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Cover

Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 300, f. 1v
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, *grec* 1853, f. 186v

others that claimed to possess superior wisdom” (p. 169). Against this backdrop, Hezser moves to a comparison between Palestinian rabbis and Graeco-Roman intellectuals. She remarks first that “Late antique rabbis who lived in the cities of Tiberias, Sepphoris, and Caesarea, that is, in urban contexts that are likely to have constituted the nodal points for the transmission, collection, and editing of rabbinic traditions, would have been interested in presenting themselves to their coreligionists and perhaps also to non-Jews as scholars who were equal or superior to Graeco-Roman and Christian intellectuals whom they encountered in daily life” (p. 170). In Hezser’s opinion, they should be included with full right in the intellectual elites of the time, while they are often overlooked in the literature on the topic: “Rabbis and rabbinic scholarship are usually overlooked by classical scholars focusing on Graeco-Roman and Christian scholarship in the Roman and early Byzantine Empires” (p. 171). However, the practice was to a large extent the same: small circles of disciples gathering under the guidance of a learned teacher. Since Hezser sides with those scholars who consider that the “ultimate goal” of the Graeco-Roman philosophers was “to provide students with guidance in life”, she sees no difference in this regard with Rabbinic schools. “Like Graeco-Roman philosophy and Christian monastic teaching, rabbinic instruction was practically oriented” (p. 173). Another common feature is what Hezser calls “identity creation”, a “shared *paideia*” that created “an elite consciousness”. After a survey of the relationship between the Palestinian Rabbinic schools and the second Sophistic, she concludes that the two cultural phenomena “seem to have shared an interest in using cultural traditions of the past to create particular Jewish and Hellenic identities” (p. 176), perhaps in the aim to constitute “a Jewish alternative to what they considered ‘Greek wisdom’” (p. 177).

As stated in the general introduction, the aim of this volume is that of “reinforcing the interconnected nature of scholarship in antiquity” (p. 6), and this is indeed something which arises in a clear and informative manner from the interesting papers gathered here. Aspects to be taken into further consideration and for understandable reasons underrepresented in this volume are the rise of schools, especially in the field of philosophy, and the connected rise, typology and evolution of the commentary tradition.

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C. Lévy, J.-B. Guillaumin (eds.), *Plato Latinus. Aspects de la transmission de Platon en latin dans l'Antiquité. Actes des Diatribai de Gargnano*, Brepols, Turnhout 2018 (Philosophie hellénistique et romaine, 8), 340 pp.

In their Introduction (pp. 7-29) the editors Carlos Lévy and Jean-Baptiste Guillaumin place this volume under the aegis of Cicero’s label “the Platonic and Socratic family” (*Tusc.*, 1, 55 quoted p. 10 fn. 12). To explore the spread in the Latin language between the 1st century b.C. and the 6th century AD of this remote forerunner of Ficinus’ *Platonica familia* means for them, as for several of the authors of this interesting volume, to discuss Cicero’s multifaceted Platonism and its heritage. “L’histoire du platonisme latin étant fortement tributaire de l’œuvre philosophique de Cicéron, la première partie de cette présentation étudie l’importance du legs cicéronien dans l’histoire de la philosophie platonicienne en langue latine. (...) En forçant à peine, on pourrait dire que Cicéron a transmis à la philosophie romaine non pas un, mais plusieurs Platons entremêlés, d’une manière qui apparaît parfois comme un défi à la perspicacité de l’historien interprète” (pp. 7-8). Plato’s unique place in the history of philosophy consists for Cicero in that his thought instantiates “l’impératif d’une recherche qui ne craint pas l’erreur, puisque celle-ci est considérée comme la conséquence inéluctable de la finitude humaine” (p. 10). In presenting their vision of Cicero’s stance, the editors identify the continuity-versus-discontinuity issue of the school of Plato as the core question faced by 1st century BC Platonism. “L’Académie, elle, présentait deux versions de son histoire et de sa pensée. Dans l’une,

