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Cover

Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḡawī 300, f. 1v
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, *grec* 1853, f. 186v

The Soul as “Harmony” in Late Antiquity and in the Latin Middle Ages

A Note on Thomas Aquinas as a Reader of Themistius’ In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis

Elisa Coda*

Abstract

The importance of Themistius’ paraphrasis of the *De Anima* is often acknowledged in scholarship mostly with respect to Thomas Aquinas’ own understanding of the Aristotelian doctrine of intellection, and occasionally also with respect to Avicenna and Averroes. This focus on Themistius’ interpretation of *De Anima* III should not prevent those interested in the history of the reception of Aristotle from taking into account other ideas typical of this paraphrasis. The present article argues that Themistius’ emphasis on soul as *ousia*, prompted by Plotinus’ polemics against the doctrine of soul as ‘harmony’ that Themistius quotes almost literally, was crucial for Thomas Aquinas’ own exegesis in his *Sententia Libri De Anima*.

With the notable exception of Gerard of Cremona’s translation from Arabic of *In Analytica Posteriora*,¹ no commentary by Themistius was translated into Latin before 1267.² Indeed, even the name of this renowned philosopher and rhetor of 4th century Byzantium remained almost unknown in the Western world until November 22, 1267, when the translation of *In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis* was completed. The date features in the colophon of the manuscript Toledo, Biblioteca del Cabildo 47-12, f. 37 v, to which attention was called by the editor of the Latin translation Gerard Verbeke. The colophon reads:

expleta fuit translatio huius operis anno Domini MCCLXVII decimo kalendas decembris Viterbii.
Fuit autem Themistius tempore Juliani apostatae apud eum plurimum honoratus.³

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¹ J.R. O’Donnell, “Themistius’ Paraphrasis of the *Posterior Analytics* in Gerard of Cremona’s Translation”, *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), pp. 239-315.

² This assessment does not take into account the question of the Latin circulation from Late Antiquity onwards of a work on Aristotle’s *Categories* that can be traced back to Themistius and is known under the title *Categoriae Decem*: cf. L Minio-Paluello, “Note sull’Aristotele latino medievale. XV. Dalle *Categoriae Decem* pseudo-agostiniane (temistiane) al testo vulgato aristotelico boeziano”, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 54 (1962), pp. 137-47 (repr. in Id., *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1972, pp. 448-58).

³ *Themistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*. Édition critique et étude sur l’utilisation du commentaire dans l’œuvre de saint Thomas par G. Verbeke, Brill, Leiden 1973, p. LXIII (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 1). In 1481, the paraphrase was translated again by Ermolao Barbaro Jr., in 1554 by Ludovico Nogarola, and finally, between 1582 and 1588, by Federico Bonaventura: cf. R.B. Todd, “Themistius”, in V. Brown (Editor in Chief) - J. Hankins - R.A. Kaster (Associate Editors), *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum. Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries. Annotated Lists and Guides*, vol. VIII, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2003, pp. 59-102, esp. pp. 79-84.

The name of the translator is not given, but the authorship of the Flemish Dominican William of Moerbeke, then at the papal court in Viterbo,⁴ lies beyond doubt.⁵ As pointed out in a series of important studies,⁶ Moerbeke was then working relentlessly to implement his “insatiable desire to pass on to Latin-reading students the yet undiscovered or rediscovered treasure of Greek civilization”, as Lorenzo Minio-Paluello has it.⁷ Although recent scholarship does not follow the 20th century scholars who, on the basis of some Medieval sources, depict Moerbeke as working on Thomas’ demand,⁸ there are cases where the latter was indeed

⁴ A. Paravicini Bagliani, “Guillaume de Moerbeke et la cour pontificale”, in J. Brams - W. Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion de 700^e anniversaire de sa mort (1286)*, Leuven U.P., Leuven 1989 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series I, 8), pp. 23-52.

⁵ Todd, “Themistius” (above, n. 2), p. 78, claims that Moerbeke’s authorship is established “mainly on stylistic grounds”, echoing Paravicini Bagliani, “Guillaume de Moerbeke et la cour pontificale” (above, n. 4), p. 24 n. 2: “l’attribution de cette traduction à Guillaume de Moerbeke se fonde aussi sur des argumentations d’ordre linguistique”. Paravicini Bagliani refers to Verbeke, *Thémistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (above, n. 3), pp. LXIII-LXVIII, who, following the lead of L. Minio-Paluello, “Guglielmo di Moerbeke traduttore della *Poetica* di Aristotele, 1278”, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 39 (1947), pp. 1-17 (repr. in Id., *Opuscula* [above, n. 2, pp. 40-56]), compares the Latin renderings of various Greek particles, reaching the conclusion that “l’identité du traducteur ne fait pas de doute, à cause de la convergence des données de la critique externe (lieu et date de traduction) avec celles de la critique interne, bien que ces dernières soient incomplètes. La méthode de traduction est certainement celle de Guillaume de Moerbeke et les informations sur le lieu et la date de la version correspondent avec ce que nous savons par ailleurs sur l’activité du célèbre dominicain flamand”.

⁶ After the seminal work by M. Grabmann, *Guglielmo di Moerbeke O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele*, Roma 1946 (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, XI, 20), a number of studies has been devoted to Moerbeke’s biography, his translations, and his relationship with several scientists and philosophers of his time. Cf. especially A. Paravicini Bagliani, “Witelo et la science optique à la cour pontificale de Viterbe (1277)”, *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome* 87 (1975), pp. 425-53. For a detailed commented bibliography cf. W. Vanhamel, “Biobibliographie de Guillaume de Moerbeke”, in Brams - Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke* (above n. 4), pp. 301-83; after 1989, cf. J. Brams, “Guillaume de Moerbeke et Aristote”, in J. Hamesse - M. Fattori (eds.), *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale. Traductions et traducteurs de l'Antiquité tardive au XIV^e siècle*. Actes du Colloque international de Cassino, 15-17 juin 1989 publiés par la SIEPM et l’Université degli studi di Cassino, KU Leuven - Università di Cassino, Leuven-Cassino 1990, pp. 317-36; Id., “Les traductions de Guillaume de Moerbeke”, in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les traducteurs au travail. Leus manuscrits et leurs méthodes*. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice 30 septembre - 6 octobre 1999, Brepols, Turnhout 2001, pp. 231-56.

⁷ L. Minio-Paluello, “Moerbeke, William of”, in Ch.H. Gillispie (ed.), *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 434-40, esp. p. 434.

⁸ J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son œuvre. Nouvelle édition profondément remaniée et enrichie d'une bibliographie mise à jour*, Cerf, Paris 2015, p. 229 n. 51, quotes a 1312 list of Thomas Aquinas’ works claiming that: “Fr. Wilhelmus Brabantinus, Corinthiensis, transtulit omnes libros naturalis et moralis philosophiae de graeco in latinum ad instantiam Fratris Thomae”. Torrell also quotes the biographer of Thomas Guglielmo da Tocco, claiming that Thomas “procuravit quod fieret nova translatio que sententia Aristotilis continet clarius veritatem”. According to Torrell, *ibid.*, the former piece of information is in all likelihood the source of the latter. Another ground for the claim that some of Moerbeke’s translations were done upon the request of Thomas Aquinas is a note on the MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Ashmolean* 424, which has been studied mostly in relationship to Witelo’s *Perspectiva*, a work dedicated to William of Moerbeke. The relevant part of the note claims that Moerbeke “transtulit physicam Aristotelis de greco in latinum ad preces sancti Thomae de Aquino”: cf. Paravicini Bagliani, “Moerbeke et la cour pontificale” (above, n. 4), p. 43, referring to his previous work “Un matematico nella corte papale del secolo XIII: Campano da Novara († 1296)”, *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 27 (1973), pp. 98-129, esp. p. 116. The idea that Moerbeke’s translations were done “ad instantiam fratris Thomae” has been challenged mostly by R. A. Gauthier in his *Preface* to the Leonine edition of Thomas’ commentary on the *De Anima: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia* iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita. Tomus XLV, 1. *Sententia Libri De Anima* cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum. Commissio Leonina - Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Roma-Paris 1984. Gauthier, *Praefatio* p. 176*, comments upon the pieces of information just quoted as follows: “Ces textes ont pu faire illu-

the first to benefit from a brand new translation or a revision of earlier translations made by Moerbeke.

One of the cases where Thomas' quotations are very close to the completion by Moerbeke of one of his translations is surely that of Themistius' *In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis*.⁹ Thomas makes extensive use of the paraphrase, both in his own *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, dated 1267-1268,¹⁰ and in the *De Unitate intellectus*, dated 1270.¹¹ It is well known that in this treatise Thomas has recourse (also) to Themistius in order to disprove the interpretation of the Aristotelian intellectual faculty as a substance existing apart from the individual souls that are forms of the individual bodies – a substance that turns out to be one and the same for all mankind.¹² It is in particular on the

sion, tant que l'histoire des traductions latines médiévales d'Aristote n'était pas connue; ils ne le peuvent plus aujourd'hui: nous avons désormais sur cette histoire trop d'informations précises avec lesquelles ils sont en contradiction". Although sharing the essentials of Gauthier's argument, C. Steel, "Guillaume de Moerbeke et saint Thomas", in Brams - Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke* (above, n. 4), pp. 57-82, draws from his analysis of Moerbeke's translations and their use by Thomas the following conclusion: "L'étude de l'histoire des traductions et les remarques critiques du P. Gauthier nous ont obligés à limiter nettement la portée de ce témoignage. Cette étude a restitué ainsi à Moerbeke son autonomie et son originalité intellectuelle. Mais elle a confirmé également qu'il y a eu communication scientifique entre les deux dominicains (ce qui est le noyau solide de la tradition). Thomas a très vite compris l'importance du travail de son confrère. Il en a profité le premier, et c'est probablement grâce à son autorité que des traductions de Moerbeke ont commencé à circuler à Paris, et à partir de là dans la culture latine" (pp. 81-82).

