Studia graeco-arabica

8

2018
Editorial Board
Mohammad Ali Amir Moezzi, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Carmela Baffioni, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli
Sebastian Brock, Oriental Institute, Oxford
Charles Burnett, The Warburg Institute, London
Hans Daiber, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a. M.
Cristina D’Ancona, Università di Pisa
Thérèse-Anne Druart, The Catholic University of America, Washington
Gerhard Endress, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Richard Goulet, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris
Steven Harvey, Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem
Henri Hugonnard-Roche, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Remke Kruk, Universiteit Leiden
Concetta Luna, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
Alain-Philippe Segonds (†)
Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University, Milwaukee (WI)

Staff
Cristina D’Ancona, Elisa Coda, Giulia Guidara, Issam Marjani, Cecilia Martini Bonadeo

Submissions
Submissions are invited in every area of the studies on the transmission of philosophical and scientific texts from Classical Antiquity to the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and early modern times. Papers in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish are published. Prospect authors are invited to check the Guidelines on the website of the journal, and to address their proposals to the Editor in chief.

Peer Review Criteria
Studia graeco-arabica follows a double-blind peer review process. Authors should avoid putting their names in headers or footers or refer to themselves in the body or notes of the article; the title and abstract alone should appear on the first page of the submitted article. All submitted articles are read by the editorial staff. Manuscripts judged to be of potential interest to our readership are sent for formal review to at least one reviewer. Studia graeco-arabica does not release referees’ identities to authors or to other reviewers. The journal is committed to rapid editorial decisions.

Subscription orders
Information on subscription rates for the print edition of Volume 8 (2018), claims and customer service: redazione@pacinieditore.it

Web site: http://learningroads.cfs.unipi.it
Service Provider: Università di Pisa, ICT - Servizi di Rete Ateneo

ISSN 2239-012X (Online)

Registration at the law court of Pisa, 18/12, November 23, 2012. 
Editor in chief Cristina D’Ancona (cristina.dancona@unipi.it)
Mailing address: Dipartimento di Civilta e Forme del Sapere, via Pasquale Paoli 15, 56126 Pisa, Italia.

© Copyright 2017 by Industrie Grafiche Pacini Editore, Pisa.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the Publisher. The Publisher remains at the disposal of the rightholders, and is ready to make up for unintentional omissions. Studia graeco-arabica cannot be held responsible for the scientific opinions of the authors publishing in it.

Cover
Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Radawī 300, f. 1v
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1853, f. 186v
Maurice Borrmans MAfr. (1925-2017)
Studia graeco-arabica is most grateful to Reverend Father Valentino Cottini, former Director of the Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d’Islamistica, for accepting to open this volume and to Dr. Concetta Luna, Scuola Normale Superiore, for her invaluable help in driving it to publication.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valentino Cottini</td>
<td>Maurice Borrmans. Un profilo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Catapano</td>
<td>Nobilissimus philosophus paganorum / falsus philosophus:</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisa Coda</td>
<td>Divine Providence and Human Logos in Themistius</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri Hugonnard-Roche</td>
<td>E Dio disse: “La terra produca germogli” (Gen. 1, 11)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ida Zilio-Grandi</td>
<td>La pazienza dell’Islam: la virtù detta ‘ṣabr’</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrizia Spallino, Mauro Mormino</td>
<td>Un esempio di circolarità lessicale tra tradizione islamica e cristiana</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina D’Ancona</td>
<td>God and Intellect at the Dawn of Arabic Philosophical Thought</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Mandolino</td>
<td>La testimonianza del patriarca nestoriano Israel di Kaiskar (m. 872)</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmela Baffioni</td>
<td>Embryology in an Ismāʿīlī Messianic Context</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thérèse-Anne Druart</td>
<td>Al-Fārābī: A Philosopher Challenging Some of the Kalām’s Views</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Khalil Samir Khalil S.J.
La doctrine de l’Incarnation de Yahyā ibn ‘Adi
à la lumière du Traité 17 Sbath

Hans Daiber
Ethics as Likeness to God in Miskawayh
An Overlooked Tradition

Issam Marjani
Avicenne, commentaire de la Sourate al-Alâ
Traduction française du texte établi à l’aide d’un ‘nouveau’ témoin
et relevé des emprunts de Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī dans son exégèse de la sourate

Emmanuel Pisani O.P.
Le hanbalisme, matrice idéologique du fondamentalisme islamique?

