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Cover

Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 300, f. 1v
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, *grec* 1853, f. 186v

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The Remnant of a Questions and Answers Commentary on Aristotle's Categories in Syriac (Vat. Syr. 586)

Sami Aydin*

Abstract

Seven folios at the Vatican Library (*Vat. Syr. 586*) constitute the only remaining part of a manuscript from the 13th century that contained a large commentary on the *Categories* of Aristotle. The text features an exchange between a pupil and a master, where the pupil either puts a question on a certain matter regarding the *Categories* or asks for a clarification to a lemma that is cited from it, to which the master attempts to offer a basic explanation. The extant part of this commentary, which deals with Aristotle's concluding discussion on the category of quantity and his initial presentation of the relatives, with some noteworthy observations, is edited here for the first time from the partially mutilated folios with a translation and some annotations. The question of its date of composition, its possible author and some other relevant points are treated in the introduction.

Introduction

The text that is presented here constitutes the remnant of a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, which is now preserved at the Vatican Library (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Vat. sir. 586*). It has remained unedited until now, but images of the folios that preserve it are accessible.¹ The folios are briefly described by van Lantschoot in his catalogue of the Vatican Syriac manuscripts (nos. 460-631).² The extant part of the manuscript is from the 13th century, written in the Syriac estrangela script and its material is parchment. All the 7 extant folios are unbound and measure 215 x 175 mm. They are written in single-column format and the pages have 31-36 lines. The beginning and the end of the manuscript are lost and the folios are partially mutilated at the top and bottom of the pages. A few letters of the initial words of the top lines are missing and at the bottom, there are lacunas covering anything from a few letters to whole words. The current order of the folios is wrong, the correct order being: 1, 5, 4, 3, 2, 6, 7. Because of the condition of the folios, it is not possible to supply any certain information about the provenance or scribe of the manuscript.

The extant part of this commentary covers Aristotle's *Categories* 6 a 17 - 7 a 4, that is, the last part of Aristotle's discussion on quantity and its properties in chapter 6 of the *Categories* and his

* I wish here to express my gratitude to Daniel King (Cardiff University) and to the anonymous reviewers of *Studia graeco-arabica* for proofreading this contribution and suggesting important improvements to it.

¹ The manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Vat. sir. 586* is available online at https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.sir.586.

² A. van Lantschoot, *Inventaire des manuscrits syriaques des fonds Vatican (490[460]-631)*. Barberini oriental et Neofiti, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1965, p. 113: "586. XIII^e siècle, parch., mm. 215 x 175, ff. 7, ll. 35; *estrangelā*. Questions et réponses concernant les *Catégoriēs* d'Aristote, mutilées du début et de la fin, ... (le texte au bas des pages est partiellement mutilé)".

in Porphyry's short commentary by questions and answers on Aristotle's *Categories* and the dialogue-form commentary of Dexippus on the same book. Their form is ultimately inspired by the philosophical dialogue, which was also adopted for the interpretation of religious works, like Philo of Alexandria's *Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus*.¹⁶ The purpose of the Syriac commentary in question is to clarify most of the passages in Aristotle's *Categories* in an elementary way and it might have been produced and used in an educational setting. The form of the composition and author's designation of the different parts of his commentary shows a clear similarity to how a lesson or a section of a textbook was divided by the late Neoplatonic commentators, first by Olympiodorus and then by Elias-David and Stephanus. As Praechter writes: "A lesson ($\pi\rho\tilde{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$) is divided, insofar as the material allows, into two parts, a general discussion ($\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha$) and an explanation of the text ($\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\xi\iota\varsigma$), of which the first provides an exegesis of a portion of text as regards its main content and its larger context, while the second provides a detailed exegesis focusing on individual sentences and words."¹⁷ The Syriac commentator too designates his more general discussion on the category of quantity (§11) ܠܝܘܩܘܢܝܘܬܐ (< $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha$) and the explanation of the individual passages or lemmas (§ 12 and § 16) ܘܡܡܘܠܐ (< $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\xi\iota\varsigma$), which points towards an arrangement for an analogous educational context.

In its contents, the commentary exhibits a relationship to the exegesis of the Neoplatonist school of Ammonius Hermeiou (d. 517-526) in Alexandria, as will be shown in my annotations (esp. to § 17), but also to that of some later commentators, such as Olympiodorus and Elias (see annotations to §§12-14). In the extant part of this partly catechetical and partly lemmatized commentary we find the incomplete answer of the master to the definition of contrariety as given by Aristotle at *Cat.* 6 a 17f. The exchange of the student with the master proceeds with the presentation of the other properties of the category of quantity (§§ 2-11). The discussion moves on to the category of the relatives, where five preliminary questions connected to this category are treated at first (§§ 12-14). Some nine species of the category of the relatives are then specified (§ 15) before the explanation of the individual lemmas. Relating to the category of the relatives, the statement of Protagoras that "everything is relative" (§ 17) is discussed and Plato's purported refutation of it is presented. Following from that, a definition of the relatives that is attributed to Plato is examined (§ 18). The questions and answers are then centred around the initial lemmas of Aristotle's discussion on relatives in the *Categories* (up to 7 a 4). The text contains some noteworthy observations.

Aristotle's treatise *Categories* became very influential and gave rise to many commentaries from the earliest time of the philosophical commentary tradition around first century BC and onwards.¹⁸

¹⁶ See Dillon's introduction to Dexippus, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Translated by J. Dillon, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1990, pp. 8f.; and also C. Zamagni, "Is the Question-and-Answer Literary Genre in Early Christian Literature a Homogeneous Group?", in M.-P. Bussières (ed.), *La littérature des questions et réponses dans l'Antiquité profane et chrétienne*, Brepols, Turnhout 2013 (Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia, 64), pp. 241-68.

¹⁷ K. Praechter, "Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 18/2 (1909), pp. 516-38 (reprinted in Id., *Kleine Schriften*, ed. H. Dörrie, Olms, Hildesheim 1973, pp. 282-304). English trans.: "Review of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*", in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca - New York 1990; Second Edition, Bloomsbury, London 2016, pp. 31-54, quotation p. 48; see also A.-J. Festugière, "Modes de composition des Commentaires de Proclus", *Museum Helveticum* 20 (1963), pp. 77-100, in part. p. 81. and L.G. Westerink, "Ein astrologisches Kolleg aus dem Jahre 564", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 64 (1971), pp. 6-21, in part. pp. 7f.

¹⁸ H.B. Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators", in Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed* (above, n. 17), pp. 69-81 and R.W. Sharples, "*Habent sua fata libelli*: Aristotle's *Categories* in the First Century BC", *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 48/1-2 (2008), pp. 273-87; see also S. Aydin, *Sergius of Reshaina: In-*

Some commentators attacked the notions expressed in it, while others defended it against those attacks and tried to prove the validity of its teachings. It was placed first in the ancient collection of Aristotelian writings, and Porphyry and most subsequent commentators considered that it should to be studied first by students of Aristotle's works.¹⁹ The text of the *Categories* was popular in the Syriac tradition too and was translated at least three times into Syriac and was much commented on, as also indicated by the extant part of the present commentary.²⁰

There are not many new lexical items in the text and only two forms of the word § 36 ܠܘܥܘܡ and § 43 & 41 ܠܕܘܥܘܡ 'conversion', 'reciprocation' (equivalent to Greek ἀντιστροφή) are not found in the Syriac dictionaries or in other Syriac texts that I have consulted.

Editorial Principles

The edition is critical to some extent, where it has been possible to introduce some emendations particularly to the lemmas cited from the *Categories* in the Syriac translation of Jacob of Edessa, according to the edition of Georr [= J].²¹ However, at a few instances, the text of this commentary seems to give better readings than the edited text of Jacob's translation.²² The scribe of the commentary has sometimes been unable to distinguish where a cited passage begins and where the answer of the master follows, which I have stated and separated in my edition. When just a few letters are missing because of the mutilation of the folios, they have been marked by three dots in parenthesis (...) and when more words are missing, they have been marked by three lines (---). Additions found in angle brackets < >, but not notified in the critical apparatus are supplied by the editor *ex coniectura*. The supplying or deletion of *səyāmē* dots, i.e., the two dots that state the plural number in Syriac, are indicated in the critical apparatus for nouns, but not for verbs inflected in the feminine plural form. The two common abbreviations ܕܐ for ܕܠܘܠܐ 'pupil' and ܐ ܥ for ܠܕܘܠܐ ܥ 'passage/lemma' are expanded throughout the text, but in the critical apparatus this has been indicated only at their first occurrence.

troduction to Aristotle and His Categories, Addressed to Philotheos. Syriac Text, with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2016 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 24), pp. 70ff.