⁹ Cf. Gauthier, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 129*: "Nombreux avaient été au XIII^e siècle, avant saint Thomas, les commentateurs du *De anima* d'Aristote, mais tous avaient commenté la *Translatio vetus* de Jacques de Venise, qui datait du milieu du XII^e siècle. Saint Thomas fut le premier à commenter, dès qu'elle eut paru, la *Translatio noua* de Guillaume de Moerbeke: là est l'originalité, et peut-être la raison d'être, de son commentaire". On James of Venice's translation (*Translatio vetus*) and Moerbeke's revision of it cf. L. Minio-Paluello, "Le texte du *De Anima* d'Aristote. La tradition latine avant 1500", in *Autour d'Aristote. Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, pp. 217-43 (repr. in *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* [above, n. 2], pp. 250-76); Gauthier, *Praefatio*, p. 160*; R. Wielockx, "Guillaume de Moerbeke réviseur de sa révision du *De Anima*", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 54 (1987), pp. 113-85. On the grounds of a detailed analysis, Gauthier establishes that "Il n'est pas impossible que saint Thomas ait reçu en même temps, à la fin de 1267, l'ensemble de l'œuvre de Moerbeke, révision du texte d'Aristote et traduction de la paraphrase de Thémistius" (p. 283*). Cf. also Steel, "Guillaume de Moerbeke et saint Thomas", referring to the attitude to counter Averroes' interpretation of the *De Anima* by means of Themistius' that is typical of the *De Unitate intellectus*: "Dans ce traité polémique, Thomas est heureux de pouvoir citer le Thémistius authentique contre le Thémistius manipulé d'Averroès: *patet etiam quod Averroes perverse refert sententiam Themistii et Theophrasti...* (...). Remarquons enfin que Thomas fut également le premier à profiter de la traduction de l'*Elementatio theologica* de Proclus, ce qui lui a permis de reconnaître que le *Liber de causis* est une adaptation de ce texte de Proclus. (...) C'est probablement par l'intermédiaire de Thomas que certaines traductions de Moerbeke (celle de Thémistius, de Proclus, de Simplicius) ont commencé à circuler dans le milieu universitaire à Paris" (pp. 70-71).

¹⁰ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, quoted in the preceding note; that this work was written between 1267 and 1268 is established also on the basis of the presence in it of quotations from Themistius' paraphrasis: see below, pp. 311-12 with notes 19-25.

¹¹ *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita. Tomus XLIII. De principiis naturae, De Aeternitate mundi, De Motu cordis, De Mixtione elementorum, De Operationibus occultis naturae, De Iudiciis astrorum, De Sortibus, De Unitate intellectus, De Ente et essentia; De Fallaciis, De Propositionibus modalibus*, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum. Editori di San Tommaso, Santa Sabina, Roma 1976. Cf. also A. de Libera, *Thomas d'Aquin, Contre Averroès. L'unité de l'intellect contre les averroïstes suivi des textes contre Averroès antérieurs à 1270*. Traduction, introduction, bibliographie, chronologie, notes et index, Flammarion, Paris 1994; Id., *L'Unité de l'intellect. Commentaire du De Unitate intellectus de Thomas d'Aquin*, Vrin, Paris 2004 (Études et commentaires).

¹² This doctrine cannot be ascribed to Averroes without qualification, because he changed his mind on the nature of intellect in the various works he devoted to the *De Anima* (the *Epitome*, the Middle and Long commentaries, not to mention other minor writings), and there is no scholarly consensus on their relative chronology. Valuable summaries of the positions held in scholar-

issue of intellect that Thomas repeatedly quotes Themistius;¹³ other *magistri* followed in Thomas' footsteps.¹⁴ What he claims he has found in Themistius' account of *De Anima*, III, 4-5, is the correct interpretation of intellect as a faculty – indeed, the highest faculty – of the human soul: the form of the individual body, the entelechy of the living being. The theory that makes the intellect instead something distinct from the individual soul, a separate entity shared in common by all mankind, is notoriously rejected by Thomas as a misinterpretation of Aristotle, and one that was propounded only by Averroes plus his followers at the Paris university. All this has been shown in a series of studies to which there is nothing that I can add. I will rather focus on the *Sententia Libri De Anima*. Against the background of a general reassessment of Themistius' sources that includes an inventory of his Plotinian readings,¹⁵ I will try to argue here that, via Moerbeke's translation of *In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis* and Thomas' use of it, Themistius passed on to the Latin readership the Plotinian account of the reasons why the soul cannot be the "harmony" of the body.

That some of Themistius' arguments are germane to Plotinus' did not go unnoticed by Thomas Aquinas, who was to some extent acquainted with the Plotinian doctrine thanks to Macrobius. Thomas remarks that both Plotinus and Themistius part company from Plato's extreme dualism, here presented, in "Gregorius Nissenus'" wording, as the doctrine that makes man *solum intellectus*.¹⁶

ship on the evolution (or lack thereof) of Averroes' position are provided by M. Geoffroy, "À la recherche de la Béatitude", an introductory essay to Averroès. *La Béatitude de l'âme*. Éditions, traductions annotées, études doctrinales et historiques d'un traité d' "Averroès", par M. Geoffroy et C. Steel, Vrin, Paris 2001 (Sic et Non), esp. pp. 42-81, and by R.C. Taylor in the Introduction to his English translation of the Long Commentary (lost in Arabic apart from some fragments, on which more later): cf. *Averroes of Cordoba's Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, Translation and Introduction* by R.C. Taylor with Th.-A. Druart Subeditor, Yale U.P., New Haven 2009, where a "middle position", a "transitional position", and a "final position" are singled out. Leaving aside the complex question whether or not the position held in the *Long Commentary* counts as Averroes' last word on the human intellect, one can confidently say that this was indeed the doctrine known to Thomas and the other scholastic authors of the 13th century. The *Long Commentary* was translated into Latin by Michael Scot (edition: Averrois Cordubensis *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros* recensuit F.S. Crawford, Cambridge [MA] 1953 [Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem ... Versionium Latinarum VI 1]). The origins of the Latin "Averroism" are in themselves a subject of scholarly research: see esp. R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du 'premier averroïsme'", *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 321-73. Finally, on the fragments of the Arabic *Long Commentary* I have alluded to before, attesting to a different draft with respect to the Latin version, see C. Sirat - M. Geoffroy, *L'original arabe du Grand Commentaire d'Averroès au De Anima d'Aristote. Prémisses de l'édition*, Vrin, Paris 2005 (Sic et Non). — Themistius was critical also for Averroes, as shown by R.C. Taylor, "Themistius and the Development of Averroes' Noetics", in R.L. Friedman - J.-M. Counet (eds.), *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima*, Peeters, Leuven 2013 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 58), pp. 1-38.

¹³ G. Verbeke, "Thémistius et le *De Unitate intellectus* de saint Thomas", in Verbeke, *Thémistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (above n. 3), pp. xxxix-lxii, previously published in the *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 53 (1955), pp. 141-64. According to Verbeke, the *verbatim* quotations are ten, all of them "empruntés au commentaire du philosophe grec sur le chapitre V du troisième livre du *Traité de l'âme*, chapitre qui traite de l'intellect actif" (p. xxxix). In reality, the *verbatim* quotations are taken also from other parts of Themistius' *In Libros De Anima*. Verbeke's article deals with only one passage, and the references in it are based on the 1936 edition of Thomas' *De Unitate intellectus* by L.W. Keeler; in consideration of all this, I deem it useful to provide the list of all the quotations with reference to the *editio Leonina* (as quoted above): see below, Appendix I. The passage dealt with in Verbeke's article quoted above is n° 11 in my list.

¹⁴ E.P. Mahoney, "Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James of Viterbo and Other Thirteenth-century Philosophers", *Augustiniana* 23 (1973), pp. 428-31.

¹⁵ I take the liberty of directing the reader interested in this survey to my book *Insegnare la filosofia. Temistio fra Costantinopoli e il medioevo arabo-latino* (forthcoming, Pisa U.P. 2018). It strains credulity that the discussions about Themistius' philosophical allegiance (Aristotelian or Neoplatonic) do not start from an accurate inventory of his quotations from the *Enneads*.

¹⁶ *De Unitate intellectus*, III 256-264: "Si autem dicatur quod hoc indiuiduum quod est Sortes neque est aliquid compositum ex intellectu et corpore animato, neque est corpus animatum tantum, sed est solum intellectus; hec iam erit opinio Platonis, qui, ut Gregorius Nissenus refert, 'propter hanc difficultatem non uult hominem ex anima et corpore esse, sed

While Plato, in Thomas' eyes, was unable to account for continuity between sense-perception and intellection because of his conviction that man is his intellect, Plotinus – whom he depicts as a commentator of Aristotle – was aware of the fact that man is his soul. This means: the individual form of this individual body, endowed with a series of faculties that span from sense-perception to intellection.¹⁷ The fact that he connects to one another the post-Aristotelian Platonism of Plotinus and the account of the Aristotelian soul given by Themistius proves once again, if proof is needed, that Thomas was remarkably percipient of the real nature of the philosophical positions that he came across.¹⁸ However, when Thomas had recourse to Themistius in his commentary on *De Anima* I 4 he was surely not aware that what he was using as a means for understanding Aristotle was in reality Plotinus.

1. *Themistius in Thomas Aquinas' Sententia Libri De Anima, Book I, Chapter IX (commentary on De Anima I 4)*

In 1932, the Belgian scholar Marcel De Corte called attention to the use made by Thomas in his *Sententia Libri De Anima* of the newly translated commentary by Themistius.¹⁹ Even though the main conclusion drawn by De Corte apropos the date of Thomas' commentary has been challenged in subsequent scholarship, one thing has been established on firm grounds in this study: Thomas quotes extensively Themistius in his commentary on Book I. From this fact, coupled with the quotations in the 1270 *De Unitate intellectus*, De Corte argued that Thomas had commented upon books II and III at a time when Themistius had not yet been translated. In De Corte's account, Thomas' commentary on Book I was written later on, at a time when he had become acquainted with Moerbeke's translation.²⁰ Both the date of Thomas' commentary on Book I and its basis, namely the alleged absence of quotations from Themistius in the commentaries on Books II and III, have

animam corpore utentem et uelut indutam corpus". The rest of this passage, containing Thomas' assessment of the Plotinian doctrine and the comparison he establishes with Themistius', is quoted below, Appendix II. What Thomas believes to be Gregory of Nyssa's account is in reality Nemesius' *De Natura hominis*, whose Sections 2 and 3, on the soul, exist also as a separate treatise *On the Soul* attributed to Gregory of Nyssa: cf. M. Chase, "Némésius d'Émèse", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, IV, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2005, pp. 625-50, esp. p. 627. A complete inventory of Thomas' quotations from "Gregorius Nissenus" coming in reality from Nemesius has been provided by E. Dobler, *Falsche Väterzitate bei Thomas von Aquin. Gregorius, Bischof von Nyssa oder Nemesios, Bischof of Emesa? Untersuchungen über die Autentizität der Zitate Gregors von Nyssa in den gesamten Werken des Thomas von Aquin*, Universitätsverlag Freiburg/Schweiz 2001 (Dokimion, 27), esp. pp. 109-12 on the *De Unitate intellectus*.