David B. Burrell C.S.C.
In the Wake of Maurice Borrmans:
Perceptions of Islam and Christianity

Christian Jambet
Le problème de la certitude dans la philosophie de Suhrawardi

Cecilia Martini Bonadeo
Una parafraasi araba di Metafisica Iota
Il capitolo XI del Libro sulla scienza della metafisica di ʿAbd al-Latīf al-Baġdādi

Richard C. Taylor
Averroes and the Philosophical Account of Prophecy

Concetta Luna
Prêcher aux philosophes et aux théologiens:
quatre sermons de Gilles de Rome pour le temps pascal

Gianfranco Fioravanti
La Questio ‘utrum passiones sive accidentia sint separabilia a subiecto’
di Antonio da Parma (m. 1327)

Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi
Le ši ʿisme entre exercice du pouvoir et sauvegarde de la foi
Le cas d’al-Maḡlisi

Book Announcements and Reviews

Jules Janssens
Marc Geoffroy. In Memoriam

Index of Manuscripts
Index of Ancient and Medieval Names
Index of Modern Names
In the Wake of Maurice Borrmans MAfr.:
Perceptions of Islam and Christianity

David B. Burrell C.S.C.

Abstract
The tension between negative and affirmative theology characterizes the discourse on God both in Christian and Muslim traditions. In the axial chapter on the “Faith in divine Unity and Trust in divine Providence” of the Iḥyāʾ ʿulam al-dīn the Ghazalian version of negative theology is presented. The pretensions of the philosophers to understand the whole reality by conceptual argument alone is contrasted with the central mystery of the free creation of the universe by the one God. Philosophy is no longer identified as a higher wisdom; speculative reason is wholly subject to practical reason, and this is the inevitable implication of the faith in an intentional creator. Man has to respond to events as they happen, in such a way that the true ordering of the things, the divine decree, can be made manifest in one’s actions-as-responses.

To offer us a way of celebrating how far we in the West have come in appreciating Islamic and Christian traditions, and their fruitful interaction, this essay will deliberately eschew a comprehensive account of each tradition by rather attending to the way a few notable figures have set the pace for us. For the last quarter century has seen remarkable scholarship in French, German and English, paving the way for those in their wake to come to a vital appreciation of the traditions long denied them. Moreover, much of the same scholarship has been intent on undoing the ravages of a colonialism which proceeded by endemic Western presumptions, to result in a mode of inquiry eager to learn from others while critical of itself. We know the names of Western thinkers: Louis Massignon, Roger Arnaldez, Georges Ch. Anawati, Louis Gardet, Edward Said, and their contemporaries who broke so much ground in comparative studies. Their trail-blazing led a new generation of inquirers into the rich tapestry of Islamic life and practice: Serge de Beaurecueil, Gerhardt Bowering, Anne-Marie Shimmel and others whose well-trained students grace us now. In a similar yet different vein, Said Hossein Nasr and Abdulazziz Sachedina opened us to the reaches of Shi’ite philosophical theology, notably Mullā Ṣadrā, whose comprehensive grasp of those before him offers us a synoptic and interior taste of wrestling with philosophy. Again, their students, trained in the thought-forms and languages of Islam, are able to present their own and their mentors’ grasp of traditions hitherto opaque to us, allowing us to partake in a favorable ‘climate’ of inquiry. Their legacy peers through the synoptic view that follows.