¹⁹ For the earliest commentary tradition of the *Categories*, see M.J. Griffin, *Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2015 and, for a brief introduction to the commentators of the later period, see L.G. Westerink, "The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to Their Commentaries", in Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed* (above, n. 17), pp. 325-48; M.J. Griffin, "Ammonius and the Alexandrian School", in A. Falcon (ed.), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2016 (Brill's Companions to Classical Reception, 7), pp. 394-418; and Aydin, *Sergius of Reshaina* (above, n. 18), in part. Introduction, pp. 52-61, with the cited literature.

²⁰ For the Syriac translations of and commentaries on the *Categories*, see King's introduction to D. King, *The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle's Categories. Text, Translation, and Commentary*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2010 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 21), pp. 1-38.

²¹ [Jacob of Edessa], *Les Catégories d'Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes. Édition de textes précédée d'une étude historique et critique et suivie d'un vocabulaire technique*, ed. K. Georr. Préface de L. Massignon. Institut Français de Damas, Beyrouth 1948.

²² Reference has occasionally also been to the Syriac translation of the *Categories* by George, Bishop of the Arabs [= G]. Cf. [George Bishop of the Arabs], *Le Catégorie e gli Ermeneutici di Aristotele nella versione siriana di Giorgio delle Nazioni*, ed. G. Furlani, Bardi, Roma 1933 (Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Memorie della classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche. Ser. VI, Vol. V. Fasc. 1).

[ענין פון ארבעה עשרה ענינים]

1r § 1 ... מן הכלל: והוא שכל מה שכתבנו. כלל <ו> יספיק ויגמור. וכן
 כל מה שכתבנו שם שכללנו הכלל והכלל הכלל. והוא שכל
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10 וכן: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל.
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§ 3 והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל.

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15 § 4 והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל.
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20 וכן: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל.
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25 § 5 והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל.
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וכן: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל: והוא שכללנו הכלל.
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3 iter. || 7 scripsi] והוא שכללנו הכלל || scripsi ex 3v18 = §26] א | supplevi ex J.270.16 ||
 14 cod., sayāmē supplevi ex J.270.17 | והוא שכללנו הכלל || scripsi ex J.270.17 ||
 15 cod., sayāmē deleui | והוא שכללנו הכלל || deleui || cod., sayāmē supplevi ex J.270.18.

[Questions and Answers on Aristotle's Categories]

§1 ... left, that the definition that the ancients have given: those things which are most distant from one another. But the ancients called contrariety the motion of opposition, like the motion of fire and water. For fire ascends upwards and water descends downwards. And since their motion is much distant from each other, that of fire and water, the ancients therefore defined contraries: those things which are most distant from one another (Cf. *Cat.* 6 a 17f.).

§2 PUPIL. Explain the passage: quantity is not supposed to admit of more and less (*Cat.* 6 a 19f.).²³

MASTER. He (i.e., Aristotle) says: it corresponds to the second property, that which is not found only in quantity and says that quantity does not admit of more and less.

§3 PUPIL. Why does he everywhere say “is supposed”?²⁴

MASTER. He puts forth “is supposed” always in all properties, instead of a solution,²⁵ and it is a custom of the ancients to make use of such an expression (λῆξις).

§4 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: as for example, a two-cubited is not more two-cubited than another. And neither concerning number, as for example, a three than a five is not something called number more a three than a five, nor a five (more) than a three (*Cat.* 6 a 20-22).²⁶

MASTER. When he wants to show all the species of quantity, that among them there is none which admits of more and less, he starts at first with number, as he did at the beginning of this speech on quantity, and means to say that a two-cubited – whether they are two or three or four – there is nothing in them which is called more number. Even if the number three is less than five, yet in being a number both are equal, in that the former is called a number and the latter (is called) a number.

§5 PUPIL. Interpret the passage: neither yet one (instance of) time is called more a time than any other (instance) of time, nor at all does that to be called more or less apply to any of the things that have been mentioned. Thus, quantity does not admit of a more or a less (*Cat.* 6 a 22-25).²⁷

MASTER. He says that neither a time than a time is called more time, nor one of the other species that have been mentioned, so that it is known from this that quantity does not admit of more and less.

²³ “A quantity does not seem to admit of a more and a less” cf. *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill, Oxford U.P., Oxford 1963.

²⁴ Corresponding to Greek δοχεῖ, which here could also be translated ‘it is held’; as to this, see the explanation of Simplicii in *Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, Reimer, Berlin 1907 (*CAG* VIII), p. 176.19-21 and R. Bolton, “Two Doctrines of *Categories* in Aristotle: *Topics*, *Categories*, and *Metaphysics*”, in E. Feser (ed.), *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2003 (*Philosophers in Depth*), pp. 68-101, in part. pp. 86-93 with n. 11.

²⁵ Fol. 1r13 seems to have ܠܘܣܝܘܬܐ, but a fitting meaning to this form is not found in Syriac lexicons and is probably used in the same sense as ܠܘܣܝܘܬܐ ‘solution’ (Gr. λύσις), that is, a fixed or accepted answer.

²⁶ “Four-foot for example: one thing is not more four-foot than another. Or take number: we do not speak of a three as more three than a five, nor of one three as more three than another three” (trans. Ackrill – cf. Aristotle *Categories and De Interpretatione*, translated with Notes by J.L. Ackrill, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963 (*Clarendon Aristotle Series*)).

²⁷ “Nor yet is one time called more a time than another. Nor is there a single one, among those we listed, as to which a more and a less is spoken of. Hence a quantity does not admit of a more and a less” (trans. Ackrill).

§ 6 PUPIL. Explicate the passage: it is chiefly <a property> of quantity to be said to be equal and unequal (*Cat.* 6 a 26f.).²⁸

<MASTER.> As he did in the speech on substance <and first> put forth the properties that are not distinctive and then the distinctive property, so did he also here and said that it is a distinctive property of quantity to be said to be equal and unequal.

§ 7 PUPIL. Expound the passage: each of these quantities that have been said is said to be equal and unequal (*Cat.* 6 a 27f.).²⁹

MASTER. He wanted to list all the species of quantity one by one and to show that all of them are said to be equal and unequal, and that this is a distinctive property of quantity. And he says that all the mentioned quantities, that is, the seven species of quantity, each of them is said to be equal and unequal.

§ 8 PUPIL. Interpret the passage: as for example, a body is said to be equal and unequal (*Cat.* 6 a 28).³⁰

MASTER. He means to say that there is a body which is equal with a body, not only to length and breadth, but also to thickness, and there is one which is unequal, in that the former is two cubits only and the latter three. So is also number, for the day of June (*Həzirān*) is not equal with the day of December-January (*Kānūn*), but the day of the 19th March (*Ādār*) is equal <with> the night of the 19th September (*Ēlūl*).

§ 9 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: so also with these other things that have been mentioned, we say each of them to be equal and unequal (*Cat.* 6 a 29f.).³¹

MASTER. That each of them is said to be equal and unequal.

§ 10 PUPIL. Set out the passage: but of the rest, that which is not quantity, is hardly³² supposed to be said to be equal and unequal (*Cat.* 6 a 31f.).³³

MASTER. That all those which are not quantity, that is, the other nine (categories), are hardly said to be equal and unequal, and because equal and unequal pertain to the species of relatives, he therefore said “hardly”.

§ 11 PUPIL. Set out the passage: as for example, a condition (*δύσθεσις*) is hardly said to be equal and unequal, but <rather> similar; and whiteness too is hardly said to be equal and unequal, <but similar>. Thus, it would chiefly be a property of quantity to be said to be equal and unequal (*Cat.* 6 a 32-35).³⁴

²⁸ “Most distinctive of a quantity is its being called both equal and unequal” (trans. Ackrill).

²⁹ “For each of the quantities we spoke of is called both equal and unequal” (trans. Ackrill).

³⁰ “For example, a body is called both equal and unequal” (trans. Ackrill).

³¹ “so also with the others we spoke of, each is called both equal and unequal” (trans. Ackrill).

³² The Syriac ܘܠܐܘܪܘܚܐ, literary ‘not much’, is here rendering the Greek οὐ πᾶν.

³³ “But anything else – whatever is not a quantity – is certainly not, it would seem, called equal and unequal” (trans. Ackrill).

³⁴ “For example, a condition is certainly not called equal and unequal, but, rather, similar; and white is certainly not equal and unequal, but similar. Thus most distinctive of a quantity would be its being called both equal and unequal” (trans. Ackrill).