¹⁷ Thomas' assessment owes much to the fact that Macrobius' summary of the Plotinian doctrine is based on I 1[53]. This treatise, placed by Porphyry as the first of the first *Ennead*, deals with the typically post-Aristotelian topic of the subject of affections. Hence, the solution advanced by Plotinus (and summarised by Macrobius faithfully) implies getting rid of dualism as the idea that the soul is one thing that enters the body, in itself another thing. Plotinus elaborates on the fact that the soul and body interact: he holds fast to the Platonic doctrine that man is his soul, but wants to account also for body-soul interactions. For more information on the treatise, its problems and solutions cf. C. Marzolo, *Plotino. Che cos'è l'essere vivente e che cos'è l'uomo? I 1[53]*. Introduzione, testo greco, traduzione e commento, Pisa University Press, Pisa 2006 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, 1).

¹⁸ An example is the continuity Thomas establishes between the Platonic tenet that man is his soul and the Aristotelian account of the intellect as the peak of man's life in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, admittedly one of the points in the corpus where the distance between Aristotle and Plato is reduced: the relevant passage is quoted below, Appendix I.

¹⁹ M. De Corte, "Thémistius et saint Thomas d'Aquin. Contribution à l'étude des sources et de la chronologie du commentaire de saint Thomas sur le *De Anima*", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 7 (1932), pp. 47-83.

²⁰ Hence De Corte, "Thémistius et saint Thomas d'Aquin", p. 72 concluded that the commentary on Book I was to be dated to the "second séjour que saint Thomas fit à Paris de 1269 à 1272, et, si l'on considère avant tout son caractère inachevé, pendant l'année scolaire 1271-1272".

been disproved first by Gerard Verbeke,²¹ and then, with much more detailed argumentation as for the time and circumstances of the composition of the *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, by R. A. Gauthier. First Gauthier shows that echoes of Themistius' paraphrase feature also in Thomas' commentaries on Books II and III.²² Then he raises the question why the quotations in Book I are explicit, while in commenting on Books II and III Thomas takes from Themistius only silent inspiration on minor points.²³ Gauthier's response revolves around the different attitude of Thomas in commenting on Book I, where the doxography on the soul in pre-Aristotelian philosophy plays an important role, if compared to that of his commentaries on Books II-III, where the doctrinal issues prevail.²⁴

On the basis of this element and others, that include (i) a comparison with further works quoting the so-called *Revisio Moerbekana* of the Latin text of the *Metaphysics*; (ii) a comparison with the *De Unitate intellectus*, and (iii) the existence of an Italian family of manuscripts of the *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, Gauthier reaches the conclusion that this work was composed between December 1267 and September 1268. Thus, he draws the conclusion that the *Sentencia Libri De Anima* was written down by Thomas during his stay at the Dominican studium of Santa Sabina in Rome, hence at a moment of his life when he was also working at the I^a Pars of the *Summa theologiae*, the *Quaestiones De Anima*, and the *Quaestiones De Spiritualibus creaturis*.²⁵

²¹ G. Verbeke, "Les sources et la chronologie du commentaire de S. Thomas au *De Anima* d'Aristote", *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 45 (1947), pp. 314-38, reprinted with corrections as "Thémistius et le commentaire de S. Thomas au *De Anima* d'Aristote" in Verbeke, *Thémistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (above n. 3), pp. IX-XXXVIII.

²² Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, pp. 274*-275*, lists some 30 passages where Thomas takes inspiration from or quotes implicitly Themistius, keeping apart those passages where the affinity between Thomas' and Themistius' exegesis of the *De Anima* might depend upon Averroes, who notoriously makes extensive use of Themistius in his *Long Commentary* (see above, p. 310 n. 12 *sub fn.*). As Gauthier has it, "Averroès connaissait bien Thémistius, souvent il le cite ou s'en inspire, et par lui l'exégèse de Thémistius est souvent passée chez les commentateurs de la *Vetus*; en bien de cas, on ne peut dire si les rencontres de saint Thomas avec Thémistius supposent la lecture de la traduction de Moerbeke ou ne relèvent pas plutôt de cette influence indirecte" (p. 274*).

²³ Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 274*: "Mis en évidence par M. De Corte, un fait reste acquis, même s'il faut aujourd'hui en nuancer l'énoncé: aux chapitres 1-11 du livre I du commentaire de saint Thomas, l'utilisation de Thémistius est massive et littérale; aux livres II et III du commentaire, si elle ne disparaît pas complètement, comme le croyait M. De Corte, elle se fait à tout le moins très discrète".

²⁴ Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, pp. 275* and 282*: "Saint Thomas utilise donc la paraphrase de Thémistius de deux manières bien différentes d'une part au livre I et d'autre part aux livres II et III de son commentaire sur le *De Anima*: là citations abondantes et précises, ici réminiscences rares et vagues. Cette constatation, dès qu'elle a été faite, a posé un problème. Une solution s'est immédiatement offerte: si les deux parties du commentaire sont disparates, c'est qu'elles ne relèvent pas du même genre littéraire. (...) En somme, l'abondance et l'exactitude des citations sont en raison inverse de l'intérêt du texte. Si le commentaire du livre I du *De Anima* relève d'un autre genre littéraire que le commentaire des livres II et III, cela tient à la nature du texte commenté: autre le commentaire laborieux et livresque d'un texte qu'on n'a pas relu depuis les jours lointains de l'école, autre le commentaire libre et spontané d'un autre texte connu, relu, aimé". Gauthier's developments about Book I of the *De Anima* in the teaching of the *magistri* of the 13th-14th centuries provide the background for understanding Thomas' attitude: see pp. 276*-279*.

²⁵ Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 288*: "L'apparition de la *Nova* [i.e., Moerbeke's revision of the Graeco-Latin version of the *De Anima* by James of Venice, namely the so-called *Vetus*] et de la traduction de la paraphrase de Thémistius invitait saint Thomas à procéder à une mise au point de ses connaissances aristotéliennes, mais la nature même du travail dans lequel il était alors engagé lui imposait de diviser le travail: la *Somma de théologie*, qu'il destine aux débutants, ne peut donner que l'essentiel de la doctrine; il faut réserver à des œuvres séparées la discussion plus détaillée des *Questions*, et la présentation de la moelle, *sentencia*, du traité de l'âme d'Aristote. Trop savante pour les débutants, la *Sentencia* sera utile aux maîtres qui voudront approfondir cet instrument privilégié de la réflexion théologique sur l'âme".

Among the Themistian quotations in Thomas' commentary on Book I, admittedly more numerous and explicit than elsewhere in the *Sententia Libri De Anima*,²⁶ I will focus on the one which features in Chapter IX, where Thomas takes into account *De Anima* I 4. Aristotle discusses here the doctrines on the soul that antedate his own, and criticises them, as Plato did before him in the *Phaedo*. At 407 b 27 - 408 a 18, with arguments that differ from those in Plato's *Phaedo*,²⁷ he deals with that which makes the soul the harmony of the body:

[407 b 27] Καὶ ἄλλη δὲ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἦττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγον δ' ὥσπερ εὐθύνοις δεδωκυῖα καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινόμενοις λόγοις. [b 30] ἄρμονίαν γὰρ τινὰ αὐτὴν λέγουσι. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ ἐναντίων. καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἄρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μυχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τ' εἶναι τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρμονίας, ψυχῆ δὲ πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἀρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγείας λέγειν ἄρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ' εἶ τις ἀποδιδόνα πειραθεῖη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρμονία τινί· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν. ἔτι δ' εἰ λέγομεν τὴν [a 5] ἄρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μὲν, τῶν μεγεθῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, τὴν σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω συναρμόζωσιν ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενές παραδέχεσθαι, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν μεμιγμένων λόγον, οὐδέτερος μὲν οὖν [a 10] εὐλογον, ἢ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν εὐξεστάτος. πολλὰ τε γὰρ αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλαχῶς· τίνος οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι, ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ὀρεκτικόν; ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον τῆς μίξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει [a 15] λόγον ἢ μίξις τῶν στοιχείων καθ' ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ' ἣν ὄστον. συμβῆσεται οὖν πολλὰς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμιγμένων, ὁ δὲ τῆς μίξεως λόγος ἄρμονία καὶ ψυχὴ.²⁸

[407 b 27] There is yet another opinion concerning soul which has come down to us, commending itself to many minds as readily as any that is put forward, although it has been severely criticised even

²⁶ Gauthier, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sententia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 273*: "G. Verbeke a d'abord confirmé ce que M. De Corte avait déjà bien mis en lumière: l'utilisation massive de Thémistius au livre I du commentaire de saint Thomas. Notre édition renforce encore cette conclusion: en plusieurs endroits où, à en croire les éditions anciennes, saint Thomas s'écartait quelque peu du texte de Thémistius qu'il cite, l'étude des manuscrits nous a amenés à rétablir la conformité de la citation avec le texte cité".

²⁷ Cf. H.B. Gottschalk, "Soul as Harmony", *Phronesis* 16 (1971), pp. 179-98.

²⁸ The Latin text in Moerbeke's revision of the *Vetus* runs: "Alia autem quedam opinio tradita est de anima, credibilis quidam multis et neque una minor hiis que dicte sunt, rationes autem tanquam directas prebens et in communi factis rationibus. Armoniam enim quandam dicunt. Et enim armoniam temperamentum et compositionem contrariorum esse et corpus componi e contrariis. Et quidem armonia quedam ratio compositorum est aut compositio, anima autem neutrum possibile est esse horum. Amplius autem mouere non est armonie, anime autem attribuunt hoc omnes. Congruit autem magis de sanitate dicere armoniam, et omnino de corporeis uirtutibus, quam de anima. Manifestum autem si aliquis temptauerit reddere passiones et opera anime armonia quadam: difficile enim adaptare. Amplius autem dicimus armoniam in duo respicientes, maxime quidem propria magnitudinem in habentibus motum et positionem, compositionem ipsorum, cum sic congruant ut nullum congenium pretermittatur. Hinc autem et eorum que miscentur rationem. Neutro quidem igitur modo rationabile. Compositio autem partium corporis multum inuestigabilis est: multe enim compositiones partium et multipliciter sunt; cuius igitur et quomodo congruit accipere intellectum compositionem esse aut et sensitium et appetitium? Similiter autem et inconueniens et rationem mixtionis esse animam. Non enim eandem habet rationem commixtio elementorum secundum quam caro et secundum quam os; accidet igitur multas animas habere. Et secundum omne corpus, si quidem omnia ex elementis commixta sunt, commixtionis autem ratio armonia et anima" (edited together with Thomas' *Sententia Libri De Anima*, p. 43).

