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Cover
Mašhad, Kitābḫāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Radawī 300, f. 1v
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grèc 1853, f. 186v
Book Announcements & Reviews
*Siglas*

CDA – Cristina D’Ancona  
EC – Elisa Coda  
GM – Giovanni Mandolino  
MZ – Marianna Zarantonello  
VK – Veysel Kaya
identifies (…) a celestial intellect as source of veridical dreams” (p. 386). In his On Sleep and Dream Visions al-Kindī endorses this doctrine, and al-Fārābī, in the Opinions of the Citizens of the Virtuous City, maintains that “the perfect human, who has reached the state of conjunction with the active intellect, receives divine revelation in the form of universal ideas from the active intellect via the mediation of his acquired intellect. That revelation (waḥy), however, is immediately passed on the other imaginative faculty (quwwa mutakhayyila), where it produces the kind of prophecy that we know from the text of the Qurʾān” (p. 389). Avicenna’s theory is not dissimilar. An evident Farabian heritage consists in that “the ability to convey theoretical insights to the masses of the people makes the prophet the best of all rulers” (p. 393). Hence “Ibn Sinā’s prophetology was embraced even by thinkers who harshly criticized other teachings of falsafa”, like al-Ġazālī, who nevertheless “severely criticizes the falāsifa’s position that prophets only teach the masses while philosophers are not in need of divine revelation” (p. 394). The focus of the chapter by M. Rustom, “Philosophical Sufism” (pp. 399-411) is the thought of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). In addition to its historical importance, the movement initiated by Ibn ʿArabī deserves special attention because “the central concern of the school (...) is with being or wujūd, which is also the central concern of Islamic philosophy. Members of the school of Ibn ʿArabī did not invent an entirely new philosophical vocabulary to explain their teachings. Many of the technical terms and concepts with which they were working had been bequeathed from the well-developed traditions of Islamic philosophy and theology” (p. 400). Among these, the most important is the “Oneness of Being” (waḥdat al-wuǧūd), whose pantheistic interpretation is rejected by Rustom (p. 400), although the description of the main tenets of the school provided in the paper point precisely to pantheism as the philosophical background of Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. Finally, A. Shihadeh, “Religious Readings of Philosophy” (pp. 412-22) outlines the reception of and reactions to philosophy in the theological tradition of Islam, showing by means of a comparison between al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) and al-Ġazālī the shift in emphasis that was determined by Avicenna. Before Avicenna “philosophy was still not perceived as a real threat and could be treated in a cursory manner” (p. 414), as illustrated by al-Bāqillānī’s polemics against philosophical cosmology: he provides “extremely little detail on the philosophical views in question” (pp. 414-15), limiting himself to advance against the doctrine of the causes advocated by philosophers a criticism that foreshadows al-Ġazālī’s occasionalism. If we turn to the latter, instead, what we find is a very different approach. “Relations between philosophy and theology underwent a huge transformation under the influence of Ibn Sinā. Not only did he develop a highly compelling philosophical system, he also theorised within that system various typically theological subjects such as prophecy, revelation, miracles, the afterlife and theodicy” (p. 415) that captured the interest of religious scholars in a way no other philosopher before him did. Hence “by the end of the eleventh century, there were rumblings that philosophy was spreading and beginning to pose a real threat to orthodoxy” (p. 416). The duty al-Ġazālī set for himself was that of studying Avicenna’s work first-hand (ibid.) and the conclusion he reached was that “the philosophers should be deemed unbelievers” (p. 417), less for the individual doctrines they put forth than for their general outlook on religion: “For al-Ghazālī, therefore, the philosophers are branded as unbelievers not simply because they espouse three doctrines that happen to clash with the teachings of scripture, but first and foremost on account of what, from the theological viewpoint, is a more fundamental and potentially more global and far-reaching offence: the view that revelation employs images to explain certain things to common people and thus should not be taken at face value”. In al-Ġazālī’s views, this was “a threat to the very epistemological and soteriological foundations of religion” (p. 418).

This rich and useful volume ends with a General Index (pp. 423-33).

CDA


This volume collects thirty chapters dealing with as many philosophical works produced by Muslim authors. The intent of the editors is “to give roughly equal weight to every century from the ninth to the twentieth” (p. 1).
In their Introduction (pp. 1-7), the editors point out that their aim is to contribute to “rethinking the course of Islamic Philosophy” (p.1). The spirit of the volume is especially prominent in their selection of entries, that is “work centred rather than person or theme centred” (p. 4), with the aim “to bring out the uninterrupted history of Islamic philosophy down to the modern period, and to emphasize the fact that philosophical activity in later centuries was not confined to one region of the Islamic world and was not exclusively preoccupied with a single set of issues” (ibid.). In this way, the volume follows in the footsteps of the pioneer works by Henry Corbin and other scholars, as acknowledged by the editors (pp. 1-2). One may however remark the absence in this list of the works by Gerhard Endress, Der Islam, Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte (C.H. Beck, München 1983, 1997), and Ulrich Rudolph, Islamische Philosophie: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (C.H. Beck, München 2004, 2013).