Arcésilas et Carnéade n'avaient fait que développer les germes de doute déjà présents chez Socrate et chez Platon, dans l'autre, ils avaient dénaturé la pensée platonicienne en proclamant l'incapacité non seulement des sens mais également de l'intellect à parvenir à des conclusions sûres" (p. 14). Against this background, "si l'on essaie de trouver une cohérence aux visions parfois contradictoires que Cicéron donne de Platon, il convient de reprendre les trois parties de la philosophie, qui représentaient le cadre pour ainsi dire inévitable pour quelqu'un qui avait été formé par des maîtres qui avaient recueilli les traditions des grandes écoles hellénistiques" (p. 17). Cicero sets the scene for the Latin reception of Platonism, even though "Il serait (...) illusoire d'imaginer un 'Platon latin' aux contours bien définis et constants dans l'ensemble de la littérature latine antique" (p. 19). This is because "il convient de considérer sur le même plan d'une part la diffusion à l'intérieur de la littérature latine d'un 'Platon latin' construit sur des rapports supposés directs à l'œuvre de Platon, et d'autre part les différentes adaptations latines des phases successives du platonisme grec – ces deux dimensions pouvant du reste s'influencer mutuellement au gré de l'évolution des horizons d'attente de chaque époque. (...) Au sens large, le corpus platonicien susceptible d'être considéré du point de vue de sa réception latine comprend donc aussi bien les dialogues de Platon proprement dits que l'ensemble des exégèses et réinterprétations qui viennent s'y ajouter durant le demi-millénaire qui sépare la Nouvelle Académie du néoplatonisme tardif" (pp. 21-2). And it is to this very interesting range of problems that this volume is devoted. It results in part from papers delivered on the occasion of the sixth meeting of the *Diatribai* held in Gargnano in 2011, and in part from the reprint of seminal studies of the past decennia.

In his "Antiochus of Ascalon on Epistemology in the Academic Tradition" (pp. 31-67) T. Reinhardt examines a passage – *Tusc.* 1, 56-58 – which is often taken as an example of Cicero's syncretism between the Platonic and Stoic accounts of how to reach knowledge. "Two features of this text are usually invoked in support of such views: the first is the expression *quasi consignatas in animis notiones*, which commentators relate to the use of the image of imprinting in the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression (...), the second is the relative clause *quas ἐννοίας uocant*, where scholars take 'them' to be the Stoics" (p. 35). In Reinhardt's opinion, neither the first expression entails allegiance to the Stoic doctrine of knowledge as imprinting, nor does the second point to the Stoics alone: Cicero may well be referring to Plato himself (*Phaed.* 73 C 1 – D 1). The discussion of *Ac.* 1, 30-32 (Plato), 1, 33-34 (Aristotle and Theophrastus), and 1, 40-42 (Zeno), namely the three passages where Varro voices Antiochus' account of the epistemology of the *ueteres*, lends support to an interpretation of the Platonic forms, which according to Reinhardt, is shaped by the *Theaetetus*. In Cicero's report, Antiochus sides with "a conceptualist view of forms and locates *scientia* in our concepts, in their use and in reflection on them, while making the availability of evidence from the senses as a necessary condition for the *iudicium ueritatis*. This view, I suggested, is developed from *Thet.* 182-187. Aristotle then undermined forms (identified with concepts) by deriving concepts from sense-perception (...). Zeno's conception of *κατάληψις* as assent to a cataleptic impression (...) is presented as a version of the view (...) that knowledge, while residing in mind, can only be obtained with the help of sense-perception. (...) His doctrine of the cataleptic impression can be read as the successful response to a challenge posed in the *Thet.*" (p. 63). If one compares this view with other Ciceronian passages dealing with epistemological issues (*Luc.* 30 and *Fin.* 4, 8-10), one is entitled to conclude that for Cicero "Antiochus identified the need for the mind and the senses to work together to obtain knowledge as one of the continuities in the Academic tradition" (p. 65).

The two subsequent papers deal with ethics and politics. The article by F. Renaud, "Le projet platonicien d'une rhétorique philosophique et son rapport à la politique chez Cicéron" (pp. 69-87) has as its starting point the passage of the *Gorgias* where Plato opposes the *ἀληθινὴ ῥητορικὴ* to the empty flattery of a public speech not inspired by science (*Gorg.* 517 A 5). "La synthèse cicéronienne