in the popular discussions of the present day. [b 30] The soul is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is on this view a blending or combining of opposites, and the components of the body are opposites. And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of these. Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of a harmony: yet this function more than any other is all but universally assigned to soul. Again, it is more in harmony [408 a 1] with the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions of the soul: it is difficult to harmonise them. Further, if we use the word [a 5] harmony with a twofold application; first, and in its most natural sense, of those magnitudes which have motion and position, to denote the combining of them into a whole, when they are so closely fitted together that they do not admit between them anything of the same kind; and then in a secondary sense to denote the proportion subsisting between the components of a mixture: in neither sense [a 10] is it reasonable to call soul a harmony. The view which regards it as a combining of the parts of the body is singularly open to criticism. For there are many combinings of the parts, and they combine in many ways. What part, then, is that whose combining with the rest we must assume to be the intellect, and in what ways does it combine? Or again, what of the sensitive and appetitive faculties? But it is equally absurd to regard the soul as the proportion determining the mixture. For the elements are not mixed in the same [a 15] proportion in flesh as in bone. Thus it will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the body, if we assume that all members consist of the elements variously commingled and that the proportion determining the mixture is a harmony, that is, soul (trans. Hicks).²⁹

As usual, Thomas begins the *divisio textus* of this specific chapter by replacing it against the background of the main part it belongs to: Book I, that aims at reaching the definition of the soul and includes criticism of the doctrines that failed in this search.³⁰ According to Thomas, after having criticised Plato's account of the soul in the *Timaeus*, Aristotle moves on to a position that is at least in part (*quantum ad aliquid*) germane to Plato's: that which makes the soul an instance of attunement. For Thomas, the sole difference Aristotle sees between Plato's position and that of the soul as "harmony" lies in that Plato made the soul arise from numbers attuned, while this position squarely identifies attunement and soul.³¹

Thomas' *divisio textus* of *De Anima* I 4 is as follows: Aristotle first presents the doctrine (407 b 27-32), then argues against it (407 b 32 - 408 a 21); finally, Aristotle accounts for the philosophical reasons that might have suggested it (408 a 21-34).³² My discussion will focus on the passage quoted

²⁹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, with Translation, Introduction and Notes by R.D. Hicks, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1907, pp. 29-31.

³⁰ *Sententia Libri De Anima*, I, pp. 6.192-7.209 Gauthier: "(...) et ideo uidetur esse questio utrum diffinitio anime sit sicut generis aut sicut speciei specialissime. Nam aliqui querentes de anima uidentur intendere solum de anima humana; et quia apud antiquos philosophos erat duplex opinio de anima (Platonici enim qui ponebant uniuersalia separata scilicet quod essent forme et ydee et erant causa rebus particularibus cognitionis et esse, uolebant quod esset quedam anima separata per se, que esset causa et ydea animabus particularibus, et quicquid inuenitur in eis deriuatur ab illa; naturales autem philosophi uolebant quod non essent substancie naturales nisi particulares tantum et quod uniuersalia nichil sint in rerum natura), et propter hoc est questio utrum sit querenda una communis ratio anime sicut dicebant Platonici, uel huius uel illius anime sicut dicebant Naturales, scilicet ut anime equi uel hominis aut dei".

³¹ *Sententia Libri De Anima*, I 9.1-11 (p. 43.1-11) Gauthier: "Postquam Philosophus reprobaui opinionem Platonis, hic consequenter reprobatur quandam aliam opinionem conformem opinioni Platonis quantum ad aliquid. Fuerunt enim quidam qui dixerunt quod anima erat armonia; et isti concordauerunt cum Platone in hoc quod Plato dixit quod anima erat composita ex numeris armonicis, hii uero quod erat armonia; sed differebant in hoc quod Plato dixit quod anima erat armonia numerorum, hii uero quod armonia tam compositorum quam contrariorum erat anima".

³² *Sententia Libri De Anima*, I 9 (p. 43.12-17) Gauthier: "Circa hoc autem tria facit: primo enim ponit opinionem

above, namely 407 b 27 - 408 a 18, leaving aside the section on Empedocles' doctrine (408 a 18-34), whose affinity with that of the soul as attunement is alluded to by Aristotle at 408 a 18-19: ἀπαιτήσεει δ' ἄν τις τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους, "one might address also to Empedocles the same objection". Thomas elaborates more on this allusion, transforming the soul as attunement into a subset of the doctrine that makes things arise from principles that combine with each other.

The first point singled out by Thomas, i.e. the account of earlier opinions, is in its turn subdivided into two. The doctrine of the soul as attunement is first presented by Aristotle, says Thomas, as an instance of the search for material causes that is typical of early Greek philosophy;³³ second, this doctrine is described as grounded on the idea that both the soul and attunement are "forms".³⁴ In presenting Aristotle's account, Thomas has recourse to various sources, as is shown by the fact that he mentions a certain Dinarchus – a misspelling for Dichaiarchus³⁵ – as one of the supporters of this doctrine: a piece of information contained in Nemesius' *De Natura hominis*, which is in all likelihood Thomas' source, be it directly or indirectly.³⁶ Then, Aristotle moves on to criticise this doctrine, and he does so, according to Thomas, in four steps. In what follows, I will describe the four points singled out by Thomas, all of them depending at least in part upon Themistius' paraphrase.

Point (i): those who define the soul as attunement are compelled to deny that it is a substance. If compared with Aristotle's statement, Thomas' account clearly appears to be amplified, and his main source is Themistius. While Aristotle limited himself to saying that the soul cannot be attunement, neither in the sense of λόγος ... τῶν μιχθέντων nor in the sense of their σύνθεσις, Thomas adds that the reason why it is so lies in that neither the *compositio* nor the *proportio compositionis* are substances, while the soul is indeed a substance: a point that Aristotle does not mention here.

istorum et rationem opinionis; secundo uero disputat contra opinionem, ibi: Et quidem armonia etc.; tercio uero ostendit quomodo hec opinio est multum probabilis, ibi: Si uero alterum anima etc."

³³ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, I 9 (p. 44.19-39) Gauthier: "Primo enim ponit dictam opinionem de anima dicens quod quedam opinio tradita est ab antiquis de anima, que uidebatur habere rectas rationes, et non solum in speciali de anima, set etiam quantum ad id quod commune est, quia antiqui philosophi nichil tractauerunt de causa formali, set tantum de materiali; et inter omnes illi qui magis uisi sunt appropinquare ad causam formalem fuerunt Democritus et Empedocles, qui, scilicet Empedocles, posuit quod omnia constabant ex sex principiis quorum quatuor posuit materialia, scilicet quatuor elementa, et duo, scilicet amicicium et litem, partim materialia et partim actiua; et dicebant quod hec principia materialia habebant inter se quandam proportionem que resultabat ex eis ita quod conueniebant in aliquo uno, quia sine hoc non possent esse simul, et hanc dicebant formam rerum et armoniam quandam esse. Unde et sicut de aliis formis, sic dicebant de anima quod erat armonia quedam".

³⁴ The two statements seem hardly consistent with each other, but this question cannot be addressed here.

³⁵ The philosopher alluded to under the anonymous reference "Dicitur autem" (see the following note for the full reference by Thomas) is indeed Dichaiarchus (= fr. 12a Wehrli = fr. 21b Mirhady — My sincere thanks go to Prof. T. Dorandi for directing me to this new edition), as shown by the comparison with Aëtius IV 2, 7 and Stobaeus I 49, 1: cf. Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. Van Der Eijk, Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2008 (Translated Texts for Historians, 49), p. 53 with n. 262. As shown by Gauthier in the *apparatus fontium ad loc.*, Thomas refers to "Dinarchus" also in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II 64. I owe to Prof. Dorandi the remark that Thomas relied surely on Nemesius, where the name is spelled "Dinarchus".

³⁶ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, IX, p. 44.40-48 Gauthier: "Secundo cum dicit: Et enim armoniam etc., ponit rationem huius opinionis, dicens quod armonia est complexio et proportio et temperamentum contrariorum in compositis et mixtis; et hec proportio que est inter ista contraria dicitur armonia et forma illius compositi; unde, cum anima sit quedam forma, dicebant ipsam esse armoniam. Dicitur autem hec opinio fuisse cuiusdam Dinarchi et Simmias et Empedoclis". As for Simmias, the spokesman of the doctrine of the soul as harmony in the *Phaedo*, Gauthier in the *apparatus fontium ad loc.* refers to the Latin translation of this dialogue by Henricus Aristippus, but is more inclined to think of some doxographical source: "uerba tamen Simmiae apud Platonem Thomam legisse non liquet". Here too, the source of Thomas is surely Nemesius, as remarked by Prof. Dorandi, because Nemesius quotes Simmias in association with "Dinarchus".

Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i> I4, 407 a 30-34 (see above, p. 313)	Thomas, <i>Sententia Libri De Anima</i> I 9.55-69 (p. 44) Gauthier
<p>ἁρμονίαν γὰρ τινα ἑαυτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ ἐναντίων. καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τ' εἶναι τούτων.</p> <p>Armoniam enim quandam dicunt. Et enim armoniam temperamentum et compositionem contrariorum esse et corpus componi e contrariis. Et quidem armonia quedam ratio compositorum est aut compositio, anima autem neutrum possibile est esse horum.</p>	<p>Ad positionem autem obicit quatuor rationibus, quarum prima talis est. Constat quod armonia proprie dicta est consonancia in sonis; set isti transumpserunt istud nomen ad omnem debitam proportionem tam in rebus compositis ex diuersis partibus quam in commixtis ex contrariis; secundum hoc ergo armonia potest duo dicere, quia uel ipsam compositionem aut commixtionem uel proportionem ipsius compositionis seu commixtionis. Set constat quod neutrum istorum est anima. Ergo anima non est armonia. Quod autem anima non sit compositio siue proportio compositionis, patet: isti enim accipiunt animam ut substantiam quandam; set illa duo sunt accidentia; non sunt ergo idem.</p>
<p>The soul is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is on this view a blending or combining of opposities, and the components of the body are opposities. And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of these (trans. Hicks, see above p. 314).</p>	<p>Aristotle puts forward four objections to this opinion, and the first is as follows. Properly speaking, attunement is obviously the harmony of sounds; those philosophers however transferred this term to every kind of exact proportion both in things resulting from different parts and in things resulting from the mixture of contraries. Taken in this sense, “harmony” can mean two things: (i) either the composition or mixture themselves, or (ii) the ratio of the composition or mixture. However, the soul is obviously neither of these. Therefore, soul is not harmony. Now, that the soul cannot be either composition or the ratio of the composition is evident, for those philosophers do assume that the soul is a substance of some sort, whereas these two are accidents: therefore, they are not the same.</p>

As pointed out by Gauthier, both Themistius and Nemesius inspire this remark. Themistius says:

ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα εἴρηται ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐν ἄλλοις· ἃ δὲ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. ἡ ἁρμονία λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν ἡρμοσμένων καὶ σύνθεσις τῶν μεμιγμένων, ἡ ψυχὴ δ' οὔτε σύνθεσις οὔτε λόγος· καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐσία ἡ δὲ οὐ (p. 24.29-32 Heinze).