The editors address the “dispute over whether to call the field of study ‘Arabic philosophy’ or ‘Islamic philosophy’”. According to them, “neither term is entirely satisfactory. (…) some modern scholars prefer locations such as ‘philosophy in the Islamic world’ or even ‘Islamicate philosophy’, but the first of these is unwieldy and the second unfamiliar. In the end, there are more important tasks than getting bogged down in issues of nomenclature. ‘Islamic philosophy’ may not be ideal, but a choice had to be made, and it may be less unsatisfactory than the alternatives” (p. 5).

The approach is thematic: the selected entries focus on the metaphysical accounts of the principles of the cosmos (God, soul and the related epistemological issues), and on ethics. This allows the editors to argue for the existence and survival of an Islamic tradition in philosophy whose concerns and motivations are Islamic and differ from the coeval Western philosophy. The chapters collected in the volume fit the frame, provided that one agrees to consider works based on mystical insight as philosophical, on the ground of the fact that they deal with God and the cosmos.

Chapters from 1 to 15 account for the historical and doctrinal background of falsafa from the 9th to the 13th centuries: al-Kindī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Ibn Masarra, al-Fārābī, Yahya ibn ’Adī, Avicenna, Naṣīr-i Khusraw, al-Gazālī, al-Šahrastānī, Ibn Ṭufayl, Averroes, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and al-Tūsī are taken into account. Chapters from 16 to 21 draw attention on philosophers active in Iran from end-13th to 17th centuries: al-Kātībī, al-Tahtānī, al-Īǧī, al-Aḥsā’ī, al-Dawānī, Mīr Dāmād, and al-Šīrāzī. Chapters 22 to 25 deal with the literary output from philosophers active in Iran from 16th to 17th centuries: al-Kātībī, al-Tahtānī, al-Īǧī, al-Aḥsā’ī, al-Dawānī, Mīr Dāmād, and al-Šīrāzī. The editors address the “dispute over whether to call the field of study ‘Arabic philosophy’ or ‘Islamic philosophy’”. According to them, “neither term is entirely satisfactory. (…) some modern scholars prefer locations such as ‘philosophy in the Islamic world’ or even ‘Islamicate philosophy’, but the first of these is unwieldy and the second unfamiliar. In the end, there are more important tasks than getting bogged down in issues of nomenclature. ‘Islamic philosophy’ may not be ideal, but a choice had to be made, and it may be less unsatisfactory than the alternatives” (p. 5).

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The first chapter, by C. D’Ancona, is devoted to “The Theology attributed to Aristotle. Sources, structure, influence” (pp. 8-29). One of the most influential works of the entire Arabic-Islamic philosophy, the pseudo-Theology is an adapted version of treatises taken from Enneads IV-VI. Why, and when was this Neoplatonic work attributed to Aristotle? After a survey of the relevant scholarship, D’Ancona lists the differences between the Theology and its Plotinian source: “Yet close as the ps.-Theology is to Plotinus, there are also many differences between the Arabic version and the original text. First and foremost, the flow of the Greek has been substantially altered, and blocks of Plotinus’s treatises are relocated, in what seems to be complete disorder. Second, misunderstandings, adaptations, and changes of meaning surface everywhere, and long passages feature in the ps.-Theology, that have no counterpart in the Enneads” (p. 13). The most relevant of these is placed at the very beginning of the work. Here ‘Aristotle’ in person announces his intention to complete his Metaphysics with a Theology, namely a work of God’s causality over the entire cosmos. Another long passage with no counterpart in Greek features ‘Aristotle’ praising his teacher Plato for having taught the creation of the whole reality by God. “It is still ‘Aristotle’ who extols ‘Plato’ for having taught the same doctrine that he himself had announced at the beginning of his Theology, namely the existence of Intellect and Soul as the principles that convey the creative power of the First Cause” (p. 20). The main topics of Arabic metaphysics and cosmology are thus set in place. Also the topic of instantaneous creation, that will be echoed by al-Fārābī and Avicenna, is presented in this passage as the doctrine both of ‘Plato’ and ‘Aristotle’. From this point of view, the pseudo-Theology really stands at the beginning of Arabic-Islamic philosophy.
E. Gannagé, “The Rise of Falsafa: Al-Kindī (d. 873), On First Philosophy” (pp. 30-62) examines the Book on First Philosophy. “One of the longest of Kindī’s treatises that have reached us (...) aiming primarily to prove the oneness of God, the first and only surviving part of the treatise consists of four chapters that form a consistent unit” (p. 31). Of this treatise, Gannagé briefly explains the scope and structure (pp. 31-2), and the sources, program and method (pp. 32-33). A paragraph illustrates what Gannagé labels ‘al-Kindī’s eclecticism’. “It is difficult to locate Kindī within a specific philosophical tradition. As has already been noted by Ivry (1974, 11-21), despite an “ambivalent usage” of what might look very close to a Neoplatonic terminology, On First Philosophy does not develop into a Neoplatonic structure. From Neoplatonism Kindī borrows a methodology consistent with the Muslim tawḥīd, but ignores the theory of hypostasis as well as the emanationist system (Hasnawi 1992, 655)” (p. 33). Gannagé continues: “Drawing from Aristotle, the Neoplatonic tradition as well as the Greek commentators, On First Philosophy elaborates a complex and original synthesis that culminates with a demonstration of the absolute unity of the first Cause where the philosophical discourse ultimately yields to a theological development that concludes with the identity of the Neoplatonic true One with the Creator and One God of Islam” (p. 34). According to Gannagé, al-Kindī “eclecticism and more so his engagement with Muslim theology, while at the same time conferring to his philosophy a real originality, have contributed to set him aside from the other major figures of Islamic philosophy. Still, he has addressed issues that were later on taken over and developed by this tradition, even if in an opposite direction, like, for example, the question of the creation of the world or the oneness of the first principle” (p. 59).