Journeying into the Unknown

Whatever we may be able to articulate of traditions of revelational inquiry, give us a shared theological path forward from the act of creation. For we have no other access to the God who gives us life in the context of a universe that the same God sustains in being. Yet that very fact defines our relation to God – a relation of God’s own making. So that relation will be unlike any other, as both traditions aver.1

And here comparison is not only helpful but essential. The term we offer, from a study of Shakara executed by a British sister, Sara Grant, is nonduality, attempting to convey that no creature can be ‘other than’ the creator, or else that creature would cease to be! A Christian phenomenologist, Robert Sokolowski employs a conceit – ‘the distinction’ – to express how we come forth from the creator without a discernible difference. For the One is the one in whom we ‘live, move, and have our being’. 

Al-Ġazālī, the Muslim theologian (d. 1111) articulated the same sui generis relation (or tawḥīd) with the arresting assertion: “there is no agent but God”. For like our very being, our actions cannot be ‘our own’, as they (and we) come forth from the God who creates us. Discourse of this sort will inevitably jar us, by fracturing our ordinary language, only show that the creation-relation is no ordinary relation. So all the relevant alterations in language may be subsumed into nonduality as a way of articulating what ordinary language will not permit us to do. The result is that our theological discourse is inescapably negative. And if this fact about theological language respects Islam it respects Christianity as well, as Deirdre Carabine shows so well in her articulate survey of this portion of Christian tradition. (I select here from her Preface for this edition). According to the followers of the via negativa, knowledge is an obstacle to be overcome, as it casts a veil of clouded particularity around the One. The subsequent stripping bare or unveiling (aperikaluptos, as Dionysius describes it), paradoxically reveals no thing, nada. Using negative theology as a knife to cut away idolatry is a necessary part of theology, but cutting away the kataphatic (which pretends to give knowledge of God) can never reveal the “hidden divinity”.

In the context of contemporary uses of negative theology, perhaps I can sum up the main contours of what I understand to be an apophatic metaphysics (and I rely chiefly on Eriugena and Eckhart): the no-thing-ness of God becomes some thing when, through creation, God becomes other than God. Thus, God can paradoxically be known when other than God (God’s energeia, in the Byzantine tradition). Creation as theophany, as the very alterity of God, enables the simultaneous knowing and unknowing of God, the simultaneous transcendence and immanence, the simultaneous procession and return. In this dialectical way of understanding the unfolding of God, the oxymorons of the mystics begin to make some kind of sense: silent music, bright darkness, unknowing knowing. The unity that is the focus of the via negativa is a unity that admits of distinction: it is not annihilation. Neither – and this is a most important point – is it the end of the otherness of God, but rather, its perpetual celebration. Creation is itself the affirmation that it is not God because it is some thing (other than God). In the eschatological moment of return to the source, there is no silent repose for many candles make up its one light and many voices make up its one choir, as Dionysius would put it.

Negative theology is, simply put, part of the dialectical understanding of the hiddenness of the revealed God. The follower of the negative way, wants to be in a “liberating ignorance in which faith rests on the Unknowable and is nourished by silence”. As Rainer Maria Rilke put it:

5 D. Carabine, The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena, Wipf and Stock, Cascade (OR) 2015.
8 F. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, Cornell U.P., Ithaca (NY) 2008.
But though my vigil constantly I keep
My God is dark – like woven texture flowing.
A hundred drinking roots, all intertwined;
I only know that from His warmth I’m growing.
More I know not: my roots lie hidden deep
My branches only are swayed by the wind.
(excerpt from The Book of a Monk’s Life)

Used as we are to trying to understand the divine nature from either the perspective of transcendence or the perspective of immanence, formulations such as ‘unmanifest manifest’, or ‘invisible visible’ stretch the mind in both directions simultaneously for the one cannot be understood without the other: God both is all things and is not all things. The idea that God is manifest in creation is true, but the fact that God remains transcendentally unmanifest is also true. And yet, neither is true when understood singly; the ‘problem’ is resolved by coupling both truths in a dialectical formulation which reveals the tension between, and the simultaneous truth of both. The truth of the statement, ‘God is all things’, is constantly undermined by the basic distinction between the divine essence and theophany which is a forceful reminder that, as an apophatic understanding demonstrates, a comprehensive account of reality can never be attained.