Haec quidem omnia dicta sunt a philosophis in aliis; quae autem nunc Aristoteles ait, talia sunt. Armonia ratio est armonizatorum et compositio mixtorum, anima autem neque compositio est neque ratio; et hec quidem substantia, hec autem non (p. 61.27-31 Verbeke).

As for Nemesius, he claims that

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δείναρχος ἀνούσιον.³⁷

Manifestum autem est quoniam et horum alii quidem animam substantiam esse dicunt, Aristoteles autem et Dinarchus insubstantialem.³⁸

³⁷ Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura hominis* edidit M. Morani, Teubner, Leipzig 1987 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), p. 17.9-10. Morani sticks with “Dinarchus” against “Dichaiarchus” in Nemesius’ text (see above, n. 35).

³⁸ Némésius d’Émèse, *De Natura hominis. Traduction de Burgundio de Pise*, éd. G. Verbeke et J.-R. Moncho, Leiden, Brill 1975 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, Suppl. 1), p. 24.34-36.

Thomas' remark deserves special attention: if he were acquainted with Nemesius' passage, as the mention of "Dinarchus" earlier in the same commentary suggests,³⁹ why on earth did he fail to notice that in that passage Aristotle sides with "Dinarchus" in denying the substantiality of the soul? The answer lies in Themistius' account. His testimony, as we have just seen, goes the other way round: Aristotle criticises the doctrine of soul as attunement precisely because the latter is not a substance, what Thomas obviously maintains soul to be according to Aristotle. These are, as Themistius says, Aristotle's *ipsissima verba*: in Moerbeke's translation Thomas reads "quae autem nunc Aristoteles ait, talia sunt". Thus, it is a fair guess that Thomas drew from Nemesius the information that there was a philosopher, named "Dinarchus", who defined the soul as attunement drawing the conclusion that it is not a substance, while he found in Themistius the bold assessment that for Aristotle the soul is indeed a substance: a doctrine unconditionally subscribed to by Thomas, and whose confirmation he found in Themistius. Thus, the part of Nemesius' account concerning Aristotle was discarded by Thomas, who retained only "Dinarchus" name as an example of a philosopher who made the soul *insubstantialis*. I will defer the analysis of this point until Section 2 in this article, where the source that accounts both for Nemesius' and Themistius' remarks, different as they may be, will be taken into account.

Point (ii): soul is admittedly the principle of movement, *set armonia non mouet*. This point also deserves attention, because what Thomas says goes beyond Aristotle's text, and his source is once again Themistius.

<p>Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i> I 4, 407 b 34-408 a 1 (see above, p. 313)</p> <p>ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁρμονίας, ψυχῇ δὲ πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλιστα' ὡς εἶπεῖν.</p> <p>Amplius autem mouere non est armonie, anime autem attribuunt hoc omnes.</p>	<p>Thomas, <i>Sentencia Libri De Anima</i> I 9.70-80 (p. 44) Gauthier</p> <p>Secundam rationem ponit cum dicit: <i>Amplius autem mouere</i> etc., quod talis est. Constat quod omnes philosophi dicunt quod anima mouet; set armonia non mouet, immo relinquitur ex mouente et sequitur, sicut ex motu cordarum qui est per musicum relinquitur armonia quedam in sono et ex applicatione et contemperatione partium a componente relinquitur proportio quedam in composito; ergo, si anima est armonia et hec relinquitur ex armonizatore, oportebit ponere aliam animam que armonizet.</p>
<p>Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of a harmony: yet this function more than any other is all but universally assigned to soul (trans. Hicks, see above, p. 314).</p>	<p>He advances a second reason by saying: <i>Furthermore, to cause motion</i>, etc., which is as follows: it is well known that all philosophers say that the soul moves; but attunement does not move, rather it results from a moving principle and comes after it, as a given attunement in sounds is the effect of the movement of the strings produced by the player, and as from the union and melting of parts made by someone who mixes them in a given proportion results in the mixture; consequently, should the soul be attunement, since attunement results from someone who attunes, there should be another soul that would attune.</p>

³⁹ See above n. 36.

As Gauthier remarks in the *apparatus fontium*, Thomas' account is taken verbatim from Themistius:

καὶ ἡ μὲν κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, ἀρμονία δὲ οὐ κινεῖ τὰ ἡρμωσμένα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεται μὲν ἡρμωσμένοις, ἀρμόζει δὲ ἄλλος, ὥσπερ τὰς χορδὰς ὁ μουσικός· ἄλλης οὖν δεήσει τῆ ψυχῆ τῆς ποιούσης αὐτῆ τὴν ἀρμονίαν (p. 24.32-35 Heinze).

Et haec quidem movet corpus, harmonia autem non movet harmonizata, sed adest harmonizatis, harmonizat autem alius, sicut cordas musicus. Alia igitur anima indigebit anima, scilicet faciente harmoniam sibi (pp. 61.32-62.35 Verbeke).

Point (iii) consists in that the doctrine of the soul as attunement cannot account for the diverse and even conflicting feelings and deeds of the soul:

<p>Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i> I 4, 408 a 1-5 (see above, p. 313)</p> <p>ἀρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγείας λέγειν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ' εἴ τις ἀποδιδόναι πειραθεῖν τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρμονία τινί· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν.</p> <p>Congruit autem magis de sanitate dicere armoniam, et omnino de corporeis uirtutibus, quam de anima. Manifestum autem si aliquis temptauerit reddere passiones et opera anime armonia quadam: difficile enim adaptare.</p>	<p>Thomas, <i>Sententia Libri De Anima</i> I 9.81-102 (pp. 44-45) Gauthier</p> <p>Terciam rationem ponit cum dicit: <i>Congruit autem</i> etc., que talis est. Philosophus enim dicit in IV Phisicorum: quicumque assignat diffinitionem seu naturam rei, oportet quod illa assignatio, si sufficiens est, conueniat operationibus et passionibus illius rei; tunc enim diffinitur optime quid est res quando non solum cognoscimus substanciam et naturam ipsius rei, set etiam passiones et accidencia eius. Si ergo anima est armonia quedam, oportet quod per cognitionem armonie deveniamus in cognitionem operationum et accidencium anime; set hoc est ualde difficile, ut puta si uelimus operationes anime in armoniam referre: "cuius enim armonie erit sentire et cuius amare aut odire" et intelligere? Set per cognitionem armonie magis <i>congruit</i> uenire in cognitionem accidencium corporum, ut si uelimus cognoscere sanitatem dicemus quod est complexio adequata et temperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore, et sic <i>de aliis corporeis uirtutibus</i>. Et sic armonia magis esset attribuenda corpori quam anime.</p>
<p>Again, it is more in harmony with the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions of the soul: it is difficult to harmonise them (trans. Hicks, see above, p. 314).</p>	<p>He puts forward the third reason by saying: <i>Again, it is more in harmony</i>, etc., and it is the following. Aristotle himself says in the <i>Physics</i>, Book IV, that if one provides the definition or nature of a thing, for the definition to be exact it is necessary that it fits both the actions and the affections of the thing it refers to. Indeed, a good definition is given when not only the substance and nature of the thing is known, but also its affections and accidents. Therefore, should soul be a sort of attunement, it would be necessary that once the attunement is known, we also know the actions and the accidents of the soul, something that proves to be really difficult, as if, for instance, we were to refer to the attunement the actions of the soul: "to what kind of attunement will belong to perceive, and to what kind to love, or to hate", or to understand? In reality, it would be <i>more in harmony</i> to come to know the physical accidents, like for instance if we were to know 'health' and we say that it consists in an adequate and harmonic mixture of humours and qualities in the body, and so on for <i>other bodily powers</i>. Thus, attunement fits better body than soul.</p>

Here too, as indicated by Gauthier, Thomas takes inspiration from Themistius:

φανερῶς δ' <ἀν> ἄτοπος ὁ λόγος φανείη πειρωμένοις τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἕκαστον εἰς ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἀναφέρειν. ποίας γὰρ ἄρμονίας τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ποίας τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν; (pp. 24.35-25.1 Heinze).

Manifeste autem inconueniens sermo apparebit temptantibus passiones animae et opera unumquodque in harmoniam quandam referre. Cuius enim harmoniae est sentire et cuius amare aut odire? (p. 62.35-38 Verbeke).

Point (iv) consists in that attunement is a physical property that Aristotle is ready to grant only to things having local movement (κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, *motum et positionem*). In Thomas' presentation of this point⁴⁰ Gauthier detected two verbatim quotations from Themistius.⁴¹

It appears from this survey that Thomas' account of the reasons why for Aristotle the soul cannot be the attunement of body bears heavily on Themistius.

Apart from point (iv), where Themistius' source is Aristotle's own wording, the objections against soul as attunement are taken from Plotinus, as I will try to show below.

⁴⁰ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, I 9.103-151 (p. 45) Gauthier: "Quartam rationem ponit cum dicit: *Amplius autem dicimus* etc. ,quae talis est. Harmonia invenitur aliquando in compositis et *habentibus compositionem et motum*, quia quando haec sic inuicem simul ponuntur et ordinantur *ut nichil congenium <praetermittatur>*, id est ut nullus defectus eiusdem generis ibi sit, «tunc» ille partes «dicuntur bene harmonizatae et compositio ipsarum nominatur harmonia, sicut ligna et lapides et» alia corpora naturalia; sic etiam et corde, quando bene ordinatae sunt (seu fistule), ut exinde consonancia sonorum resultet, dicuntur bene armonizatae et huiusmodi consonancia dicitur armonia; et hoc modo proprie dicitur armonia. Aliquando autem invenitur in corporibus mixtis ex contrariis; quando enim aliqua contraria sunt complexa et commixta in aliquo ita ut nulla repugnancia seu excessus alicuius contrarii sit ibi, ut puta calidi aut frigidi aut humidi aut sicci, tunc illa dicuntur bene armonizata et horum ratio, id est proportio, dicitur armonia. Si ergo anima est armonia, secundum aliquem istorum modorum diceretur; set constat quod neutro istorum modorum rationabile est animam dici armoniam; ergo male dicunt animam armoniam esse. Et quod neutro istorum modorum anima dicatur armonia, patet. Non enim anima potest dici armonia secundum quod invenitur in rebus compositis et habentibus compositionem: nam ordo partium compositarum in corpore est ualde manifestus, facile enim est scire ordinem ossium ad ossa et neruorum ad neruos et brachii ad manum et carnis ad ossa; set ratio ordinis partium anime est nobis inmanifesta, non enim per hoc possumus scire ordinem qui est inter intellectum et sensum et appetitum et huiusmodi. Nec etiam potest dici armonia secundum proportionem corporum commixtorum ex contrariis, et hoc duplici ratione. Una ratio est, quia diuersa proportio inuenitur in diuersis partibus corporis: nam *commixtio elementorum* non habet eandem *rationem*, idest proportionem, *secundum quam* est *caro* et *secundum quam* est *os*; ergo in diuersis partibus erunt diuerse anime. Alia ratio est, quia omnia corpora sunt *commixta ex elementis* et contrariis; si ergo proportio *commixtionis* in quolibet corpore est armonia et armonia est anima, ergo in quolibet corpore erit anima quod est inconueniens. Et sic patet quod inconuenienter dicunt animam esse armoniam".