MASTER. He brings forward evidence from the species of quality: the condition (διάθεσις), that is 'instability', that it is hardly said to be equal and unequal, likewise whiteness too, being a species of quality, is hardly said to be equal and unequal. But remember also this: in that they hardly appear to be equal with each other, and he means to say that because of this I said: "it is a distinctive property of quantity", to be equal and unequal (cf. *Cat.* 6 a 34f). And similar and dissimilar is a distinctive property of quality (cf. *Cat.* 11 a 15-19). One ought to know that these two properties, that of quantity being equal and unequal and that of quality being similar and dissimilar, pertain to the species of relatives, as for example, the equal is equal to what is equal to it and the similar is similar to what is similar to it. Here ends the discussion (θεωρία) on quantity.

§ 12 The speech is now concerned with relatives. Passage: relatives and so on (cf. *Cat.* 6 a 36ff.). PUPIL. If there is anything that needs to be said before the explanation of the text (*lexis*), say it!

MASTER. One ought to know that the commentators put forth five main points (κεφάλαια) before they comment on the speech about the relatives.

§ 13 PUPIL. Which are these?

MASTER. The first main point is about what Aristotle said: "relatives are said" (cf. *Cat.* 6 a 36), and there is a certain dispute concerning this. For Aristotle spoke of each of all the categories in the singular, but he spoke of the category of relatives in the plural. Some people are puzzled about whether the category of relatives should be said in the singular or in the plural. We say that even if Aristotle spoke of it as about many, he said this regarding relation, because the category of relatives has relation and relation signifies many. He therefore spoke of it in the plural. However, it should be spoken of in the singular, so that confusion does not occur in the categories and they appear to be more than ten. The second main point is this: whether the relatives are learned or not. Because everything that is learned possesses an uncertainty until it is verified, one ought to know that in the way the (other) nine categories are learned, so are also the relatives not perceived without learning, even if they are rooted in nature. The third (main point): whether they have independent existence or not. There is <also> a dispute concerning this, in that some people have said that some of the relatives are of (...) and some of them (...). The fourth (main point): whether they would be a genus or not. There is also a dispute concerning this, in that some of the species of relatives pertain to quantity, some of them to quality, and some of them to doing and being-affected. And we say that the category of relatives is a most generic genus, properly, in that it is predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of many things that differ in species;

and it is not at all contradictory that some species (that) appear in one category (appear also) in other categories in varying ways. And the fifth (main point) is the one that he said regarding order (τάξις), as there is a dispute about the relatives in the enumeration of the categories: that Aristotle in the introduction (προοίμιον) of his book placed quality before the relatives (*Cat.* 1 b 26). Regarding this (point) we will talk later, because we will begin our speech with this main point, which is the last one, so that the beginning of our speech follows on the end of the main points.

§ 14 PUPIL. Interpret what you (just) said! Why did Aristotle place quality before the relatives in the enumeration of the categories and here took and placed the relatives before quality?

MASTER. He did that because of four reasons. One and the first: because he at the end of the speech on quantity ended up with equals and unequals, which are the species of the relatives. And since he at the end of his speech mentioned the species of the relatives, he wants to place (next) the category of those species. The second (reason): since the species of quantity and quality are found in the relatives, he wants to place the category of relatives between quantity and quality. The third (reason): since the relatives are included in all categories, he wants to honour a category like this, which is more generic, and place it <before> quality. And the fourth (reason): since most of the species (...) are not <of the relatives>, for knowledge (---), these (...) the species of quality, the category of the relatives contains them.

§ 15 PUPIL. How many are the species of relatives?

MASTER. The species of relatives: some are taken from similarity, as the friend of his friend is a friend, the neighbour of his neighbour is a neighbour and the like. Some are taken from dissimilarity, as double and half, and large and small. Some from participation (?),³⁵ as knowledge and knowable. Some from position, as right and left. Some from nature, as father and son. Some from chance, as slave and master. Some from possession, as possession is the possession of a possessor. Some from paronymy (παρόνυμα), as standing and sitting. Some from weakness, as what we cannot see, cannot be visible to us.

§ 16 PUPIL. Is there anything else that needs to be said before the explanation of the text (λέξις)?

MASTER. There is, but it cannot be said in brief.

³⁵ See annotation to §15.

§ 17 הלכתי: כי לא ידעתי לומר. וכלתו כי ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן
 זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
 5 ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
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 10 ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
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 4v § 18 הלכתי: כי לא ידעתי לומר. וכלתו כי ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
 15 ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
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 20 ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
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 30 ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
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 3r ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
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 35 ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.
 ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי. ויבן זכר: כי יבן יבן ואלו ידעתי כחכמי.

13 iter., correxī ex J.271.13 || 14 supplevi ex J.271.13f. ||
 20 cod., sayāmē suppl. || 21 scripsi] ויבן זכר || 25 alterum, כי ואלו ידעתי כחכמי]

§ 17 PUPIL. Tell me what Protagoras said, that everything is relative!

MASTER. He states evidently that honey is sweet and bitter. It is sweet to those whose sense of taste is sound, but bitter to those who have the sickness of jaundice.³⁶ Therefore, whatever someone says is true. If he says honey is sweet, it is true, and if he says it is bitter, it is true. Again, if one says about fire, that it is burning or nonburning, it is true. It burns all matters, but is nonburning of salamander. If the salamander enters fire, it extinguishes it. Again, a long pole, that is a long stick, when it is thrown into water, if someone says it is broken, it is true, in that it appears as broken, but if he says it is not broken, it is true, in that as truth is, it is actually not broken. Concerning this Plato said: "O Protagoras, as you have said, whatever someone says is true and you said the truth. And I say about you, that you have spoken falsely and since whatever someone says is true, it has appeared that you are a liar, (...) I have spoken the truth".

§ 18 PUPIL. Interpret now the passage: relatives are those which are like this: <all those things which are said to be what they are of other things>, or howsoever differently in relation to something else. (*Cat.* 6 a 36f.).³⁷

MASTER. This is the definition of the ancients by which they defined the category of relatives and, as it is handed down, this is Plato's definition. For he says in this way: "Relatives are those which are said like this: all those things of what they are". And Plato added to this definition "are said", to signify that the relatives do not exist naturally, but (rather) relationally, that is, it is said and they are said by the sharing of each other's natures. Because of the relation they have and not in that they are. That which he said "they are of other things" means this: they are not solely known by themselves, but also by another thing. For everything that pertains to relatives, its referring is towards another thing. That which they said: "or howsoever differently" means that they do not refer only to one grammatical case (πτῶσις), but to three, that is to the genitive, to the dative, and to the accusative. When we say: 'a father is the father of a son', we make use of the genitive case. When we say: 'the knowable is knowable by knowledge', we make use of the accusative case. The (letter) *dālad* (i.e. *d* 'of') signifies the genitive case, the (letter) *lāmad* (i.e. *l* 'to') dative, and the (letter) *bēt* (i.e. *b* 'by') accusative. Some criticize this definition in this way: they say everything that does not convert straightforwardly³⁸ is not a relative. Not everything that is said of another thing, pertains to the relatives, because there is something that is said of another thing, but does not convert. For head, feet, hands, eyes are said of animal, but they do not convert. Everything that has eyes is animal, but there are animals which have neither head nor hands nor feet. For crab and scorpion do not have a head, even though each of them is an animal. And snake and fish have neither hands nor feet. Again, mole does not have eyes. Thus, not everything that is said of another thing, pertains to the relatives.

³⁶ The Syriac ܩܘܒܘܠܐ ܕܥܘܒܪܐ ܕܥܘܒܪܐ ܕܥܘܒܪܐ 'having the sickness jaundice', corresponds to the Greek ἰκτερίαν as also found in Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 67.2 Busse; Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 104.3f. Busse; Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 98.25 Busse; and Elias, *In Cat.*, p. 202.7, p. 204.7 Busse.

³⁷ "We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else" (trans. Ackrill).

³⁸ This is the basic meaning of the Syriac adverb ܕܥܘܒܪܐ, but it is also possible that it should be translated according to its rare meaning 'in the nominative case', M. Sokoloff, *A Syriac Lexicon. A Translation from the Latin, Correction, Expansion, and Update of C. Brockelmann's Lexicon Syriacum*, Eisenbrauns, Pennsylvania State 2009, p. 1668. It was however just stated that the relatives are expressed by three cases.

§ 19 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: as for example, larger is said of this which is what it is of another thing, for it is larger than something (*Cat.* 6 a 37-39).³⁹

MASTER. When he starts with the species of relatives, he at first puts forth the large and small, and that is justly done, because most of them were mentioned in the speech about quantity. He means to say that the larger is said to be larger than another thing, that is, than the one that is smaller than it. And the small is said to be smaller than the large.

§ 20 PUPIL. Expound the passage: also double is said of another thing, this which is what it is, is said double of something (*Cat.* 6 a 39-6b1).⁴⁰

MASTER. He means to say that also 'double' is said to be double of something, that is, of half.