Al-Ǧazālī and ‘negative theology’

By taking a mainline figure like al-Ǧazālī, and notably the axial chapter in his magnum opus – Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn (Revivifying Religious Sciences)– we will find a similar ‘negative cast’ in this representative Muslim theologian. The work is divided into two parts of unequal length: the first on tawḥīd (or “divine unity”), the second on tawakkul (or “trust in God”). Reading them together gives us Ġazālī’s unadulterated teaching. The effect of the book of “Faith in divine Unity and Trust in divine Providence” (Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul) of the Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, together with al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād (Preserving the Faith), is to qualify al-Ǧazālī as a Muslim theologian in the full medieval meaning of that term, and not merely in the descriptive sense extended to include any thinker adept at kalām, or the dialectical defense of faith. That is, Ġazālī was intent on using human reason, as he found it elaborated in Ibn Sīnā and others, not merely to defend the faith but to lead Muslim faithful to a deeper penetration of the mysteries of their revealed religion – the central mystery being the free creation of the universe by the one God. The works of the philosophers themselves were not always helpful to him in their native state, so he set out to purify them of their pretensions to offer an access to truth independent of and superior to that of divine revelation-the Qurʾān. Hence his need to understand them thoroughly, embodied in the work entitled The Intentions of the Philosophers (Maqāṣid al-falāsifa), itself conceived as an extended introduction to his Deconstruction of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa). The negative tone of this latter work, together with its detailed refutation by Averroes (Tabāfut al-Tabāfut), has left the impression that Ġazālī should never be ranked with ‘the philosophers’ but always left with ‘the theologians’ as a defender of kalām orthodoxy in the face of reasonable inquiry. It is precisely that stereotype which this reflection challenges, and so we offer Ġazālī’s own assistance to deconstruct the historical image which he helped to create for himself.

The Book of Faith in Divine Unity [tawḥīd] and Trust in Divine Providence [tawakkul] is Book 35 in Ġazālī’s masterwork, the Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn. The French summary of this magnum opus,
"Reviviication des sciences religieuses",⁹ reminds us how forceful is the key term taken from the fourth form of the Arabic verb ḥayyā, probably best rendered in English as ‘putting life back’ into religious learning, conveying al-Ḡazālī’s intent as well as his assessment of the state of such learning in his time. He presents a clear understanding of religious matters, yet one which continues to give primacy to practice: faith is rooted in trust so needs to be expressed in a life of trust. The pretensions of the philosophers to understand the mysteries of the heavens and the earth and all that is between them [Qu. 15:85], proceeding by conceptual argument alone, must be exposed as just that pretension, in the face of the central assertion that the universe was freely created by the one sovereign God. Yet reason, which they so intent to elaborate, will prove to be an indispensable tool in directing our minds and our hearts to understand how to think and how to live as a consequence of that signal truth. Such is al-Ḡazālī’s intent, displayed in the structure of his Iḥyāʾ as well as in the pattern adopted for his treatise expounding the ninety-nine canonical “names” of God, where he devotes an extensive introduction to explaining the human practice of naming and how it might be understood in relation to the names which God has given Himself in the Qurʾān. It turns out that the only way to extend the limits of human knowledge of such divine things is by “adorning oneself” with the meaning of the names, so the commentary on each name begins with semantics and closes with a counsel: how one might oneself become more like God so presented. This pattern will become the master strategy of the Iḥyāʾ as well, where the entire gamut of Muslim life-beliefs together with practices is laid out in a way which displays the importance of both knowledge and state [of being], that is, of understanding together with practice. Readers familiar with Aquinas will marvel at the way in which Ġazālī’s master plan aligns with that thinker’s insistence that theology is at once a speculative and a practical mode of knowing: “Sacred doctrine takes over both [speculative and practical] functions, in this being like the single knowledge whereby God knows himself and the things he makes”.¹⁰