Chapter 3 by P. Adamson, “Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925), The Spiritual Medicine” (pp. 63-82), contextualises the Galenic background of the idea that there is a “medicine for the soul” (pp. 65-7). Then the place of reason in the well-lived human life is explained (pp. 67-70). An examination of al-Rāzī’s ideas on the place of pleasure in the good life (pp. 70-2) follows, turning to the consideration of the general aim of the work: “the Spiritual Medicine is not intended to turn us into philosophers. It is, rather, to set us on the right road, by helping us to habituate ourselves so that reason can gain the upper hand over the lower souls. To return to the idea that this is literally a medical work, we can say that al-Rāzī’s advice is analogous to the prescription of a diet or exercise regime in the case of bodily medicine” (p. 72). The account of the primacy of values in the life of philosophers gives Adamson the opportunity to express his views on the question of the relationship between al-Rāzī’s two ethical works, The Spiritual Medicine and The Philosophical Life: “In both texts, then, we find the idea that the pursuit of pleasure is acceptable, even if it is not the primary goal of the philosophical life. The two works also agree about that primary goal: though the Spiritual Medicine mostly focuses on the task of restraining the lower souls, it does also speak about the higher values of knowledge and justice. (...) If there is a difference between the two works, then, it is more one of emphasis, which in turn derives from a difference in purpose. In both, al-Rāzī asserts that it is counterproductive to do things that bring more pain than pleasure in the long run” (p. 76).

S. Stroumsa, “Ibn Masarra’s (d. 931) Third Book” (pp. 83-100) briefly reviews the evidences regarding Ibn Masarra and his books, that were considered lost until 1972, when they were discovered by the Egyptian scholar Muḥammad Kamāl Ḥaḍrīm Jafār in a manuscript of the Chester Beatty Collection. Stroumsa points to the fact that “These treatises (...) amply demonstrate that Ibn Masarra was neither a Muʿtazilite nor an Aristotelian philosopher, and prove the unquestionably Neoplatonic nature of his philosophical mysticism” (p. 84). Stroumsa presents a detailed description of what we know about Ibn Masarra’s writings (pp. 85-9). Most of this chapter is devoted to the quotation from Ibn Masarra’s Tawḥīd al-muqūnin made by Ibn al-Marʿa (d. 611/1214) in his Šarb al-Iršād (pp. 89-97). Stroumsa analyzes this quotation and provides a “speculative reconstruction” (p. 97) of how it stands in relation to what we already know from other sources about Ibn Masarra’s thought.

D. Janos, “Al-Fārābī’s (d. 950) On the One and Oneness: Some Preliminary Remarks on its Structure, Contents, and Theological Implications” (pp. 101-28) analyses the contents and sources of the Farabian On the One, a treatise which “appears to be fundamentally a systematic linguistic analysis of the various senses (maʿāni) and aspects (anḥāʾ) of ‘the one’ (al-wāḥid) and ‘the multiple’ (al-kathīr)” (p. 103). According to Janos, “al-Fārābī’s aim to clarify the semantic nuances of ‘oneness’ in On the One is reminiscent of what he seeks to achieve in the Book of Particles with regard to ‘the existent,’ ‘thing,’ and ‘substance,’ which play an equally important role in his metaphysics. Given their common approach and purpose, it is not surprising that the two works share similar stylistic and formal characteristics and an identical division of the text into discrete units.”
the most important feature of authentic work by the Christian philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, but also thinks with Naji al-Takriti that “Perhaps (pp. 130-1). Griffith examines five major topics in the Persian tradition of ‘mirrors for princes,’ along with the admittedly dominant Greek philosophical traditions” (p. 130). Concerning the structure of the treatise, Griffith’s opinion is that “Given the undoubtedly Hellenistic flavor of the Tadhīb al-akhlāq as a whole, it would nevertheless be a mistake to think of Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī’s text as more or less a translation of a preexisting, originally Greek composition, as some scholars have supposed” (p. 130). Aware as he is that there is no scholarly consensus on this point, Griffith thinks that Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī intermingles various traditions of thought: “there are at least three predominant frames of reference behind the work: pre-Islamic Arabic tradition as refracted in early Islamic discourse, the Persian tradition of ‘mirrors for princes,’ along with the admittedly dominant Greek philosophical traditions” (pp. 130-1). Griffith examines five major topics in the Tadhīb al-akhlāq: the definition of a moral quality; the tripartite soul; the virtues and vices; the way of reformation, and the portrait of the perfect man. Turning to the question of the general aim of the treatise, he says that “for all his devotion to philosophy and to the cultivation of reason, one suspects that Yaḥyā’s purposes were not narrowly academic, nor were they limited to channeling the works of Plato, Aristotle, and their commentators to an Arabic-speaking readership. There is every reason to believe that he was among the philosophers of his time who were concerned to philosophize in support of their religious convictions (…) the relentless logician Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī (…) was keen to cultivate philosophy both for its own sake and as a medium through which to commend virtue, right religion, and a humane polity, within the framework of his own religious tradition, not least in view of the fact that in the Abbasid Baghdad of his day, society had become religiously plural and the scholars of each community were called upon to commend the credibility of their own traditions to any and all who would follow the way of reason” (p. 140).