§ 21 PUPIL. Set out the passage: similarly are also all other such things (*Cat.* 6 b 1f).⁴¹

MASTER. He means to say that also other things are in this way, that is, the friend of a friend, the neighbour of a neighbour, what is similar is similar to what is similar to it, and all these which he does not mention, pertain to the category of relatives.

§ 22 PUPIL. Explain the passage: those which are suchlike too, pertain to relatives (*Cat.* 6 b 2).⁴²

MASTER. He means to say that also those other things, which I am about to tell, pertain in this way to relatives.

§ 23 PUPIL. Explain the passage: as for example, state (ἔξις), condition (διάρθεσις), perception, knowledge, position. For all these that have been mentioned, what each one of them is is spoken of as being of something else or being in relation to another thing (*Cat.* 6 b 2-4).⁴³

MASTER. He listed the species of the category of relatives when he says: state (ἔξις), that is possession, is said of a possessor. Condition (διάρθεσις), that is instability or a separable accident, is said of somebody. Perception too (is said) <perception of the perceivable> and knowledge (is said) knowledge of the knowable. The position is said of a substrate. All these species that I have listed are said in <this way> and they refer to others, for each of them is said of something. State (is said) of the possessor; condition (is said) of the one who does not possess; perception (is said) of the perceivable; knowledge (is said) of the knowable; positions (are said) of the substrate; and other things too in this way.

§ 24 PUPIL. Expound well what you have listed in order that they will become elucidated.

<MASTER.> And he says that all those which I have not mentioned are too like those that I have recounted.

³⁹ "For example, what is larger is called what it is than something else (it is called larger than something)" (trans. Ackrill). The wording of this passage is different from that of Jacob of Edessa (J.271.17f.).

⁴⁰ "and what is double is called what it is of something else (it is called double of something)" (trans. Ackrill).

⁴¹ "similarly with all other such cases" (trans. Ackrill).

⁴² "The following, too, and their like, are among relatives" (trans. Ackrill).

⁴³ "State, condition, perception, knowledge, position. For each of these is called what it is (and not something different) of something else" (trans. Ackrill).

§ 25 PUPIL. Interpret the passage: relatives are all those things which are said to be what they are of another thing, or howsoever differently <in relation to something else> (*Cat.* 6 b 6-8).⁴⁴

MASTER. He stated the same definition again in order that his speech would be clear. He says: “relatives are all those things which are said to be what they are of another thing, or in relation to something else howsoever differently”. We have given its explanation above and since he was a friend of brevity, he did not want to list all the species of relatives, but he said that all relatives are those which are said of another thing howsoever, that is, they are said by means of variation of grammatical case.

§ 26 PUPIL. Expound the passage: as for example, a mountain is called ‘large’ in relation to another mountain, for a mountain is called ‘large’ in relation to something; and what is similar is said to be similar to something; and the others of this kind too are in the same way said in relation to something (*Cat.* 6 b 8-11).⁴⁵

MASTER. As he did at the beginning, by putting forth the definition of the ancients and letting follow on it the large and small, so did he also now and said that a large mountain is said to be ‘larger’ than a small one and he digressed from what he said about double and mentioned that which is pertinent to (the point) there, that is, what is similar is similar to what is similar to it; and as a friend of brevity, he states that all relatives are said in the same way.

§ 27 PUPIL. Explicate the passage: lying, standing, and sitting too are positions and position pertains to relatives (*Cat.* 6 b 11f.).⁴⁶

MASTER. He means to say that standing, sitting, and lying are three species of the substrate. Aristotle <counts> them in the species of relatives and he means to say that position is said position of a substrate. And standing (is said) of the one who stands, sitting (is said) <of the one who sits, and lying (is said) of the one> who lies. Thus, position too is said to pertain to relatives.

§ 28 PUPIL. Set out the passage: that to lie, <to sit> or to stand, are themselves not positions, (but) they are paronymously (*παρωνύμως*), namely nominally (*men šmāhāʾīt*), said of the aforesaid positions. (*Cat.* 6 b 12-14).⁴⁷

MASTER. He means to say that to lie, to sit, and to stand are not positions, but are said paronymously (*men šmāhāʾīt*), that is, from position, and therefore they do not pertain to relatives, in that all those said paronymously, even if (one of them) pertains to whichever category, yet it passes on to another category by the change of grammatical case. As place, pertaining to quantity, when the letter *bēt* (i.e. *b-*) has been added to it, that is the accusative case, and is said ‘in place’, then it appears in the category of where. That to lie is derived from lying, that to sit from sitting, that to stand from standing. Thus, these are (said) paronymously.

⁴⁴ “All things then are relative which are called just what they are, of or than something else – or in some other way in relation to something else” (trans. Ackrill).

⁴⁵ “Thus a mountain is called large in relation to something else (the mountain is called large in relation to something); and what is similar is called similar to something; and the others of this kind are in the same way spoken of in relation to something” (trans. Ackrill).

⁴⁶ “Lying, standing, and sitting are particular positions; position is a relative” (trans. Ackrill).

⁴⁷ “To-be-lying, to-be-standing, or to-be-sitting are themselves not positions, but they get their names paronymously from the aforesaid positions” (trans. Ackrill).

§ 29 PUPIL. Interpret well!

MASTER. The philosopher, from having divided the species of relatives, came to define it, as a typical rule. And since the category of relatives is a most generic genus and there is no genus above a most generic genus, neither does it have substantial differences, he defines it by its property, in that property substitutes for definition. For wherever a definition cannot be obtained, which is compounded of genus and substantial differences, any entity whatsoever is defined by its property. And since the category of relatives has non-distinctive and distinctive properties, he first mentioned the non-distinctive ones and then taught about the distinctive properties.

§ 30 PUPIL. Tell me what are the distinctive properties of relatives.

MASTER. Since the relatives are included in all categories, he brings forth evidence from other categories, those which are found in relatives: substance, quantity, quality and the rest. When he takes evidence from them to the category of relatives, he teaches about them in the way they are found <in those> categories. For whenever he brings forth something in the category of relatives from substance and quantity, in which contrariety is not found and which do not admit of more and less, he does not say that they have contrariety and do not admit of more and less.

§ 31 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: there is also contrariety in relatives, as for example, vice is contrary to virtue, each of them pertaining to relatives, and knowledge to ignorance (*Cat.* 6 b 15-17).⁴⁸

MASTER. He means to say that sometimes when I treat the species of quality (at the same time I do treat) the relatives. He says that, since contrariety is found in the category of relatives, vice is contrary to virtue and knowledge to ignorance, and these pertain to quality. However, because virtue is said of the virtuous, knowledge of the knowable, and ignorance of the ignorant and they pertain to relatives on account of (their) relation. As pertaining to the category of quality, contrariety is found in them here too. One ought to know that this is not a distinctive property of relatives.

§ 32 PUPIL. Examine the passage: but contrariety is not found in all relatives, for there is no contrary to double, nor to treble or to anything like that (*Cat.* 6 b 17-19).⁴⁹

MASTER. He refers to those which enter the category of relatives from quantity, and since there is no contrariety in quantity, nor is there contrariety in those which are derived from it into the relatives. For there is no contrary to ten, which is the double of five, and to fifteen, which is the treble of five, nor to all of those things from (any) category, which are said of the category of relatives.

⁴⁸ "There is contrariety in relatives, e.g. virtue is contrary to vice (and each of them is relative), and knowledge to ignorance" (trans. Ackrill).

⁴⁹ "But there is not a contrary to every relative; there is no contrary to what is double or treble or anything like that" (trans. Ackrill).

§ 33 PUPIL. Examine the passage: relatives are as well supposed to admit of more and less (*Cat.* 6 b 20f.).⁵⁰

MASTER. He means to say that many people believe that relatives admit of more and less, but this is not true regarding those which are <truly?> relatives, but as (...) those which are derived from <quality> into this category, more and less is said of them.⁵¹

§ 34 <PUPIL.> Examine the passage: for what is similar is said to be more and less; what is equal and unequal is said to be more and less; and each of them pertains to the relatives. For what is similar is said to be similar to something, and those which are unequal (are said to be) unequal to something. (*Cat.* 6 b 21f.).⁵²

<MASTER.> Similar and dissimilar belong to quality, and since more and less similar and dissimilar are said there, this very same manner is said of them here too. And since equal and unequal are a property of quantity and quantity does not admit of more and less, he states that when equal and unequal are counted to the species of relatives, they admit of more and less. For he states that this is said to be more and less equal to that, and again unequal to it. It is equal to it in something and unequal to it in something, their being in quantity. The equal is equal in everything and the unequal is (un-?)equal in everything. See well! Thus, also here in the same manner equal and unequal will be said to not be more or less. As the equal and unequal belongs to quality, the same manner will be said of it in relatives too, if this expressed opinion is accurate.