d'une rhétorique philosophique gagne en relief et en spécificité si on la comprend comme une réponse à Platon, en particulier au *Gorgias*" (p. 69). Parting company with the scholarship that refuses to see Cicero as a philosopher, let alone a Platonist, Renaud sets Cicero's "platonisme sélectif" (p. 70) against the backdrop of the variety of options which characterise the history of Platonism. In addition, Renaud sets himself the task to show that, notwithstanding the criticism of Socrates' rejection of rhetoric expounded by Cicero in the *De Oratore*, "Platon est l'un des principaux interlocuteurs de Cicéron" (p. 70). Plato is both criticised for his aversion to eloquence and praised for having invented the dialogue, that perfect mix of form and content that surpasses any other literary genre. Still, Plato and the other philosophers fail to take into account the nature of public speech; as a consequence, they are doomed to inanity: "Platon a beau être de loin le premier (*princeps*) par le charme et la gravité, son style n'a ni le nerf ni le mordant de l'éloquence du forum (...). Les philosophes en général s'adressent uniquement à des gens instruits dont ils aiment mieux calmer les passions que les exciter. (...) En un mot, leur grande erreur, à l'instar de Socrate, est le refus du *decorum*, l'adaptation au contexte, la distinction entre discours privé et discours public. (...) Les avertissements que Calliclès adresse à Socrate concernant les dangers que ce dernier court sans les armes de la rhétorique n'ont aucune valeur pour lui; ils sont même signe de servilité, preuve d'un attachement excessif à la simple survie. La condamnation de Socrate pose néanmoins problème pour la philosophie. Cette condamnation révèle l'incapacité de surmonter la résistance du grand nombre à l'auto-examen et à la vie philosophique. Certes, Socrate reste fidèle à lui-même et à la philosophie, à la vertu. Mais cette fidélité reste largement sans fruit pour la cité: la philosophie reste menacée et réservée au petit nombre" (pp. 85 and 86-87).

With the paper by F. Prost, "Le *Laelius* de Cicéron et le *Lysis* de Platon" (pp. 89-103) we remain, broadly speaking, within the same field. Prost is aware that the relationship of Cicero's dialogue *Laelius* with the *Lysis* is not acknowledged in scholarship. "La parenté de sujet (...) peut elle-même être mise en doute. La multiplicité et la spécificité des sens donnés par Socrate aux termes *philos* et *philia*, qui constituent un défi à la traduction, laissent volontiers à penser qu'il ne s'agit qu'accidentellement de ce que Cicéron appelle *amicus* et *amicitia* (...). Et conséquemment, ne parlant peut-être pas de la même chose, Cicéron et Platon peuvent paraître n'en pas dire de choses comparables: bien des idées avancées par Socrate ne semblent trouver aucun écho chez Cicéron, qui évolue pour sa part dans un champ de réflexion apparemment fort éloigné des préoccupations structurant le texte platonicien". This notwithstanding, a comparison of the structure of the two dialogues and an outline of the topics dealt in them elicit, in Prost's view, the conclusion that for Cicero, as well as for Plato, "la relation entre individus en présence n'est pas le tout de la relation d'*amicitia*, même si elle en constitue bien entendu la forme à la fois la plus manifeste et la plus importante. Dans son essence (c'est toute la leçon du *Laelius*) elle procède d'une commune aspiration au bien et d'une admiration réciproque pour la vertu qui en garantit l'assise morale. (...) La qualité morale des amis devient alors, bien entendu, l'enjeu central de la réflexion, tant chez Platon que chez Cicéron" (p. 100).

A foundational study published in 1977 by the late lamented P.L. Donini (1940-2020), "Le fonti medioplatoniche di Seneca: Antioco, la conoscenza e le idee" is reprinted here (pp. 105-23). It was also included some ten years ago in his selected papers (*Commentary and Tradition. Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* ed. by M. Bonazzi, De Gruyter, Berlin – New York 2011 [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina. Quellen und Studien, 4], pp. 297-313). First Donini outlines the scholarly debates about the sources of Seneca's philosophical tenets in the *Epistles* 58 and 65. Antiochus of Ascalon is the best candidate as a source of inspiration for the account of the Platonic Forms and their epistemological role provided by Seneca in both epistles. Now, even the most recent scholarship – including that of the volume under consideration here – agrees that "il problema piú complesso che ogni tentativo di ricostruzione della dottrina di Antioco di Ascalona ha