⁴¹ The verbatim quotations are as follows: (1) *Sentencia Libri De Anima* I 9.104-112 (p. 45) Gauthier: "Armonia inuenitur aliquando in compositis et habentibus positionem et motum, quia quando hec sibi inuicem simul ponuntur et ordinantur ut nichil congenium <praetermittatur>, id est ut nullus defectus eiusdem generis ibi sit, 'tunc' ille partes 'dicuntur bene armonizate et compositio ipsarum nominatur armonia, sicut ligna et lapides et' alia corpora naturalia" = p. 62.39-44 Verbeke: "Venit autem haec opinio maxime quidem ex magnitudinibus, quaecumque habent positionem et motum, quoniam haec autem sic inuicem secus ponuntur ut nihil congenium suscipiatur, tunc dicuntur esse bene harmonizatae, et compositio ipsarum nominatur harmonia, sicut ligna et lapides et quaecumque naturalia corpora harmonizant artes". (2) *Sentencia Libri De Anima* I 9.129-134 (p. 45) Gauthier: "Non enim anima potest dici armonia secundum quod inuenitur in rebus compositis et habentibus positionem: nam ordo partium compositarum in corpore est ualde manifestum, facile enim scire ordinem ossium ad ossa et neruorum ad neruos et brachii ad manum et carnis ad ossa" = pp. 62.50-63.52 Verbeke: "Secundum quem igitur modorum horum est harmoniam vocare animam? Neque enim ut compositio aut secus positio, velut ossium ad ossa, aut ossium ad neruos".

2. The Harmony of the Body? Plotinus' Greek and Latin Legacy

My starting point here is the brand new Italian translation of the treatise *On the Immortality of the Soul*, IV 7[2], where Plotinus devotes a section to arguing against the doctrine of the soul as the “harmony” of the body.⁴² Elaborating more on a previous article she authored together with the late lamented Matthias Baltes,⁴³ Cristina D’Ancona shows that in commenting upon *De Anima* I 4, 407 b 27 - 408 a 18 Themistius quotes *verbatim* Plotinus’ *On the Immortality of the Soul*.

Plotinus, IV 7[2], 8 ⁴ .1-28	Themistius, p. 24.21-25.1 Heinze
<p>ἄρ' οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δὲ τι, οἷον ἄρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἄρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον ᾧ ἤθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδαῶν ἄρμονία.</p> <p>ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένον τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεται τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ' αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἄρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινομένου τὴν ποιὰν κρασίων ζωὴν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχὴν οὔσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν εἴρηται· καὶ γὰρ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἡ ψυχὴ, ἡ δ' ἄρμονία ὑστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τε καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῆ, ἄρμονία δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὔσα ταῦτα ποιοῖ, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δ' ἄρμονία οὐκ οὐσία, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κρασίς τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ οὔσα ὑγεία ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅτι καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἄλλως κραθὲν εἴη ἂν ψυχὴ ἑτέρα, ὥστε πολλὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ δὴ μέγιστον, ὡς ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ταύτης ἄλλην ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν ποιούσαν τὴν ἄρμονίαν ταύτην, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν μουσικὸν τὸν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς χορδαῖς τὴν ἄρμονίαν λόγον ἔχοντα παρ' αὐτῷ, καθ' ὃν ἀρμόσει. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ χορδαὶ παρ' αὐτῶν οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα τὰ σώματα ἑαυτὰ εἰς ἄρμονίαν ἄγειν δυνήσεται. ὅλως δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐξ ἀψύχου ἔμψυχα ποιοῦσι καὶ [τά] ἐξ ἀτάκτων κατὰ συντυχίαν τεταγμένα, καὶ τὴν τάξιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς αὐτομάτου τάξεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρμονία.</p>	<p>πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἔχει, διελήλεγκται δὲ πολλαχῆ καὶ ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος.</p> <p>καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τοῦ σώματος, τουτέστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἄρμονία δὲ ὑστερον, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχίς, ἄρμονία δὲ οὐ μάχεται τοῖς ἡρμοσμένοις, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον ἄρμονία μὲν δέχεται, ψυχὴ δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὡς ἄρμονία μὲν σωζομένη οὐ προσίεται ἀναρμοστίαν, ψυχὴ δὲ κακίαν προσίεται, καὶ ὅτι εἴπερ τοῦ σώματος ἡ ἀναρμοστία νόσος ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσχος ἢ ἀσθένεια, ἡ ἄρμονία τοῦ σώματος κάλλος ἂν εἴη καὶ ὑγεία καὶ δύναμις ἀλλ' οὐ ψυχὴ, ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα εἴρηται ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐν ἄλλοις· ἃ δὲ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. ἡ ἄρμονία λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν ἡρμοσμένων καὶ σύνθεσις τῶν μεμιγμένων, ἡ ψυχὴ δ' οὔτε σύνθεσις οὔτε λόγος· καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐσία ἡ δὲ οὐ· καὶ ἡ μὲν κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, ἄρμονία δὲ οὐ κινεῖ τὰ ἡρμοσμένα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίνεται μὲν ἡρμοσμένους, ἀρμόζει δὲ ἄλλος, ὥσπερ τὰς χορδαῶν ὁ μουσικός· ἄλλης οὖν δεήσει τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ποιούσης αὐτῇ τὴν ἄρμονίαν. φανερῶς δ' <ἀν> ἄτοπος ὁ λόγος φανείη πειρωμένους τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἕκαστον εἰς ἄρμονίαν τινα ἀναφέρειν. ποίας γὰρ ἄρμονίας τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ποίας τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν;</p>

⁴² Plotino. *L'immortalità dell'anima* (IV 7[2]). *Plotiniana arabica* (pseudo-Teologia di Aristotele, capitoli I, III, IX). Introduzione, testo greco, traduzione e commento; testo arabo, traduzione e commento di C. D'Ancona, Pisa U.P., Pisa 2017 (Greco, Arabo, Latino. Le vie del sapere, 5), pp. 440-2 (trans.) and 317-36 (commentary).

⁴³ M. Baltes† - C. D'Ancona, “Plotino, *L'immortalità dell'anima*. IV 7[2], 8⁴”, in R. Chiaradonna (ed.), *Studi sull'anima in Plotino*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2005 (Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico, 42), pp. 19-58.

Is it, then, something different from body, but belonging to body, like its tuning? For, though the Pythagoreans meant this term, tuning, in another sense, people thought it was something like the tuning of strings. For just as here, when the strings are stretched, they come to be affected in a kind of way, and this being affected is called being in tune, in the same way, since our body also consists of a mixture of dissimilar parts, the mixture of a particular kind produces life and soul, which is the way of being affected which comes upon the mixture. But many arguments have already been brought against this view to show that it is impossible: they are that soul is the prior and the tuning subsequent to it; and that this prior reality rules and directs the body and fights it in many ways, but the soul would not do this if it was a being in tune; and that the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance, and that the mixture of bodies of which we consist, when it was in proportion, would be health [not soul]; and that in each part, which is mixed in a different way, there would be a different soul, so that there would be many; and what is certainly the greatest difficulty of all, that it is necessary that there should be another soul before this soul producing this being in tune, as with musical instruments there is the player who brings the strings into tune and has a proportion in himself according to which he will tune them. For neither can the strings nor the bodies here bring themselves into tune by themselves. And in general these people also make ensouled things out of soulless, and things casually arranged out of things in disorder, and do not make order arise from the soul, but say that the soul has received its existence from a chance arrangement. But this cannot happen either in parts or wholes. The soul, then, is not being in tune (trans. Armstrong).

Now although this theory is plausible, it is thoroughly disproved in numerous [arguments] by both Aristotle and Plato. [Plato argued]: (a) that while the one (i.e. the soul) is prior to the body, the attunement is posterior; (b) that the [soul] rules and commands the body and is often in conflict with it, whereas an attunement does not conflict with what has been attuned; (c) that an attunement admits differing degrees, whereas the soul does not; (d) that where an attunement is maintained it does not admit a non-attunement, whereas the soul admits vice; (e) that if non-attunement of the body is sickness, ugliness or weakness, then the attunement of the body would be health, beauty, and power rather than the soul. All the preceding points have been stated by philosophers elsewhere; the following points are what Aristotle states here. Attunement is a ratio between things that have been attuned, and a combination of things that have been mixed, yet the soul is neither a combination nor a ratio. In fact the [soul] is a substance, but the [combination] is not.

The soul causes the body to move, whereas the attunement does not cause movement in what has been attuned, but supervenes on what has been attuned, while someone else imposes the attunement, as where the musician tunes the strings. This means that the soul will need another soul to provide its attunement. The theory would obviously appear absurd if we tried to refer the affections and function of each thing's soul back to a specific attunement. For what sort of attunement does sense-perception belong, and what sort is there for loving or hating? (trans. R.B. Todd 1996, pp. 40-41).

The first uncontroversial point that arises from this comparison is that Themistius had Plotinus' *On the Immortality of the Soul* ready to hand when commenting upon *De Anima*, I 4. What he takes from Plotinus' arguments – that are in part derived from Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, but are also, at one and the same time, directed against Aristotle and Alexander⁴⁴ – is first and foremost the idea that the soul cannot be the attunement of the body because of its ontological priority with respect to it. Prior to and independent from body, soul rules over it and can resist it in various ways. The remote origin of this argument is obviously Plato's *Phaedo*, but Themistius' wording shows clearly that his immediate source is Plotinus, whom he quotes verbatim.⁴⁵

The reason that Plotinus qualifies as the main one, namely the fact that were the soul an attunement, there should be another soul prior to it “producing this being in tune”, is also endorsed by Themistius. But what proves to be decisive for the medieval reception is the fact that Themistius

⁴⁴ As argued for by D'Ancona, *Plotino. L'Immortalità dell'anima*, pp. 323-35.

⁴⁵ The argument is ultimately rooted in the *Phaedo*, but the forms it takes in Themistius, Nemesius and Philoponus shows that all three depend upon Plotinus' *On the Immortality of the Soul*: cf. Baltes† - D'Ancona, “Plotino, *L'immortalità dell'anima*”, p. 35, and D'Ancona, *Plotino. L'Immortalità dell'anima*, p. 329.

credits Aristotle himself with the claim that the soul cannot be a kind of attunement because it is a substance, while attunement is not.