A. Bertolacci’s chapter offers an analysis of “Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037): Metaphysics of the Shīfā” (pp. 143-68). It is his conviction that “For its thorough recasting of the epistemological profile of the science of metaphysics and the profound revision of the content of the canonical text on this subject; the sharp novelty and deep impact of its original doctrines; and the distinctive traits that it exhibits with respect to the other Avicennian works on metaphysics, the Ilāhiyyāt represents an unparalleled peak in the history of Western metaphysical thought. On the one hand, it is the last and widest of a series of exegetical transformations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in late antiquity and the Middle Ages. On the other hand, within the Peripatetic tradition it constitutes the first concrete replacement of the Metaphysics with an original treatment of the science of metaphysics, thus granting this latter the possibility of autonomous progress” (p. 161).

In Chapter 8 “Reconciling Religion and Philosophy. Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s (d. 1088) Jāmiʿ al-hikmatayn” (pp. 169-90), Khalil Andani takes into consideration a Persian treatise by the learned Šī‘ī Nāṣir-i Khusraw. The analysis highlights the following topics: Hermeneutics (pp. 172-4); Theology (pp. 174-7); Metaphysics and Cosmogony (pp. 177-80); Cosmology (pp. 180-2); Psychology (pp. 182-6); Epistemology (pp. 186-8); Reconciliation and Restoration (pp. 188-9). Andani’s main focus is on the purpose of the book, which is described as follows: to “reconcile the science of true religion, which is one of the products of the Holy Spirit, with the science of creation, which is one of the necessary concomitants (alā‘iq) of philosophy (Jāmiʿ, § 20, 32)” (p. 171). Andani explains that “By ‘philosophy’ (falsafa), Nāṣir is evidently referring to the Greek...
intellectual heritage stemming from what he refers to as the “deform philosophers” (mutāʾallihān-i falāsifa), namely Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (Jāmiʿ, § 65, 67)” (ibidem). This means in Andani’s view that “while it can be said that the Jāmiʿ al-hikmatayn presents us with Nāsir-i Khusraw’s attempt to reconcile philosophy and religion (i.e., Ismāʿīlī doctrine), it is equally an attempt to restore philosophy to its original state of union with revealed, prophetic wisdom. This type of restorative effort on Nāsir’s part would thus be in keeping with the famous saying in early Islamic thought, “Philosophy springs forth from the niche of prophecy” (yanha u al-ḥikma min mishkāt al-nabuwwa)” (p. 189).

F. Griffith, “Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) Incoherence of the Philosophers” (pp. 191-209) presents al-Ghazālī’s biography and an outline of the Incoherence of the Philosophers with its main topics: the three discussions of the eternity of the world (pp. 200-2), of the bodily resurrection, and of God’s knowledge of particulars (pp. 202-3), followed by the condemnation of these teachings of the philosophers (pp. 203-5). Turning to the discussion of the possible relationship between the “rule of interpretation” and al-Ǧazālī’s strategy of refutation in his Incoherence, Griffith maintains that “In all cases where positions of the falāsifa come in direct conflict with the outward text of revelation, their truth depends on whether or not they are supported by demonstrative proofs. If they are, according to al-Ğazālī’s judgment, unproven, he may include these philosophical teachings in his Incoherence and point to their shortcomings. If positions of the falāsifa can be supported by valid demonstrative proofs, al-Ğazālī would not include them in his Incoherence but very likely adopt them in his own theological works” (p. 206).

After his presentation of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, “a crucial stage in the early engagement of Muslim theologians with the Avicennan system that began with al-Ğazālī” (p. 192), Frank Griffith has authored also Chapter 10, “Ismāʿīlī Critique of Ibn Sīnā: Al-Shahrastānī’s (d. 1153) Wrestling-Match with the Philosophers” (pp. 210-32). Griffith provides the context of the religious background of al-Šahrastānī, examining the issue of his alleged Ismāʿīlism. “It was only in the 1960s that researchers in Iran unearthed al-Šahrastānī’s Ismāʿīlī sympathies. It took a few decades for this revised view to be accepted by scholars both in the East and in the West. The degree of commitment that he showed toward Ismāʿīlism, however, as well as how he managed to square that with the Ashʿarism he was educated in and that he put forward in some of his works, is still a largely unstudied subject” (p. 215). A comparison follows between the Wrestling Match and al-Gazālī’s Incoherence: “One of the main differences between al-Ğazālī and al-Šahrastānī is that while the former disputes with Ibn Sīnā only on the level of his teachings, the latter also disputes on the level of his texts and how he presents these teachings. Ibn Sīnā simply ‘ought to have said’ such and such given his stated aim. Here, al-Šahrastānī criticizes Ibn Sīnā’s on the semantic level of what words ought to mean” (p. 218). The issue resurfaces at the end of the chapter (p. 225-7). The core of the chapter is the analysis of al-Šahrastānī’s “Ismāʿīl objections” to Ibn Sīnā, and Griffith reaches the conclusion that “Al-Šahrastānī’s Wrestling Match is a thoroughly Ismāʿīlī work that may have had little or no influence among Ashʿarites. It clearly advances Ismāʿīlī theology and philosophy” (p. 229).