dovuto affrontare è quello della teoria della conoscenza. I termini della questione si possono riassumere semplicemente contrapponendo le due teorie che due diversi testi ciceroniani sembrano attribuire ad Antioco: una teoria fortemente sensistica e apparentemente stoica si incontra negli *Academica priora* (= *Lucullus*), una teoria che sembra far posto alle idee e che limita, se proprio non respinge, la validità della conoscenza sensibile compare invece negli *Academica posteriora* (= *Varro*)” (p. 106). This question bears heavily on the interpretation of Seneca’s stance. A solution to the mutual inconsistency of the two accounts may consist in crediting Antiochus with the identification of the Stoic λόγοι σπερματικοί and the thoughts of God; however, Donini highlights that it is Seneca, and not Cicero, who is speaking of “thoughts of God”, with the additional problem that Seneca, on his part, does not mention Antiochus: “La terza soluzione identifica appunto con le idee platoniche le ragioni seminali presenti nella divina ragione ignea degli stoici: sfugge così ad alcune delle obiezioni fatali per le altre due proposte, anche se ha il difetto di presupporre come certa per Antioco la dottrina delle idee come pensieri di Dio che Cicerone non gli attribuisce esplicitamente, e che Theiler gli attribuisce solo muovendo da Seneca, il quale non fa il nome di Antioco” (p. 110). The discussion of the various and, at times, conflicting positions in the scholarship on Antiochus and, in particular, on the place he assigned to Aristotle paves the way for Donini to describe Seneca’s stance as inspired by the topic – typical of Antiochus – of the harmony of the *ueteres* (both Plato and Aristotle): “poiché Cicerone non fa esplicita menzione degli *eide* immanenti, non è arrischiato attribuire alla sintesi di Antioco, e alla filosofia platonica come era intesa da Antioco, anche questa dottrina specificamente aristotelica? (...) Sappiamo (...) che Seneca descrive nelle lettere 68 e 65 un sistema platonico in cui sotto le idee, definite nei termini di Senocrate e concepite come i pensieri di dio, compaiono le forme immanenti di Aristotele (...). Brevemente, la logica che dovrebbe avere il platonismo degli *Academica*, la logica che si intuisce o si induce da *Varro*, corrisponde all’effettiva struttura del sistema descritto da Seneca, dove appunto Platone appare come colui che contiene tutto quel che di buono hanno detto Aristotele e gli Stoici, migliorato però dall’ammissione dei superiori livelli dell’essere che mancano ad Aristotele (e ancor più, si può presumere, agli Stoici)” (pp. 115-16). While details can nowadays be added and individual points of this paper further developed, Donini’s original analysis has, however, lost nothing of its explanatory power.

In 158 AD Apuleius went to trial in Sabratha before the proconsul Claudius Maximus, charged with having practised magic. The *Apology* he wrote on this occasion is discussed by C. Moreschini, “Dio e dèi in Apuleio” (pp. 125-46) in an attempt to identify the prominent features of Apuleius’ theology. According to Moreschini, these are to be found in the pseudo-Platonic *Second Letter*, rather than in the alleged influence of the Hermetism of Apuleius’ times: “In conclusione, Apuleio non ha nessuna notizia dell’ermetismo, ma si muove nell’ambito della tradizione platonica, alla quale, comunque, arreca elementi di novità. (...) Apuleio definisce dio ‘re’, basandosi sulla seconda epistola pseudoplatonica, e attribuisce a questo re trascendente quelle prerogative che saranno riproposte nel *De Platone*, quella di essere causa e origine di tutte le cose (vale a dire creatore e padre) e quindi il concetto della incommensurabilità e ineffabilità di dio. (...) È significativo, se questa epistola pseudoplatonica è un falso neopitagorico del secondo secolo, che i medioplatonici l’abbiano subito utilizzato” (pp. 127-8). From the quotation of the *Second Letter* in Apuleius’ *Apology* Moreschini moves on to his philosophical works which belong to the last part of his life: *De Platone et eius dogmate* and *De Mundo*, i.e. the Latin paraphrastic version of the pseudo-Aristotelian Περὶ κόσμου. In both works, as well as in the *De Deo Socratis* whose date is less certain, Moreschini detects a vision of God and the divine that goes beyond the standard middle-Platonic doctrine of God, Ideas, and Matter as the basic principles of the whole of reality: “In conclusione, Apuleio supera la dottrina dei tre principi: egli non ammette che la materia e le idee siano poste sullo stesso piano di dio, ma stabilisce una gerarchia in cima alla quale è posto dio. Dio è evidentemente il κυριώτατος, come osserva anche