§ 35 PUPIL. Expound the passage: but not all admit of more and less; for double is not said to be more <or less> double, nor anything like that (*Cat.* 6 b 24-27).⁵³

MASTER. He worked out his speech in order that it would be clear to beginners. For he says that not all relatives admit of more and less, as for example, all those that pertain to substance and quantity, when they are inferred within relatives, do not admit of more and less. And as he explains, he says that double, which pertains to quantity, does not admit of more and less, when it is said within relatives, and so are all those which pertain to substance and quantity.

§ 36 <PUPIL.> Explicate the passage: all relatives are said in relation to those that convert, as for example, slave is called slave of a master and master is called master of a slave; double (is called) double of a half; <half (is called) half of a double;> and large (is called) large of small; and so for the others too (*Cat.* 6 b 28-33).⁵⁴

⁵⁰ "Relatives seem also to admit of a more and a less" (trans. Ackrill).

⁵¹ Cf. *Cat.* 10 b 26.

⁵² "For a thing is called more similar and less similar, and more unequal and less unequal; and each of these is relative, since what is similar is called similar to something and what is unequal unequal to something" (trans. Ackrill).

⁵³ "But not all admit of a more and less; for what is double, or anything like that, is not called more double or less double" (trans. Ackrill).

⁵⁴ "All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. For example, the slave is called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double; the larger larger than a smaller, and the smaller smaller than a larger; and so for the rest too" (trans. Ackrill).

<MASTER.> The third property of relatives: they are said in relation to those that convert. And when he wants to elucidate his speech, he brings forth evidence from the species of the category of relatives and he tells how a conversion of a property of relatives is. Not like the conversion of a property: 'every man is able to laugh' and so on; nor again like the conversion of a property that declares: 'not a single man is stone, not a single stone is man'; nor again like the conversion of a deduction (συλλογισμός) that declares: 'a woman has given birth, and she who has given birth has milk'; except another conversion which is not similar to these, that which starts with something and again connects the end to the beginning, as for example, son is son of a father, slave is slave of a master, and double is double of a half, large is large of small.

§ 37 PUPIL. Explicate the passage: in *ptōsis* however, that is case (*mappūltā*), they may sometimes differ in expression, as for example, knowledge is said to be knowledge of (*d-*) the knowable, and the knowable (is said to be) knowable by (*b-*) knowledge; perception (is said to be) perception of (*d-*) the perceptible, and the perceptible (is said to be) perceptible by (*b-*) perception (*Cat.* 6 b 33-36).⁵⁵

MASTER. He means to say that all the other species of relatives, which we have not mentioned, should be said like that. That which he said: "in *πτῶσις*, that is case (*mappūltā*), they may sometimes differ in expression", pertains to the species of relatives. They are expressed in the genitive case in the first expression.

§ 38 PUPIL. Explain this to me!

MASTER. In the first expression, we express it like this: knowledge is knowledge of (*d-*) the knowable, and this *dālad* [i.e., the letter *d-* 'of'], that we have added to knowable, is for the genitive case. In the second expression, we express it like this: the knowable is knowable by (*b-*) knowledge, and this *bēt* [i.e., the letter *b-* 'by'], that we have added to knowledge, is for the accusative case. So also (...) that he said: "in *πτῶσις*, that is in case (*mappūltā*), they may sometimes differ in expression".

§ 39 PUPIL. Explicate the passage: not only, <but> sometimes they are not supposed to convert, if they are not given properly in relation to that which they are said of, but the giver has made a mistake (*Cat.* 6 b 36-38).⁵⁶

MASTER. He means to say that some people supposed that all the relatives convert and therefore the philosopher states that not all the relatives convert. By no means does everything that is said of another thing convert. That which he says "not only" (means) that (all) the relatives not only do not convert, but they cannot convert also when a person errs in defining them. Mistake occurs in (the definition of) relatives in two ways: one of them is when one of the limitations of a proposition (*protasis*) is more general than the other and one is more deficient than the other. The second way is when one of the limitations of a proposition becomes accidental, and we will speak about this later. We will now speak about the way when one is more general than its counterpart (i.e., correlate), as for example, the head of animal is called a head, and animal is more general than head, so are also eyes, hands, feet and so forth. Again, regarding bird and boat, if their definitions will not be given accurately, they do not convert.

⁵⁵ "Sometimes, however, there will be a verbal difference, of ending. Thus knowledge is called knowledge of what is knowable, and what is knowable knowable by knowledge; perception perception of the perceptible, and the perceptible perceptible by perception" (trans. Ackrill).

⁵⁶ "Sometimes, indeed, they will not seem to reciprocate – if a mistake is made and that in relation to which something is spoken of is not given properly" (trans. Ackrill).

§ 40 <PUPIL.> Clarify what you just have said!

<MASTER.> We say: a rudder is the rudder of a boat, but it is not possible to convert and say: a boat is the boat of a rudder. So also for bird. A bird has wings, but not everything that has wings is a bird. We will first talk about the Greek word (λέξις), for in the Greek language it not called bird, but the feather-winged, and they name this ὄρνιθος.⁵⁷ And those which are nonfeather-winged, they name them πετεινόν,⁵⁸ those (which are) membrane-winged, such as locusts, wasps, and flies; and flesh-winged, such as bats. And because all of them have wings, bird is that which they name *ornithos*, and *peteinon* is that which they do not call bird, for wing is more general than bird, as boat is more general than rudder. For every bird has wings, but not everything that has wings is bird. And every rudder belongs to a boat, but not all boats have rudder. And every rudder belongs to a boat, but not all boats have rudders, such as rowing-boats. <And every> head belongs to an animal, (...) ⁵⁹ head, such as crabs and scorpions. <Also the same for> eyes, hands, and feet: the mole is an animal, but it does not have eyes; the snake is also an animal, but it does not have feet. However, the word (λέξις) for bird is not like this, but they name bird all those which are nourished by pecking of seeds and they call bird of prey those which are nourished by meat. They do not however name locusts, flies, and wasps bird, even though they fly.

§ 41 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: as for example, if wing is given as of bird, (the expression) 'bird of wing' does not convert (*Cat.* 6 b 38f.).⁶⁰

MASTER. He wants to elucidate what he says: if someone fails with the presentation, namely the definition, of relatives, conversion does not occur. He says, for example, what I say is, that is, if wing is said to be of bird, (the expression) 'bird of wing' does not convert. It is why he adds and says this.

§ 42 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: for <the first> (expression) is not properly given: 'wing of bird' (*Cat.* 6 b 39-7a1).⁶¹

MASTER. He declares that if you say: 'wing of bird' and 'bird of wing', the statement does not turn out accurately, because 'wing' is more general than 'bird', in that not only bird has wing, but also others that are not bird have it, as we (already) have said above. Thus, the first (expression), that is 'wing of bird', is not accurately given and therefore it does not convert, because the definition is defective.

⁵⁷ The Syriac ܡܘܨܝܘܬܐ seems to render the Greek ὄρνιθος in the plural, but since it is treated as being in the singular, it is probably based on the genitive singular form ὄρνιθος found in Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 112.12 Busse [cf. Philoponi (*olim Ammonii*) *In Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, Reimer, Berlin 1898, *CAG* XIII.I].

⁵⁸ The Syriac ܡܘܨܝܘܬܐ seems to render the Greek πετεινόν in the singular or πετεινῶν the genitive plural form, but it is also possible that it renders the Greek form πτηνῶν in the genitive plural as found in Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 112.13 Busse, even though the *sayāmē* dots for the plurals in Syriac should have been supplied.

⁵⁹ It should probably be added here: "but not all animals have head, such..."; cf. *Cat.* 6 b 36f.; *Simpl.*, *In Cat.*, p. 185.22 Kalbfleisch (cf. *Simplicii In Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, Reimer, Berlin 1907, *CAG* VIII).

⁶⁰ "For example, if a wing is given as of a bird, bird of a wing does not reciprocate" (trans. Ackrill).

⁶¹ "For it has not been given properly in the first place as wing of a bird" (trans. Ackrill).

§43 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲛⲁ:** ⲓⲙⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.
 ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ: ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.
 ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.

5 §44 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲛⲁ:** ⲓⲙⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.
 ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.
 ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ: ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.
 ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.

10 §45 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲛⲁ:** ⲓⲙⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ. ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.
 ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ.

ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ: ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ ⲛⲓⲁⲓⲛⲁ (?)

1 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁ** cod., punctum supplevi ex J.273.17 || 5 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁ** scripsi ex J.273.18] ||
 6 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲓⲛⲁ** scripsi ex J.273.19] **ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲓⲛⲁ** || 10-11 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁ** supplevi ex J.273.19f. ||
 12 **ⲗⲁⲗⲁ** scripsi] , **ⲗⲁⲗⲁ** (= **ⲗⲁⲗⲁⲓⲛⲁ** sic!).