As pointed out by D'Ancona, Plotinus' remark that "the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance" involves a sharp criticism of Aristotle's and Alexander's accounts of the soul.⁴⁶ This may or may not have been noticed by Themistius, but one thing is sure: if one reads *De Anima*, I 4 under Themistius' guidance, one is driven quite naturally to conclude that while others have advanced various reasons why the soul is not an instance of attunement, Aristotle's own main reason consists in that soul is a substance, while attunement is not. Plotinus' words τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δ' ἄρμονία οὐκ οὐσία are quoted literally, but after a sentence that presents them as a statement by Aristotle, or better, Aristotle's idiosyncratic reason: the soul is οὐσία. Mixing up skilfully Aristotle's genuine argument of *De An.*, I 4, 407 b 30-32 ("And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of these") and Plotinus' IV 7[2], 8⁴.13-14 ("the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance"), Themistius succeeds in presenting the substantiality of the soul as the specific Aristotelian argument against the soul as attunement:

All the preceding points have been stated by philosophers elsewhere; the following points are what Aristotle states here. Attunement is a ratio between things that have been attuned.

Although Aristotle did not advance this argument,⁴⁷ Thomas had no reason not to follow Themistius' lead. This might account also for the fact that he completely discards Nemesius' account that, at variance with Themistius', echoes the real intention of Plotinus in this passage. Plotinus aims to challenge Aristotle's definition of the soul as οὐσία, insinuating that the Aristotelian arguments against the soul as harmony should have suggested to him to abandon his idea that it is σώματος ... τι. If the soul is a substance, it has to be independent of and prior to the body. This was, if D'Ancona is right, the intention of Plotinus in adding Aristotle's and Alexander's arguments to the traditional

⁴⁶ According to D'Ancona, *Plotino. L'Immortalità dell'anima*, p. 322, Plotinus takes the doctrine of the soul as attunement as one of the instances of epiphenomenism, whose main representatives are for him the Stoics. After having discussed the Stoic version of the soul as an "emergent property" (in modern language), Plotinus moves on to criticise another version of the same doctrine, that of the soul as attunement: "I Pitagorici la fanno emergere in altro modo, non nel senso evoluzionista dello stoicismo ma in un senso propriamente epifenomenista, altrettanto errato per Plotino. Nel fare ciò, essi hanno ritenuto che l'anima stesse al corpo appunto come l'armonia sta alle corde, tesi che Plotino respinge sia con gli argomenti del *Fedone* che con quelli di Aristotele e Alessandro. In questa prospettiva, assume un particolare significato il fatto (...) che la posizione epifenomenista venga individuata dall'espressione ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, descrizione dell'anima che Aristotele approva. Ancora una volta, Plotino sottintende una critica: Aristotele, il quale sa bene quanti inconvenienti sorgano dal definire l'anima come un prodotto dell'accordo armonico del corpo, non si è reso conto che anche la sua posizione rischia di incorrere nello stesso errore: quello di trattare l'anima come una proprietà del corpo".

⁴⁷ "È Plotino a impiegare l'idea che l'anima è οὐσία come una prova del fatto che essa non possa essere 'armonia': dopo di lui, i platonici non esiteranno a leggere nelle critiche rivolte da Aristotele alla tesi dell'anima-armonia esattamente questa concezione, anche se nel passo del *De Anima* in cui questa tesi è criticata l'idea che l'anima sia un'οὐσία non svolge alcun ruolo, e anche se la definizione di anima come οὐσία ... ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον compare solo più avanti nel trattato aristotelico. (...) È fuor di dubbio che quando Plotino dice che l'anima non può essere armonia perché è οὐσία, egli dà a questo termine un significato ben diverso da Aristotele: i platonici posteriori, invece, sembrano decisi a ritrovare nella critica aristotelica dell'anima-armonia proprio la nozione plotiniana di οὐσία come 'vero essere' in senso platonico. Temistio è ancora una volta un esempio molto interessante: esponendo la dottrina di *De An.*, I 4, 407 b 32-34 (...) egli cita fedelmente le parole di Aristotele, introdotte dalla formula "ecco che cosa dice Aristotele", ma aggiunge una conclusione che è ripresa letteralmente dalla linea 14 di Plotino: 'e l'anima è οὐσία, mentre l'armonia non lo è' (Them., *In De An.*, 24.30-32 Heinze)" (Baltes† - D'Ancona, "Plotino, L'immortalità dell'anima", pp. 37-8).

Platonic ones against the doctrine of the soul as “harmony”. And this is what Nemesius of Emesa has correctly read in Plotinus, whom he takes as his source of inspiration when he accounts for Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul repeatedly saying that it is not a substance – at least if one takes “substance” in its most rigorous sense of an ontologically independent reality.⁴⁸

Themistius exhibits a completely different approach. He is convinced that Aristotle’s definition of the soul as a substance is beyond criticism; moreover, he is convinced that such a definition perfectly meets Plato’s requirements for the soul to be an instance of the “real being”, the immaterial and intelligible one. The fact that Plotinus makes use of the notion of the soul as οὐσία as an argument against the soul as attunement reinforces Themistius’ conviction. This is precisely the conviction that surfaces, in another language and in a different scholarly context, when Thomas looks for the *interpretatio authentica* of Aristotle’s *De Anima* in Moerbeke’s Latin version of Themistius’ paraphrase.

⁴⁸ Nemesius, *De Natura hominis* 2, pp. 22.17-23, 23.19-20, 26.10-11, 27.9-11 and 28.9-11 Morani, says: “So it is clear from what has been said that the soul is not a body: it follows next to say that it is not insubstantial. Since Deinarchus defined the soul as an attunement, and also Simmias, in reply to Socrates, said that the soul was an attunement (...) we must set out the refutations of this to be found in Plato’s *Phaedo*. (...) Further, the soul by admitting opposites in turn is a substance and a substrate, while an attunement is a quality and in a substrate; but substance is other than quality; so the soul is also other than attunement. (...) Aristotle, who says that the soul is an actuality, none the less agrees with those who say that it is a quality. (...) So soul never exists without body, nor body apart from soul. For soul is not body but belongs to body (σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει καὶ σώματι τοιῶδε, καθ’ ἑαυτὴν δὲ οὐχ ὑπάρχει), and therefore it exists in a body and a body of a certain sort, but it does not exist on its own. Therefore the soul cannot be the actuality of the body in any way, but is an incorporeal being complete in itself (οὐ δύναται τολύνην ἢ ψυχὴν κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐσία αὐτοτελεῆς ἀσώματος)”: trans. Sharples - Van Der Eijk quoted above n. 35, pp. 59-66.

Appendix I

Themistius, In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis and Thomas Aquinas, De Unitate intellectus

Literal quotations

1.

De Unitate intellectus, I 654-662

Si quis autem contra hoc obiciat quod Aristoteles dicit in I De anima, quod “intelligere et amare et odire non sunt illius passiones, id est anime, sed huius habentis illud secundum quod illud habet; quare et hoc corrupto neque memoratur neque amat, non enim illius erant sed communis, quod quidem destructum est”: patet responsio per dictum Themistii hoc exponentis, qui dicit “Nunc dubitanti magis quam docenti assimilatur” Aristoteles.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, II, *ad De An.*, I 4, 408 b 18-29, tr. Moerbeke, ed. Verbeke, pp. 74.87-75.91
Sed quae quidem dubitabit utique aliquis, haec et talia sunt; quae autem utique de ipsis audebit aliquis existimare, oportet reponi in aliud tempus, in quo et philosophus manifestum aliquid de ipsis determinat; nunc autem dubitanti magis quam docenti assimilatur ipse.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis* (...) edidit R. Heinze, Berlin 1889 (*CAG V 3*), p. 30.34-38
ἀλλ’ ἂ μὲν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν· ἂ δ’ ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν θαρρήσειεν ὑπονοῆσαι, εἰς ἕτερον χρόνῳ καιρὸν ταμιεύεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος φανερόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διορίζεται. νῦν γὰρ ἀποροῦντι καὶ αὐτὸς μᾶλλον ἢ διδάσκοντι προσέειπεν.

2.

De Unitate intellectus, II 1-5

Nunc autem considerare oportet quid alii Peripatetici de hoc ipso senserunt. Et accipiamus primo verba Themistii in Commento de anima, ubi sic dicit “Intellectus iste quem dicimus in potentia magis est anime connaturalis”, scilicet quam agens; “dico autem non omni anime, sed solum humane. Et sicut lumen potentia uisui et potentia coloribus adueniens actu quidem uisum fecit et actu colores, ita et intellectus iste qui actu non solum ipsum actu intellectum fecit, sed et potentia intelligibilia actu intelligibilia ipse instituit.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 4, 430 a 14 - III 5, 430 a 23, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 224.1-225.8 Verbeke
Et est iste intellectus separatus et impassibilis et immixtus: quem autem dicimus potentia intellectum, et si maxime sibi eadem intitulaverimus, tamen magis est animae connaturalis, dico autem non omni animae sed soli humanae. Et sicut lumen potentia visui et potentia coloribus adueniens actu quidem visum fecit et actu colores, ita et intellectus iste qui actu producens potentia intellectum non solum ipsum actu intellectum fecit, sed et potentia intelligibilia actu intelligibilia ipsi instituit.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, pp. 98.32-99.3 Heinze

καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός τε καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἀμιγής. ὃν δὲ λέγομεν δυνάμει νοῦν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιφημίζομεν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον γε ἔστι τῆ ψυχῆ συμφοῆς, λέγω δὲ οὐ πάση ψυχῆ ἀλλὰ μόνον τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ. καὶ ὡσπερ τὸ φῶς τῆ δυνάμει ὄψει καὶ τοῖς δυνάμει χρώμασιν ἐπιγινόμενον τὴν μὲν ἐνεργεῖα ὄψιν ἐποίησεν, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ ἐνεργεῖα προαγαγὼν τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖα νοῦν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνάμει νοητὰ ἐνεργεῖα νοητὰ αὐτῷ κατεσκευάσεν.

3.