Aezio (*Dox.* p. 309, 15 Diels), la *causa generalis* di Seneca (*Epist.* 65, 12). Sulla stessa linea di pensiero si trovano anche Plutarco (*Def. orac.* 414E) e Tauro ('l'idea non può essere detta principio in senso proprio': cfr. Ioh. Philop., *Aetern. mundi* p. 147.18 ss. Rabe = fr. 23 Gioè). Apuleio, quindi, 'is the first Latin writer to reestablish the metaphysical transcendence characteristic of Ancient Platonism as opposed to the physical transcendence advocated by Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero, Varro, and Seneca' (S. Gersh)" (pp. 133-4). In this vein, Moreschini concludes his paper by presenting Apuleius as one of the best examples of 'Henotheism', understood as an overarching principle governing the many divine forces at work in the cosmos. "Un elemento importante della cultura tardoantica è l'enotheismo, cioè la convinzione filosofico-religiosa che istituisce un'intermediazione tra il dio sommo e l'uomo, e che in quanto richiede l'esistenza di una molteplicità di entità intermedie, si distingue (...) dal monoteismo, che non ammette tale molteplicità" (p. 144).

As Donini's essay summarised above, the paper by A. Setaioli, "La citazione di Plotino in Servio, *ad. Aen.* 9.182" (pp. 147-65) is also a reprint (from the *Giornale italiano di filologia* 67 [2016], pp. 299-322). Setaioli explores the philosophical sources of the commentary that in all likelihood towards the end of the 4th century Servius devoted to the *Aeneid*. In further developing a point he first highlighted in his seminal *La vicenda dell'anima nel commento di Servio a Virgilio*, Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1995, pp. 157-63, esp. p. 158, Setaioli calls attention to Servius' reference to Plotinus in his commentary on the verse where Nisus asks Euryalus "Do the gods put this ardor in our hearts, Or does each man's desire become his god?" (trans. MacKendrik-Howe). In commenting upon this verse, Servius mentions Plotinus' doctrine of the $\delta\alpha\lambda\mu\omega\nu$ as expounded in *Enn.* III 4 [15], *On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit*. Setaioli states from the outset that Plotinus' ideas are to some extent misunderstood by Servius: "L'ampio commento di Servio a Virgilio contiene abbondante materiale riferibile alla *vulgata* culturale della sua epoca e pertanto influenzato in primo luogo da un neoplatonismo che aveva accolto numerosi elementi di matrice meno filosoficamente rigorosa, legati a correnti riconducibili, ad esempio, all'ermetismo, agli *Oracoli Caldei*, e a volte anche a credenze e superstizioni popolari. (...) in queste condizioni, non sorprende che il fondatore del neoplatonismo, vale a dire un pensatore caratterizzato da grande profondità e rigore filosofico come Plotino, venga citato un'unica volta in tutto il commento e per di più (...) in un modo che, se pur dimostra la conoscenza almeno indiretta della sua opera, rappresenta però un fraintendimento e una banalizzazione del suo pensiero" (p. 147). At variance with Plotinus, who maintained that the $\delta\alpha\lambda\mu\omega\nu$ acts in us only because it is our soul which operates (III 4 [15], 5.27-29), Servius thinks that the $\delta\alpha\lambda\mu\omega\nu$ /*genius* is a spiritual entity distinct from and independent of the soul of each human being: "Il testo serviano è abbastanza chiaro sulla concezione che il nostro scoliasta si fa del demone personale: si tratta per lui di un'entità divina (un *genius* o *numen* familiare, cioè un $\omicron\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\alpha\lambda\mu\omega\nu$) distinta dall'anima umana ed esterna ad essa, che viene assegnata ad ogni uomo al momento della nascita (*nobis nascentibus datur*)" (p. 153). A comparison with Porphyry's *Vita Plotini*, Chapter 10, and with Iamblichus' *Response to Porphyry* (*De Myst.* IX 8 = *Réponse à Porphyre*, p. 209 Saffrey-Segonds) allows Setaioli to suggest that Servius did not take inspiration directly from Plotinus' treatise III 4 [15], but rather from Porphyry's interpretation of it. This idea sits well with the opening passage of Servius' scholium: *apud Plotinum philosophum et alios philosophos quaeritur, utrum mentis humanae acies per se ad cupiditates et consilia moveatur an impulsu alicuius numinis*.