§ 43 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: for (the fact of) being a bird is not the thing by which wing is said to belong to it (*Cat.* 7 a 1f).⁶²

MASTER. He means this: wing does not belong only to bird, but also to others, and therefore conversion does not occur, since there is a fault in the delimitation.

§ 44 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: but by being winged, for wings belong to many others as well, which are not birds (*Cat.* 7 a 2f).⁶³

MASTER. He means to say that wing belongs to anything that has wings, not simply to bird, that is, to it alone, because there are many things that are not called birds, such as locusts, wasps, and flies.

§ 45 PUPIL. Elucidate the passage: so that if (the expressions) are properly given, <they will likewise convert> (*Cat.* 7 a 3f).⁶⁴

MASTER. He says that if they are given ...

⁶² "For it is not as being a bird that a wing is said to be of it" (trans. Ackrill).

⁶³ "But as being a winged, since many things that are not birds have wings" (trans. Ackrill).

⁶⁴ "Thus if it is given properly there is reciprocation; for example, a wing is wing of a winged and a winged is winged with a wing" (trans. Ackrill).

Annotations

§ 1 (p. 60) The definition of contrary things (ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ). The first section that we have extant here, which is the partial answer of the master to the question of the student, deals with the definition of contrary things ascribed to the ancients and found in Aristotle's *Categories* 6 a 17-18: τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηγότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὀρίζονται 'for they define as contraries those things in the same genus which are most distant from one another' (tr. Ackrill).

§ 2 (p. 60) The "second property" of quantity. Aristotle specifies quantity by three properties. The first is that quantity does not have contrariety (§ 1 pp. 60[Syr.] and 61[Engl.]) and the second is that of not admitting of more or less, and these two are not distinctive properties of quantity, since they are also said of substance (cf. *Cat.* 3 b 33). The third property however is distinctive of it and states that quantities are said to be equal and unequal (cf. § 6 pp. 62[Syr.] and 63[Engl.]).⁶⁵

§ 6 (p. 62) Non-distinctive and distinctive properties. Cf. also § 29 (74[Syr.] and 75[Engl.]), where the commentator states that Aristotle usually provides the non-distinctive properties before the distinctive ones, especially if the discussion is about a most generic genus, of which a definition cannot be supplied; see the annotation to § 29 (pp. 74[Syr.] and 75[Engl.]).

§ 7 (p. 62) The "seven species" of quantity. In the *Categories* 4 b 20-25, Aristotle specifies seven things that are said to be quantities, namely number (ἀριθμός), speech (λόγος), line (γραμμὴ), surface (ἐπιφάνεια), solid (σῶμα), time (χρόνος), and place (τόπος).

§ 8 (p. 62) The giving of equinoxes as example of equal and unequal quantities. The Syriac commentator presents here the vernal/spring equinox and autumnal equinox as examples of something that is equal in number and number is counted to quantity (see previous note). I have not found the same example in other commentaries on the *Categories*.

§ 11/23 (pp. 62/70) Condition (διάρθεις) explained as 'instability' (ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ) or a separable accident (ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ), and state (ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ < ἔξις) as possession (§23 ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ and §15 ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ). The use here of 'instability' (ܩܘܠܘܒܐܘܬܐ) for Greek διάρθεις 'condition' is in line with Sergius' usage.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Cf. also Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 65.9-18 Busse (cf. Ammonius. *In Aristotelis Categoriae commentarius*, ed. A. Busse, Reimer, Berlin 1895, *CAG* IV.4); and Iohannes Damasc., *Dialectica* v' / p. 50.81-91 Kotter (cf. *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, I, Institutio elementaris. Capita philosophica (Dialectica). Als Anhang Die Philosophischen Stücke aus Cod. Oxon. Bodl. Auc. T. I. 6*, ed. B. Kotter, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1969 [Patristische Texte und Studien, 7], tr. by F.H. Chase Jr., Ch. 49, pp. 76f. in Saint John of Damascus, *Writings*, trans. F.H. Chase Jr., New York 1958 (The Fathers of the Church, 37).

⁶⁶ Sergius, *Intr.* § 81 and § 83 Aydin, and the commentary at pp. 242-3 (cf. Sergius of Reshaina, *Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories*, above, n. 18).

While ܠܘܘܢܐ 'possession' is the definition offered for ܘܘܘܢܠܘܢܐ by Jacob of Edessa.⁶⁷ The variant form ܠܘܘܢܐ 'possession' is here used at § 15 (pp. 66[Syr.] and 67[Engl.]).

§ 12-13 (pp. 64-66) Five initial points. The commentator begins his discussion on the relatives by specifying five preliminary points that were dealt with in connection with this category. We may assume that he had initial discussions on the other categories as well. The examination of five initial points is also present in the works of the Greek commentators, but with a somewhat different wording. Ammonius, for example, begins his treatment of relatives by saying (Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 66.5-7 Busse): Πρὸ τῆς τῶν πρὸς τι διδασκαλίας πέντε ταῦτα χρὴ ζητεῖν· τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὸν τρόπον τῆς διδασκαλίας τὴν εἰς τὰ εἶδη διαίρεσιν. "Before going into Aristotle's teaching on relatives, these five things must be examined: (1) their location; (2) the explanation of the title; (3) their independent existence (ὑπόστασις); (4) the manner of teaching; (5) their division into species" (tr. Cohen - Matthews).⁶⁸ Sergius of Rešaina treats four initial points at the outset of book five of his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* (unedited), omitting the point about the title of this category. A nearer parallel is found in Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, pp. 96.35-97.1 Busse) who commences the lecture on the relatives by saying: πέντε παρακολουθήματα ἔπεται τοῖς πρὸς τι, τὸ λέγεσθαι, τὸ διδάσκεσθαι, τὸ εἶναι, τὸ γένος εἶναι, τὸ συναριθμεῖσθαι ταῖς κατηγορίαι. 'Five concomitant points are followed on the relatives, that to be said, that to be learned, that to exist, that to be a genus, and that to be counted among the categories', (so also in Elias, *In Cat.*, p. 200.33-35 Busse).

The first point (1) in the Syriac commentary deals with the question of the title of this category, or more precisely, why this category was given by Aristotle in the plural (ܠܘܘܢܐܘܢܐ ܡܠܬܘܛܐܘܬܝܟܘܢܐ) and not in the singular (ܠܘܘܢܐ ܕܢܝܚܘܢܐ), as he treats the other categories.⁶⁹

The second point (2) is more closely related to the account of Olympiodorus and Elias that deals with the question of the study of relatives, which Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, pp. 97.3f. Busse) says is about τὴν διασκευὴν τῶν πρὸς τι "the arrangement of the relatives" (cf. also *ibid.*, p. 97.9-25 Busse). Elias (*In Cat.*, p. 201.4-6, p. 205.17-31 Busse) however clearly connects this point with that of Ammonius (*In Cat.*, p. 67.11-15 Busse) and Philoponus (*In Cat.*, p. 105.12-18 Busse) that investigates the manner of teaching used by Aristotle with regard to this category.

The third point (3) concerns the question of whether relatives have independent existence (ܠܘܘܢܐܘܢܐ/ὑπόστασις/ὑπαρξίς) or not, that is, if their existence is in physical things or in a relation that is perceived by us, a question which is also discussed by other commentators.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Jacob, [Syriac trans. of *Cat.*], pp. 271.23-272.1 Georr; see also Hugonnard-Roche, "Jacques d'Édesse" (above, n. 5), p. 46; King, *The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle's Categories* (above, n. 20), pp. 208f., and 224; and our commentary in Sergius of Reshaina, *Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories* (above, n. 18), p. 242.

⁶⁸ Ammonius, *On Aristotle Categories*, translated by S. M. Cohen - G. B. Matthews, Duckworth, London 1991 (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle). Concerning the five preliminary questions, see also Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 102.13-16 Busse; Olymp., *In Cat.*, pp. 96.35-97.6 Busse; and Elias, *In Cat.*, pp. 200.33-201.17 Busse.

⁶⁹ On this point, see Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 66.18-21 Busse; Philop., *In Cat.*, pp. 102.29-103.17 Busse; Olymp., *In Cat.*, pp. 97.2f., 97.27-37 Busse; Elias, *In Cat.*, pp. 200.35-201.3, 205.32-206.24 Busse; and Simpl., *In Cat.*, pp. 169.1-162.11 Kalbfleisch.

⁷⁰ Ammon., *In Cat.*, pp. 66.21-77.11; Philop., *In Cat.*, pp. 103.18-104.36 Busse; Olymp., *In Cat.*, pp. 97.4f., 98.7-99.20; Elias, *In Cat.*, pp. 201.6-9, 203.35-35.15; and Simpl., *In Cat.*, pp. 169.1-172.10 Kalbfleisch.