Chapter 11 by T. Kukkonen consists in a discussion of the contents of the only extant, still very famous work of “Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185): Hāyī ibn Yaquẓan” (pp. 233-54). Kukkonen briefly introduces the reader to the Almohad religious revivalism (pp. 234-5). Then, the following doctrinal points are taken into consideration: physics and metaphysics (pp. 239-43), soul and God (pp. 243-7), ethics and religion (pp. 247-51). As he did in his Ibn Tufayl. Living the Life of Reason (Oxford 2014), Kukkonen emphasises Ibn Tufayl’s originality: “The handful of philosophical issues Ibn Tufayl allows to remain in dispute – spontaneous generation, the eternity of the world, individual immortality – constitute such well-known controversies in twelfth-century intellectual life as to make any false front of enforced harmony unsellable. But in each of these cases, too, a specific strategy is deployed that allows Ibn Tufayl to present philosophical wisdom as a coherent and mostly uniform tradition” (p. 239).

J. Walbridge, “Suhrawardi’s (d. 1191) Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne: The Relationship of Illuminationism and the Peripatetic Philosophy” (pp. 255-77) focuses on the rejection of the Peripatetic theory of essential definition, the rejection of hylomorphism, the intentionality of existence and other similar concepts, the affirmation of the Platonic Forms, and reincarnation” representing “basic disagreements with Avicenna in four areas of philosophy: logic, physics, metaphysics, and philosophical theology” (p. 263). Walbridge’s starting point is Ibn Kammūna’s view that Suhrawardī’s works “form a coherent whole in which the mature Peripatetic works and The Philosophy of Illumination can be understood in terms of each other” (p. 261). According to
Walbridge, instead, a work such as *The Intimations* could contain doctrines identical to or in dialogue with the doctrines of *The Philosophy of Illumination*” (p. 263). This leads Walbridge to conclude that “This interpretation of the interrelations among the works has implications for the interpretation of the system as a whole. Most important, the Peripatetic works cannot simply be ignored, for they set up the problem to which *The Philosophy of Illumination* is responding and work out the details. Moreover, there is a large overlap between the Illuminationist philosophy and the Peripatetic Avicennism to which Suhrawardi is responding. (...) It is necessary to consider works such as *The Philosophy of Illumination* in the light of the Peripatetic works, works by other Illuminationists (...), and the philosophical works that form the context of Suhrawardi's system, notably Avicenna, his commentators, and the other philosophers roughly contemporary with Suhrawardi” (pp. 273-4).

In her chapter “Averroes (d. 1198), *The Decisive Treatise*” (pp. 278-95) C. Belo outlines the main points of Averroes' biography and works before discussing the *Decisive Treatise*. In the wake of recent scholarship that presents this work as a legal opinion by an Averroes who addresses as a jurist the question of the legal status of the study of philosophy, Belo comes to the conclusion that “This work is a manifest in defense of Islamic philosophy in a Sunnī context, and possibly the most explicit text to propose such a goal in the medieval period. Averroes avails himself of his training as a jurist and a philosopher in order to seek to establish philosophy as a legitimate Islamic science. However, the fact that philosophy remains accessible only to a minority of Muslims and that its theories must be hidden from the majority, coupled with the previous charges leveled against it by theologians and other religious scholars, made Averroes's task exceedingly difficult” (p. 294).

Chapter 14 by A. Shihadeh deals with “Al-Rāzī's (d. 1210) Commentary on Avicenna's Pointers. The Confluence of Exegesis and Aporetics” (pp. 296-325). Shihadeh presents his chapter as a reply to the "self-fulfilling assumption" that "al-Rāzī's work was effectively a sequel to the Tabāfut, and as such a second instalment in a sustained attack on Avicenna's teachings in defense of Ash'arī orthodoxy, and that thanks in large part to al-Ṭūsī's efforts, his predecessors' attack did not result in a complete rout of philosophy, which consequently managed to survive in some form or other (...) reinforcing the portrayal of al-Rāzī merely as the Ash'arī critic of Avicenna" (p. 296). Shihadeh's presentation of Rāzī's commentary is oriented by the purpose to present "a somewhat iconoclastic reading, one that steers clear of the grand narrative and interprets the Sharḥ, not in the light (and shadow) of any traditional canon of classics, but in the proper, chronologically narrower intellectual context of the text's genesis, and by its own yardstick" (p. 297).