It is fair to say that the Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul plays an axial role among the other books in the Iḥyāʾ. For tawḥīd, or “faith in divine unity”, sounds the distinctive note of Islam which grounds everything Muslims believe in the šahāda: “There is no god but God”. Islamic reflection on tawḥīd is reminiscent of rabbinic commentary on divine unity as evidenced in the šema’: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One” (Deuteronomy 6:4). It is hardly at issue that God be one rather than many; it points instead directly to the injunction against idolatry: all Israelites know thereby that they must orient their entire lives to God – through the Torah, and nowhere else. So a philosophical argument culminating in the assertion that God is one would hardly interest the rabbis, nor would it al-Ḡazālī.¹¹ Its conclusion may be true enough, but what is at issue is not the unity itself, but the implications of the community’s faith in divine unity. Yet that cannot be a blind faith, so what is being asserted? That everything comes from God and that “there is no agent but God”.

In cataloguing degrees of assent to this šahāda, Ġazālī notes: “The third kind [of believer] professes faith in divine unity in the sense that he sees but a single agent, since truth is revealed to him as it is in itself; and he only sees in reality a single agent, since reality has revealed itself to him as it is in itself because he has set his heart on determining to comprehend the word ‘reality’ [ḥaqīqa], and this stage

---


¹⁰ Summa theologiae, I 1, q. 4 Resp.: “Sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit”.

¹¹ Cf. e.g. F. Shehadi, Ghazali’s Unique Unknowable God. A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Some of the Problems Raised by Ghazali’s View of God as Utterly Unique and Unknowable, Brill, Leiden 1964.
belongs to lay folk as well as theologians” (11). He sketches out the two-part structure of the book by way of showing how tawakkul – trust in divine providence – is grounded in an articulate tawḥīd, as practice is anchored in faith, or state [of being] in knowledge. In doing so, he is even more insistent: this first part “will consist in showing you that there is no agent but God the Most High: of all that exists in creation-sustenance given or withheld, life or death, riches or poverty, and everything else that can be named, the sole one who initiated and originated it all is God Most High. And when this has been made clear to you, you will not see anything else, so that your fear will be of Him, your hope in Him, your trust in Him, and your security with Him, for He is the sole agent without any other. Everything else is in His service, for not even the smallest atom in the worlds of heaven and earth is independent of Him for its movement. If the gates of mystical insight were opened to you, this would be clear to you with a clarity more perfect than ordinary vision” (15-16).

These last words are telling, and signal al-Ġazālī’s ‘method’ in the first section elaborating faith in divine unity. There is no attempt to show how everything-that-is is of God; that would be beyond the capacity of our intellect to grasp. And should we try, we would invariably end up articulating something like Ibn Sinā’s emanation scheme, modeled on logical inference and amounting to a twin denial of divine and of human freedom. Indeed, when al-Ġazālī tries to articulate what he attributes to mystical insight, it sounds uncannily like Ibn Sinā, though he begins with a characteristic verse from the Qurʾān: “we did not create heaven and earth and what lies between them in jest; we did not create them but in truth” [Qu. 44:38-39]. Yet he will offer images to move us away from a literal acceptance of the Avicenna-like scheme, for in such matters human reason can at best offer models; yet the images offered by the Qurʾān will certainly take precedence for al-Ġazālī.

But what about human freedom? Have we not exalted God’s sovereign freedom, as the only agent there is, to the inevitable detriment of human initiative? It certainly appears that the intent of al-Ġazālī’s images is to take us by the hand and lead us on, in hopes that we “may come to understand the emanation of things so ordained (muqaddarat) from the eternal omnipotence, even though the omnipotent One is eternal and the things ordained (maqdurat) […] But let us leave all that, since our aim is to offer counsel regarding the way to faith in divine unity in practice: that the true agent is One, that He is the subject of our fear and our hope, and the One in whom we trust and depend” (41-42). So the test of our understanding of divine unity will not come by way of clever philosophical schemes but through a life of trust (tawakkul), in which concerted practice will bring each of us personally to the threshold of the only understanding possible here, that of “unveiling”. Yet through its clarifications, reason can offer some therapeutic hints to attenuate the apparent scandal.