The dispute of the fourth point (4) is about whether the relatives are a genus or not. This corresponds to the fifth point of Ammonius about the division of relatives into species, because Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, p. 97.5 Busse) specifies that since the relatives are a genus, one need to learn its species.⁷¹ The argument that a species found in a given category can also be found in other categories is already found in Porphyry, *In Cat.*, p. 114.8-22 Busse (cf. Porphyrii *Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, Reimer, Berlin 1887, *CAG* IV.1).

The discussion of the fifth and last point (5), which is about the order of relatives in the list of the ten categories, is also found in the Greek commentators.⁷²

§ 14 (p. 66) Olympiodorus and Elias too, in discussing the order of the relatives among the categories, present four reasons for why Aristotle treats relatives before quality. For the first reason, Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, p. 97.13-15 Busse) and Elias (*In Cat.*, p. 201.29-31 Busse) give the same argument as the Syriac commentary, which is already found in Porphyry (*In Cat.*, p. 111.11-15 Busse). Olympiodorus' (*In Cat.*, p. 97.15-18 Busse) and Elias' (*In Cat.*, p. 201.31-33 Busse) second argument is about the fact that many points in the teaching about quality appear already in the discussion on the relatives, which makes it proper to discuss relatives before quality for an easier understanding; this is also the idea of the Syriac commentator. Regarding the third reason, Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, p. 97.18-22 Busse) says that relatives do not have matter, but appear to be present in the other categories; the teaching about relatives points towards that of quality, and in order to avoid confusion in the discussion on quality it is appropriate to introduce relatives before it. The fourth point is defectively preserved in the Syriac text, but Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, p. 97.22-26 Busse) connects it with the doctrine of Protagoras that also quality belongs to the relatives, which makes it necessary to introduce it first in order to assess the validity of that statement. Elias (*In Cat.*, p. 202.4-9 Busse) also notes that statements about quality involve the relatives.

§ 15 (p. 65) The species of relatives. In this Syriac text, the species of relatives are partly differently denoted compared to the Greek commentaries. Nine species of relatives can be distinguished as follows:⁷³

Some relatives are said here in the Syriac text to be derived ܠܗܘܢܐ ܙܘܢ 'from similarity', while Ammonius (*In Cat.*, p. 67.17 Busse) and Philoponus (*In Cat.*, p. 105.1 Busse) say ܠܗܘܢܐ ܕܘܡܘܢܘܡܝܘܬܐ 'homonymously'.⁷⁴ Others are said to be derived ܠܗܘܢܐ ܠܘܢܐ ܙܘܢ 'from dissimilarity', where Ammonius (*In Cat.*, p. 67.17f.) and Philoponus (*In Cat.*, p. 105.2) have ܠܗܘܢܐ ܗܝܬܪܘܢܘܡܝܘܬܐ 'heteronymously'. The third kind of relatives are said to be derived ܠܗܘܢܐ ܘܚܘܢܐ ܙܘܢ, which might be translated 'from participation'. The basic meaning of the Syriac word ܠܗܘܢܐ (ܡܗܘܚܘܒܘܬܐ) is 'concealment', but based on the example given, it might correspond to Greek μέθεξις 'participation'

⁷¹ Cf. also Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 99.21-38 Busse; Elias, *In Cat.*, pp. 201.9-11, 202.11-203.34 Busse; and Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 168.20-36 Kalbfleisch.

⁷² See Porphy., *In Cat.*, p. 111.11-15 Busse; Dexip., *In Cat.*, pp. 64.1-66.13 Busse (cf. Dexippi *In Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, Reimer, Berlin 1888, *CAG* IV.2); Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 66.7-14 Busse; Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 102.16-29 Busse; Olymp., *In Cat.*, pp. 97.6, 97.7-26 Busse; Elias, *In Cat.*, pp. 201.11f., 201.18-202.9 Busse; and Simpl., *In Cat.*, pp. 155.33-159.22 Kalbfleisch.

⁷³ For the division of the relatives, see also Sergius of Reshaina, *Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories* (above, n. 18), §74 Aydin, and the comm. *ad loc.*, pp. 236ff.

⁷⁴ Cf. however Porphy., *In Cat.*, p. 113.6f. Busse and Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 176.21-24 Kalbfleisch.

Regarding the view that a certain relation may be perceived from the weakness (ܠܗܘܢܘܢܘܢ) of a subject towards the object of its action, it is worth giving a passage of Iamblichus in Simplicius (*In Cat.*, p. 161.21f. Kalbfleisch): [ἡ διαίρεσις τοῦ πρὸς τι] εἰς τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν δυνάμεως, ὡς τὸ ἀδύνατον ὀραθῆναι πρὸς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἰδεῖν “[the division of the Relative is made into] that based on privation of potentiality, e.g. that which cannot be seen in relation to what cannot see”, (tr. Fleet).⁷⁸ For the latter three kinds of relations, Simplicius seems to render the exegesis of Iamblichus, whose lost commentary on the *Categories* might therefore directly or indirectly have influenced the Syriac commentator too.

§ 16 (pp. 66-68) Protagoras: everything is relative! (ܘܡܘܠܘܩ ܡܘܠ ܕܘܠܘܢܘܢܘܢ; Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 66.27 Busse: πάντα πρὸς τι; Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 103.31f. Busse: πάντα τὰ πράγματα πρὸς τι; Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 98.23 Busse: πάντα εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τι; Elias, *In Cat.*, p. 203.37 Busse: πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς τι). This is one of the most interesting passages in the commentary, where the enquiry on ontology appears to be confused with that on epistemology. Namely, the question of how things are in themselves seems to have been mixed up with how the knowledge of them reaches our perception and is handled by our senses, which are two different philosophical questions. The same discussion is also made by Ammonius (*In Cat.*, pp. 66.26-67.7 Busse), Philoponus (*In Cat.*, p. 104.18-25 Busse), Sergius (*In Cat.*, book 5); and partially by Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, pp. 98.22-99.20 Busse) and Elias (*In Cat.*, pp. 203.35-204.36 Busse) in connection with the category of relatives. The inquiry is however justified if the aim is to determine how relational things are linked to each other and to establish on what premises that relation is based. In that case, the question is relevant for how we, on the basis of our knowledge, put (two) separate things into relation to each other and include them in the category of the relatives.

The passage at the end of § 17 (p. 68), in Ammonius (*In Cat.*, p. 67.3-7 Busse), Philoponus (*In Cat.*, p. 104.18-25 Busse), and Sergius (L f. 41va8-22 / P f. 77r8-15)⁷⁹ appears to be a quotation from a work by Plato, where he refutes Protagoras' view regarding the relativity of everything. This topic is not found as such in Plato's dialogues. The editor of Ammonius' and Philoponus' commentaries (Ammon. p. [144] and Philop. p. [XIX] Busse) and the former's translators into English (Cohen - Matthews, p. 78 n. 94) refer to Plato's *Theaetetus* 170C.⁸⁰ But neither Ammonius, nor Philoponus or Sergius are really quoting Plato literally here, even if the nearest correspondence of such a refutation of Protagoras by Plato is found in the passage from the *Theaetetus*. Nor is the Syriac passage here in question a faithful quotation from any known text by Plato, or even closely related to Sergius' wording, who is reliant on Ammonius. Instead, Ammonius seems to paraphrase Plato's refutation by chiefly adopting his form of argument. The same mode of procedure is applied by Ammonius to the refutation of the sceptical or ephectic stand towards the possibility of obtaining firm knowledge.⁸¹ Thus, a

⁷⁸ Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories 7-8*, translated by B. Fleet, Cornell U.P., Ithaca, New York 2002. On this point, see also Anonymi *In Aristotelis Categoriae paraphrasis*, ed. M. Hayduck, Reimer, Berlin 1883 (*CAG* XXIII.2), p. 30.21f.

⁷⁹ Sergius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories, to Theodore*. L = London MS, British Library, *Add.* 14658; and P = Paris MS, Bibliothèque nationale de France, *Syr.* 354.

⁸⁰ See also the quotations in Elias, *In Cat.*, pp.110.4-7, 204.33-35 and Busse's reference [p. 289] to Plato's *Theaet.* 170A.

⁸¹ See Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 2.14-17 Busse, tr. Cohen - Matthews, with n. 2 *ad loc.*; and Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 2.21-24 Busse, tr. Sirkel - Tweedale - Harris, with n. 8 *ad loc.*; Philoponus, *On Aristotle Categories 1-5*, translated by R. Sirkel - M. Tweedale - J. Harris, with Philoponus, *A Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts*, translated by D. King, Bloomsbury, London 2014.

type of argument is employed here rather than being a direct quotation, which also explains the difference in wording between Ammonius, Philoponus, and Sergius.