J. McGinnis, "Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) Sharḥ al-Išārāt" (pp. 326-47) offers an overview of al-Ṭūsī's commentary on Avicennian *al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*, with a special focus on sections (nimāt) IV, “On Existence and Causes”, and V, “On Production and Creation”. These are "arguably the 'most metaphysical' sections of the *Išārāt*" (p. 330). The assumption that “al-Ṭūsī's interpretation of the metaphysics of the *Išārāt* is simply al-Ṭūsī's own metaphysics” justifies the fact that McGinnis deliberately does "not try to distinguish the historical Avicenna from Ṭūsī's Avicenna" (ibidem). The doctrinal points taken into consideration by Street are: Ontology (pp. 330-5), Cosmology (pp. 335-43), Metaethics (pp. 344-5). The conclusion is that "Iftal-Ṭūsī is correct, the *Išārāt*, far from being an irreverent book, as many thought, is a highly religious work. For the shift to action theory and metaethics provides the philosophical basis for the applied ethics of the *Išārāt's* final sections. Moreover, the ethical *mores* that are elaborated there just are the Five Pillars of Islam: the *Shahāda*, five daily prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage. Also in these *nimāt*, if one takes al-Ṭūsī seriously, Avicenna provides a metaphysical, or naturalized, framework for understanding other traditional Islamic religious practices such as the stations of the knower or mystic (*maqāmāt al-ārif*). Given that Islam is more like Judaism than Christianity in its preference for orthopraxy over orthodoxy, the *Išārāt*’s substantiation of Islamic legal practices, at least as al-Ṭūsī reads the *Išārāt*, would have made it an important work in Islamic philosophical theology” (p. 345). Chapter 16, “Kātibī (d.1277), Taḥtānī (d.1365) and the *Shamsiyya*” (pp. 348-74) by T. Street analyses Kātibī's *Epistle for Shams al-Din on the Rules of Logic* (*Shamsiyya*). First Street compares "its structure, style, and contents in broad terms with that of Avicenna's *Pointers and Reminders*, because *Pointers* is the text from which, in the last analysis, it is descended” (p. 351). Then he focuses on “how the *Shamsiyya* relates to the thirteenth century project to present logic as an Aristotelian science” (p. 351). The chapter comprises a table of contents of the *Shamsiyya* (pp. 366-7), and a concordance among Taḥtānī, *Taḥyir*, and Rescher, *Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic* (Dordrecht 1967).
A. Dhanani, “Al-Mawûqiq fi ʿilm al-kalâm by ʿAdûd al-Ḍîn al-Ījî (d. 1355), and Its Commentaries” (pp. 375-96) focuses on this theological text which is described as “the most influential text of postclassical Sunnî kalâm” (p. 375). Dhanani argues that “Al-Ījî’s unstated aim, which underlies his more detailed yet terse exposition in al-Mawûqiq, is to present the overarching theories and specific positions of the rival explanatory systems of falsafa and kalâm” (p. 376). According to Dhanani, on the grounds of al-Ījî’s account of the ontology of the philosophers “There can be little doubt that for al-Ījî, this formulation derived from Ibn Sînâ, although the term ‘necessarily existent’ (wâjiḥ al-wujûd) is found in pre-Avicennan kalâm texts” (p. 381). This leads Dhanani to conclude that “The examination of the distinction between essence and existence and the question of the priority of the one over the other is a topic that is not found in the exposition of classical kalâm. It belongs to postclassical kalâm, influenced as it is by the conceptual framework and technical language of Avicenna. That is not to say that the Avicennan formulation was received without question. Rather it was appropriated, and as such merited critique, questioning, and refinement. While al-Ījî’s examination benefited from the previous scholarship of authors like Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî, it is nonetheless characteristically his own. Even though al-Ījî does not indicate a preference for one of the three responses that he discusses, it is clear from his analysis that if, as a mutakallim, one were to deny mental existence, then the first response, attributed to al-ʿAsh’ârî, is the preferred position” (p. 384).

S. Schmidte, “Ibn Abî Jumhûr al-ʿAbsâʾî (d. after 1491) and his Kitâb Muḥfî Miwrât al-munjî” (pp. 397-414) focuses on the magnum opus of this Imāmî theologian, pointing out that “taking into consideration his entire œuvre in the field of kalâm, Ibn Abî Jumhûr developed over his lifetime from a conventional theologian whose doctrinal views were predominantly characterized by Muʿtazilite notions, as was typical for Imāmî theologians up to his time, into a thinker who predominantly maintained philosophical and mystical notions. This having been said, the concern to mediate between opposing views of different strands of thought, be it within the field of kalâm or beyond, is a trait that characterizes his entire oeuvre in this field” (p. 403). Conversely, “in his Muḥfî Ibn Abî Jumhûr argues for a middle position between determinism and free will on the basis of the mystical notion of unity of existence. Considered from the level of the revealed law (martabat al-shariʿa), the actions of man are attributable to him. From the more elevated point of view, the level of being, which allows a deeper insight into the true existential unity (mutaʿammîq fi l-tawhîd al-wujûd al-haqiqi), all multiplicity (katbra) vanishes and the observer grasps that all is included in divine providence. The true understanding of the intermediary position between determinism and free will implies both levels of consideration simultaneously” (p. 409).

R. Pourjavady, “Jâlî al-Ḍîn al-Dawānî (d. 908/1502), Glosses on ‘Alâʾ al-Ḍîn al-Qâshî’s Commentary on Nasîr al-Ḍîn al-Ṭûsî’s Taṭrîd al-iʿtiqâd” (pp. 415-37) presents first al-Dawānî’s biography and works (pp. 416-18). Then he provides the context, by considering the background of al-Dawânî’s Glosses on al-Qâshî’s Commentary on the “Epitome of Belief” (Taṭrîd al-iʿtiqâd) by Naṣîr al-Ḍîn al-Ṭûsî. After this, he turns to the explanation of al-Dawânî’s solution of the liar paradox. “Dawânî explains that every statement signifies a relation (nîshaʿ) in reality (amr waʿâqiʿ) between subject and predicate. It is on the basis of the correctness of this relation that we evaluate the statement as true or false. The problem with the paradoxical sentence is that, on the one hand, it purports to signify a relation, as all genuine statements do, and, on the other hand, the relation between the subject and predicate is not genuine”. The reception of al-Dawânî’s Glosses is then examined. “The glosses of Dawânî and the subjects of his disputes with Dashtaki were brought to the attention of the Indian scholars by migrant Shiraz-trained scholars. (...) Dawânî’s teachings were also known in the Ottoman lands, where scholars seem to have known his philosophical contributions from a very early period” (p. 434).