The Latin 5th century and its philosophical culture is the backdrop to the essay by J.-B. Guillaumin, "De la représentation mythologique à l'ontologie néoplatonicienne: rôle et statut des dieux chez Martianus Capella" (pp. 167-205). Even though Platonism and Neoplatonism do not overtly take the floor, their influence on the overall picture of the *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* is apparent: "Martianus laisse au lecteur avisé le soin de chercher les clefs allégoriques

permettant d'interpréter l'apothéose de Philologie comme une image de l'ascension de l'âme par et vers la connaissance, dans un cadre néoplatonicien qui, s'il n'est pas présenté dans un exposé théorique au même titre que les sciences, apparaît toutefois fréquemment à travers les détails de la narration" (p. 168). The gods attending the ascent of Philology to the heavens where the weddings will be celebrated bear an unmistakable cosmological and astronomic meaning. "Ces métamorphoses de dieux anthropomorphes en corps célestes peuvent être interprétées comme une mise en scène littéraire de la distinction platonicienne (qui apparaît dans le *Timée* 41 A et dans les *Lois* XI, 930 E – 931 A) entre les dieux visibles qui sont les astres et les dieux traditionnels de la mythologie, dont les hommes forgent des représentations. (...) De fait, au-delà de l'assimilation entre dieux et planètes, c'est un univers rempli de divinités que Martianus donne à voir au moyen de plusieurs listes constituant en quelque sorte une cartographie des êtres divins" (p. 174). A unique principle rules over all of these gods and is named in many ways, all of which refer to the highest level of the cosmic hierarchy. "Ce syncrétisme tendant vers un hénothéisme solaire n'est pas une innovation de Martianus, mais a marqué l'histoire du paganisme philosophique tardo-antique" (p. 178), like Julian's hymn to the God Helios and the "long exposé de théologie solaire" at the beginning of Macrobius' *Saturnales* (*ibid.*). **Philology stands for the rational soul** "ournée principalement vers la raison et la connaissance" (p. 180). A celestial ascent through the degrees of the divine which provide the *vinculum* of the whole cosmos allows the rational soul to be purified and eventually united with the highest God. Guillaumin calls attention to a typically Neoplatonic feature of Martianus' universe: 'after' – so to say – the transcendent first God standing alone in its absolute unity, a multi-layered divine order combines unity and multiplicity. Without this hierarchy of intermediate degrees, it would be impossible for the rational soul to reach the highest God. "La mise en scène littéraire des divinités qui apparaissent dans l'œuvre fournit un panorama des fonctions et des représentations qui leur sont attribuées dans un contexte néoplatonicien fortement marqué par la réinterprétation allégorique des mythes et l'utilisation d'images chaldaïques (...). Au-delà de l'aspect bigarré de la narration et du sérieux-comique propres au genre littéraire de la satire ménippée, le récit des *Noces de Philologie et de Mercure* peut donc être envisagé comme un accès à la 'connaissance du sacré sous le voile pieux de la fiction', selon la définition néoplatonicienne de la *fabula* philosophique que l'on trouve chez Macrobe" (p. 205).

B. Bakhouché, "Les *Hebraica* dans le Commentaire au *Timée* de Calcidius" (pp. 207-32) lists and comments upon the eleven passages where Calcidius has recourse to the Bible, a trait which makes this work a unicum in its literary genre. "Calcidius, qui a traduit et commenté, très vraisemblablement dans le dernier quart du IV^e siècle, le *Timée* de Platon, reste un auteur mystérieux et problématique. Nous ne savons rien de lui et guère plus sur son destinataire. Bien plus, son commentaire est le seul de tous les commentaires philosophiques de l'Antiquité à être émaillé de références bibliques" (p. 207). First Bakhouché draws attention to the fact that the Bible is dealt with as a doxographical source "au même titre que les stoïciens ou Aristote" (p. 212), on issues like the nature of the human soul or the createdness versus eternity of prime matter. In both cases, what Bakhouché labels the "doxographies hébraïques" reflect a traditional arrangement of the sources quoted, thus allowing for the remark that "Que Calcidius s'inspire de Philon, d'Origène ou d'autres, qu'il ait construit lui-même (...) sa propre notice ou qu'il la tire d'une source elle-même exégétique, l'allusion aux doctrines des Hébreux s'inscrit à la fois dans un contexte de mise à distance doxographique (par rapport à l'orthodoxie platonicienne) et dans une tradition d'exégèse du texte sacré" (pp. 214-15). Other passages are not doxographical, though, as is the case when the issue at hand is as crucial as that of the choice between free will and determinism: "pour Calcidius, les Hébreux ne pensent pas autrement que Platon, pour défendre la part de choix qui