De Unitate intellectus, II 12-22

Et post pauca concludit "Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui in potentia. Propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando uolumus. Non enim est ars materie exterioris, sed inuestitur toti potentia intellectui qui factivus; ac si utique edificator lignis et erarius eri non ab extrinseco existeret, per totum autem ipsum penetrare potens erit. Sic enim et qui secundum actum intellectus intellectui potentia superueniens unum fit cum ipso".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 225.16-226.24 Verbeke
Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui potentia, et sic hic quidem omnia fit, hic autem omnia facit; propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando volumus. Non enim est ars materiae exterioris, sicut aeraria [non] est aeris et aedificativa lignorum, sed investitur toti potentia intellectui qui factivus, ac si utique aedificator lignis et aerarius aeri non ab extrinseco assisteret, per totum autem ipsum penetrare potens erat. Sic enim et qui secundum actum intellectus intellectui potentia superveniens unus fit cum ipso.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 99.11-18 Heinze

ὄνπερ οὖν ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην λόγον ἔχει, τοῦτον καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ποιητικὸς πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει, καὶ οὕτως ὁ μὲν πάντα γίνεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα ποιεῖ. διὸ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν νοεῖν ὅταν βουλώμεθα· οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν τῆς ὕλης ἡ τέχνη, ὡσπερ χαλκευτικὴ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ τεκτονικὴ τοῦ ξύλου, ἀλλ' ἐνδύεται ὅλῳ τῷ δυνάμει νῷ ὁ ποιητικὸς, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ τέκτων τοῖς ξύλοις καὶ ὁ χαλκοτύπος τῷ χαλκῷ μὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεστάτει, δι' ὅλου δὲ αὐτοῦ φοιτᾶν οἷός τε ἦν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς τῷ δυνάμει νῷ προσγενόμενος εἷς τε γίνεται μετ' αὐτοῦ.

4.

De Unitate intellectus, II 23-33

Et post pauca concludit "Nos igitur sumus aut qui potentia intellectus, aut qui actu. Siquidem igitur in compositis omnibus ex eo quod potentia et ex eo quod actu, aliud est hoc et aliud est esse huic, aliud utique erit ego et michi esse. Et ego quidem est compositus intellectus et potentia et actu, michi autem esse ex eo quod actu est. Quare et que meditor et que scribo, scribit quidem intellectus compositus ex potentia et actu, scribit autem non qua potentia sed qua actu; operari enim inde sibi deriuatur".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, p. 228.68-75 Verbeke

Nos igitur sumus aut qui potentia intellectus aut qui actu. Siquidem igitur in compositis omnibus ex eo quod potentia et ex eo quod actu, aliud est esse hoc et aliud est esse huic, aliud utique erit ego et mihi esse, et ego quidem est compositus intellectus ex potentia et actu, mihi autem esse ex eo quod actu est. Quare et quae meditor, et quae scribo, scribit quidem intellectus compositus ex potentia et actu, scribit autem non qua potentia, sed qua actu. Operari enim inde sibi derivatur.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 100.16-22 Heinze

Ἡμεῖς οὖν ἡ ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς ἢ ὁ ἐνέργεια. εἴπερ οὖν ἄλλο ἐπὶ τῶν συγκειμένων ἀπάντων ἔκ τε τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνέργεια τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ τῷδε <εἶναι>, ἄλλο ἂν εἶη καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ συγκείμενος νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ ἐμοὶ εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἂ διανοοῦμαι ταῦτα, καὶ ἂ συγγράφω, γράφει μὲν ὁ σύνθετος νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνέργεια, γράφει δὲ οὐχ ἢ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐνέργεια· τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖν ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῷ ἐποχτεύεται.

5.

De Unitate intellectus, II 33-42

Et post pauca adhuc manifestius “Sicut igitur aliud est animal et aliud animali esse, animali autem esse est ab anima animalis, sic et aliud quidem ego, aliud autem michi esse. Esse igitur michi ab anima et hac non omni; non enim a sensitiva, materia enim erat fantasie; neque rursum a fantastica, materia enim erat potentia intellectus; neque eius qui potentia intellectus, materia enim est factiui. A solo igitur factiuo est michi esse”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 228.79-229.85 Verbeke
Sicut igitur aliud est animal et aliud animali esse, animali autem esse est ab anima animalis, sic et aliud quidem ego, aliud autem mihi esse. Esse enim mihi ab anima et hac non omni; non enim a sensitiva, materia enim erat phantasiae; neque rursum a phantastica, materia enim erat potentia intellectus; neque eius qui potentia intellectus, materia enim erat factivi. A solo igitur factivo est mihi esse.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 100.2-32 Heinze

ὥσπερ οὖν ἄλλο τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῶον εἶναι παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τοῦ ζώου, οὕτω καὶ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐγώ, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι. τὸ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ταύτης γε οὐ πάσης· οὐ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, ὕλη γὰρ ἦν τῆς φαντασίας· οὐδὲ αὖ τῆς φανταστικῆς, ὕλη γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ· οὐδὲ τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ, ὕλη γὰρ ἦν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. παρὰ μόνου τοίνυν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι.

6.

De Unitate intellectus, II 43-46

Et post pauca subdit “Et usque ad hunc progressa natura cessauit, tamquam nichil habens alterum honoratius cui faceret ipsum subiectum. Nos itaque sumus actiuus intellectus”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, p. 229.88-91 Verbeke
Extrema autem et summa specierum actiuus iste intellectus et usque ad hunc progressa natura cessavit tanquam nihil alterum habens honoratius, cui utique ipsum faceret subiectum. Nos igitur sumus actiuus intellectus.

Them. *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, pp. 100.35-101.1 Heinze

ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ ἀκρότατον τῶν εἰδῶν ὁ ποιητικὸς οὗτος νοῦς, καὶ ἄκρι τούτου προελθοῦσα ἡ φύσις ἀπεπαύσατο ὡς μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἕτερον τιμιώτερον, ὅτῳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν ὑποκείμενον. ἡμεῖς οὖν ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς.

7.

De Unitate intellectus, II 47-55

Et postea reprobans quorundam opinionem dicit “Cum predixisset, scilicet Aristotiles, in omni natura hoc quidem materiam esse, hoc autem quod materiam mouet aut perficit, necesse ait et in anima existere has differentias, et esse aliquem hunc talem intellectum in omnia fieri, hunc talem in omnia facere. In anima enim ait esse talem intellectum et anime humane uelut quandam partem honoratissimam”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 233.73-79 Verbeke
Cum praedixisset enim in omni natura hoc quidem materiam esse, hoc autem quod materiam movet et perficit, necesse ait et in anima existere has differentias, et esse aliquem hunc quidem talem intellectum in omnia fieri, hunc autem talem in omnia facere. In anima enim ait esse talem intellectum et animae humanae uelut quandam partem honoratissimam.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 103.1-6 Heinze

προειπών γάρ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει τὸ μὲν ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὁ τὴν ὕλην κινεῖ καὶ τελειοῖ, ἀνάγκη φησὶ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ εἶναι τινα τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον νοῦν τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γὰρ εἶναι φησι τὸν τοιοῦτον νοῦν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οἷόν τινα μοῖραν τὴν τιμιωτάτην.

8.

De Unitate intellectus, II 55-58

Et post pauca dicit "Ex eadem etiam littera hoc contingit confirmare, quod putat, scilicet Aristotiles, aut nostri aliquid esse actuum intellectum, aut nos".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 234.88-90 Verbeke

Ex eadem etiam littera hac et hoc contingit confirmare, quod putat aut nostri aliquid esse activum intellectum aut nos.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 103.15-17 Heinze

ἐκ δὴ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης ῥήσεως καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι βεβαιώσασθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἡμῶν τι εἶναι οἴεται τὸν ποιητικὸν νοῦν ἡ ἡμῶν (...).

9.

De Unitate intellectus, II 66-80

Et Theophrasti quidem libros non uidi, sed eius verba introducit Themistius in Commento que sunt talia, sic dicens "Melius est autem et dicta Theophrasti proponere de intellectu potentia et de eo qui actu. De eo igitur qui potentia hec ait: Intellectus autem qualiter a foris existens et tamquam superpositus, tamen connaturalis? Et que natura ipsius? Hoc quidem enim nichil esse secundum actum, potentia autem omnia bene, sicut et sensus. Non enim sic accipiendum est ut neque sit ipse, litigiosum est enim, sed ut subiectam quandam potentiam sicut et in materialibus. Sed hoc a foris igitur, non ut adiectum, sed ut in prima generatione comprehendens ponendum".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 242.54-63 Verbeke

Melius est autem et dicta Theophrasti proponere de intellectu potentia et de eo qui actu; de eo igitur qui potentia haec ait: "Intellectus autem qualiter a foris existens et tamquam superpositus, tamen connaturalis? Et quae natura ipsius? Hoc quidem enim nihil esse secundum actum, potentia autem omnia, bene, sicut et sensus. Non enim sic accipiendum est ut neque sit ipse (litigiosum est enim), sed ut subiectam quandam potentiam sicut et in materialibus. Sed hoc a foris ergo non ut adiectum, sed ut in prima generatione comprehendens ponendum".

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, pp. 107.30-108.1 Heinze

Ἄμεινον δὲ καὶ τὰ Θεοφράστου παραθέσθαι περὶ τε τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δυνάμει τάδε φησίν. "ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτε ἔξωθεν ὦν καὶ ὡς περ ἐπίθετος ὅμως συμφυῆς; καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὡς περ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ληπτέον ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτός (ἐριστικὸν γάρ). ἀλλ' ὡς ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὕλικῶν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξωθεν ἄρα οὐχ ὡς ἐπίθετον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει συμπεριλαμβανόμενον θετέον".

10.

De Unitate intellectus, III 230-235

Quod exponens Themistius dicit “Nam et si ab aliis aliquando scientia et sanitas est, puta a docente et medico, tamen in patiente et disposito facientium inexistere actus ostendimus prius, in hiis que *De natura*”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, III, *ad De An.*, III 1, 414 a 12, tr. Moerbeke, p. 109.68-72 Verbeke

Nam et si ab aliis aliquando scientia et sanitas, puta a docente et medico, tamen in patiente et disposito facientium inexistere actus ostendimus prius in his que *De natura*, quare et anima in corpore ut species in materia.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, III, p. 46.23-26 Heinze

καὶ γὰρ εἰ παρ’ ἄλλων ἐνίοτε ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ υἰγεία, οἷον παρὰ τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ ἰατροῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐν γε τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ τὰς τῶν ποιούντων ἐνυπάρχειν ἐνεργείας ἔφθημεν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως ἀποδείξαντες, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ.

11.

De Unitate intellectus, V 354-370

Et ut Grecos non omittamus, ponenda sunt circa hoc verba Themistii in Commento. Cum enim quesisset de intellectu agente utrum sit unus aut plures, subiungit soluens “Aut primus quidem illustrans est unus, illustrati autem et illustrantes sunt plures. Sol quidem enim est unus, lumen autem, dices modo aliquo partiri ad uisus. Propter hoc enim non solem in comparatione proposuit, scilicet Aristoteles, sed lumen; Plato autem solem”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 235.7-11 Verbeke

Aut primus quidem illustrans est unus, illustrati autem et illustrantes plures, sicut lumen; sol quidem enim est unus, lumen autem dices utique modo aliquo partiri ad visus; propter hoc enim non solem in comparatione proposuit sed lumen, Plato autem solem.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 103.32-35 Heinze

ἡ ