining orthodoxy against the challenge of Sabellians they had to clarify the relationship between the terms hypostasis and person. In order to define the Trinity against the doctrine of the Sabellians, Basil used the term πρόσωπον, but did not understand it in the classical meaning of mask, used by Sabellius himself and his followers;

⁶ See Ph. Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution to the Trinitarian Doctrine. A Synthesis of Greek Paideia and the Scriptural Worldview”, *Phronema* 25 (2010), pp. 57-83, here p. 59.

⁷ On the topic of distinctions in Basil and its relation to Aristotelian philosophy see A. Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity*, Oxford U.P., New York - Oxford 2009 (Oxford Early Christian Studies), pp. 122-42, where the author speaks of five kinds of distinctions in Basil which are keys for understanding his thought: 1) ‘knowing that’ vs ‘knowing what’; 2) ‘knowing how’ vs ‘knowing what’; 3) absolute vs relative terms; 4) common vs particular; and 5) positive vs negative terms.

⁸ It was Gregory of Nyssa who developed this Aristotelian distinction, see L. Turcescu, *Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons*, Oxford U.P.s, Oxford - New York 2005 (American Academy of Religion, Academy Series); Studer, *Dio Salvatore* (above, n. 2), p. 204.

⁹ See S. Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea. A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2007, pp. 45-56; There is still a discussion among scholars as to whether Basil used Stoicism more than Aristotle in his Trinitarian definitions, see N. Jacobs, “On ‘Not Three Gods’-again: Can a Primary-Secondary Substance Reading of Ousia and Hypostasis Avoid Tritheism?”, *Modern Theology* 24 (2008), pp. 331-58, here pp. 332-5.

¹⁰ See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), p. 63; Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea* (above, n. 7), pp. 132-7. On the abstract and concrete see Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), pp. 58-9.

¹¹ See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 63-4.

¹² See Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), pp. 45-56, 67-74 and 76-82; Ch. A. Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God. In Your Light We Shall See Light*, Oxford U.P., Oxford - New York 2008 (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), pp. 220-4. It must be noted that for the Cappadocians consubstantiality must be always seen with the monarchy of the Father; we will come back to this last topic in a while.

¹³ See Studer, *Dio Salvatore* (above, n. 2), pp. 203-4; Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus* (above, n. 12), p. 222.

he rather identified it with the term hypostasis.¹⁴ In this case the *ὑπόστασις* gives essence to the general nature and manifests it perfectly in a particular and concrete nature; the *πρόσωπον* personalizes the general nature and makes it determined, so that these two terms acquired almost the same meaning and metaphysical function.¹⁵

It was also necessary to explain the relationship of the hypostases with the common substance, and of the hypostases with one another. These questions were the result of the reflection on how the three hypostases should not be considered as three deities. In fact, for the Cappadocians the affirmation of one common nature in God and of three consubstantial hypostases was not enough to demonstrate that Trinity is not tantamount to Tritheism. Therefore, the three divine hypostases had to have one and unique cause “*αἰτία*”, principle “*ἀρχή*” and source “*πηγή*”, not in a chronological, but in an ontological sense. For them, this cause is the same Father. In this way, the Father, as hypostasis and essence,¹⁶ is the one who maintains the uniqueness in the Trinity.¹⁷ He is the eternal cause of the eternal generation of the Son; he is also the eternal cause of the eternal procession of the Spirit. The Father, then, is the cause of the Trinity being a hypostasis and essence without being identified with the general substance, common to the three divine hypostases. He, unlike the other two hypostases, is uncaused. He gives existence to the other two divine hypostases, which are co-eternal to him, participate in the same divine general substance, however, they are caused. For the Cappadocians, and especially for Gregory of Nazianzus, the monarchy of the Father is, on the one hand, the cause and root of the unity of the divine essence, and on the other, the reason for the distinct identities of the three hypostases.¹⁸ Therefore, consubstantiality cannot be understood without the monarchy of the Father. In fact, it is the Father who fully conveys his divinity to the Son and the Spirit.¹⁹

To explain the relationship between substance and hypostasis, Basil develops the concept of property “*ἰδιότης*” and idiom “*ἰδιώμα*”. The hypostasis of the unbegotten Father results from the joining of the general divine substance to the property of unbegottenness; the hypostasis of the Son, eternally begotten by the Father, results from the adding of the idiom of the eternal begottenness to the same general substance; while the hypostasis of the Spirit, eternally proceeding from the Father, results from the joining of the idiom and property of the procession to the divine substance. Thus, the idiom has a metaphysical role distinct from that of the hypostasis, but through it the hypostasis is recognized and distinct from the other hypostases of the same common substance. In other words, idiom and property are related to the hypostasis, while the hypostasis is related to the substance.²⁰ This distinction was essential in the polemic against the Eunomians, who identified the property with the substance and hypostasis and affirmed that knowing that the property of the Father is different from that of the Son reveals that their substances are different. In fact, Basil and the other Cappadocians

¹⁴ See Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), pp. 82-92.

¹⁵ See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 62-6; L. Turcescu, “*Prosōpon* and *Hypostasis* in Basil of Caesarea’s ‘*Against Eunomius*’ and the *Epistles*”, *Vigiliae Christianae* 51 (1997), pp. 374-95.

¹⁶ See Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus* (above, n. 12), p. 212.

¹⁷ See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 66-7.

¹⁸ See Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus* (above, n. 12), pp. 201-17; Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), pp. 67-74 and especially 96-8.

¹⁹ See Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus* (above, n. 12), p. 206.

²⁰ See S. Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), p. 92.

also intended to highlight that the divine substance remains unknown and incomprehensible.²¹ In order to explain the relationship between the hypostases themselves as between cause and caused, that is, the relationship between the monarchy of the Father, the co-eternity of the hypostases and their consubstantiality, the Cappadocians developed the concept of “relationship”, σχέσις.²² Thus, the Son, being begotten by the Father, is in relationship with the Father, and this relationship is called “filiation”. The Spirit, proceeding from the Father, is in relationship with him, and this relationship is called “procession”. As a consequence, the Father is in relationship with the Son and the Spirit through his “paternity”. The relationship is the distinctive character of the hypostasis (χαρακτήρ της ὑποστάσεως) or the ἰδίωμα of each hypostasis, or also the mode of existence, τρόπος της υπάρξεως or ὑποστάσεως.²³

Thus, the Cappadocians established a Christian metaphysical system, called by some scholars like J. Zachhuber “Patristic Philosophy”, a system that can be summarized in the following points, without, however, entering into detail on the differences between the singles Cappadocians:²⁴ 1) substance, if conceived as a common and universal reality, cannot exist without its instantiations; only the concrete realities are real, since they have their existence through the hypostasis, or in other words the substance, which is an immanent reality, is instantiated in its hypostases;²⁵ 2) the hypostases of the same substance are consubstantial since they share the same substance and perfectly manifest the properties predicated of their common substance; 3) each hypostasis has its own property and idiom that distinguishes it from the other hypostases of the same substance; 4) a hypostasis can be considered as a single substance, since it manifests the general and common substance concretely and perfectly, but cannot be identified with the general substance; 5) in created and material beings hypostases are individuals, while in uncreated beings, i.e. in the Godhead, and since divine substance is immaterial and spiritual, hypostases are not seen as individuals; therefore 6) in Trinitarian doctrine it is better to avoid calling the hypostases “single/particular substances”;²⁶ 7) the

²¹ On this topic see Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea* (above, n. 7); T. Stepien – K. Kochańczyk-Bonińska, *Unknown God, Known in His Activities. Incomprehensibility of God during the Trinitarian Controversy of the 4th Century*, Peter Lang, Berlin 2018 (European studies in theology, philosophy and history of religions, 18).

²² See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 67-8.

²³ See Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), pp. 59-67; Studer, *Dio Salvatore* (above, n. 2), p. 203.

²⁴ For a detailed analysis of the Cappadocian metaphysics, the differences between the single Fathers etc. see J. Zachhuber, *The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus*, Oxford U.P., Oxford - New York 2020.

²⁵ One must mention that Gregory of Nyssa’s position is quite different from his brother Basil since he, in his highlighting the oneness of the substance, accepts, in some way, the existence of the common substance (realism) refuting, in this manner, the risk of considering it as simple concept in mind (nominalism), for more details see C. Erismann, *L’homme commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Age*, J. Vrin, Paris, 2011, pp. 149-85, and J. Zachhuber, “Universals in the Greek Church Fathers”, in R. Chiaradonna – G. Galluzzo (eds.), *Universals in Ancient Philosophy*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2013, pp. 425-70, especially pp. 436-47. See also D. Krausmüller, “A Conceptualist Turn: The Ontological Status of Created Species in Late Greek Patristic Theology”, *Scrinium* 16 (2020), pp. 233-52.

²⁶ On these topics in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, especially concerning the relationship between, from one hand, the substance as universal and common and, from the other, the hypostases as particular substances, calling them as such, as well as concerning whether there is a distinction between substance and nature, see J. Zachhuber, *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance*, Brill, Leiden 2000 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 46); J. Zachhuber, “Once again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals”, *Journal of Theological Studies* 56 (2005), pp. 75-98; R. Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa

oneness of the divine substance, the monarchy of the Father, the consubstantiality of the hypostases and the simplicity and immateriality of the divinity is what ensures unity in the Godhead, which for the Cappadocians is the correct way to understand Monotheism;²⁷ and finally 8) on the one hand, substance and nature have the same meaning, and on the other hand, hypostasis and person are identified as metaphysical principles.

2. Christological Controversies and Metaphysical Developments among the Miaphysites

This metaphysical system became part of their heritage for all Christians who accepted the first two ecumenical councils of Nicaea and Constantinople. However, it created a problem during the Christological controversies, when Christians tried to apply it to the explanation of how humanity and divinity were united in Christ as one single subject.²⁸

on Universals”, *Vigiliae Christianae* 56 (2002), pp. 372-410. See also D. Biriukov, “Gregory of Nyssa’s Teaching on Indivisible Monad and its Philosophical Context”, in M. Knezevic (ed.), *Aristotle in Byzantium*, Sebastian Press, Alhambra, California 2020, pp. 87-100.

²⁷ On the understating of Monotheism by the Cappadocian fathers see Jacobs, “On ‘Not Three Gods’” (above, n. 9), pp. 342-51.

²⁸ The second and third parts of Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24) are to be considered an analysis of how the Cappadocian system became a problem during the Christological controversies. In addition, the work of Grillmeier and Hainthaler gives the reader a very good overview of the Christological controversies and their historical context, see A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, A. R. Mowbray, London 19752; A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/I From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590-604). Reception and Contradiction, The Development of the Discussion about Chalcedon from 451 to the Beginning of the Reign of Justinian*, A. R. Mowbray, London 1987; A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/II From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590-604). The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century*, A. R. Mowbray, London 1995; A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/III From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590-604). The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2013; A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/IV From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590-604). The Churches of Alexandria with Nubia and Ethiopia after 451*, A. R. Mowbray, London 1996. One might also see the following references to have a wider picture and idea: R.V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies. A study in the Christological Thought of the Schools of Alexandria and Antioch in the Early History of Christian Doctrine*, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London 1954; M. Simonetti, *Studi di Cristologia postnicena*, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Rome 2006 (*Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum*, 98); L. Scipioni, *Nestorio e il Concilio di Efeso: storia, dogma e critica, Vita e pensiero*, Milan 1974 (*Studia Patristica Mediolanensia*, 1); J. McGucking, *St. Cyril of Alexandria. The Christological Controversy, its History, Theology and Texts*, Brill, Leiden-New York 1994; S. Wessel, *Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2004 (*Oxford Early Christian Studies*); A. Munitiz – L. van Rompay (eds.), *After Chalcedon: Studies in Theology and Church History Offered to Professor Albert Van Roey for His Seventieth Birthday*, Peeters, Leuven 1985 (*Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta*, 18); W.H. C. Frend, *The Rise of the Monophysite Movement. Chapters in the History of the Church in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1972; W.A. Wigram, *The Separation of the Monophysites*, The Faith Press, London 1923; W. Witakowski, “Syrian Monophysite Propaganda in the Fifth to Seventh Centuries”, in L. Rydén–J. O. Rosenqvist (eds.), *Aspects of Late Antiquity and Early Byzantium*. Papers read at the Colloquium held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul 31 May – 5 June 1992, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Istanbul-Stockholm 1993 (*Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Transactions*, 4), pp. 57-66; E. Hardy (ed.), *Christology of the Later Fathers*, Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville 2006; M.R. Pecorara Maggi, *Il processo a Calcedonia. Storia e interpretazione*, Glossa, Milan 2006; R. Price – M. Whitby (eds.), *Chalcedon in Context. Church Councils, 400-700*, Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2009 (*Translated Texts for Historians, Contexts*, 1); W. Baum – D. Winkler, *The Church of the East. A Concise History*, Routledge, London - New York 2003.

Indeed, if one applies this system, and affirms that in Christ two natures are united, and since these two natures are not abstract and universal realities, one implies that they are concrete natures, that is, hypostases. In this case, Christ would be two hypostases, i.e. a duality of persons, which destroys the oneness of the subject of Christ. As a result, the Cappadocian system had to be modified. Chalcedonians, Miaphysites, and Nestorians²⁹ developed different metaphysical systems to solve the Christological question: Chalcedonians affirmed that Christ is two substances/natures united in one hypostasis and one person;³⁰ Miaphysites taught that Christ is one substance/nature and one hypostasis/person and this unique substance/nature is from (or composed of) two substances/natures;³¹ Nestorians, instead, said that Christ is two substances/

²⁹ As I said elsewhere, see B. Ebeid, “Christology and Deification in the Church of the East. Mar Gewargis I, His Synod and His Letter to Mina as a Polemic against Martyrius-Sahdona”, *Cristianesimo nella Storia (Studies in History, Theology and Exegesis)* 38 (2017), pp. 729-84, here pp. 731-2, when I use the term “Nestorian Church” I mean the Church of the East after 612, i.e. after applying the doctrine of the two hypostases (*qnōmē*) in its Christology. We cannot say, in fact, that this Church had accepted a “Nestorian” Christology before the year 612. It is clear, however, that such doctrine was not real Nestorianism, i.e. teaching two Christs and two Sons, but the texts of this Church (like the document of the synod of 612), and some of its theologians (like Elias of Nisibis and ‘Abdīshō’ bar Brīkhā), adopted this title for themselves, making it a synonym of orthodoxy, and for this reason I use the term in this paper. It must be said that there is a tendency today among scholars not to call this Church or its doctrine “Nestorian” due to the negative connotation this term had over the centuries. For the Miaphysites, I accept the distinction scholars make between Miaphysites, i.e. the Severians and moderate Monophysites, and the radical one, calling the latter Monophysites. It must be noted, however, that the texts of the Chalcedonian and Nestorian Churches did not distinguish clearly between them as two different groups, always calling them by one technical term “Monophysites”.

³⁰ With its doctrine the council of Chalcedon tried to reconcile the Christology of the Antiochians with that of the Alexandrians, therefore as basis one might find Fathers from both traditions. On the Chalcedonian Christology and its development one might read the following: R. Price – M. Gaddis (eds.), *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon*, 3 vols., Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2005 (Translated Texts for Historians 45); Price–Whitby (ed.), *Chalcedon in Context* (above, n. 28); Pecorara Maggi, *Il processo a Calcedonia* (above, n. 28); P. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East*, 451–553, Brill, Leiden 1979 (Studies in History of Christian Thought, 20); C. dell’Osso, *Il calcedonismo. Leonzio di Bisanzio*, Edizioni “Vivere in”, Rome 2003 (Tradizione e vita, 13); B.E. Daley, “‘A Richer Union’. Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of the Human and Divine in Christ”, *Studia Patristica* 24 (1939), pp. 239-65; D. Krausmüller, “Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon. The Cappadocians and Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium’s *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos*”, *Vigiliae Christianae* 65 (2011), pp. 484-513; D. Krausmüller, “Divine Self Invention. Leontius of Jerusalem’s Reinterpretation of the Patristic Model of the Christian God”, *Journal of Theological Studies* 57 (2006), pp. 527-45; D. Krausmüller, “Leontius of Jerusalem. A Theologian of the Seventh Century”, *Journal of Theological Studies* 52 (2001), pp. 637-57; C. Hovorun, *Will, Action and Freedom. Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century*, Brill, Leiden–Boston 2008 (The Medieval Mediterranean Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400-1500, 77); H.U. von Balthasar, *Massimo il Confessore. Liturgia Cosmica*, Jaca Book, Milan 2001 (Già e non ancora, 378); A. Louth, “John of Damascus and the Making of the Byzantine Theological Synthesis”, in J. Patrich (ed.), *The Sabaite Heritage in the Orthodox Church from the Fifth Century to the Present*, Peeters and Department Oosterse Studies, Leuven 2001 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 98), pp. 301-4; A. Louth, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2002 (Oxford Early Christian Studies).

³¹ The Miaphysite Christology is based on the most important Miaphysite theologians, Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug, and Jacob of Sarug; on such Christology one might read: R. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies. Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug and Jacob of Sarug*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 1976 (Oxford Theological Monographs); A. de Halleux, *Philoxène de Mabbog. sa vie, ses écrits, sa théologie*, Imprimerie orientaliste, Leuven 1963; H. Manoir de Juaye, *Dogme et spiritualité chez Saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie*, Vrin, Paris 1944 (Études de théologie et d’histoire de la spiritualité, 2); M.A. Mathai, “The Concept of ‘Becoming’ in the Christology of Philoxenus of Mabbug”, *The Harp* 2 (1989), pp. 71-7; S. McKinion, *Words, Imagery, and Mystery of Christ. A Reconstruction of Cyril of Alexandria’s Christology*, Brill, Leiden–Boston–Cologne 2000 (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*, 55); B. Meunier, *Le Christ de Cyrille d’Alexandrie. L’Humanité, le salut et la*

natures, two hypostases and one person.³² It must be noted that some scholars today avoid translating the Syriac term *qnūmō* (ܩܢܘܡܘܐ), used by Syrians to translate the Greek ὑπόστασις,³³ as “hypostasis”, leaving it transliterated.³⁴ Even if such method is acceptable, I prefer to use

question monophysite, Beauchesne, Paris 1997 (Théologie Historique, 104); D. Michelson, *The Practical Christology of Philoxenos of Mabbug*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2014 (Oxford Early Christian Studies); L. Perrone, “Il “Dialogo contro gli aftartodoceti” di Leonzio di Bisanzio e Severo di Antiochia”, *Cristianesimo nella storia* 1 (1980), pp. 411-42; A.A. Luce, *Monophysitism, Past and Present. A Study in Christology*, Macmillan, London 1920; Ph.M. Forness, *Preaching Christology in the Roman Near East: A Study of Jacob of Serugh*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2018 (Oxford Early Christian Studies); D. Michelson, “Philoxenos of Mabbug: A Cappadocian Theologian on the Banks of the Euphrates?”, in J. Kreiner – H. Reimnitz (eds.), *Motions of Late Antiquity: Essays on Religion, Politics, and Society in Honour of Peter Brown*, Brepols, Turnhout 2016 (Cultural Encounters in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 20), pp. 151-74; I.R. Torrance, *Christology after Chalcedon. Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite*, The Canterbury Press, Norfolk 1988; V. C. Samuel, “The Christology of Severus of Antioch”, *Abba Salama* 4 (1973), pp. 126-90.

³² The Nestorian Christology is based on the doctrine of the theologians of Antioch, such as Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius and some other Syriac theologians such as Narsai and Babai the Great; on their Christological doctrine see C. Hay, “Antiochene Exegesis and Christology”, *Australian Biblical Review* 12 (1964), pp. 10-23; J. Siemens, *The Christology of Theodore of Tarsus. The Laterculus Malalianus and the Person and Work of Christ*, Brepols, Turnhout 2010 (Studia Traditionis Theologiae, 6); M. Anastos, “Nestorius was orthodox”, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 16 (1962), pp. 119-40; R. Chesnut, “The two *Prosopa* in Nestorius’ Bazaar of Heraclides”, *Journal of Theological Studies* 29 (1978), pp. 392-409; J. Dewart – E. McWilliam, “The Notion of ‘Person’ Underlying the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia”, *Studia Patristica* 12 (1975), pp. 199-207; R.A. Greer, “The Antiochene Christology of Diodore of Tarsus”, *Journal of Theological Studies. New Series* 17 (1966), pp. 327-41; R.A. Greer, “The Image of God and the Prosopic Union in Nestorius’ Bazaar of Heraclides”, in R. A. Norris (ed.), *Lux in Luminae. Essays in Honor of W.N. Pittenger*, Seabury, New York 1966, pp. 46-61; L. Hodgson, “The Metaphysic of Nestorius”, *Journal of Theological Studies* 19 (1917), pp. 46-55; H. Hovhannisyán, “On the Christological Teaching of Nestorius”, *Etchmiadzin* 2 (2015), pp. 15-28; F. McLeod, *The Roles of Christ’s Humanity in Salvation. Insights from Theodore of Mopsuestia*, The Catholic Univ. of America Press, Washington 2005; F. McLeod, “Theodore of Mopsuestia’s Understanding of Two Hypostases and Two *Prosōpa* Coinciding in One Common *Prosōpon*”, *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 18 (2010), pp. 393-424; L. Scipioni, *Ricerche sulla cristologia del “Libro di Eraclide” di Nestorio. La formula teologica e il suo contesto filosofico*, Edizioni Universitarie, Freiburg 1957 (Paradosis, 11); B. Soro, “The Person and Teachings of Nestorius of Constantinople with a Special Reference to his Condemnation at the Council of Ephesus”, *Syriac Dialogue*, vol. III, Pro Oriente, Vienna 1998, pp. 67-91; A.R. Vine, *An Approach to Christology: An Interpretation and Development of Some Elements in the Metaphysic and Christology of Nestorius*, Independent Press, London 1948. However one must note that the Church of the East adopted a Nestorian Christology just at AD 612, see B. Ebeid, “The Christology of the Church of the East. An Analysis of the Christological Statements and Professions of Faith of the Official Synods of the Church of the East before A.D. 612”, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 82 (2016), pp. 353-402; Ebeid, “Christology and Deification” (above, n. 29); S. Brock, “The Christology of the Church of the East”, in D. Afinogenov – A. Muraviev (eds.), *Traditions and Heritage of the Christian East*, Izdatelstvo, Moscow 1996, pp. 159-79; S. Brock, “The Christology of the Church of the East in the Synods of the Fifth to Early Seventh Centuries: Preliminary Considerations and Materials”, in G.D. Dragas – N.A. Nissiotis (eds.), *Aksūm-Thyateira: A Festschrift for Archbishop Methodius of Thyateira and Great Britain*, Thyateria House, Athens 1985, pp. 125-42; Y.P. Patros, “La cristologia della Chiesa d’Oriente”, in E. Vergani – S. Chialà (eds.), *Storia, Cristologia e tradizioni della Chiesa Siro-orientale. Atti del 3° Incontro sull’Oriente Cristiano di tradizione siriana* Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14 maggio 2004, Centro Ambrosiano, Milano 2006, pp. 27-42; L. Abramowski, “Ein nestorianischer Traktat bei Leontius von Jerusalem”, in R. Lavenant (ed.), *III Symposium Syriacum*, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma 1983 (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 221), pp. 43-55.

³³ See Y.P. Patros, “La cristologia della Chiesa d’Oriente”, in E. Vergani – S. Chialà (eds.), *Storia, Cristologia e tradizioni della Chiesa Siro-orientale. Atti del 3° Incontro sull’Oriente Cristiano di tradizione siriana* Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14 maggio 2004, Centro Ambrosiano, Milano 2006, pp. 27-42, here pp. 29-31.

³⁴ See Brock, “The Christology of the Church of East in the Synods of the Fifth to Early Seventh Centuries” (above, n. 32), p. 131; Baum and Winkler, *The Church of the East* (above, n. 28), p. 39.

the English translation “hypostasis” also for the Syriac *qnūmō* (ܩܢܘܡܐ), highlighting that hypostasis, either in Greek as ὑπόστασις or in Syriac as ܩܢܘܡܐ (*qnūmō*) or even in Arabic as أقنوم (*uqnūm*), was used as a technical term by all Christian confessions of the East with different metaphysical meanings, especially in Christological doctrine.³⁵

What is important for us in this paper is to outline the specificity of the metaphysical development that occurred in the Miaphysite field, in order to understand the reasons for the appearance of new Trinitarian controversies among them in the sixth and seventh centuries. As mentioned above, the Miaphysites affirmed that Christ is one substance/nature and one hypostasis/person, and that this unique substance/nature is from two substances/natures and realities, divine and human; therefore, the one subject is also called composite substance/nature. According to the metaphysics of the Cappadocians, an abstract substance cannot exist, and only a concrete substance exists, i.e. the hypostasis. Christ really existed, he was one subject and not two; he, however, was not just divine nor just human, but both realities together, and therefore he was called the incarnate *Logos* of God. For Miaphysites, then, it was vital that Christ be affirmed as one concrete substance/nature that really existed, that is, a hypostasis/person. In this way they highlighted the oneness of subject. In addition, this one substance/nature was special insofar as it was composed of two substances/natures, divine and human. With the doctrine of the composition, Miaphysites highlighted and saved the duality of the two components from which Christ derived.

The Cappadocians had distinguished between substance/nature and hypostasis/person as between general-common and particular-singular, and in their Trinitarian doctrine they had avoided considering the three hypostases as three single substances, i.e. as three individuals. Miaphysite Christology, however, did not make any clear distinction between substance/nature and hypostasis/person; instead, it considered these two metaphysical categories as almost synonymous.³⁶ Once transposed back to the Trinitarian level, such a development gave rise to two questions: 1) was the whole substance of the Trinity incarnated? 2) are the three divine hypostases three substances?

3. Miaphysite Christology and the Controversy concerning Tritheism

Indeed, a new Trinitarian controversy did occur in the second half of the 6th century among the Miaphysites in Syria. A group which relied on the works of the Alexandrian Miaphysite John Philoponus (d. 570), who was considered by his opponents as the ‘heresiarch of the Tritheists’,³⁷ applied the metaphysical innovation discussed above, i.e. the identification of

³⁵ See Ebeid, “Christology and Deification” (above, n. 29), p. 732.

³⁶ According to Erismann, Miaphysites to avoid a duality of subjects in Christ, i.e. two hypostases/individuals, had highlighted the principle according to which ‘hypostasis’ is comprehended a ‘particular substance/nature’ and from this perspective one shall understand the identification they made between hypostasis and nature, see C. Erismann, “*Non Est Natura Sine Persona: The Issue of Uninstantiated Universals from Late Antiquity to the Early Ages*”, in M. Cameron – J. Marenbon, (eds.), *Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500*, Brill, Leiden 2011, pp. 75-91, here pp. 81-2.

³⁷ On John Philoponus see the following: G. Couvalis, “John Philoponus: Closeted Christian or Radical Intellectual?”, *Modern Greek Studies* 15 (2011), pp. 207-19; C. Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and Particular Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin”, *Traditio* 53 (2008), pp. 277-305; T. Hainthaler, “John Philoponus, Philosopher and Theologian in Alexandria”, in Grillmeier-Hainthaler (eds.), *Christ in Christian Tradition*. Vol. II/IV (above, n. 28), pp. 107-46; M.U. Lang, *John Philoponus and the Controversies Over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century: A Study*

hypostasis/person and substance/nature, to the Trinitarian doctrine, with the result that the three hypostases/persons³⁸ were considered as three divine substances/natures. Therefore, their opponents called them Tritheists. Tritheism began to spread not just in Syria, but also in Constantinople and Alexandria, and the works of John Philoponus started to circulate in Greek and in Syriac translation; all attempts at a reconciliation between the supporters and the adversaries of the doctrine of the three substances failed.³⁹ Thus, the controversy resulted in a division between the Tritheists and the other Miaphysites.

Van Roey argues that the starting point of the Tritheists was purely philosophical and that only later did they add patristic arguments.⁴⁰ According to scholars such as van Roey,⁴¹ Grillmeier,⁴² Hainthaler,⁴³ and Lang,⁴⁴ the Tritheists based their doctrine on certain metaphysical and logical principles. Following the metaphysical system of the Cappadocians as well as some Neoplatonic doctrines, they 1) considered the hypostasis as an individual concrete substance/nature, and since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three hypostases, they are consequently three concrete individual substances/natures; 2) the general substance is

and Translation of the Arbiter, Peeters, Leuven 2001 (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 47); J. Zachhuber, "Christology after Chalcedon and the Transformation of the Philosophical Tradition. Reflections on a Neglected Topic", in M. Knezevic (ed.), *The Ways of Byzantine Philosophy*, Sebastian Press, Alhambra CA 2015, pp. 103-27 (Contemporary Christian Thought Series, 32); J. Zachhuber, "Personhood in Miaphysitism. Severus of Antioch and John Philoponus", in A. Torrance – S. Paschalides (eds.), *Personhood in the Byzantine Christian Tradition: Early, Medieval, and Modern Perspectives*, Routledge, New York 2018, pp. 29-43; H. Martin, "Jean Philopon et la controverse trithéite du VI^e siècle", *Studia Patristica* 5 (1962), pp. 519-25; A. van Roey, "Les fragments trithéites de Jean Philopon", *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 11 (1980), pp. 135-63; Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), pp. 145-69.

³⁸ It must be mentioned, as van Roey notes, that sometimes, for John Philoponus and his followers, hypostasis does not mean just the common nature realized in an individual, but also the special properties that belong to an individual, see R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum. Anti-Tritheist Dossier*, Département Oriëntalistiek, Leuven 1981 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 10), p. 27; see also the note by Hainthaler who underlines that for Philoponus person (πρόσωπον) is sometimes distinguished by hypostasis acquiring the meaning of relationship (σχέσις) of some to one another, see Hainthaler, "John Philoponos" (above, n. 37), p. 120.

³⁹ This controversy had three main phases: 1) it started in Syria with a certain John, a Miaphysite theologian and a native of Apamea; 2) then John's doctrine was endorsed by two bishops, Conon of Tarsus and Eugenius of Isauria, and finally 3) it spread among Miaphysites in Syria, Egypt and even Constantinople. On Tritheism see the following: A. Grillmeier, "The Tritheist Controversy in the Sixth Century and its Importance in Syriac Christology", in Grillmeier-Hainthaler (eds.), *Christ in Christian Tradition*. Vol. II/III (above, n. 28), pp. 268-80; H. Martin, *La controverse trithéite dans l'Empire byzantin au VI^e siècle*, UCL, Leuven 1960; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 20-33; A. van Roey, "La controverse trithéite depuis la condamnation de Conon et Eugène jusqu'à la conversion de l'évêque Elie", in W.C. Delsman – J.T. Nelis – J.R.T.M. Peters – W.H.Ph. Römer – S.A.S. van der Woude (eds.), *Von Kanaan bis Kerala: Festschrift für Prof. Mag. Dr. J.P.M. van der Ploeg O.P. zur Vollendung des siebzigsten Lebensjahres am 4. Juli 1979 überreicht von Kollegen, Freunden und Schülern*, Neukirchener Verlag, Kevelaer 1982 (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 211), pp. 487-97; A. van Roey, "La controverse trithéite jusqu'à l'excommunication de Conon et d'Eugène (557-569)", *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 16 (1985), pp. 141-65.

⁴⁰ See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), p. 25. One must also mention the opinion of U. M. Lang who maintains that Tritheists' argumentations were based first on patristic material and then on philosophical principles, see U.M. Lang, "Patristic Argument and the Use of Philosophy in the Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century", in D. Vincent Twomey – L. Ayres (eds.), *The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church*. Proceedings of the Fourth International Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 1999, Four Courts Press, Dublin 2007 (Irish Theological Quarterly Monograph Series), pp. 79-99.

⁴¹ See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 25-33.

⁴² See Grillmeier, "The Tritheist Controversy" (above, n. 39), pp. 276-80.

⁴³ See Hainthaler, "John Philoponos" (above, n. 37), on his Christology pp. 112-31, on his Trinitarian doctrine pp. 131-8.

⁴⁴ See Lang, "Patristic Argument" (above, n. 40).

an abstract reality, it has no real existence and exists only in the mind;⁴⁵ 3) being supporters of the Miaphysite Christological formula, i.e. of one nature from two, they considered the one composite nature and hypostasis of Christ as different from those of the Father and the Spirit; 4) therefore, it is not the whole Trinity that was incarnated, but only the Son, in his individual nature, i.e. hypostasis; 5) with their doctrine they could avoid Sabellianism, but they sacrificed the unity and oneness of the divine substance by introducing division; 6) therefore, for them, the unity in the Godhead is seen only in mental abstraction, i.e. at the level of the general substance, which, however, has no real existence; 7) the three divine hypostases and natures are three consubstantial divinities 8) since each of them is a concrete “copy”⁴⁶ of the general substance,⁴⁷ each is “God in a different way”;⁴⁸ 9) consubstantiality, then, occurs between individual substances, without taking into consideration the properties of each substance-hypostasis;⁴⁹ 10) each concrete “copy” of the general substance differs from the other “copy” on account of its own characteristics, i.e. idioms and properties; and finally 11) the different species or “copies” of this general divine substance are designated through the addition of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’, i.e. the idioms and properties.⁵⁰

4. The Miaphysite reactions against Tritheism

Tritheists were attacked and anathematized by the other Miaphysites from the outset.⁵¹ The most important reactions were those of Theodosius of Alexandria on the one hand and of Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicum on the other, the latter two in turn being engaged in reciprocal controversy.

4.1. The reaction of Theodosius of Alexandria

During the first phase of the controversy, the patriarch Theodosius of Alexandria (d. 567), who was in exile in Constantinople, disagreed with the doctrine of the first Tritheists, but did not regard it as a heresy. Although he believed that the point at stake was a disagreement about words and concepts, he wrote a long treatise on the question known as *De Trinitate*.⁵² In his work Theodosius

⁴⁵ On the universals in John Philoponos see Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 463-5.

⁴⁶ The idea of a concrete “copy” of the general substance is developed by John in his *Diaitetes seu Arbitrator*. John, it seems, did not use a technical term that corresponds to “copy”; the latter term was used by Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 134. In chapters 16, 22, 23 and 24 of the *Diaitetes* one can find this idea expressed in other terms, especially in the conclusion of chapter 24: “*ܘܢܘܨܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܘܬܐ*”, “For the nature of each single one of the human beings has the common concept of the nature [ὁ τῆς φύσεως λόγος κοινός] in the same way”, Iohannis Philoponi, *Opuscula Monophysitica*, ed. A. Sanda, Beirut 1930, Syriac text p. 23. English translation is mine.

⁴⁷ See Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 134.

⁴⁸ Ebied, van Roey and Wickham, Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 29. See also Lang, “Patristic Argument” (above, n. 40), pp. 91-99.

⁴⁹ As mentioned above for John Philoponos and his followers, hypostasis sometimes differs from the individual nature, which is a concrete copy of the general abstract reality without its special properties, therefore hypostasis is considered an individual nature with proper characteristics, idioms and properties. This, in fact, is the reason why, for Tritheists, consubstantiality can be between individual and concrete substances and not between hypostases. For more details see Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 27-31.

⁵⁰ See also the chapter dedicated on Philoponos’ doctrine in Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), pp. 145-69, esp. pp. 155-67.

⁵¹ See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 268-276; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 20-1.

⁵² This work is preserved only in Syriac translation, see J.B. Chabot (ed.), *Documenta ad origines monophysi-*

maintained that each divine hypostasis, when considered individually, is a certain substance and nature.⁵³ This statement kindled the opposition of a group known as the Condobaudites, who affirmed that none of the three hypostases of the Trinity, if seen individually, can be considered as a substance, and therefore it was the common divine nature and substance that was incarnated.⁵⁴

Although this doctrine and that of Tritheism were condemned, Miaphysites continued to look for reconciliation,⁵⁵ but no agreement was reached and the Tritheists established their own hierarchy.⁵⁶ Very soon, however, they were divided into two groups, one following the doctrine of John Philoponus on Resurrection, and the other, known as Cononites, rejecting it.⁵⁷

Theodosius' arguments against Tritheism were patristic and not philosophical, as Tritheist arguments and principles were.⁵⁸ Such a patristic approach proved insufficient and in the second stage of the controversy, Peter and Damian had to formulate their arguments in a rational way, even though the patristic material remained an important support.

4.2. *The Reaction of Peter of Callinicum and Damian of Alexandria*

The second important reaction against Tritheism came from two important Miaphysite figures of the second half of the sixth century, namely Peter of Callinicum, the patriarch of Antioch (d. 591), and Damian of Alexandria (d. 605), two friends who became enemies because of the different Trinitarian doctrines they espoused in opposition to Tritheism. This is not the place to mention the context of their reaction, and the development of the controversy, which have already been studied in depth.⁵⁹ What interests me here is to present how each of them tried to respond to Tritheism and why they disagreed.

tarum illustrandas, Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, Leuven 1907,1933 (CSCO 17, 103, Syr. 17, 52); A. van Roey – P. Allen, (eds.), *Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century*, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 56).

⁵³ See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 270-1.

⁵⁴ See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), p. 271; Lang, “Patristic Argument” (above, n. 40), pp. 86-8.

⁵⁵ See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 272-4; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 20-5.

⁵⁶ See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 274-5; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), p. 22.

⁵⁷ See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 22-3.

⁵⁸ See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), p. 33.

⁵⁹ See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 1-19, 34-43; R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham, “Introduction” to *Petri Callinicensis Patriarchae Antiocheni, Tractatus contra Damianum*, ed. R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham, Vol. 1, Leuven U.P., Turnhout - Leuven 1994 (Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 29), pp. vi-xxvi; R.Y. Ebied, “Peter of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria. The End of a Friendship”, in R.H. Fischer (ed.), *A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus. Studies in Early Christian Literature and Its Environment, Primarily in the Syrian East*, The Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago 1977, pp. 277-82; R.Y. Ebied, “Peter of Callinicum and Damian of Alexandria: The Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century”, *Colloquium* 15 (1982), pp. 17-22; Id., “Peter of Callinicum and Damian of Alexandria. The Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century”, *Parole de l’Orient* 35 (2010), pp. 181-91; P. Allen, “Religious Conflict between Antioch and Alexandria c. 565-630 CE”, in W. Mayer – B. Neil (eds.), *Religious Conflict from Early Christianity to the Rise of Islam*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2013 (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, 121), pp. 187-99. See also Th. Hainthaler, “The Christological Controversy on Proba and John Barbur”, *Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 56 (2004), pp. 155-70; A. van Roey, “Une controverse christologique sous le patriarcat de Pierre de Callinique”, in F. Graffin – A. Guillaumont (eds.), *Symposium Syriacum, 1976: célébré du 13 au 17 septembre 1976 au Centre Culturel “Les Fontaines” de Chantilly (France)*, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Rome 1978 (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 205), pp. 349-57; Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), pp. 170-83.

During the negotiations for a reconciliation between Miaphysites and Tritheists, Damian wrote a work, known as *Adversus Tritheitas*, against certain chapters composed by some Tritheists, which summarized their doctrine. Damian sent this work to his friend Peter and asked for his opinion. Peter, however, found its doctrinal basis to be quite similar to Sabellianism. He conveyed this to Damian, who in turn accused him of being an Eunomian and a Tritheist. The controversy began and eventually led to a schism between Antioch and Alexandria that ended years after the death of both patriarchs, in 616, when Damian's teachings were rejected by all Miaphysite churches.

The works written by Peter against Damian have survived only in Syriac translation and unfortunately in partial form,⁶⁰ while Damian's work against the Tritheists and his letters to Peter have not survived. What we have today are just those quotations that Peter culled from them in his major three-volume work against the patriarch of Alexandria, known as *Contra Damianum*. An analysis of these quotations and of other indirect sources helped scholars reconstruct Damian's doctrine.

Through this work of reconstruction scholars such as van Roey,⁶¹ Krausmüller⁶², and Zachhuber⁶³ presented the main metaphysical principles of Damian's doctrine as follows: 1) clear distinction between substance and hypostasis; 2) substance is the common and constituent element of being and 3) it exists concretely and not only in the mind; 4) hypostases are identified with the characteristic (also called hypostatic) properties; as a consequence, 5) there is no distinction between "name" and "things"; 6) hypostases are distinct and incommunicable, but 7) each becomes substantial through participation in the substance, i.e. the common and constituent element of being, and 8) it consequently gains a substantial component; therefore, 9) it is not an abstract reality. In conclusion, Damian's metaphysics works on two levels: that of the substance and that of the hypostases-properties, where the hypostases, as substantial properties, have their ontological origin in the substance as the 'true' one.

Applying these principles to the Trinitarian doctrine implies that 1) oneness in God is seen in the oneness of the divine substance as an entity distinct from the three divine hypostases, which are identified with three properties: 2) the hypostasis of the Father is the divine unbegottenness-fatherhood, the hypostasis of the Son is the divine begottenness-sonship and the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is the divine procession; thus, 3) the distinction between hypostasis and substance and the identification of hypostasis and hypostatic property allow Damian to avoid multiplying the constituent element of the Trinity, i.e. the substance. 4) Even if hypostasis is distinct from substance, however, in reality it exists only insofar as it

⁶⁰ For his letters and some other documents see R Ebied, van Roey and Wickham, *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38); while for his main work against Damian see Petri Callinicensis Patriarchae Antiocheni, *Tractatus Contra Damianum*, ed. R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham, 4 Vols., Leuven U., Turnhout - Leuven 1994, 1996, 1998, 2003 (Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 29, 32, 35 and 54). See also R.Y. Ebied – L.R. Wickham, "The Discourse of Mar Peter Callinicus on the Crucifixion", *Journal of Theological Studies. New Series* 26 (1975), pp. 23-37.

⁶¹ See A. van Roey, "Le traité contre les Trithéites (CPG 7245) de Damien d'Alexandrie", in A. Schoors – P. van Deun (eds.), *Philobistôr: Miscellanea in Honorem Caroli Laga Septuagenarii*, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 60), pp. 229-50; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), *Peter of Callinicum* (above, n. 38), pp. 34-43; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham, "Introduction" (above, n. 59), pp. xxii-xxvi.

⁶² See D. Krausmüller, "Properties Participating in Substance: the Trinitarian Theology of Severus of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria", *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 12 (2018), pp. 15-29.

⁶³ See Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), pp. 171-9.

participates in the substance, so that in the Trinity there are not two different constituent elements; thus, 5) consubstantiality is interpreted in the light of the latter statement.

Damian supported his doctrine with patristic quotations, especially from Severus of Antioch and Gregory of Nazianzus.⁶⁴ In fact, as Krausmüller notes, Damian especially based himself upon Severus of Antioch's Trinitarian reflections as expressed in the *Contra Grammaticum*.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, having no more than fragments from the work of Damian, we cannot know how much he used the fathers, and how exactly he read and interpreted them. On the contrary we know that Peter abundantly quoted the fathers, such as the Cappadocians, and those Miaphysite authors who had developed the Miaphysite metaphysics in relation to Christology, such as Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, and Theodosius of Alexandria. Peter used these authorities in support of his doctrine, accusing Damian of incorrect reading of the fathers.⁶⁶

Although we do not yet have a systematic study of Peter's thought and Trinitarian doctrine we can present his metaphysical system as follows:⁶⁷ 1) substance is the sum of all hypostases belonging to its species; 2) each hypostasis participates in the sum of all hypostases, i.e. the common substance; 3) the hypostases of the same common substance share the same attributes of the substance, therefore they are consubstantial; 4) the substance, then, is participated and shared while the hypostasis is the participant and sharer; 5) each hypostasis, however, has its own characteristic property; 6) the characteristic property is the specific mode of being of each hypostasis; 7) through its characteristic property, or hypostatic property, each hypostasis is distinct from the other hypostases of the same common substance; therefore, 8) hypostasis is not the substance itself nor the characteristic properties themselves; it is the individual, which includes both aspects; and finally, 9) each hypostasis taken individually is considered as a particular substance and nature, which manifests its consubstantiality through the attributes it shares with the other hypostases of the same substance and species, while it manifests its particularity through its own characteristic properties. Differently from Damian's metaphysics, then, Peter's solution distinguishes three metaphysical levels: the substance, the hypostasis, and the property.

This tripartition allowed Peter to demonstrate that: 1) God is one in word and reality; 2) oneness means that there is only one divine substance; 3) the divine substance is the sum of the three divine hypostases; 3) these three hypostases are consubstantial since each shares in the totality of the substance and Godhead; 4) each hypostasis differs from the others through the characteristic property of the hypostasis or hypostatic property, i.e. unbegottenness-fatherhood, begottenness-sonship and procession, which manifests the way each hypostasis exists; 5) each hypostasis seen individually is a concrete substance with its own characteristic property; therefore, 6) Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three complete and existing realities; and finally, 7) it is God the Word alone who was incarnated, not the whole Trinity. As Ebeid notes, the disagreement between Damian and Peter was a real dilemma, and resorting to patristic heritage on Trinity, used by both in a "genuinely puzzling way", could not solve

⁶⁴ See Krausmüller, "Properties Participating in Substance" (above, n. 62), p. 26.

⁶⁵ In fact, the whole of Dirk Krausmüller's paper "Properties Participating in Substance" (above, n. 62) sets out to demonstrate this relationship between the Trinitarian doctrine of Severus and Damian.

⁶⁶ On the use of the fathers by Peter see the following: R.Y. Ebeid, "Quotations from the Works of St. Cyril of Alexandria in Peter of Callinicus' magnum opus *Contra Damianum*", *Collectanea Christiana Orientalia* 13 (2016), pp. 33-94; R.Y. Ebeid, "Quotations from the Works of St. Severus of Antioch in Peter of Callinicus' magnum opus *Contra Damianum*", in J. D'Alton – Y.N. Youssef (eds.), *Severus of Antioch: His Life and Times*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2016 (Texts and Studies in Eastern Christianity, 7), pp. 65-123.

⁶⁷ See also Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), pp. 179-81.

the problem.⁶⁸ As mentioned above, the disagreement turned into a schism between the two Miaphysite sees of Alexandria and Antioch, and although reconciliation was achieved after the rejection of Damian's doctrine, this does not mean that Damian's metaphysical system, i.e. his distinction between hypostasis and substance on the one hand and the identification between hypostasis and property on the other, nor his particular reading of the patristic Trinitarian doctrine, disappeared among Miaphysites.⁶⁹

5. Tritheism, Damian's Trinitarian Doctrine and other Christian Confessions

The Cappadocian metaphysical system was not the exclusive heritage of the Miaphysite Church; it was a common tradition shared with the other Christian confessions, namely Chalcedonians and East Syrians, who also applied it to Christology with analogous problems and looked for solutions, as I have already explained.

Chalcedonians distinguished between substance/nature and hypostasis/person; they also distinguished between natural characteristics and attributes, common to all hypostases of the same nature/substance, and hypostatic properties and characteristics, proper to each hypostasis. Such distinction, for example, was underlined, as Hainthaler pointed out, by the Chalcedonian patriarch of Constantinople Eutychius in his polemical treatise against Tritheists written between 568 and 577.⁷⁰ The Chalcedonians' starting point was also Christological. In another text of the 8th century, the *Epistula Apologetica* written by the Miaphysite Eliya to Leo, the syncellus of the Chalcedonian bishop of Harran, the Miaphysite author accuses the Chalcedonians of identifying the hypostasis with its characteristic property.⁷¹ In fact, this view of the Chalcedonian doctrine reflects the metaphysical developments that occurred among Chalcedonians after Chalcedon, i.e. so-called neo-Chalcedonianism, especially those authors who tried to give a metaphysical answer to the challenge of John Philoponus.⁷² It can be argued that Miaphysites saw a similarity between the doctrine of Damian and the metaphysical developments of the Chalcedonian doctrine.

In addition, some East Syrian theologians such as Babai the Great (d. 628) had a metaphysical background similar to that of John Philoponus. I mentioned above that Tritheists made no

⁶⁸ See Ebeid, "Peter of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria" (above, n. 59), p. 282.

⁶⁹ It is interesting to mention that many Christian theologians, Miaphysites and others, used Damian's identification between hypostasis and property in their Trinitarian doctrine expressed and developed in response to Islamic accusations of Tritheism, see R. Haddad, *La Trinité divine chez les théologiens arabes 750-1050*, Beauchesne, Paris 1985 (Beauchesne Religions, 15); the part on Elias of Nisibis' Trinitarian doctrine in Ebeid, *La Tunica di al-Masīh* (above, n. 5); see also the introduction in Elias of Nisibis, *Commentary on the Creed*, ed. B. Ebeid, UCOPress CNERU-Éditiones de l'USJ CEDRAC, Cordova - Beirut 2018 (Series Syro-Arabica, 9).

⁷⁰ See Hainthaler, "John Philoponos" (above, n. 37), pp. 135-8.

⁷¹ See A. van Roey, "La lettre apologétique d'Élie à Léon, syncelle de l'évêque chalcédonien de Harran; une apologie monophysite du VIII^e-IX^e siècle", *Le Museon* 57 (1944), pp. 1-52, here pp. 22-35; for more details on this work, its author and its contents see U. Possekel, "Christological Debates in Eighth Century Harran. The Correspondence of Leo of Harran and Eliya", in M. Doerfler – E. Fiano – K. Smith, (eds.), *Syriac Encounters. Papers from the Sixth North American Syriac Symposium*, Duke University, 26-29 June 2011, Peeters, Leuven - Paris - Bristol 2015, pp. 345-66.

⁷² See D. Krausmüller, "Under the Spell of John Philoponus: How Chalcedonian Theologians of the Late Patristic Period Attempted to Safeguard the Oneness of God", *The Journal of Theological Studies* 68 (2017), pp. 625-49; while on the thought of neo-Chalcedonian authors and doctrines except the given references on Chalcedon see B. Gleede, *The Development of the Term ἐνπρόσωπον from Origen to John of Damascus*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2012 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, Texts and Studies of Early Christian Life and Language, 113); see also C. dell'Osso, *Cristo e Logos. Il Calcedonismo del VI secolo in Oriente*, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 2010 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 118).

distinction between substance and hypostasis; however, they also affirmed that abstract reality, i.e., the common and universal substance, exists only in the mind, while the existing reality is the concrete copy of abstract reality. It was also noted that Tritheists sometimes called hypostases the copy of abstract reality with its characteristic property. One might suppose that the approach of John Philoponus and the Tritheists was not purely Aristotelian, but closer to that of some Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle who developed the doctrine on the three states of substance,⁷³ and applied it into their Trinitarian and Christological doctrines.⁷⁴ I think then, that one might find some common points with the doctrine of the Nestorian Babai the Great, who distinguishes between abstract reality, which he calls nature (ܩܝܢܐ, *kyānā*), concrete reality without characteristic properties, which he calls hypostasis (ܩܝܢܐܘܬܐ, *qnōmā*), and concrete and individualized reality, i.e. hypostasis with its characteristic properties, which he called person (ܩܝܢܐܘܬܐ ܩܝܢܐܘܬܐ, *paršōpā*).⁷⁵ It can be argued, then, that Miaphysites could see a similarity between the doctrine of Nestorians with that of John of Philoponus and his followers, thing that Chalcedonians, like Leontius of Jerusalem, who also polemicized Tritheism and its followers, have also noted.⁷⁶

I am not affirming a direct relationship or influence between Damian and the Chalcedonians or between Tritheism and Babai's thought. What I am trying to say is that according to the Miaphysite metaphysical system such doctrines share common points, and to polemicize them one might use the works written by Miaphysite tradition during the controversy against Tritheism and against Damian. Even if Tritheism and Damian's doctrine did not completely disappear⁷⁷ in the following century, i.e. before the advent of Islam,⁷⁸ the main concern for Miaphysites under Islam was not the divisions within their own confession, but the debate with Chalcedonians and Nestorians.

⁷³ We mean the distinction between general substance, partial substance, and particular substance, for more details, see L. Benakis, "The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Thoughts", in D.J. O'Meara (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Norfolk 1982, pp. 75-86.

⁷⁴ Already Hainthaler compared in one point John Philoponus and Leontius of Byzantium concerning their use of this doctrine, see Hainthaler, "John Philoponos" (above, n. 37), p. 125. It must, however, be mentioned that Leontius of Byzantium followed this doctrine on substance and applied it also in his Christology, see Krausmüller, "Making Sense" (above, n. 30). For the reception of the theory on the three states of the universal in Byzantium, see C. Erismann, "The Trinity, Universals, and the Particular Substances: Philoponus and Rescelin", *Traditio* 53 (2008), pp. 277-305, here 277-85.

⁷⁵ For the metaphysical doctrine of Babai the Great and his trinitarian doctrine see B. Ebeid, "The Trinitarian doctrine of Ibn at-Tayyib. An interpretation of Babai the Great's metaphysical system in the world of Islam", *Parole de l'Orient* 44 (2018), pp. 93-131, here pp. 97-107. For more on Babai's doctrine see L. Abramowski, "Babai der Grosse. Christologische Probleme und ihre Lösungen", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 41(1975), pp. 289-343; L. Abramowski, "Die Christologie Babais des Grossen", in *Symposium Syriacum I*, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Rome 1972 (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 197), pp. 219-44.

⁷⁶ In fact, Krausmüller had noted that also for the Chalcedonian Leontius of Jerusalem there is a similarity between both Nestorians' and Philoponos' Trinitarian doctrines, see Krausmüller, "Under the Spell" (above, n. 72), pp. 639-41.

⁷⁷ See J. Block, "Philoponian Monophysitism in South Arabia at the Advent of Islam with Implications for the English Translation of 'Thalātha' in Qur'an 4.171 and 5.73", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 23 (2012), pp. 50-75. One also might mention the doctrine of an anti-Tritheist Trinitarian florilegium, copied centuries after the controversy between Damian and Peter, which understands the common divine substance as Aristotle's first substance and identifies the hypostases with the properties, see G. Furlani, "Un florilegio antitriteistico in lingua siriana", *Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti* IX, 8[83] (1924), pp. 661-77.

⁷⁸ As Penn has demonstrated, the first writings of Syriac Christians on Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries do not consider it new religion. They also reveal that their knowledge of Islamic doctrine was not deep, see M.Ph. Penn, *Envisioning Islam. Syriac Christians and Early Muslim World*, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2015 (*Divinations: Reading Late Ancient Religion*).

6. Composing and Copying Miaphysite Trinitarian Florilegia

During the first centuries of Islamic rule in the East, the Miaphysites started to compose and copy different dogmatic *florilegia* on the Trinity and Christology based on patristic quotations categorized in thematic order, divided in groups where each group has a specific title. Such *florilegia* were probably used for the theological formation of West Syrian Christians.

The *Trinitarian Florilegium* on which the present paper focuses was composed neither to oppose Tritheists nor against Damian's doctrine. As mentioned above, and since it treats mainly metaphysical topics, this and other *florilegia* were also important to prepare good theologians that could debate with Chalcedonians and Nestorians. The fact that these *florilegia* were copied during the first centuries of Islamic rule confirms that Miaphysites in that period still saw Chalcedonians and Nestorians as their main adversaries. In addition, one might note that the Miaphysite writings against Chalcedonians and Nestorians composed in that period, firstly in Syriac and then in Arabic, made a direct and indirect use of these *florilegia*.⁷⁹

When Islam began to be felt as a real intellectual and religious threat, however, such *florilegia* started also to be useful for Miaphysites in their apologetic works against Muslims who saw the Christian Trinity as an expression of Tritheism and could not accept God's incarnation. Though the Church fathers were quoted directly in Miaphysite writings against Chalcedonians and Nestorians, since all three of them shared a respect for the fathers as foundational authorities, the *florilegia* were used indirectly and without mentioning the fathers in the Miaphysite Arabic writings against Islam.⁸⁰

6.1. The Trinitarian Florilegium in BL Add. 14532

One of these dogmatic *florilegia*, which is Trinitarian in content, is found in the following manuscripts of the British Library: *Add.* 14532, ff. 94vb-133va; *Add.* 14533, ff. 73r-89r; with some additions at the end in *Add.* 14538, ff. 119v-133v; and with other additions at the beginning and the end in *Add.* 12155, ff. 2va-32va.⁸¹

A critical digital edition of this florilegium, with other *florilegia*, will soon be available online.⁸² In this paper I shall study the florilegium according to *Add.* 14532⁸³ and I shall present 1) the titles given for each group of patristic quotations; 2) the fathers mentioned in each group, their quoted works and an identification of these quotations; and 3) the main topics treated in these patristic quotations. After this presentation I shall provide an analysis of the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium and study the new understanding of the metaphysical terms and concepts that emerges from their juxtaposition.

⁷⁹ See my forthcoming papers on Abū Rā'īṭah al-Takrītī's use of these patristic *florilegia*: "Miaphysite Syriac Patristic *Florilegia* and Theopaschism: Abū Rā'īṭah's *Defence of the Christological Trisagion Hymn*", *Annali di Scienze Religiose* 14 (2021); "Patristic Tradition, Trinitarian Doctrine, and Metaphysics in Abū Rā'īṭah al-Takrītī's Polemics against the Melkites", in *Proceedings of the Colloquium Florilegia Syriaca*, Brill, Leiden 2022.

⁸⁰ I am preparing a paper on Abū Rā'īṭah al-Takrītī's use of the content of such *florilegia* in his writings in relation with Islam, esp. on his understanding of the concept "hypostasis" and whether it can be identified with attribute or property.

⁸¹ See also A. van Roey, "Un florilège trinitaire syriaque tiré du *Contra Damianum* de Pierre de Callinique", *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 23 (1992), pp. 189-203.

⁸² See the website of the ERC-project FLOS, at <https://www.unive.it/pag/40548/>.

⁸³ I have already checked the florilegium in the four given manuscripts; it is identical in *Add.* 14533 (with just one small addition); in *Add.* 12155, however, this florilegium is found in ff. 13ra-23va, while the rest of the folios, i.e. ff. 2ra-13ra and 23va-32va, contain additions that are not copied in *Add.* 14532 and 14533. I have noted that the copyist of *Add.* 12155 follows another order for the patristic groups, and that in ff. 13ra-32va there are some groups that are not copied in the other manuscripts. It must be mentioned too that in *Add.* 14532 there is a missing folio and I completed it through *Add.* 14533 and *Add.* 14538. Finally, it is worthy of note that the opinion of Wright, followed by Furlani, according to which the *Trinitarian florilegium* in BL *Add.* 14532 is copied in ff. 94v-186r, is wrong, see Furlani, "Un florilegio" (above, n. 77), p. 661 and footnote 3 on the same page.

	Syriac title	English translation	Fathers and their works	Main topics
1 (94 vb - 97vb) ⁸⁴	ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܡܘܨܩܝܘܬܝܘܢ ܕܗܘܠܘܬܝܘܬܝܘܢ	Demonstrations of the holy fathers who teach that the substance and the nature of the Holy Trinity, which is the Godhead, is the three hypostases of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that the substance is not one thing, which is the Godhead, and the hypostases are another thing	Bas. Caesar, <i>De Fide</i> ⁸⁵ Greg. Naz., <i>In sanct. pascha et in tardit.</i> (or. 1) ⁸⁶ Greg. Naz., <i>De Pace I</i> (or. 6) ⁸⁷ Greg. Naz., <i>In theophan.</i> (or. 38) ⁸⁸ Greg. Naz., <i>De Spiri. sancto</i> (or. 31) ⁸⁹ Greg. Naz., <i>In Scipsum</i> (or. 26) ⁹⁰ Greg. Naz., <i>In Sancta lumina</i> (or. 39) ⁹¹ (Ps.) Athan. Alex., <i>De Incarn. et contra Arianos</i> ⁹² (Ps.) Greg. Thaumaturgus (=Apollinarius Laodicenus), <i>De Fide kata meros</i> ⁹³ (Ps.) Ioh. Chrysost., <i>De Sancta trinitate seu de fide</i> ⁹⁴ Epiph. Const., <i>Panarion</i> ⁹⁵ Cyril. Alex., <i>De Adoratione et cultu in spiritu et veritate</i> ⁹⁶ Sev. Antioch., <i>Hom. cathedr.</i> 42 ⁹⁷ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Euprax.</i> ⁹⁸ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Isid. com.</i> ⁹⁹	Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the uncreated nature, one Godhead, one God, one power. Trinity is one God. The one Godhead is the three and the three are the one Godhead. The oneness is according to the concept (λόγος) of the substance or Godhead. The three are one, by identity of substance and divinity. One substance and Godhead in three hypostases. The hypostases are distinguished: no confusion between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the Godhead is united on account of the identity of the substance.

⁸⁴ It must be noted that *BL Add.* 14532 and *BL Add.* 12155 follow a different numeration that depends on the general numeration of the patristic quotations of all the *florilegia* that each manuscript contains, while *BL Add.* 14533 in this florilegium does not follow any numeration. *BL Add.* 14538 follows the same numeration we find in *BL Add.* 14532 and probably it is a copy of it. Thus, the numeration followed here is mine.

⁸⁵ *PG* 31, 465.22-42.

⁸⁶ Two quotations: *PG* 35, 400.39-40 and *PG* 35, 401.1-7.

⁸⁷ *PG* 35, 740.1-5.

⁸⁸ *PG* 36, 320.18-28.

⁸⁹ Section 33.12-17, Gregor von Nazianz. *Die fünf theologischen Reden*, ed. J. Barbel, Patmos-Verlag, Düsseldorf 1963.

⁹⁰ *PG* 35, 1252.29-40.

⁹¹ Two quotations: *PG* 36, 345.39-49 and *PG* 36, 348.37-38.

⁹² Two quotations: *PG* 26, 1000.17-25 and *PG* 26, 1001.28-29.

⁹³ Two quotations: *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule. Texte und Untersuchungen*, ed. H. Lietzmann, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 1904, p. 176.13-18 and p. 184.23-27.

⁹⁴ *PG* 60, 767.34-768.2.

⁹⁵ Two quotations: Epiphanius, *Ancoratus und Panarion*, ed. K. Holl, Vols. 3, Hinrichs, Leipzig 1933 (*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*, 37), p. 346.17-23 and p. 405.7-11.

⁹⁶ *PG* 68, 412.42-55.

⁹⁷ *PO* 36, 34.25-28.

⁹⁸ Two quotations: *PO* 14, 12 and 14,13-14.

⁹⁹ *PO* 12, 214.

¹⁰⁰ *Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century*, ed. A. van Roey – P. Allen, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (*Orientalia Lov-*

<p>2 (97vb-99rb)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that we say that the united one and the separated one is the same, and that the three are one according to Godhead and the one is three according to properties and that He is one and not one, and that the same is numbered and escapes from number</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), <i>Ep.</i> 38¹⁰¹ Greg. Naz., <i>De Spiri. sancto</i> (or. 31)¹⁰² Greg. Naz., <i>De Pace</i> III (or. 23)¹⁰³ Greg. Naz., <i>In laudem Heronis philosophi</i> (or. 25)¹⁰⁴ Greg. Nys., <i>Refutatio confessionis Eunomii</i>¹⁰⁵ Greg. Nys., <i>Oratio catechetica magna</i>¹⁰⁶ Sev. Antioch., <i>Hom. cathedr.</i> 70¹⁰⁷ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad presbyteros et archidiaconos Iohannem et Iohannem et alios</i>¹⁰⁸</p>	<p>God paradoxically has in himself both union and division. For, as far as the concept (λόγος) of substance is concerned, God is one, but inasmuch as the properties indicative of hypostases are concerned He is divided into Father, Son and Holy Spirit: inseparably divided and unconfusedly united. The same thing (God) is both numbered and avoids number. The Trinity is numerable with regard to the hypostases but it is outside number because it is one and the same substance.</p>
<p>3 (99ra-99rb)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that one hypostasis is not the whole substance and Godhead</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁰⁹</p>	<p>Each hypostasis participates perfectly in the common substance but is not the whole substance. Christ is one of the three divine hypostases comprehended in the substance of the Godhead. He is not the whole Godhead and substance, which comprehends the three hypostases.</p>
<p>4 (99rb-99vb)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ ܐܘܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܘܢ ܘܢ</p>	<p>The whole substance of the Godhead is the Holy Trinity</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Gramm.</i>¹¹⁰ Greg. Naz., <i>In sanctum baptisma</i> (or. 40)¹¹¹</p>	<p>Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the one Godhead. The whole substance of the Godhead, which is the Holy Trinity, is not incarnate.</p>

niensia Analecta, 56), p. 178.208-215; p. 208.179-186.

¹⁰¹Two quotations: sections 4.87-91 and 5.5-7, Saint Basile, *Lettres*, ed. Y. Courtonne, I-III, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1957-1967.

¹⁰²Section 9.12-16, ed. Barbel.

¹⁰³PG 35, 1160.30-38.

¹⁰⁴PG 35, 1221.43-46.

¹⁰⁵Two quotations: sections 5.8-6.6 and 12.1-13.1, Gregorii Nysseni *Opera*, ed. W. Jaeger, Vol. 2.2, Brill, Leiden 1960.

¹⁰⁶Section 3.5-10, Grégoire de Nysse, *Discours Catéchétique*, ed. E. Mühlberg, Cerf, Paris 2000 (Sources chrétiennes, 453).

¹⁰⁷PO 12, 18.9-19.11.

¹⁰⁸Two quotations: PO 12, 215 and 215-216.

¹⁰⁹Three quotations: Severi Antiocheni *Liber contra impium grammaticum, oratio prima et secunda*, ed. J. Lebon, Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, Leuven 1938 (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), p. 163.1-5; p. 162.15-18 and p. 167.20-23.

¹¹⁰Four quotations: ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), p. 172.20-22; p. 174.19-29; p. 212.15-21 and Severi Antiocheni *Liber contra impium grammaticum, orationes pars prior*, ed. J. Lebon, Secrétariat du CSCO, Leuven 1929 (CSCO 93, Syr. 45), p. 8.7-10.

¹¹¹PG 36,424.3-7.

<p>5 (99vb-100rb)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܐܠܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ</p>	<p>The fact that each of the hypostases participates in the substance does not mean it is the whole substance</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹¹²</p>	<p>Each hypostasis, although it participates fully in the substance, is not the whole substance which collectively comprises all the hypostases. God the Word is a hypostasis and not a substance in the sense of the common substance, even if He possesses the Godhead's substance.</p>
<p>6 (100ra-100rb)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ</p>	<p>What participates is the hypostasis, what is participated is the substance</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹¹³</p>	<p>The common substance is the participated, which holds all the hypostases participating in it. Even if each of the hypostases participates in the substance it is not called a substance in the sense of a common substance, but a hypostasis. The participant (<i>sharer</i>) is not identified with the participated (<i>shared</i>).</p>
<p>7 (100rb-101rb)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܐܘܢܘܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that God the Father and God the Son and Word are hypostases, and not the participated and the participant</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹¹⁴ Cyril. Alex., <i>Commentarii in Joannem</i>¹¹⁵ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Constantinum e p i s c o p u m Seleucia Isauria</i>¹¹⁶ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹¹⁷ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Maronem</i>¹¹⁸</p>	<p>The hypostasis of the Son is distinguished from the hypostasis of the Father and of the Spirit. The Father and Son and Spirit are equal in divinity and Godhead. Neither the Father, nor the Son nor the Spirit are identified with the common substance. Even if the Son is begotten by the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father, the latter is not the common shared substance. The hypostasis of the Son, who is one of the three divine hypostases, was incarnated; this means that He was united to flesh with a rational soul.</p>

¹¹²Two quotations: pp. 164.28-165.2 and p. 203.12-19, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹¹³Ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), pp. 191.21-192.1.

¹¹⁴PG 29, 621.23-31.

¹¹⁵Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini *In D. Joannis evangelium*, ed. P.E. Pusey, I-III, E Typ. Clarendoniano, Oxford 1872, vol. 1, p. 72.9-22.

¹¹⁶*The Sixth Book of the Selected Letters of Severus Patriarch of Antioch*, ed. E.W Brooks, vol. I/p.1, London 1903, p. 6.2-9

¹¹⁷Five quotations: p. 56.4-6; p. 56.13-16; pp. 147.27-148.6; p. 148.9-12 and p. 203.12-14, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹¹⁸PO 12, 198.5-6.

<p>8 (101rb-102ra)</p>	<p>ܠܗ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܠܗ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ</p>	<p>On the fact that Eunomius believed what he called “substances” were hypostases</p>	<p>Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i>¹¹⁹ Greg. Nys., <i>Ad Eust. de sancta trinitate</i>¹²⁰ Eunomius Cyz., quoted in Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹²¹ Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹²² Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹²³ Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. prolixa seu Apologia prima</i>¹²⁴</p>	<p>Eunomius said that “begottenness” is the name of the substance of the Son. Consequently, he affirmed three different substances for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. They are, however, not three substances, but three hypostases. Hypostasis is a substance, but not according the meaning and definition of the “common substance”. Severus proves it through Basil, who says that the “substance of the Son” means the “hypostasis of the Son”, differently from Eunomius’ understanding. Damian refuses to consider the hypostases as substances, considering such doctrine as Eunomian.</p>
<p>9 (102ra-102vb)</p>	<p>ܠܗ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܡܝܢ ܗܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ</p>	<p>On the fact that it sometimes happens that the holy fathers interchange the nature of the Father or of the Son with the hypostasis of the Father or the Son</p>	<p>Cyrl. Alex., <i>Comm. in Joannem</i>¹²⁵ Cyrl. Alex., <i>Quod unus sit Christus</i>¹²⁶ Theod. Alex., <i>De Trinitate</i>¹²⁷ Cyrl. Alex., <i>Apologia xii anathematismorum contra Theodoretum</i>¹²⁸ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹²⁹</p>	<p>Cyrl says that the Son is from the “nature and the substance of the Father” while Severus affirms that the Son is from the “hypostasis of the Father”. Theodosius quotes Gregory of Nazianzus to show that Gregory calls the Father and the Son natures and substances, and that the three are one Godhead and nature.</p>

¹¹⁹Two quotations: Book 3, chapter 1, section 70.8-11 and section 68.1-3, Gregorii Nysseni *Opera*, ed. W. Jaeger, voll. 1.1-2.2, Brill, Leiden 1960.

¹²⁰Section 6.11-15, Gregorii Nysseni *Opera dogmatica minora*, ed. F. Müller, vol. 1, Brill, Leiden 1958.

¹²¹PG 29, 584.4-8.

¹²²Two quotations: PG 29, 588.17-26 and 589.8-11.

¹²³Cfr. p. 82.9-1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), 5.

¹²⁴Lost in the Greek original.

¹²⁵Not identified in the original Greek.

¹²⁶Cyrille d’Alexandrie, *Deux dialogues christologiques*, ed. G.-M. de Durand, Cerf, Paris 1964 (Sources chrétiennes, 97), p. 764.12-13.

¹²⁷Cfr. p. 168.26-23, ed. van Roey-Allen.

¹²⁸Two quotations: First quotation: *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, tome I, vol.1, part 6, ed. E. Schwartz, De Gruyter Berlin-Leipzig 1960 (Collectio Vaticana 165-172), pp. 115.9-15; The second quotation is not identified.

¹²⁹Cfr. p. 63. 3-10, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

<p>10 (102vb-104ra)</p>	<p>ⲉⲗ ⲉⲃⲉⲛ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲙⲉⲛⲁⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ :ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ</p>	<p>On the fact that each of the hypostases, of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, when it is seen by itself and for itself (that is regarded on its own), is confessed by the holy fathers as God, substance, and nature</p>	<p>Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin.</i>¹³⁰ Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹³¹ Ioh. Chrysost., <i>Hom. in Joannem</i>¹³² Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin.</i>¹³³ Greg. Naz., <i>De Spir. sancto</i> (or 31)¹³⁴ Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin.</i>¹³⁵</p>	<p>The three hypostases are God because of the monarchy, and each of the three, if taken separately, is also God because of their consubstantiality. The Word is a hypostatic (ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ / ἐνυπόστατος) substance. The hypostasis of the Word is called substance by the holy fathers. Each hypostasis is substance because the substance is not un-hypostatic and hypostasis is not empty of substance and is an existing thing – otherwise it would be an accident.</p>
<p>11 (104ra)¹³⁶</p>			<p>Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹³⁷ Cyril. Alex., <i>Thesaurus de sancta consub. trinit.</i>¹³⁸ Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin.</i>¹³⁹</p>	<p>A substance is acknowledged to each of the divine hypostases. This substance manifests separately whatever is predicated of the one Godhead as common substance.</p>
<p>12 (104vb-106ra)</p>	<p>ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓ</p>	<p>On the fact that “unbegottenness” or “begottenness” are not substance or God</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹⁴⁰ Bas. Caesar., <i>Contra Sabellianos et Ariam et Anomoeos</i>¹⁴¹ Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomi</i>¹⁴² (Ps.) Bas. Caesar., <i>Contra Anomoeos</i>¹⁴³ Greg. Nyss., <i>Contra Eunomium</i>¹⁴⁴ Greg. Naz., <i>De Filio I</i> (or 29)¹⁴⁵</p>	<p>Affirming that the substance or God is “unbegottenness” and “begottenness” means different substances, which destroys the consubstantiality and introduces polytheism. Since “unbegottenness” is opposite to “begottenness”, considering them as two substances is tantamount to teaching two opposite gods, that is, Manicheism.</p>

¹³⁰ Cfr. p. 172.39-50; p. 202.9-19, ed. van Roey-Allen.

¹³¹ Two quotations: *PG* 29, 524.43-525.9 and 605.21-28.

¹³² *PG* 59, 47.31-34.

¹³³ Cfr. p. 162.75-81; p. 197.73-80, ed. van Roey-Allen.

¹³⁴ Two quotations: sections 6.3-6 and 6.12-13, ed. Barbel.

¹³⁵ Two quotations: p. 165.156-164; p. 200.154-161 and p. 166.198-167; p. 201.194-203, ed. van Roey-Allen.

¹³⁶ In *BL Add.* 14532 the copyist gives a numeration without a title for this group of patristic quotations; however, in both *BL Add.* 14533 and *BL Add.* 12155 there is no numeration or a given title and these patristic quotations belong to the previous group, i.e. no. 10 in our list. *BL Add.* 14538 gives it a number and title: “ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ” that is “That also the Holy Spirit is called nature by the doctors of the Church”, see folio 123r.

¹³⁷ Two quotations: *PG* 29, 649.45-652.4 and 728.42-729.3.

¹³⁸ *PG* 75, 592.37-43.

¹³⁹ Cfr. p. 168.26-32 and p. 163.109-112; p. 198.108-111, ed. van Roey-Allen.

¹⁴⁰ *PG* 29, 512.15-22.

¹⁴¹ *PG* 31, 605.43-52.

¹⁴² Two quotations: *PG* 29, 520.23-28 and 29, 520.40-521.5.

¹⁴³ A. van Roey, “Une Homélie inédite contre les Anoméens attribuée à saint Basile de Césarée”, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 28 (1997), 179-191, here pp. 189(149a.32)-190(149rb.28).

¹⁴⁴ Three quotations: book 1, sections 510.1-6; 512.1-8 and 514.3-515.1, ed. Jaeger.

¹⁴⁵ Section 12.7-13, ed. Barbel..

<p>13 (106ra-107rb)</p>	<p>ܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity subsist by themselves and for themselves (i.e. <i>καθ' ἑαυτὰ</i>)</p>	<p>Bas. Caes., <i>Ep.</i> 210¹⁴⁶ Epiph. Constant., <i>Ancoratus</i>¹⁴⁷ Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i>¹⁴⁸ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Sergium Grammaticum</i>¹⁴⁹ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad presb. et archimandritas Iohannem et Iohannem et alios</i>¹⁵⁰ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Simum Scribaniarium</i>¹⁵¹</p>	<p>The names are indicative of the realities; the realities have full proper being; so Father, Son and Holy Spirit are existing realities. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are subsistent (<i>ἐνυπόστατον</i>, literally “having a hypostasis” <i>ܩܘܬܐ</i>). Each hypostasis subsists in itself.</p>
<p>14 (106vb-107rb)</p>	<p>ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that the properties of the hypostasis are characteristics that do not subsist by themselves and for themselves (i.e. <i>καθ' ἑαυτὰ</i>)</p>	<p>Cyril. Alex., <i>De sancta trin. dialogi</i> I-VII¹⁵²</p>	<p>‘Begottenness’ and ‘unbegottenness’ are not things existing individually and hypostatically, they are indicative names (indicating properties) of the hypostases. They do not subsist on their own but take up concrete existence only in the subsisting hypostases to which they pertain.</p>
<p>15 (107rb-108ra)</p>	<p>ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ ܩܘܬܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that the fathers recognize the properties in three ways</p>	<p>Greg. Naz., <i>Contra Arianos et de seipso</i> (or. 33)¹⁵³ Greg. Naz., <i>De Filio</i> I (or. 29)¹⁵⁴ Cyril. Alex., <i>De Sancta trinitate dialogi</i> I-VII¹⁵⁵ Greg. Naz., <i>De Filio</i> I (or. 29)¹⁵⁶</p>	<p>“Theunbegotten” and “thebegotten” do not mean “unbegottenness” and “begottenness”. “The unbegotten” and “the begotten” are properties subsisting in individualized form, i.e. as hypostases.</p>

¹⁴⁶ Section 4.20-28, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁴⁷ Chap. 6, sections 4-6, Epiphanius, *Ancoratus und Panarion*, ed. K. Holl, vol. 1, Leipzig 1915 (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 25).

¹⁴⁸ Book 3, chapter 1, section 94.1-9, ed. Jaeger.

¹⁴⁹ Severi Antiocheni *Orationes ad Nephaliium, Eiusdem ac Sergii Grammatici, Epistulae mutuae*, ed. J. Lebon, Secrétariat du CSCO, Leuven 1949 (CSCO 119, Syr. 64), p. 125.27-31.

¹⁵⁰ *PO* 12, 216.1-7.

¹⁵¹ *PO* 12, 195.3-5.

¹⁵² Three quotations: Cyrille d'Alexandrie, *Dialogues sur la Trinité*, ed. G.-M. de Durand, I-III., Cerf, Paris 1976-1978 (Sources chrétiennes 231, 237, 246), pp. 433.40-434.5; 434.37-39 and 421.25-36.

¹⁵³ *PG* 36, 236.3-9.

¹⁵⁴ Section 10.9-17, ed. Barbel.

¹⁵⁵ Two quotations: 434.2-9 and 434.37-39, ed. de Durand.

¹⁵⁶ Section 10.17-18, ed. Barbel.

			Cyril. Alex., <i>De sancta trinitate dialogi</i> I-VII ¹⁵⁷ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra additiones Juliani</i> ¹⁵⁸ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Sergium Grammaticum</i> ¹⁵⁹	“Unbegottenness” is to be reckoned as something existing in the concept of the hypostasis of God the Father. It belongs to Him. Property is not the hypostasis itself, but an indicative name of the hypostasis. There are properties for the whole Godhead (common to all hypostases) such as invisibility, impalpability and infinity.
16 (108ra-110ra)	ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܕܥܠܐ :ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܢܐ	On the fact that the property is innate in the hypostasis (i.e. gets its name through the hypostasis), and for it (for the hypostasis), the property is set aside, is seen in it (in the hypostasis), follows it (the hypostasis), is mixed with it (i.e. is joined to the hypostasis), and is added to it (i.e. is adjunct to the hypostasis)	Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i> ¹⁶⁰ Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 210 ¹⁶¹ Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), <i>Ep.</i> 38 ¹⁶² Greg. Nys., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i> ¹⁶³ Bas. Caes., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i> ¹⁶⁴ Sev. Antioch., <i>Hom. cathed.</i> 109 ¹⁶⁵ Greg. Nys., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i> ¹⁶⁶ Cyril. Alex., <i>De Sancta trin. dialogi</i> I-VII ¹⁶⁷	Distinction between hypostasis and property. Property is innate and present in each hypostasis. The hypostasis gets its name through the property: fatherhood in the Father, sonship in the Son, procession in the Spirit. Even if the hypostases share the same common substance, each hypostasis is distinguished through a specific property: the Father remains Father and not Son or Spirit, the Son remains Son and not Father or Spirit, and the Holy Spirit remains Holy Spirit and not Son or Father. Property follows its hypostasis externally, i.e. from outside: unbegottenness follows God externally; what is outside God is not His substance. Property is seen in the hypostasis: when we say “this one is begotten” or “this one is not begotten”, by the subject of the sentence we mean the substrate, while by the predicate we mean what is viewed as pertaining to the substrate. Property is mixed with the hypostasis: it is inseparable from it. Property is added to the hypostasis: distinction between the common characteristics of the substance-substrate and the added and innate property of each hypostasis.

¹⁵⁷ Cfr. p. 434.30-37, ed. de Durand.

¹⁵⁸ Sévère d’Antioche, *La Polémique Antijulianiste*, II, A: *Le Contra Additiones Juliani*, ed. R. Hespel, Secrétariat du CSCO, Leuven 1968 (CSCO 295, Syr. 124), p. 84.1-6.

¹⁵⁹ Cfr. pp. 86.24-87.1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 119, Syr. 64).

¹⁶⁰ Two quotations: p. 170.9-12 and p. 64. 7-16, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁶¹ Section 5.28-34, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁶² Section 4.38-43, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁶³ Three quotations: the first two are not identified; the third quotations: Book 3, chapter 5, section 56.7-12, ed. Jaeger.

¹⁶⁴ Three quotations: *PG* 29, 640.23-27; 517.27-38 and 520.14-23.

¹⁶⁵ *PO* 25, 747.6-748.5

¹⁶⁶ Book 3, chapter 8, section 25.1-12, ed. Jaeger.

¹⁶⁷ Cfr. p. 641.6-14, ed. de Durand.

<p>17 (110ra-110rb)</p>	<p>ܘܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܕܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܕܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܕܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that every hypostasis is known with its property, and every hypostasis exists in the substance of the Godhead with its distinctive [character]</p>	<p>Greg. Naz., <i>De Dogmate et constitut. episcop.</i> (or. 20)¹⁶⁸ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>.¹⁶⁹</p>	<p>Each hypostasis exists along with its property in the substance of the Godhead.</p>
<p>18 (110rb-110vb)</p>	<p>ܘܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that union, mixture, and connection are understood in different ways</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>¹⁷⁰ Bas. Caesar., <i>In Principio erat Verbum</i>¹⁷¹</p>	<p>The meanings of union, mixture, and connection are different.</p>
<p>19 (110vb-112rb)</p>	<p>ܘܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ ܘܘܢܝܘܢܐ ܕܘܢܝܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that sometimes “existence” (ὕπαρξις) is understood by the holy fathers as “substance” and sometimes as “one hypostasis”</p>	<p>(Ps.) Athan. Alex., <i>De Salutari adventu Jesu Christi et adversus Apollinarium</i>¹⁷² Athan. Alex., <i>Ep. I ad Serapionem</i>¹⁷³ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁷⁴ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Simum Scribarium</i>¹⁷⁵ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁷⁶ Bas. Caesar., <i>In Principio erat Verbum</i>¹⁷⁷ Cyril. Alex., <i>Comm. in Joannem</i>¹⁷⁸</p>	<p>The word “being” (essence) can indicate the general and common substance when it is said without determination, while with determination and conjoined with a particular distinction, it indicates a hypostasis, that is, a particular being.</p>

¹⁶⁸ PG 35, 1072.42-45.

¹⁶⁹ Cfr. p. 169.13-16, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁷⁰ Six quotations: PG 29, 588.33-44; 600.15-16; 600.24-27; 601.36-42; 605.30-39 and 625.7-10.

¹⁷¹ PG 31, 476.18-20.

¹⁷² PG 26, 1149.25-27.

¹⁷³ PG 26, 596.15-21.

¹⁷⁴ Three quotations: pp., 61.20-62.11; pp. 73.28-74.10 and p. 73.5-11 ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁷⁵ PO 12, 194.6-195.5.

¹⁷⁶ Cfr. p. 76.24-27, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁷⁷ PG 31, 477.42-46.

¹⁷⁸ Cfr. p. 261. 14-17, ed. Pusey, vol. 2.

<p>20 (112rb - 113ra)</p>	<p>ܐܘܢ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܕܥܠ ܥܘܠܡܝܢ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܥܘܠܡܝܢ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܥܘܠܡܝܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that the hypostasis is substrate (ὕποκειμενον) if its properties are seen on it</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), <i>Ep.</i> 38¹⁷⁹ Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 210¹⁸⁰ Greg. Naz., <i>De Dogmate et constitutione episcoporum</i> (or. 20)¹⁸¹ Greg. Naz., <i>De filio</i> I (or. 29)¹⁸² Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i>¹⁸³</p>	<p>Thinking of the hypostasis does not mean thinking of the substance indefinitely, but delimiting the common substance within a precise reality, by means of the properties appearing on it. Hypostasis is a substrate, i.e. a concretely existing reality, with particular properties that distinguish it from other hypostases: how could the Father be distinguished from the Son without the particular property of fatherhood or of sonship?</p>
<p>21 (113ra - 113va)</p>	<p>ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that the substance is one thing and the hypostasis is another thing</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch.s, <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁸⁴ Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 236¹⁸⁵ quoted in Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁸⁶ Cyrillus Alexandrinus, <i>De Sancta trin. dialogi</i> I-VII¹⁸⁷</p>	<p>The meaning of substance is common and general (κοινὸν), while the meaning of hypostasis is particular (καθ' ἑκάστων). The difference between substance and hypostasis is that substance is comprehensive (περιεκτικὴ) of each hypostasis belonging to it.</p>
<p>22 (113va - 113vb)</p>	<p>ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ ܩܘܠܘܡܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that each of the hypostases participates in the concept (λόγος) of the substance and in the common [concept] of the substance</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁸⁸ Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 214¹⁸⁹ Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>¹⁹⁰</p>	<p>Each hypostasis participates in the concept (λόγος) of the substance, that is, manifests the common characteristics of the substance to which it belongs, and in addition it manifests its particular properties.</p>

¹⁷⁹ Section 3.1-12, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁸⁰ Section 5.25-34, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁸¹ PG 35,1072.42-45.

¹⁸² Section 10.12-14, ed. Barbel.

¹⁸³ Two quotations: book 3, chapter 5, section 56.7-12 and section 58.1-9, ed Jaeger.

¹⁸⁴ Two quotations: pp. 210.23-211.2 and 211.22-212.10 ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁸⁵ Section 6.1-3, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁸⁶ Cfr. p. 67.7-10, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁸⁷ Cfr. p. 408.31-33, ed. de Durand.

¹⁸⁸ Cfr. pp. 160.17-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁸⁹ Section 4.9-15, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁹⁰ Cfr. p. 162.15-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

23 (1 1 3 v b - 114rb)	ܐܘܢ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ	On the fact that those [hypostases] that have [and participate in] the concept (λόγος) of the one substance are equal in substance (i.e. consubstantial)	Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i> . ¹⁹¹ Greg. Naz., <i>In Sancta lumina</i> (or. 39) ¹⁹² Greg. Nys., <i>Refutatio confessionis Eunomii</i> ¹⁹³	The hypostases that participate in the same concept (λόγος) of substance have the same natural characteristics in common but are differentiated through their particular properties.
24 (1 1 4 r b - 114va)	ܐܘܢ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ	On those things whose concept (λόγος) is other and whose nature is different	Greg. Nys., <i>Ad Eust. de sancta trinitate</i> ¹⁹⁴ Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.), <i>Ep.</i> 38 ¹⁹⁵	If two things belong to different substances, and thus manifest different concepts (λόγοι) of substance, this means that they are different as to their nature.
25 (1 1 4 v a - 114vb)	ܐܘܢ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ	On what the division of the substance is	Sev. Antioch.s., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i> ¹⁹⁶	Hypostases do not divide the substance. Even if each divine hypostasis, taken separately, is called God, this does not mean that the Godhead is divided.
26 (1 1 4 v b - 115ra)	ܐܘܢ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ	That this is “not dividing and not cutting the substance”: understanding and predicating the hypostases as not different in all [their natural properties]	Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i> ¹⁹⁷	We can affirm that the hypostases do not divide the substance only when they belong to the same substance and manifest the same concept (λόγος) of substance (i.e., common natural properties).
27 (1 1 5 r a - 115va)	ܐܘܢ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ ܘܘܥܠܝܢܐ	On the fact that God is seen in one substance and [one] Godhead, but in three hypostases, and that each person exists in a true hypostasis	Sev. Antioch., <i>Hom. cathed.</i> 123 ¹⁹⁸ Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin.</i> ¹⁹⁹ Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 210 ¹⁹⁹	God is one, exists and is known in one substance and three unconfused hypostases. Each of the three divine persons exists in true hypostases. Even if there are three hypostases, God is one in substance and divinity (i.e., in the concept of substance). In the Trinity there is one beginning, the Father, from whom the Son and the Holy Spirit come.

¹⁹¹ Book 3, chapter 1, section 74.8-75.3, ed. Jaeger.

¹⁹² PG 36, 345.39-45.

¹⁹³ Sections 5.8-6.2, ed. Jaeger.

¹⁹⁴ Section 14.12-16, ed. Müller.

¹⁹⁵ Section 3.26-30, ed. Courtonne.

¹⁹⁶ Two quotations: p. 156.21-30 and p. 159.6-11, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁹⁷ Cfr. p. 217.13-23, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

¹⁹⁸ PO 29, 148.12-22.

¹⁹⁹ Two quotations: pp. 152.126-153.130; p. 188.131-135 and p. 159.319-321; pp. 194.320-195.322, ed. van Roey-Allen.

²⁰⁰ Section 5.35-36, ed. Courtonne.

28 (115va)	ܠ ܕܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	On the fact that three hypostases are seen in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit	Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i> ²⁰¹	There is one common substance of the Godhead and three hypostases particularly, which are seen as definite and unconfused in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit.
29 (115vab)	ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	That the Holy Trinity is known in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit	Cyril. Alex., <i>Comm. in Joannem</i> ²⁰²	There is one Holy Trinity known in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God is not divided; He is simple, even if the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are numbered.
30 (115vb-116ra)	ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	That “Father” and “Son” are called “two things” (πράγματα)	Alex. Alex., <i>Hom. festalis</i> 7 ²⁰³ Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i> ²⁰⁴	The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are called things and names. The Father is the cause of the Son. Time cannot be applied to the eternal and uncreated divine substance.
31 (116ra)	ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	That “Father” and “Son” are called “two substrates” (ὑποκείμενα)	Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i> ²⁰⁵	The Father and the Son are two substrates and they are united as to nature.
32 (116ra)	ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	That “Father”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirit” are called three substrates (ὑποκείμενα)	Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra Felicissimum</i> ²⁰⁶	The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three hypostases and three substrates. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist in three separate and unconfused hypostases.
33 (116rb-116va)	ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	That “one substrate” (ὑποκείμενον) is not predicated of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit	Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 214 ²⁰⁷ Bas. Caesar., <i>In Principio erat Verbum</i> ²⁰⁸	The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three hypostases and three persons, therefore they are three substrates and not one substrate. This does not mean that they are dissimilar with regard to substance (ἀνόμοια).
34 (116va)	ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ ܕ ܗܘܐ ܘܢܘܨܘܢܐ	That we do not say the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit “one thing” (πρᾶγμα)	Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 210 ²⁰⁹	Affirming that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one thing, that is one hypostasis, means rejecting the economy of salvation realized by the Son and the role of the Spirit in it.

²⁰¹ Cfr. p. 66.9-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

²⁰² Not identified in the original Greek.

²⁰³ *Analecta Sacra Patrum Antenicenorum ex Codicibus Orientalibus: Syriac and Armenian Fragments of Antenicene Writings*, ed. J.-P.-P. Martin, Ex Publico Galliarum Typographeo, Paris 1983, p. 199.

²⁰⁴ Book 1, section 377.1-8, ed. Jaeger.

²⁰⁵ Book 1, section 498.1-2, ed. Jaeger.

²⁰⁶ Preserved just in Syriac in Petri Callinicensis *Contra Damianum*, Vol. 2, Chapter IX, 284-290, ed. Ebied-van Roey -Wickham.

²⁰⁷ Two quotations: sections 3.14-18 and 3.29-33, ed. Courtonne.

²⁰⁸ *PG* 31, 479.32-39.

²⁰⁹ Section 3.15-21, ed. Courtonne.

35 (116vab)	ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ	On what is often posited instead of the [preposition] “with” (σύν)	Bas. Caesar., <i>De Spiritu sancto</i> ²¹⁰	Sometimes in Scripture the preposition ἐν is used instead of μετὰ and sometimes instead of σύν.
36 (116vb)	ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ	The substance consists in three hypostases	Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Isidorum Comitem</i> ²¹¹	Godhead is one substance that consists in three hypostases.
37 (116vb - 117ra)	ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ	It is necessary to confess the Holy Trinity as one substance in word and reality	(Ps.) Athan. Alex., <i>De Fide</i> ²¹² Cyril. Alex., <i>De Sancta trin. dialogi</i> I-VII ²¹³	The substance of the Holy Trinity is acknowledged as one both in thought and reality. It is one substance because of the unity of nature and of being identical in every natural aspect. Therefore, the Son is acknowledged to be consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit.
38 (117rab)	ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ	That the fathers confess the Holy Trinity eminently as one God and one Godhead and one substance	Greg. Nys., <i>Ad Ablabium quod non sint tres dii</i> ²¹⁴	The divine nature is one, therefore the Trinity is one God and one Godhead.
39 (117rb - 117va)	ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ	That the name of substance is mainly an indicator of the common meaning	Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i> ²¹⁵	The Fathers sometimes interchange the terms hypostasis and substance. In this case, and especially in Christological contexts, “substance” does not indicate the general meaning comprehending a plurality of hypostases but the individual meaning of a concretely existing thing.
40 (117vab)	ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ ܘܢܘܩܡ	That the Son is God in a proper sense; but this is evident for the Father and the Holy Spirit, too	Greg. Naz., <i>De Filio I</i> (or. 29) ²¹⁶	Whatever shares in a concept is called by the same name. The Son shares the concept of Godhead (the common meaning of the substance) with the Father therefore He is called God, not by homonymity and sheer participation in an appellation, but in a proper sense and in reality.

²¹⁰ Chapter 25, section 58.5-14, Basile de Césaré, *Sur le Saint-Esprit*, ed. B. Pruche, Cerf, Paris 1968 (Sources chrétiennes, 17 bis.).

²¹¹ PO 12, 213.6-8.

²¹² Not preserved in the original Greek.

²¹³ Cfr. p. 641.6-11, ed. de Durand.

²¹⁴ Section 57.8-13, ed. Müller.

²¹⁵ Cfr. p. 218.11-24, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

²¹⁶ Sections 13.12-14.5, ed. Barbel.

<p>41 (118ra-118va)</p>	<p>انما هو : و انما هو الطاهر والعظيم والعزيم والقائم والخالق والصانع والرازق والغني والعزيم والقائم والخالق والصانع</p>	<p>That the indicative modes of the property will not damage the condition of simplicity [of God] and that the characteristic properties are understood outside of the substance</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar, <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>²¹⁷ Petrus Callinic., <i>Contra Damian</i>.²¹⁸</p>	<p>The characteristics and properties with which God is described, like light, goodness etc., are understood outside of the substance; therefore, God is simple and not composite. The same is applied to the properties of the hypostases, but not to the hypostases themselves. Therefore, those who acknowledge the characteristic properties of the hypostases as hypostases must say that the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit are not light, life or goodness at all, but merely accompany the light, being understood outside of the substance</p>
<p>42 (118vb)</p>	<p>انما هو : و انما هو الطاهر والعظيم والعزيم والقائم والخالق والصانع والرازق والغني والعزيم والقائم والخالق والصانع</p>	<p>That the “Not-begottenness” is not the substance of God the Father at all, but only a predicate that means, for those who hear, that the Father was not begotten</p>	<p>Cyril . Alex., <i>De Sancta trin. dialogi</i> I-VII²¹⁹</p>	<p>Unbegottenness does not indicate the Father’s substance; it is a word that indicates His not having been begotten as an appropriate concept and property concerning God the Father, not the substance itself of God.</p>
<p>43 (118vb-119va)²²⁰</p>	<p>انما هو : و انما هو الطاهر والعظيم والعزيم والقائم والخالق والصانع والرازق والغني والعزيم والقائم والخالق والصانع</p>	<p>That those which are indicators and those which are indicated, and those which are depicted and those which depict, and those which enable to be known and those which are known, are not the same things</p>	<p>Bas Caesar, <i>Adv. Eunom</i>.²²¹ Bas. Caesar. (Greg.Nys), <i>Ep.38</i>²²² Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.210</i>²²³ Greg. Naz., <i>In Sancta lumina</i> (or.39)²²⁴ Greg.Nys., <i>Contra Eunom</i>.²²⁵ Greg.Nys., <i>Ref.conf.Eunom</i>.²²⁶ Cyril. Alex., <i>Thesaurus de sancta consubst.trin</i>.²²⁷ Sev. Antioch., <i>Hom. cath.</i> 21²²⁸ Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin</i>.²²⁹</p>	<p>Names are indicative of substances and are not themselves substance. Amongst the names of God, some are indicative of what belongs to Him and others of what does not belong to Him. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have the same nature and share in the one Godhead; therefore, they share the name “God” that indicates the divine reality. They have, however, different proper names, which indicate different definite and complete realities.</p>

²¹⁷ PG 29, 640.18-641.2.

²¹⁸ Vol. 1, Chapter VI. 364-372, ed. Ebied – van Roey – Wickham.

²¹⁹ Cfr. p. 433.20-28, ed. de Durand.

²²⁰ Because of a missing folio in BL *Add.* 14532 this group of quotations is integrated through the other manuscripts, precisely BL *Add.* 14533, f. 83rv; BL *Add.* 14538, f. 128rv and BL *Add.* 12155, f. 17v.

²²¹ Two quotations: PG 29, 681.40-41 and 533.40-45.

²²² Two quotations: sections 3.2-8 and 3.17-22, ed. Courtonne.

²²³ Section 4.20-31, ed. Courtonne.

²²⁴ PG 36, 348.7-19.

²²⁵ Book 3, chapter 1, section 87.3-88.4, ed. Jaeger.

²²⁶ Section 14.6-13, ed. Jaeger.

²²⁷ Four quotations: PG 75, 28.23-24; 36.27-31; 321.22-30 and 609.8-13.

²²⁸ PO 37, 70.32-72.2.

²²⁹ Cfr. pp. 152.116-153.129; p. 188.122-135, ed. van Roey-Allen.

44 (119vab)	ܠܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ	That no accident is to be thought of in God	Cyr. Alex., <i>De Sancta trinitate dialogi</i> I-VII ²³⁰	Accidents or things naturally present in the substances of certain things, are not conceived as existing on their own as distinct and individual beings but they are rather seen as belonging to the substances of existent things, or in them. No accident is to be thought of in God.
45 (119vb-120rb)	ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ	That the Father is not God insofar as He is Father; it is evident that this is not so for His Son either	Cyr. Alex., <i>De Sancta trinitate dialogi</i> I-VII ²³¹	The Father is not God because of His being Father and the Son is not God because of His being Son.
46 (120rb-121va)	ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ	On how we preserve the confession of one God and of three hypostases	Greg. Naz., <i>De Dogmate et const. episcop.</i> (or. 20) ²³² Theod. Alex., <i>De Trin.</i> ²³³ Bas. Caesar., <i>Ep.</i> 236 ²³⁴ Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i> ²³⁵	Distinction between substance and hypostasis. One substance and three hypostases are professed in the Godhead. The hypostases are unconfused, they differ through the properties of fatherhood, sonship and procession. Unity in God is maintained because of the one common and shared substance. Unity in God is not divided through the hypostases.
47 (121va-122b)	ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ	On how Basil conceives of the community of the substance (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας)	Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i> ²³⁶	The three divine hypostases share the same substance; therefore, the characteristics of the divine nature, such as light, goodness etc. can be said of all three.
48 (122rb-122vb)	ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ ܕܥܘܒܕܐ	That each of the hypostases has in itself the community and that which is from the community and from the substance by which it is denominated, and on how they must be conceived of	Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i> ²³⁷	Even if it possesses its particular properties, each hypostasis manifests the common substance to which belongs. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three hypostases of the Godhead. They manifest the common divine substance, so that each is called God. Each one in its specificity, however, is not identified with the substance that includes all the divine hypostases.

²³⁰ Cfr. p. 421.13-25, ed. de Durand.

²³¹ Cfr. p. 640.10-30, ed. de Durand.

²³² PG 35, 1072.42-1073.15.

²³³ Cfr. p. 154.163-170; pp. 189.165-190.171, ed. van Roey-Allen.

²³⁴ Section 6.1-22, ed. Courtonne.

²³⁵ PG 29, 637.21-44.

²³⁶ Two quotations: PG 29, 556.1-30 and 629.12-30.

²³⁷ Two quotations: p. 157.17-30 and pp. 165.22-166.1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

<p>49 (122vb-123ra)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that sometimes substance and Godhead receive a meaning</p>	<p>Sev. Antioch., <i>Contra impium Grammaticum</i>²³⁸</p>	<p>The hypostases are based in the substance and are included in the general meaning; therefore, they share to the same degree what is perceived to be within the common meaning of substance. The substance and the general meaning are inclusive of the hypostases. In God, the substance and general meaning is the Godhead.</p>
<p>50 (123rab)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ</p>	<p>If the difference is not placed from outside, the nature is not divided into a duality of Father and Son, and the nature is expanding [by the properties of the hypostases]</p>	<p>Cyril. Alex., <i>Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali trinitate</i>²³⁹ Cyril. Alex., <i>De Sancta trinitate dialogi</i> I-VII²⁴⁰</p>	<p>The divine nature is simple and not composite, and is expanded by the properties and the distinction of persons and names. Each hypostasis shares the same nature; the difference between hypostases is not in nature but outside of nature, therefore the nature is not divided into a duality of Father and Son.</p>
<p>51 (123rb-123va)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ</p>	<p>It is not possible to understand the proper concept of “Father” and of “Son” without addition of properties</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunomium</i>²⁴¹</p>	<p>The concepts of “Father” and “Son” can be real only through the addition of the property of “unboggottenness” and “begottenness” to the substance.</p>
<p>52 (123va-124r)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ</p>	<p>That the divinity of the Father is that of the Son</p>	<p>Athan. Alex., <i>Oratio I contra Arianos</i>²⁴² Athan. Alexa., <i>Oratio III contra Arianos</i>²⁴³ Bas. Caesar., <i>Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomoeos</i>²⁴⁴</p>	<p>The Father is God and the Son is God, but they are not two gods because they are not dissimilar with regard to substance. The Father and the Son share in the same divinity.</p>
<p>53 (124ra)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ ܘܢܘܢ</p>	<p>That the divinity of the Father and of the Son is one</p>	<p>Cyril. Alex., <i>Comm. in Joannem</i>²⁴⁵</p>	<p>One and the same divinity is in the Father and in the Son.</p>

²³⁸ Five quotations: p. 160.12-17; p. 162.15-18; p. 156.11-14; p. 157.5-8 and p. 162.24-30, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).

²³⁹ PG 75, 141.29-36.

²⁴⁰ Cfr. p. 641.6-14, ed. de Durand.

²⁴¹ PG 29, 640.11-17.

²⁴² Section 60, subsection 5.5-section 61, subsection 1.1-6, Athanasius, *Werke*, Band I. *Die dogmatischen Schriften*, Erster Teil, 2. *Lieferung*, ed. K. Metzler – K. Savvidis, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1998.

²⁴³ Section 23, subsection 5, Athanasius, *Werke*, Band I. *Die dogmatischen Schriften*, Erster Teil, 3. *Lieferung*, ed. K. Metzler – K. Savvidis, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2000.

²⁴⁴ Two quotations: PG 31, 605.10-17 and 605.40-44.

²⁴⁵ Not identified in the original Greek.

<p>54 (124ra-124va)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܡܝܘܣܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ</p>	<p>That Eunomius repudiated the community of substance of Father and Son</p>	<p>Greg. Nys., <i>Contra Eunomium</i>²⁴⁶ Dam. Alex., <i>Adv. Tritheitas</i>²⁴⁷</p>	<p>Teaching that “unbegottenness” and “begottenness” indicate the substance means that there are different substances in God, one for the Father and another for the Son, and still another for the Holy Spirit. Affirming different substances is tantamount to polytheism. Only by affirming the community of substance of the three hypostases does one destroy polytheism.</p>
<p>55 (124va-125rb)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܡܝܘܣܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ</p>	<p>It is necessary to confess each one of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity as substantial (ἐνούσιος)</p>	<p>Bas. Caesar., <i>Adv. Eunom.</i>²⁴⁸ Athan. Alex., <i>Tomus ad Antiochenos</i>²⁴⁹ Cyril. Alex., <i>Commentarii in Joannem</i>²⁵⁰</p>	<p>‘Unsubstantial’ (ἀνούσιος, ܘܢܘܡܝܘܣܘܨ) and ‘non-subsistent’ (ἀνυπόστατος, ܘܢܘܚܘܒܘܣܘܨ) mean a non-existent nature. ‘Substantial’ (ἐνούσιος, ܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܣܘܨ) and ‘subsistent’ (ἐνυπόστατος, ܥܘܢܘܚܘܒܘܣܘܨ) mean an existing hypostasis. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit truly exist, therefore they are subsistent and substantial. Insofar as the Son is consubstantial with the Father, he has his being in the Father and with the Father.</p>
<p>56 (125ra-125vb)</p>	<p>ܘܢܘܡܝܘܣܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ ܕܥܘܢܘܡܝܘܨ</p>	<p>That each of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity is God by nature, and not by participation. Indeed, the latter thing is said of the creatures</p>	<p>Athan. Alex., <i>Ep. ad episcopos Aegypti et Libyae</i>²⁵¹ Theoph. Alex., <i>Ep. festalis prima</i>²⁵² Cyril. Alex., <i>Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali trinitate</i>²⁵³</p>	<p>Christ is God by nature and not by participation. The Holy Spirit is holy by nature. Rational creatures can have holiness by participation. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are God by nature and not by participation.</p>

²⁴⁶Two quotations: book 1, sections 479.1-7 and 483.6-484.2, ed. Jaeger.

²⁴⁷Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinicensis *Contra Damianum*, vol. 3, chapter XXX, 328-335, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

²⁴⁸Two quotations: *PG* 29, 749.16-22 and 713.24-31.

²⁴⁹Section 5, subsection 4.1-9, Athanasius: *Werke, Zweiter Band. Die “Apologien”*, 8. *Lieferung*, ed. H. C. Brennecke-U. Heil – A. von Stockhausen, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2006.

²⁵⁰Cfr. vol. II, pp. 47.24-48.8, ed. Pusey.

²⁵¹Section 13, subsection 3, ed. Hansen-Metzler-Savvidis.

²⁵²Two quotations: Not preserved in the original Greek.

²⁵³Three quotations: *PG* 75, 137.22-25; 137.27-32 and 528.33-39.

<p>57 (125vb-127va)</p>	<p>ܘܟܘܢ ܪܘܚܢܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ</p>	<p>Refutation of what Damian said, that those who say that each of the hypostases is God do not escape from the accusation of being Tritheists</p>	<p>Greg. Naz., <i>De Spiritu sancto</i> (or. 31)²⁵⁴ Epiph. Constant, <i>Paranior</i>²⁵⁵ Cyril Alex., <i>Comm. in Joan</i>²⁵⁶ Cyril Alex., <i>Contra Diodonmet Theodonim</i>²⁵⁷ Cyril Alex., <i>Thesaurus de sancta consubst. trin.</i>²⁵⁸ Sev. Antioch., <i>Hom. cath.</i>²⁵⁹ Sev. Antioch., <i>Ep. ad Victor</i>²⁶⁰ Petr. Callinic., <i>Contra Dam</i>²⁶¹</p>	<p>The Spirit is God, since He is called Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ etc. The Spirit is God since it proceeds from the Father. Christ is God by nature. He is God from God and became flesh. Christ is called the likeness of God. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are truly God, Life and Light by nature and not metaphorically or by grace or participation.</p>
<p>58 (127va-128rb)</p>	<p>ܘܟܘܢ ܪܘܚܢܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that Damian confesses the “non-begottenness”, since it participates in the substance, as substance, nature and God, and similarly the “begottenness” and the “procession”</p>	<p>Dam. Alex., <i>Adv. Tritheitas</i>²⁶² Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. prolixa seu Apologia prima</i>²⁶³</p>	<p>“Property” is called “hypostasis” when it subsists (ܘܟܘܢ) in the substance. Properties are not natures but belong to the nature, i.e. they participate fully in the substance. However, each property-hypostasis is named “nature” because it participates fully in the nature.</p>
<p>59 (128rb-128vb)</p>	<p>ܘܟܘܢ ܪܘܚܢܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܘܟܘܢ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ ܕܘܫܘܒܐ</p>	<p>That Damian confesses the characteristic properties, i.e. “fatherhood”, “sonship”, or “unbegottenness” and “begottenness” and “procession”, as hypostases of the Holy Trinity</p>	<p>Dam. Alex., <i>Adversus Tritheitas</i>²⁶⁴ Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. prolixa seu Apologia prima</i>²⁶⁵</p>	<p>“Properties”, if seen in the common substance, are called “hypostases” and are considered as realities. The Father, being the Father and not the Son or the Holy Spirit, has the unique characteristic of the fatherhood which is called his “hypostasis” or “property”; the same is applied to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Property is a hypostasis when it subsists (ܘܟܘܢ) in the substance and has reality in the common. Property is substantial (ܘܟܘܢ) since it fully participates in the substance and is not an aggregate of substance and property.</p>

²⁵⁴Section 29.12-14, ed. Barbel.
²⁵⁵Cfr. p. 518.23-26, ed. Holl, vol. 3.
²⁵⁶Two quotations: the first one not identified in the original Greek; the second: pp.700.24-701.3, ed. Pusey.
²⁵⁷Cfr. p. 498, ed. Pusey.
²⁵⁸PG 75, 609.50-612.2.
²⁵⁹PO 8, 353.1-8.
²⁶⁰PO 14, 120.
²⁶¹Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, chapter XXXVIII. 153-160, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
²⁶²Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XXXIX.31-37; 38-43 and 44-49, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
²⁶³Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XXXIX.50-59; 59-66 and 67-72, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
²⁶⁴Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 2, Chap. I.44-50, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
²⁶⁵Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 2, Chap. I.116-123; 125-130 and 130-137, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

60 (128vb- 129va)	<p>ܘܠ ܕܘܒܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܠܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that Damian confesses the substance of the Godhead to be something, and the hypostases something else, i.e. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit</p>	<p>Dam. Alex., <i>Adv. Tritheitas</i>²⁶⁶ Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. proluxa seu Apologia prima</i>²⁶⁷</p>	<p>The fact that the divine nature is “seen in three persons” and that the three properties “subsist in the divine substance” implies that the concept of “property” or “person” is one thing and “nature” or “substance” another thing. The characteristic properties, when seen in the substance, subsist as three perfect persons and three hypostases; they are substantial (ܠܘܚܘܬܐ) but not substances, otherwise the three hypostases would be three gods.</p>
61 (129va- 130vb)	<p>ܘܠ ܕܘܒܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ ܘܢܐ</p>	<p>On the fact that the hypostasis as to its signification (meaning), i.e. its concept, is not at all substance or nature or God, as Damian’s impiety wants</p>	<p>Dam. Alex., <i>Adv. Tritheitas</i>²⁶⁸ Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. proluxa seu Apologia prima</i>²⁶⁹ Petr. Callinic., <i>Contra Dam.</i>²⁷⁰</p>	<p><i>Damian’s doctrine</i> Each hypostasis is named, and is, substance not by its own signification but because it participates in the common nature. Distinction between what “substance and nature in the full sense” is, and what has been called “nature in a metaphorical sense”. “Father” and “Son” are names that do not indicate the substance but are exclusively indicative of properties. However, since the substance of the Godhead in the full sense belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of them is in the full sense both God and substance, as being truly substantial(ܠܘܚܘܬܐ).</p> <p><i>Peter’s doctrine</i> Unbegottenness, begottenness or procession are neither called ‘substance’ or ‘God’ nor are substance and God by participating in the substance and Godhead. If “hypostasis” is identified with “property” it cannot be considered substance or nature. The fact that Damian teaches that the properties, recognized as hypostases, are one thing in their own concept (λόγος) and the substance of Godhead is another thing; and that he also teaches that each of the properties is not God or substance or nature in its own concept, means that he does not truly think of the three hypostases as ‘God’, ‘substance’ or ‘nature’.</p>

²⁶⁶Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XL.30-37 and 39-53, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

²⁶⁷Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XL.55-62 and 75-87, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham

²⁶⁸Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XLI.61-75 and 77-81, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham

²⁶⁹Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XLI.84-97, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

²⁷⁰Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XLVI.51-78, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

<p>62 (130vb-131ra)</p>	<p>ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܘܢܝ ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ</p>	<p>How it is necessary to understand what Damian said regarding the substance, that it is something different in its concept; or regarding the hypostasis, that it is not substance</p>	<p>P e t r u s C a l l i n i c . , C o n t r a D a m .²⁷¹</p>	<p><i>Damian's doctrine</i> Distinction between “the concept (λόγος) of nature or substance” that indicates the natures and substances in themselves, and “the concept of hypostasis” that indicates the hypostases themselves. <i>Peter's doctrine</i> If the hypostasis does not indicate the substance in its own concept, it cannot be indicative of substance either in full sense or metaphorically.</p>
<p>63 (131rb-131va)</p>	<p>ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ</p>	<p>On the fact that Damian does not understand God the Father only as hypostasis</p>	<p>Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. prolixa seu Apologia prima</i>²⁷²</p>	<p>“God the Father” means the common joined to the property, it is not a simple hypostasis but a substantial (ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ) hypostasis: saying “God” indicates the substance and the common; the denomination “Father” indicates the hypostasis and the property of the prosopon. The substance is never unhypostastic (ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ), nor is the hypostasis unsubstantial (ܩܘܪܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ). God the Father is both participant and participated, i.e. He is a substantial hypostasis and not simply the characteristic of a hypostasis. Therefore, one must distinguish the meanings of substance and hypostasis in the full sense that is, one must separate hypostasis from substance and maintain their meanings unconfused.</p>
<p>64 (131va-132va)</p>	<p>ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ</p>	<p>That Damian celebrates the “fatherhood”, that is named in the Godhead, as God the Father</p>	<p>Dam. Alex., <i>Apologia secunda</i>²⁷³ Dam. Alex., <i>Ep. per Gerontium allata</i>²⁷⁴ Petr. Callinic., <i>Contra Dam.</i>²⁷⁵</p>	<p><i>Damian's doctrine</i> “Fatherhood” or “unbegottenness” are not separated from the Godhead, i.e. do not subsist on their own apart from the substance. “Fatherhood” is substantial in the Godhead since it is joined to the substance. “Fatherhood” indicates the property-hypostasis; “God the Father” indicates the substantial property-hypostasis existing in the Godhead. Hypostasis is the participant; substance is the participated “God the Father” is a substantial hypostasis and not simply a hypostasis. <i>Peter's doctrine</i> Rejection of the identification of property and hypostasis made by Damian.</p>

²⁷¹Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XXXVI.207-212; 213-223 and 231-240, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

²⁷²Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 3, Chap. XXXII.21-30 and 31-36, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

²⁷³Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 3, Chap. XXXII.152-156 and 157-163, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham. The *Apologia secunda* is a letter sent to Peter of Callinicum through Zachariah at Paralos (*Epistula per Zachariam allata*): Peter was waiting to meet Damian.

²⁷⁴Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 3, chapter XXXII.166-170, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

²⁷⁵Two quotations in Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 2, chapter I.138-166 and 166-173, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

65 (132va)	<p>ܐܘܨܬܐܝܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ ܕܥܠܘܢ</p>	How it is necessary to understand the words of Saint Eustathius the Bishop regarding the common and particular names of the hypostases of the Trinity	E u s t . Antioch., <i>Adv. Photinum</i> ²⁷⁶ Petr. Callinic., <i>Contra Dam.</i> ²⁷⁷	<p><i>Eustathius' doctrine</i> The person is one thing and the nature is another thing. If the name 'God' were indicative of the person, saying "three persons" would mean "three Gods". Properties belong to natures and indicate natures but are not natures, therefore, one cannot say "three gods" or "three natures", but "one nature of three persons". "Father", "Son" and "Holy Spirit" indicate the persons and not the common nature, otherwise the persons would be confused. "God" indicates the common nature and not the persons, otherwise one would affirm "three gods".</p> <p><i>Peter's understanding/interpretation</i> Eustathius does not define the Godhead as one thing and the hypostases of the Godhead as another thing (as Damian and others do). Eustathius says that the name 'God' is not indicative of a distinct person. Some of the names are common, some proper: the common ones show the invariableness of the substance, the proper ones characterize the properties of the hypostases. "Father", "Son", and "Holy Spirit" are proper to each hypostasis, whereas 'God' and 'Lord' are common.</p>
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6.2. Analysis of the Content of the Florilegium

An examination of the titles shows that the florilegium deals with the following main metaphysical topics, related to the Trinitarian doctrine: 1) the relationship between substance and hypostasis; 2) the relationship between hypostasis and property; and 3) the relationship between substance, hypostasis, and property. That the compiler of the florilegium had to deal once again with these topics was, I believe, the consequence of the metaphysical dilemma created during the controversy between Damian and Peter, which had not been resolved with the reconciliation after the schism between Alexandria and Antioch.

This dilemma can be seen as a predictable consequence of Severus of Antioch's Trinitarian reflections in his *Contra Grammaticum*. One might note that both Peter and Damian considered the *Contra Grammaticum* as a basic work for their polemic. In that work, Severus tried to resolve the two above-mentioned questions that Miaphysite Christology had elicited, namely, 1) Was the whole substance of Trinity incarnated? 2) Are the three divine hypostases three substances?

²⁷⁶Two quotations: Not preserved in the original Greek.

²⁷⁷Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 4, Chap. XL.187-234, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.

Severus, as Krausmüller notes,²⁷⁸ 1) rejects the notion of immanent universal; 2) he makes no clear distinction between the intensional and the extensional meaning of substance, that is, “common (λόγος) concept” and “sum total of all hypostases”; 3) he defines substance just as the sum total of all hypostases; 4) he considers the hypostases as equated with the properties; 5) for him, properties gain their substantial component through participation in a common substance; 6) this common substance, finally, is located above the hypostases and thus different from them.²⁷⁹ This system was rather unclear. In fact, as Zachhuber notes, Severus was dangerously close from one hand, to suggest that the substance is quantitatively divided between its hypostases, and from the other, to assert that the hypostases are only subsisting properties.²⁸⁰ Both Miaphysite patriarchs, Damian and Peter, tried to modify Severus’ system so that it could be useful for their anti-Tritheistic polemics, each of them, taking and developing a different part of Severus’ system. In fact, they had divergent understandings of Severus’ system, even if it seems that on some points they agree.

Damian, as again Krausmüller notes,²⁸¹ affirmed the reality and concreteness of the common substance. It seems that, to polemicize against the Tritheists’ consideration of the non-existence of the universals, in his doctrine there is no mention of the idea that the particular substance is the concreteness of the abstract reality. He, then, did not take into consideration Severus’ concept of substance as the sum total of hypostases. He identified property with hypostasis and affirmed that properties gain their substantial component through participation in a common substance. Peter, by contrast, considered the common substance as the sum total of all hypostases; he could therefore affirm that since the substance is what each hypostasis shares and has in common, the hypostases participate in this sum total of all hypostases and thus gain their substantial component. In addition, although he affirmed that each hypostasis is a particular substance, he was not interested in clarifying whether the substances in the hypostases could be counted or not.²⁸²

This florilegium, then, tries to resolve this metaphysical dilemma, adopting a clear position against Damian and, as mentioned above, rejecting his doctrine. Even so, we cannot affirm that the compiler of this florilegium totally shared Peter’s position, since he tried to modify it, resolving the questions that Peter’s system had left open. In order to do this, the compiler read Peter’s *Contra Damianum* and Severus’ *Contra Grammaticum*²⁸³ with a critical eye and made a new synthesis based on patristic doctrine and authority. Now let us analyze the metaphysical system underlying the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium.

²⁷⁸ See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 29.

²⁷⁹ For the relationship between substance as common and hypostasis as particular in Severus’ thought, see also Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 458–62.

²⁸⁰ See Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), pp. 133–9.

²⁸¹ See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 29.

²⁸² See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 27. See also Zachhuber, *The Rise* (above, n. 24), p. 181.

²⁸³ I think that the main source of this florilegium is Peter’s *Contra Damianum*. However, some material, especially from a doctrinal point of view, come, at least indirectly, from Severus’ *Contra Grammaticum*. I aim to prepare a study on the relationship between the patristic quotations in the Trinitarian florilegium and those in Peter’s *Contra Damianum*, affirming and continuing what already van Roey had sustained, see van Roey, “Un florilège” (above, n. 81).

Relationship between substance and hypostasis

For the relationship between substance and hypostasis the compiler mainly follows the Cappadocian distinction between common and particular (cfr. nos. 21 and 47 where the name of Basil appears in the title): the substance coincides with what is common and participated (cfr. nos. 6, 39, 47, 52, 53); it is an abstract reality, i.e. it does not exist in itself; therefore, it is not considered as a substrate or a thing (cfr. nos. 33, 34); it consists of and exists in hypostases (cfr. no. 36). Consequently, the hypostases are the concrete substances; each is subsistent, i.e. exists in itself and for itself (cfr. nos. 10, 13); they are considered substrates (cfr. nos. 20, 31, 32) and things (cfr. no. 30). Since the hypostases share in the same common substance, they are called consubstantial (cfr. no. 6 where the compiler mainly follows Basil's understanding of consubstantiality, and nos. 47, 52, 53, 22, 23). As a result, substance is also considered the sum total of all hypostases (cfr. nos. 1, 4), and from this point of view it is one and escapes from number while the numbered are the hypostases themselves (cfr. no. 2). Even if the hypostases are numbered this does not mean that their being numbered divides the substance (cfr. nos. 25, 26). This means that the substance is identified with the sum total of its hypostases; therefore, it could not be affirmed, on the one hand, that the substance is one thing and its hypostases are another (cfr. nos. 1, 4), while on the other hand one hypostasis is not the whole substance, i.e. the sum total of the hypostases (cfr. nos. 3, 5).²⁸⁴ However, a hypostasis, if seen individually, is a concrete substance, and since it participates in the common substance, is from it and of it, it is called by the name of its general substance and is characterized through its natural characters and attributes (cfr. nos. 9, 10, 13, 19, 40, 48). This does not mean that each hypostasis is denominated with the name of its substance by participation, but by nature, that is, since it is really and concretely substance (cfr. no. 56). As a consequence, one can understand why some fathers interchanged nature, essence, or substance on the one hand, and hypostasis on the other (cfr. nos. 9, 19). In fact, hypostasis is not empty of substance but substantial, that is, it participates in and shares the common substance and through this participation gains its substantial component – it possesses all the characteristics of the concept (λόγος) of the substance to which it belongs (cfr. nos. 55, 56). The substantiality of the hypostases, finally, is the basis of their consubstantiality, since they share and manifest the same concept (λόγος) of the substance (cfr. nos. 23, 55).

²⁸⁴ It is clear that the florilegium has as basis the Neoplatonic doctrine of collective universal, where species gets two meanings, a predicable concept (universal concept) and an extramental collection of particulars, for the Neoplatonic doctrine see. Cross, "Gregory of Nyssa" (above, n. 26), pp. 374-80. Note that the florilegium, explaining the relationship between substance and hypostasis, as will be cleared through my analysis, cannot accept the idea that the substance, being collective, is divided into its particulars (like the Neoplatonic doctrine), since as common and participated remains indivisible. Such doctrine is seen, in some way, in Gregory of Nyssa's teaching, in regards see, Zachhuber, *Human Nature* (above, n. 26), pp. pp. 61-118, especially pp. 64-70; Zachhuber, "Once again" (above, n. 26), pp. 75-98; Zachhuber, "Universals" (above, n. 25), pp. 444-5, 447. See also H. Cherniss, "The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa", *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 11 (1930), pp. 1-92, here p. 33; R.M. Hubner, *Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der 'physischen' Erlosungslehre*, Brill, Leiden 1974, pp. 83-7; D. Balàs, "Plenitudo humanitatis: The Unity of Human Nature in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa", in D. F. Winslow (ed.), *Disciplina Nostra: Essays in Memory of Robert F. Evans*, Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, Cambridge 1979 (Patristic monograph series, 6), pp. 115-31, here p. 119-21. This opinion, however, was rejected by Cross, "Gregory of Nyssa" (above, n. 26), pp. 372-410. Personally, I agree with the opinion of Zachhuber which I find more articulated.

Relationship between hypostasis and property

Also, for the relationship between hypostasis and property the compiler relied on the Cappadocian doctrine on *idiomata*, which affirms that without the property added to the substance, a hypostasis cannot be recognized as distinct and particular (cfr. no. 51 where the compiler quotes only Basil as reference). However, our florilegium puts more emphasis, on the one hand, on the distinction between property and hypostasis and on the fact that they cannot be identified, since predicator and predicated are different things (cfr. nos. 15, 42, 43, 59, 64); on the other hand, it emphasizes the fact that hypostasis and property are united and cannot be separated (cfr. no. 16), since a hypostasis without property does not exist and is not a substrate, and a hypostasis gets its particular name precisely through its property (cfr. nos. 16, 20). Property, then, is the distinctive character of each hypostasis (cfr. no. 17); it belongs to the hypostasis, is united and mixed with it, but without any confusion (cfr. nos. 18, 35 where the compiler tries to show that union and mixture do not mean confusion). Finally, if the hypostasis subsists, property exists only in the hypostasis, and is then not subsistent in itself (cfr. n. 14).

Relationship between substance, hypostasis and property

As for the relationship between substance, hypostasis and property, the compiler is very careful to highlight that for each hypostasis to have its own property does not imply that the property is mixed with the substance itself, i.e. with the substantial component. Even if it belongs to the hypostasis, property should be understood and seen outside of the substance, i.e. outside of the constituent element (cfr. no. 41). Property does not define the substance but the hypostasis, and the hypostasis is not the substance because of the property (cfr. nos. 45, 58). Therefore, the hypostasis gets its particular name through its property, and its substantial name, i.e. its natural name, through its substance (cfr. no. 65).

Other metaphysical principles

Differently from Severus, the compiler of the florilegium makes a clear distinction between the intensional and the extensional meaning of substance. Indeed, this is clear in the title of group no. 22: “On the fact that each one of the hypostases participates in the concept (λόγος) of the substance and in the common [concept (λόγος)] of the substance”. Here the compiler quotes from Severus’ *Contra Grammaticum* and Basil’s *Epistula* 214. One can then maintain that the concept of the substance (*mellto d-’ūsīya*, ܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܡܐ) is the sum total of the hypostases, as already theorized by Severus, which is elsewhere called “the whole substance” (*kūllōh ’ūsīya*, ܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܥܠܡܐ) (cfr. nos. 3,4,5); while the common concept of the substance (ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος κοινός, *mellto d-’ūsīya gawōnītō*, ܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܡܐ ܕܥܠܡܐ), an expression that comes from Basil, is the substantial component, i.e. the natural properties that are manifested equally in each hypostasis belonging to a certain substance, or, in other words, the constituent element of the substance. In this case, the compiler agrees with Severus’ and not with Peter’s position, making the distinction between the two meanings of substance clearer.

In addition, it is clear that the compiler rejects Damian’s doctrine on the concreteness and reality of the common substance, supporting, instead, Peter’s understanding of abstract and concrete realities, clearly expressed in groups nos. 57-64. The key-concepts one should highlight in these groups are the following: substantial (ἐνούσιος, ’ūsīyōgō, ܡܠܠܘܬܐ), un-substantial (ἀνούσιος, lō ’ūsīyōgō, ܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܘܚܝܠܐ), hypostatic/subsistent, i.e. existent

the hypostases), and it is by participation that it shares the same common substance (i.e., the common constituent element) with the other hypostases.

Thus, one can now understand why, for our florilegium, the common substance is called “shared/participated” (*mšawtap*, ܡܫܘܘܬܘܦ) and the hypostasis “sharer/participant” (*meštawtap*, ܡܫܘܘܬܘܦܝܢ); and secondly, it is now clear how the concept of participation is related to substantiality, that is, to the hypostases gaining the substantial component, and to consubstantiality, that is, to the hypostases sharing and manifesting the same common substance perfectly and equally. Finally, it is evident that, if one follows this line of thought, affirming that each hypostasis is a substance does not imply a multiplication of the constituent element of the substance, which remains one according to its *λόγος* or concept.

This is the reason why the compiler, following Peter, rejects Damian’s affirmation according to which property is substantial. Such a rejection is a consequence of the refusal to identify property with hypostasis, a doctrine affirmed by Damian, who to some extent follows Severus’ ideas on this matter. Indeed, a careful reading of the titles of groups nos. 61, 62 and 63 leads to recognition that the intention of the compiler is to underline that Damian’s understanding of these concepts is wrong.

In addition, it is worth noting the use of the terms “substrate” (*ὑποκείμενον*, *sīmō*, ܣܝܡܘܢ) and “thing” (*περᾶγμα*, *sū’rōnō*, ܣܘܪܘܢܘܢ) as synonyms for “hypostasis” in our florilegium (cfr. nos. 30, 31, 32). These terms were used in the Cappadocian Trinitarian doctrine (cfr. the Cappadocian quotations in the same groups nos. 30, 31, 32, 33), probably through a Stoic influence: a substrate was considered the substance with its particular property, that is, hypostatic and subsistent, or, in other words, a qualified substrate.²⁸⁷ However, they used the term “substrate” also, under Aristotelian influence and Stoic understanding, to indicate the common substance in the sense of an unqualified substrate (qualitiless substrate), that is, the constituent element of the substance, which cannot be comprehended or described.²⁸⁸ Basil applied this meaning to Christ, calling him one in substrate and one substance, thus indicating his divinity as a simple and incomposite nature.²⁸⁹ Our florilegium, however, refuses to use the term substrate for the common substance, preferring to understand it only as a qualified single substance, that is, as a subsistent hypostasis, an existing concrete nature (cfr. no. 33), following Peter’s polemic against Damian’s understanding of substrate as the common substance.²⁹⁰

Finally, I would like to highlight one important consequence of these innovations in the understanding of the Trinitarian doctrine: in our florilegium there is no mention of the relationship between the hypostases of the Trinity. For the Cappadocians, as mentioned above, the doctrine on the monarchy of the Father was essential. In fact, besides the oneness of the divine substance, the consideration of the Father as the unique cause of the Trinity,

²⁸⁷ See Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology* (above, n. 9), p. 47 and pp. 49-50.

²⁸⁸ See Jacobs, “on ‘Not Three Gods’” (above, n. 9), p. 334. See also D. Biriukov, “The Principle of Individuation in *Contra Eunomium* 2, 4 by Basil of Caesarea and its Philosophical and Theological Context”, *Scrinium* 12 (2016), pp. 215-43, here pp. 228-34; to be mentioned that Biriukov does not see in Basil the Stoic use of substrate as the singular and qualified substance, cfr. p. 239.

²⁸⁹ See for example Basil’s use of the term substrate which is different from the later use during the Christological controversies. In fact, his use of the term substrate is linked with his understanding of substance and hypostasis related to his anti-Eunomian polemic, see M. Delcogliano, *Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names. Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010 (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*, 103), p. 141.

²⁹⁰ See chapter 10 of Book 2, see Petri Callinic., *Contra Dam.*, vol. 2, chapter X, ed. Ebeid-van Roey-Wickham.

and of the Son and the Holy Spirit as co-eternally caused, was the basis of the Cappadocian understanding of monotheism. Our florilegium does not simply avoid mentioning this doctrine, but as other Miaphysite anti-Tritheistic texts,²⁹¹ rejects it. Indeed, in group no. 7, it is affirmed that the relationship between Father and Son is not that between a cause and a caused effect (participated/shared and participant/sharer). Such a statement must be understood in light of the meaning taken up in the florilegium by the terms substance (common concept and sum total), participation, substantiality and consubstantiality. One substantial hypostasis, in our case the Father, cannot be considered as the cause of the other two, since they share in the same substance (common meaning=consubstantiality) and are all together the same substance (sum total), otherwise, the cause would be considered another substance, and the Trinity would become “Tetrade”, a doctrine which some Chalcedonians, like Anastasius of Sinai, proposed into their attempt to challenge John Philoponus’ Tritheism.²⁹²

Application of these principles to the Trinitarian doctrine

With this in mind, we can now summarize the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium as follows: 1) The Holy Trinity is one God, one substance and one Godhead in word and reality; 2) God is the three hypostases; 3) the Godhead exists in three hypostases; 4) God is seen and recognized in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 5) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, three substantial divine hypostases, equal in substance, that is, consubstantial; therefore 6) the divinity of the Father is the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, all three share the same divinity. 7) Each hypostasis, taken individually, is considered as substance, substrate and thing; therefore 8) each is called God in the full sense; 9) this does not mean division within the Godhead, since the substance, i.e. the constituent element in the Trinity is one and the same in the three hypostases; 10) thus, affirming three hypostases, and each one as a substance, does not imply Tritheism. 11) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not divine because of the property joined to each, namely fatherhood, sonship, and procession, but because they share in the same Godhead; 12) without these characteristic properties each hypostasis cannot be recognized as a distinct and particular reality. 13) The properties in the Godhead, even if they can be conceived outside of the substance, and although they belong to, and exist in, the hypostases, cannot be considered as accidents. 14) The oneness of the Trinity is to be found in the common substance, the one constituent element, not in the cause identified with the Father; in other words, we have here a “monarchy of the substance”.²⁹³

The florilegium as a metaphysical position against Chalcedonians and Nestorians

The importance of this florilegium lies not only in its Trinitarian doctrine, but also in its reformulation of the metaphysical principles used to express the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas. One of the main aims of this florilegium was to create a metaphysical system through which Miaphysites could answer the accusations of Chalcedonians and Nestorians, by resolving some metaphysical weaknesses.

²⁹¹ Some texts, written after the anti-Tritheistic work of Theodosius of Alexandria and probably before the compilation of our florilegium, edited and translated by G. Furlani, reject to understand the relationship between the divine hypostases as cause and caused, see *PO* 14, pp. 716-17, 748.

²⁹² See Krausmüller, “Under the Spell” (above, n. 72), pp. 641-3.

²⁹³ The same idea one might find in the Syriac anti-Tritheistic texts in *PO* 14, pp. 673-766 (above, n. 291).

What leads me to this conclusion is the mention, in the titles of the florilegium, of the names of two “heresiarchs”, namely, Damian and Eunomius. Why mention them? Were there, at the time when the florilegium was composed, followers of their doctrines? There is no historical evidence for their existence; I am rather inclined to think that behind the mention of the names of Damian and Eunomius one might recognize a link between their doctrines and those of Chalcedonians and Nestorians, as I shall explain in the following paragraphs.

As I said above, Miaphysites had probably seen a Chalcedonian influence in the doctrine of Damian, at least on the metaphysical level. Behind the polemic against Damian in this florilegium one may therefore read an anti-Chalcedonian polemic. Such a hypothesis helps us to better understand the accusations made against Damian, of whose work we possess only a small number of fragments. Indeed, Chalcedonians made a metaphysical distinction between nature-substance and hypostasis-person; they developed a new understanding of the concept of hypostasis, which was quite different from that of the Cappadocians. Therefore, the polemics in groups nos. 1, 2 60, and 61, for instance, could be understood as anti-Chalcedonian. Miaphysites rejected the Chalcedonian understanding of hypostasis, accusing them of identifying it with the characteristic property. Such an accusation can be read behind all polemics of the florilegium concerning this topic, as for example in nos. 42, 43, 58, 59.

In addition, the appearance of the term ἐνυπόστατος in more than one title (cfr. nos. 13, 14), and not just in patristic quotations, may be another proof of this hypothesis. Such term, with all the other technical terms explained above (an-hypostatic, substantial etc.), was a key concept in the metaphysical development of neo-Chalcedonianism, through which Chalcedonians had tried to resolve the Christological question regarding the existence of two natures in one hypostasis. For neo-Chalcedonians, this term was not understood according to its Trinitarian use by previous generations, but according to their new understanding of hypostasis.²⁹⁴ Our florilegium, then, although it treats the Trinitarian dogma, basically deals with metaphysics, and offers a new understanding of the term “hypostatic/subsistent” (ἐνυπόστατος). While using it mainly in Trinitarian doctrine, the compiler presupposes its application to Miaphysite Christology: the one composite nature from two is one subsistent reality, one hypostasis, having divinity and humanity as its substantial components. These components, however, are not two subsistent realities: through the new understanding of participation, substantiality, and consubstantiality, this one subsistent reality of Christ is consubstantial with humanity since it participates in the common human substance, and at the same time it is not all the hypostases of humanity; while through the participation in the common divine nature, it is consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, without affirming that all the Trinity was incarnated.

For the same reason, the florilegium understands the term substrate (ὑποκείμενον, *sīmō*, *رأس*) only as the hypostasis with its property, that is, as a qualified single substance, and not as the unqualified common substance. Affirming that the three hypostases are three substrates, and, on the other hand, that Christ is one substrate, means that it is not the common substance that was incarnated, and that divinity and humanity in Christ are not two substances or substrates. Consequently, one might say that this Trinitarian florilegium

²⁹⁴ See the references given on neo-Chalcedonism above in footnotes 30 and 72; for the use of the term ἐνυπόστατος and its relation to other technical terms among (neo-)Chalcedonians, see Gleede, *The Development* (above, n. 72), pp. 45-181 and especially Erismann, “A World of Hypostases” (above, n. 285).

was essential to resolve the open questions Miaphysite Christology had raised, without causing, at least from a Miaphysite perspective, troubles in the Trinitarian doctrine.

The same can be said of the polemics against Eunomius. He was accused, as mentioned above, of having taught three different substances in the Godhead, affirming that the property was indicative of the substance, and that therefore the three hypostases, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, were three different substances. Eunomians were also accused of being Tritheists.²⁹⁵ In fact, one of the arguments Damian had put forward in his anti-Tritheistic polemic was that Tritheism is Eunomianism (cfr. the quotation from Damian in group no. 8). Damian, as we saw above, also accused Peter of being Eunomian and Tritheist, since Peter considered each hypostasis, individually taken, as a substance. Why, then, does the compiler of the florilegium mention Eunomius twice in his titles (cfr. nos. 8, 54)? I do not think that he is defending Peter from the accusations of Damian. It is likelier that the name of Eunomius hides the Nestorian doctrine.

As already mentioned, Miaphysites could easily see a similarity between Nestorianism and Tritheism. Nestorians, in fact, were accused of being Tritheists because they put considerable stress on the individuality of the hypostases.²⁹⁶ Their metaphysical system, at least that of Babai and his followers, was understood as divisive. Here one should note the role played in our florilegium by the polemic against teachings that introduce divisions into the Godhead or claim that the three hypostases divide the divine substance (cfr. nos. 25, 26). Such teachings call consubstantiality into question, another typical polemical motif against Eunomius' doctrine (cfr. no. 54), which might be also read in an anti-Nestorian key.

Another important element that can demonstrate how the compiler takes a stance against the Nestorian doctrine, especially of Babai, is the title of no. 27: "On the fact that God is seen in one substance and [one] Godhead, but in three hypostases, and that each person exists in a true hypostasis". The term "person" (*paršūpō*, ܦܪܫܘܦܐ), even if it recurs in many patristic quotations in the florilegium, appears in no other title. It must be noted, firstly, that the statement "each person exists in a true hypostasis" comes from the quotation of Basil's *Epistle* 210 in the same group, no. 27. As already noted by Turcescu, in this letter, contrasting Sabellius' understanding of the term person (*πρόσωπον*) as mask, Basil underlines that if one wants to call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit "persons" (*πρόσωπα*), one needs to clarify that these persons really exist (*ἐν ὑποστάσει ἀληθινῇ ὑπάρχον*). Consequently, in this letter Basil understands hypostasis as a subsistent reality.²⁹⁷ The compiler, I would argue, uses Basil's quotation and doctrine to contrast the Nestorian position regarding the term "person". In fact, for Babai each hypostasis is distinguished through its "person" (*paršōpā*, ܦܪܫܘܦܐ). In this case, "person" is identified with the particular property, and distinguished from the hypostasis, which is a single nature without particular properties. Moreover, according to Babai's doctrine persons belong to hypostases, but can be given and received.²⁹⁸ Our compiler, then, is taking an opposite stance here. Although he also identifies the person (*paršōpā*, ܦܪܫܘܦܐ) with the particular property, or with the name

²⁹⁵ See A. Kazhdan, "Tritheism", in AA. VV., *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, vol. 3, Oxford U.P., New York-Oxford 1991, p. 2121.

²⁹⁶ See Kazhdan, "Tritheism" (above, n. 295), p. 2121.

²⁹⁷ See Turcescu, "*Prosōpon and Hypostasis*" (above, n. 15), p. 391.

²⁹⁸ See Ebeid, "The Trinitarian doctrine" (above, n. 75), pp. 98-107.