§ 17 (p. 68) Salamander being unburning. The idea that the salamander is believed not to be destroyed by fire but rather that it extinguishes a fire that it enters, is reported already by Aristotle (*History of Animals*, V 19, 552 b 15-17). This belief was transmitted by several subsequent writers, such as Olympiodorus in his commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorology*.⁸² The source of this Syriac commentary however is probably the more popular anonymous work called *Physiologus*, which is supposed to have been written in Greek during the second/third century A.D. During the following centuries it was translated into many languages, such as Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic, and Armenian. The old Syriac version is extant in incomplete form in two manuscripts, of which only one preserves the chapter on the salamander (*Vat. Syr.* no. 217, ff. 213r-219v). In the edition of the Greek text of the *Physiologus* by Sbordone, chapter 31 concerns the salamander's ability to put out fire,⁸³ and in the Syriac text edited by Tychsen the topic is found in chapter 9.⁸⁴ The same report about the salamander is also found in the other versions of the *Physiologus* and books on animals in Syriac.⁸⁵ In the Greek commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, this example is not found, although the salamander is said not to be hot by Elias (*In Cat.*, pp. 202.6, 204.6, and 220.26 Busse) in connection with the discussion on the relatives.

§ 18a (p. 68) The definition of the relatives and its attribution to Plato. The definition of the relatives that is given at the outset of chapter 7 of the *Categories*, is attributed to Plato also by Porphyry, which he says is corrected by Aristotle (*Cat.* 8 a 28-b 24) later on,⁸⁶ but Simplicius (*In Cat.*, p. 159.12-22 Kalbfleisch) reports that Boethus of Sidon (1st century BC) noted its connection to Plato (see also Fleet's nn. 25-27 *ad locum*).

§ 18b (p. 68) Relatives expressed by grammatical cases. The use of grammatical cases for the purpose of specifying the different ways in which things are related to each other is also found in Porphyry (*In Cat.*, p. 112.8-21 Busse) and Simplicius (*In Cat.*, pp. 162.19-163.5 Kalbfleisch). What in Greek is expressed by the grammatical cases through the change of word endings is in Syriac expressed by the addition of prepositional particles. This means that Syriac lacks the inflection of grammatical cases. This would perhaps indicate that the original of this commentary was written in Greek, but that conclusion would require an explanation to the high degree of adaptation to the grammar of the Syriac language that has been imposed on the text.

⁸² Olympiodori *In Aristotelis Meteora Commentaria*, ed. G. Stüve, Reimer, Berlin 1900 (*CAG* XII.2), p. 331.13-18.

⁸³ *Physiologus*, ed. F. Sbordone, Società Dante Alighieri, Milano - Genova - Roma - Napoli 1936, pp. 101f.

⁸⁴ *Physiologus Syrus seu Historia Animalium XXXII* in *S. S. memoratorum, Syriace e codice Bibliothecae Vaticanae*, nunc primum edidit, vertit et illustravit O. G. Tychsen, Rostochii 1795, p. 7. A few words from the end of this chapter are unfortunately dropped in this edition and the manuscript should be consulted here (*Vat. Syr.* 217, f. 214v4-7). I intend however to prepare a new edition with translation of this Syriac version of the *Physiologus*.

⁸⁵ "*Physiologus Leidensis*", *Anecdota Syriaca*, vol. 4: *Otia Syriaca*, ed. J.P.N. Land, Brill, Lugduni Batavorum 1875, Ch. 52, pp. 75f. ["The Book of Natural Things"], Das "Buch der Naturgegenstände", herausgegeben und übersetzt von K. Ahrens, C.F. Haeseler, Kiel 1892, Ch. 118, p. 63; and Bar Bahlul, *Lexicon syriacum*, col. 1354 Duval.

⁸⁶ Porph., *In Cat.*, p. 111.28f. Busse, see also Porphyry, *On Aristotle's Categories*, trans. by S. K. Strange, Cornell U.P., Ithaca N.Y. 1992, p. 113 n. 307 *ad loc.*

than it.⁹⁰ The other way that a presentation may contain a mistake is if a proposition refers to something accidental, and such cases were probably discussed in the following part of the Syriac commentary, which is lost. Cases with propositions that contain accidental elements are however discussed by Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, p. 107.17-29 Busse), Simplicius (*In Cat.*, p. 185.28-35, p. 186.14-20, and also p. 172.27-36 Kalbfleisch), and others as well.

§ 40 (p. 80) Examples of improper presentations. The discussion in the Syriac work contains examples that are present already in Aristotle's *Categories* and its Greek commentaries. Porphyry for example says (*In Cat.*, p. 116.11-13 Busse): πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων ἔστι πτερά, ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρνιθες, μελισσῶν, σφηκῶν, ἀκρίδων, τεττίγων καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων “For there are many other winged creatures that are not birds, for example bees, wasps, locusts, cicadas, and a myriad of others” (tr. Strange), and Philoponus (*In Cat.*, p. 112.12f. Busse): οὐ γὰρ πᾶν πτερόν ὄρνιθός ἐστι πτερόν· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὰ πτηνὰ ἃ οὐκ εἰσιν ὄρνιθες ‘for not every wing is a wing of a bird, since there are some flying creatures that are not birds’. Another near parallel is found in Simplicius, who writes (*In Cat.*, p. 183.18-21 Kalbfleisch): ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα πτερωτά, ἃ οὐκ εἰσιν ὄρνιθες· τῶν γὰρ πτερωτῶν τὰ μὲν ἔστιν σαρκόπτερα, τὰ δὲ κολεόπτερα, τὰ δὲ σχιζόπτερα, ὧν τὰ σχιζόπτερα μόνα ὄρνιθές εἰσιν “for there are other winged creatures which are not birds; for some winged creatures are flesh-winged, others sheath-winged, others feather-winged, of which only the last are birds” (tr. Fleet).

The terminology used being: ܘܕܘܝܘܟ < ὄρνιθες = ܕܘܝܘܟ ‘birds’, which are ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ τὰ σχιζόπτερα ‘split/feather-winged’; and ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ < πετεινά/πετηνά/πτηνά ‘flying creatures’, which are $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ ‘non-split-winged creatures’, that is, τὰ ὀλόπτερα ‘whole/nonfeather-winged creatures’; and these are either $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ ‘membrane-winged’, such as $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ ἀκρίδες ‘locusts’, $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ σφήκες ‘wasps’, and $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ μυῖαι (Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 105.6 Busse) ‘flies’; or $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ σαρκόπτερα⁹² ‘flesh-winged’, such as $\text{ܩܠܘܟܐ ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ}$ νυκτερίδες ‘bats’. While the *κάνθαροι* ‘beetles’ are said by Ammonius (*In Cat.*, p. 71.22 Busse) to be κολεόπτερα ‘sheath-winged’.

As an example of boats that do not have a rudder, the Syriac text has ܕܘܝܘܟܢܐ ܩܠܘܟܐ (lit. ‘boats of sea’), which probably corresponds to the Greek ἀκάτια ‘rowing-boats’, ‘skiffs’, ‘dinghies’ as found in Ammon. (*In Cat.*, p. 72.2 Busse), Philop. (*In Cat.*, p. 112.25 Busse), Olymp. (*In Cat.*, p. 105.7 Busse), whereas Elias (*In Cat.*, p. 210.36 Busse) just mentions τὰ μικρὰ πλοῖα ‘small boats’; see also Porph. (*In Cat.*, p. 116.31 Busse) and Simpl. (*In Cat.*, p. 184.31-33 Kalbfleisch).

Furthermore, Porphyry (*In Cat.*, p. 116.23f. Busse) writes: πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι ζῶα, ἃ μὴ ἔχει κεφαλὴν, ὡς ὄστρεα, καρκίνοι καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια “for there are many animals that do not have heads, such as oysters, crabs and similar animals” (tr. Strange); cf. also Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 113.4ff. Busse.

§ 42 (p. 80) The statement does not turn out accurately. For a discussion on this, see for example, Simpl., *In Cat.*, pp. 184.3-185.3 Kalbfleisch.

⁹⁰ Cf. also Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 183.30f. Kalbfleisch: ὑπερβάλλειν and ἐλλείπειν; and p. 186.19f.: ὑπερβολή and ἐλλειψίς, with n. 142 *ad loc.* by Fleet.

⁹¹ Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 112.15f. Busse has ὑμενόπτερα ‘membrane-winged’ for νυκτερίδες ‘bats’.

⁹² Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 183.21 Kalbfleisch; Olymp., *In Cat.*, p. 105.2 Busse; but Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 71.22 Busse has δερμόπτερα; and Elias, *In Cat.*, p. 211.3f. Busse has δερματοπτερα.

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