So “How can there be any common ground between faith in divine unity and the šari‘a [‘religious law’]? For the meaning of faith in divine unity is that there is no god but God Most High, and the meaning of the law lies in establishing the actions proper to human beings [as servants of God]. And if human beings are agents, how is it that God Most High is an agent? Or if God Most High is an agent, how is a human being an agent? Is there is no way of understanding ‘acting’ between these two agents? But if ‘agent’ had two meanings, then the term comprehended could be attributed to each of them without contradiction, as when it is said that the emir killed someone, and also said that the executioner killed him; in one sense, the emir is the killer and in another sense, the executioner. Similarly, a human being is an agent in one sense, and God – Great and Glorious – is an agent in another. The sense in which God Most High is agent is that He is the originator of existing things (al-muḥtari‘ al-mawḡūdāt), while the sense in which a human being is an agent is that he is the locus (maḥāl) in which power is created. (…) So we are called ‘agent’ in a manner which expresses that fact of our dependence, much as the executioner can be called
'killer' and the emir a killer, since the killing depends on the power of both of them, yet in different respects. In that way both of them are called 'killer', and similarly, the things ordained (maqrurat) depend on two powers” (43).

Indeed the Qurʾān often attributes agency to God as well as to creatures, showing that revelation acknowledges and exploits the inherently analogous character of agency as exhibited in the multiple uses of the term ‘agent’. This small clue offers us the best way of presenting al-Ġazālī’s intent and his strategy to contemporary readers. What he wanted to do was to help believers to recognize that theirs is a unique perspective on the universe: each thing is related in its very existence to the one from whom it freely comes. As Aquinas will put it: “the very existence of creatures is to-be-related to their creator as to the principle of their being”. Yet since we cannot articulate this founding and sustaining relationship conceptually, for to do so would trespass on divine freedom, we can only display our understanding by the way we live our life: trusting in the One who so sustains us.

This summary offers a springboard to part two of al-Ġazālī’s book, which relates one Sufi story after another, while judiciously selecting them and weaving them into a pattern that allows persons to discriminate in making subtle decisions regarding the way they lead their lives aware of God’s benevolent care, exhibiting the sorts of choices they make in typical situations. If al-Ġazālī closes the first part with what looks like a backward-looking conceptual reminder, he opens the way to an entirely different mode of consideration in part two: “Indeed, all this happens according to a necessary and true order, according to what is appropriate as it is appropriate, and in the measure proper to it; nor is anything more fitting, more perfect, and more attractive within the realm of possibility. The upshot of tawḥīd, then, must be the believer’s profound conviction of the unalterable justice and excellence of things as they are [...], of the perfect rightness of the actual”. Eric Ormsby sees this conviction as the upshot of the ten years of seclusion and prayer following al-Ġazālī’s spiritual crisis. By “the actual” he means what God has decreed, itself the product and reflection of divine wisdom. And by asserting the primacy of the actual over the possible, al-Ġazālī shows himself a true theologian. The world in all its circumstances remains unimpeachably right and just, and it is unsurpassably excellent. Yet the excellence in question is not one which we can assess independently of the fact that it is the product of divine wisdom, so al-Ġazālī is not asserting that ours is the “best of all possible worlds”, as though there were a set of such worlds “each of which might be ranked in terms of some intrinsic excellence”. That would miss the point of al-Ġazālī’s quest: to find ways of expressing that relation of creator to creatures which quite resists formulation. The deconstructive moment had been his rejection of the emanation scheme; the constructive task is taken up in this twin discourse on faith in divine unity and trust in divine providence, but especially in this second part where practice will allow us to traverse domains which speculative reason cannot otherwise map.