S. Rizvi, “Mir Dâmâd’s (d. 1631) al-Qabasâr. The Problem of the Eternity of the Cosmos” (pp. 438-64) offers an analysis of Mir Dâmâd’s doctrine of the perpetual creation in al-Qabasâr, a treatise which according to Rizvi “reflects his mature and perhaps final doctrine late in like and at the end of the reign of Shah ‘Abbâs” (p. 448). Special attention is paid to “the Avicennan substrate (...) of his definition of temporality and creation”. This analysis elicits the conclusion that “Mir Dâmâd’s theory assumes a processual nature of reality in which everything is in flux and all entities are dynamic and not static. While it is a product of his intellectual formation and stands upon the shoulders of the Greeks and classical Islamic thinkers, he is not a conventional thinker in the slightest. It might even be tempting to label his views as consistent with late Neoplatonism.
But he moved that paradigm and expressed key concerns as a theological thinker from a Shīʿī context reacting to mature Islamic Platonist/Neoplatonist traditions in the Safavid period. What may be significant is that no thinker in the Safavid period upheld the eternity of the world as Avicenna had. This may be because the notion of philosophy has loosened to encompass theology and mysticism and commitment to a ‘religious life’, and certainly postulating that the world was eternal seemed to belie the Qurʾān and many famous sayings of the Shīʿī imams” (p. 456).

In Chapter 21 “Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 1635) Divine Witnesses” (pp. 465-87), C. Bonmariage aims to present the method and ideas of this prolific author through the analysis of “his smaller comprehensive book as entry point to his thought, the Ṣawāḥib al-rubūbiyya” (p. 465). In Bonmariage’s view, this work “presents a complete cycle of Schörl’s understanding of reality, in comparison with treatises centred on one topic, such as the Risāla fi ḥudūth al-ʿālam or the Masbāḥ” (p. 468).

In Chapter 22 “The Sullam al-ʿulām of Muḥibb Allāh al-Bihārī (d. 1707)” (pp. 488-508), A.Q. Ahmed engages in a comparative assessment of the work of the Indian Ḥanāfī scholar al-Bihārī. Ahmed’s conviction is that if the Sullam “reflects the structure and contents of the leading madrasa textbooks, such as al-Kātibī’s Shamsiyā”, it also departs “from the earlier tradition in significant ways”, and “may be considered as a collection of sites posited deliberately to exercise scholars in a diachronic and synchronic system of debate” (p. 507).

Kh. El-Rouayheb, “Ahmad al-Mallawi (d. 1767): ‘Commentary on the versification of the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions’” (pp. 509-34) deals with the works of the Egypt-born learned scholar and poet Mallawi. El-Rouayheb claims that “the works of Mallawi also serve as a corrective to both Rescher’s assumption that the teaching of logic in these late centuries [scil. 17th-18th cent.] “was merely a matter of passing on received set of doctrines with little or no critical reflection”, and “to the thesis advanced by Peter Gran (...) that the study of logic had languished in Egypt before being revived by Hassan al-ʿAttār” (d. 1250/1835) in the early nineteenth century” (p. 527).

J. McGinnis and A.Q. Ahmed present “Faḍl-ʾi Ḥaqq Khayrābādi’s (d. 1861) al-Hadiyya al-saʿīdiyya” (pp. 535-59) as “the last independent work written within the Arabic-Islamic tradition of physics” (p. 535). This work is located “at the far end of a line of physics textbooks that can be traced back to the Ishārat of Avicenna (980-1037) and the Hidāyat al-ḥikma of al-Abharī (1200-1265)” (p. 536). The authors highlight the importance of the reception of the Aristotelian physics in the Arabic-Islamic literature on natural philosophy, “a tradition that begins with Aristotle, undergoes radical reinterpretation at the hands of Avicenna, and is subsequently submitted to intense criticism by such notable figures as Abū l-Barakāt, Fakhr al-Din al-Rażī, Qāḍī Mīr al-Maybudī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. In this panorama, the textbook al-Hadiyya al-saʿīdiyya counts for them as “a terminus, if not a road map, for those interested in the history of what might be called ‘Islamic natural philosophy’ ” (p. 554). The Appendix (pp. 555-57) contains “basic information for making comparisons among the three works [i.e. Avicenna’s Ishārat, the Hidāyat al-ḥikma and the al-Hadiyya al-saʿīdiyya]” (p. 554).