reste à l'homme" (p. 218). The Hebrew Scriptures are understood by Calcidius as similar in content to and inspired by the Platonic dialogues. This is of course all but an unprecedented stance among the Platonists of the Christian era. However, at variance with authors like Numenius, who credits Plato with a position in agreement with the Hebrew Scriptures, Calcidius challenges the idea that the Jews came before Plato: "Dans une chronologie inversée, les Hébreux, que Numénus qualifie de 'beaucoup plus anciens', sont considérés par Calcidius comme des 'disciples de Platon (*auditores Platonis*)" (p. 222). Bakhouché then goes on to ponder which version of the Hebrew theological doctrines was influential for Calcidius: "Ces idées ramenées aux juifs et nettement marquées par le dualisme nous permettent d'en conclure que la cohérence d'une pensée qui se développe dans tous les *Hebraica* plaide en faveur de l'idée que Calcidius se réfère toujours au même groupe. Il s'agit dès lors d'identifier ledit groupe. S'agissait-il de gnostiques?" (p. 227). If this is so, a good candidate is the Sethian tradition attested in some fifteen treatises of the library of Nag Hammadi.

The paper by A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic, "*Os illud Platonis*: Platonisme, scepticisme et néoplatonisme dans le *Contra Academicos* d'Augustin" (pp. 233-56) addresses the question of Augustine's vision of the history of the Platonic schools from the vantage point of the *Contra Academicos*. Here Augustine "s'inscrit (...) dans une vision unitariste de l'Académie, soulignant une continuité depuis Platon, conception qu'avaient déjà défendue certains représentants du médioplatonisme, comme Plutarque ou l'auteur du *Commentaire anonyme* du *Théétète*. En effet, loin de dire la Nouvelle Académie infidèle à la doctrine du prestigieux fondateur (...) il cherche au contraire à mettre l'accent sur une continuité qui se fait jour à travers les aléas de l'histoire de la philosophie; cette continuité s'ancre dans l'idée d'un Platon dogmatique, et ce précisément grâce à l'(hypo)thèse du 'dogmatisme ésotérique'; selon celle-ci, les néoacadémiciens auraient professé un scepticisme de façade, afin de dissimuler une doctrine ésotérique qui était transmise secrètement" (p. 235). On the grounds of *C. Acad.*, 2, 1, 1 and 3, 18, 41 Bouton-Touboulic outlines Augustine's idiosyncratic idea of a strategy on the part of the Platonists to preserve their doctrines from the attacks of the Stoics. Once the Stoic school was defeated, there was no reason to keep the secret any longer, and the time came to abandon the fiction upheld by the sceptical Academy. The second passage mentioned above, namely *C. Acad.*, 3, 18, 41 is famously that in which Augustine compares Plato and Plotinus, claiming that the former came to life again in the latter. Two texts belonging to a much later period of Augustine's life, the *Letter* 118 to Dioscorus and Book VIII of the *City of God*, reassess the basic lines of Augustine's history of philosophy already set in place in the *Contra Academicos*, with the difference that the triumphant Platonic school is now seen by Augustine as destined to merge with Christianity. In addition, the topic of the "dogmatisme ésotérique" fades away in the *City of God*: "Cette évolution laisse penser qu'il y avait peut-être chez Augustin à l'origine, dans le *Contra Academicos*, la volonté d'articuler à la religion chrétienne tout à la fois Cicéron et le néoplatonisme, l'*Hortensius* et les *libri Platoniorum* ayant constitué deux moments majeurs dans sa quête progressive de la sagesse" (p. 247). In the final part of her paper, Bouton-Touboulic goes back to the *Contra Academicos* to argue that Augustine challenges the sceptical interpretation of *Phaed.* 66 B and "désigne les néoplatoniciens comme les véritables héritiers de Platon" (p. 252).

Unfortunately, in the volume at hand, the first two pages of the paper entitled "Les questions sur les universaux dans le premier commentaire de Boèce à l'*Isagogè* et le débat Plotin-Porphyre autour de l'*ousia*" by M.-J. Huh appear as pp. 258 and 287 at the end of the paper. After page 288, the article is truncated and the *Bibliography* begins. Huh deals with a vexed question: that of the reception of Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Judging from what is extant, the paper is interesting and one can only hope that another print will be made available.

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