What sort of a practice is tawakkul: trust in divine providence? It entails accepting whatever happens as part of the inscrutable decree of a just and merciful God. Yet such an action cannot be reduced to mere resignation, and so caricatured as ‘Islamic fatalism’. It rather entails aligning oneself with things as they really are: in al-Ġazālī’s sense, with the truth that there is no agent but


12 Summa theologiae, I 45, q. 3 Resp.: “Unde relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad creatorem ut ad principium sui esse”.
14 Ibid., p. 257.
God Most High. This requires effort since we cannot formulate the relationship between this single divine agent and the other agents which we know, and also because our ordinary perspective on things is not a true one: human society lives under the sign of ǧahiliyya or pervasive ignorance. But by trying our best to act according to the conviction that the divine decree expresses the truth in events as they unfold, we can allow ourselves to be shown how things truly lie. So faith (tawḥīd) and practice (tawakkul) are reciprocal; neither is foundational. The understanding we can have is that of one journeying in faith, a salik, the name which Sufis characteristically appropriated for themselves. The formula for faith here is the hadīt: “There is no might and power but in God”, which al-Ġazālī shows to be equivalent to the Qurʾānic šahāda: “There is no god but God”, thereby reminding us that the hadīt does not enjoin us to trust in power or might, as attributes distinct from God, but in God alone. It is in this context that he selects stories of Sufi sheiks, offering them as examples to help point us towards developing specific skills of trusting: habits of responding to different situations in such a way that one learns by acting how things are truly ordered, the truth of the decree. The principle operative throughout is that a policy of complete renunciation of means (asbab) is contrary to divine wisdom, the sunna Allāh, but those who journey in faith will be cognizant that there are different kinds of means, as they become aware of hidden as well as manifest ones.

The bevy of stories which al-Ġazālī mines offer living examples of the attitude proper to one who firmly believes in divine unity, namely, a total trust in God’s providential care. He uses them to offer one object lesson after another of a way to take esoteric Sufi lore and allow it to inspire one’s practice. So there is a school whereby we learn how to respond to what happens in such a way that we are shown how things are truly ordered. This school will involve learning from others who are more practiced in responding rightly; al-Ġazālī’s judicious use of stories is intended to intimate the Sufi practice of master-disciple wherein the novice is helped to discern how to act. Philosophy is no longer identified as a higher wisdom; speculative reason is wholly subject to practical reason, but that is simply the inevitable implication of replacing the emanation scheme with an intentional creator, evidenced also in Maimonides. So the challenge of understanding the relation of the free creator to the universe becomes the task of rightly responding to events as they happen, in such a way that the true ordering of things, the divine decree, can be made manifest in one’s actions-as-responses.

This is also evident in his treatise on the names of God, for it is the ninety-nine names culled from the Qurʾān, names by which God reveals the many “faces” of the divine, which offer a composite picture for human perfection. If we take names to identify attributes, then that book can be read in two distinct, yet related, ways: as a condensed summary of Islamic theology and as offering a revealed counterpart to Aristotle’s Ethics. Perhaps enough has been said so far to begin to make my case for al-Ġazālī as an Islamic theologian, in the normative and not merely descriptive sense of that term. If he tends to resolve to mystical insight in places where philosophers would prefer conceptual schemes, one ought to acknowledge that he is thereby suggesting that certain domains quite outstrip human conceptualizing. Yet more significant, however, is that everything he says about practice can be carried out quite independently of such “mystical insight”, as indeed it must be for the vast majority of faithful.

A Šī‘ite Perspective

Fifteen years ago, canvassing the mammoth book fair in Cairo, no one had even heard of Mullā Ṣadrā! Yet thanks to Said Hossain Nasr and his students, we can bridge that Sunni/Shia divide as well. If one were to peruse the work of Ibrahim Kalin, Sajjad Rizvi, Mohammed Rustom, with the translations of Laimah Peerwani – and we have space only for these recommendations – one would meet a philosophical theologian whose sense of nonduality of creatures and creator reflects the entire Islamic tradition and a keen spiritual wit. Mullā Ṣadrā rightly crowns this extensive survey.