A presentation of the philosophical poem the Blazes of Pearls follows, by F. Fena, “Hajj Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī (d. 1878), Gbur al-ʿfarāʾid” (pp. 560-85), with an analysis of its role in the development of the School of Isfahan and the fortuna of Mullā Ṣadrā’s “trascendent philosophy”. The Blazes of Pearls is “a didactic poem on various branches of philosophy” (p. 562) adhering “to the system of the transcending philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, notwithstanding certain specific criticisms of some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s arguments and positions and an inclination toward the Illuminationist tradition” (p. 563).

In the subsequent chapters the focus is on the debate on the compatibility of Islam and science and formal logic. Five modern works defend such a compatibility. Chapter 26 is devoted to “Ali Sedad Bey’s (d. 1900) Kavâidu’t-Taḥâvvülât fî harekâti’z-Zerrât (Principles of Transformation in the Motion of Particles)” (pp. 586-606). The author, N. Muhtaroglu, deals with “modern science in relation to Islamic occasionalism”. Challenging the idea that the Islamic worldview is not compatible with modern science (to mention only the most blatant example, with Darwin’s theory of evolution), Muhtaroglu claims that the Ottoman Ašʿārīe school of kalām whose foundational theses represent the Islamic worldview”, and that “there are two main scientific components of the argument for this claim:
the theory of atomism and the idea of energy” (p. 600). An overview of “The Intellectual Atmosphere of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman World” (pp. 588-92) concludes the chapter.

The Indian Muslim poet-philosopher reformer Muhammad Iqbal is presented by M. Mir, “Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938): The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam” (pp. 607-28). A survey of Iqbal’s attempt to “reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical tradition of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge” (p. 609) makes M. Mir conclude that “Iqbal’s attitude toward that thought [sic. the Western one] is balanced in the sense that Iqbal takes neither a slavish nor a dismissive view of the dominant Western civilization, and so considers the body of Western thought an integral part of the larger and inevitable movements of progress of human thought with which Muslims must come to terms” (p. 623).

Chapter 28 by S.J. Agha, “Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d. 1979) on the Logical Foundations of Induction” (pp. 629-53), deals with the “main philosophical work” (p. 630) of al-Sadr, a twentieth-century Iraqi Shi‘i jurist and philosopher, and “his so-called subjectivistic doctrine” in epistemology (ibid.). Agha’s analysis leads to the conclusion that “it is remarkable that there is nothing peculiar Islamic about Sadr’s approach and the content of what he writes in his treatise. It may as well have been written by a Christian philosopher concerned to defend religious faith against the perceived threat of scientific modes of reasoning by developing an entire epistemology based on an analysis of inductive reasoning” (author’s emphasis, p. 652). It is Agha’s claim that “the division between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Western’ philosophy may be artificial to begin with, given the two traditions’ common roots and concerns, their overlapping and crisscrossing histories, and their similar methods and tools” (p. 652).

Chapter 29, “Allama Tabataba’i (d. 1981), Nihayat al-hikma” (pp. 654-75) by S. Rizvi and A. Bdaiwi presents “the thought of the Iranian Shi‘i philosopher and exegete Sayyid Muhammad Husaym Tabataba’i” (p. 654). According to Rizvi and Bdaiwi, Tabataba’i is “arguably the most important and influential” among the Shi‘i thinkers “of the twentieth century, for his efforts in establishing the study of philosophy at the heart of the Shi‘i seminary curriculum” (p. 654). His Nihayat al-hikma was a key Shi‘i school-text in philosophy and theology, and “represents the culmination of Tabataba’i’s philosophical contribution to the seminary” (p. 661).

Chapter 30 by M.A. Khalidi, “Zaki Najib Mahmud (d. 1993), Nahwa Falsafa ‘Ilmiyya (Towards a Scientific Philosophy)” (pp. 676-94) presents the peculiar version of logical empiricism of the early writings of the twentieth-century Egyptian scholar Zaki Najib Mahmud, focusing on the contents of his Nahwa Falsafa ‘Ilmiyya.

An Index of Names (pp. 695-97; modern names are not included), and an Index of Terms (pp. 699-700) conclude this useful volume.

A chapter on the translations of scientific and philosophical texts from Greek, that would surely have been useful for the purpose of the book, is lacking. It is well known that scholars disagree about the role of the Greek sources in ‘Islamic’ philosophy: some consider the Qur‘an as the main source of inspiration for Islamic philosophy, claiming that falsafa did not come from the encounter of Muslim intellectuals with Greek scientific and philosophical heritage (e.g. S.H. Nasr, “The Meaning and Concept of Philosophy in Islam”, in History of Islamic Philosophy, I-II, Routledge, London - New York 1996, pp. 21-26). Others side with the opinion that what gave rise to the intellectual tradition of Islamic philosophy was the so-called ‘movement of translation from Greek’ (e.g. R. Walzer, “The Rise of Islamic Philosophy”, Orients 3 [1950], pp. 1-19; “L’éveil de la philosophie islamique”, Revue des Études Islamiques 38 [1970], pp. 7-42; 207-41). A momentous interplay took place between the doctrines of the Muslim learned men and the Greek sources made available in Arabic translation. To provide the reader with an idea of what was translated at different times would have been vital, in my opinion, for the understanding of the multifarious intellectual life narrated in this volume. This is especially regrettable in consideration of the fact that in several occasions the complex doctrines expounded in so many centuries and across the many lands of Islam cannot be understood if not against the background of the interplay with Greek philosophy that took place in the formative period of Islamic philosophical thought.

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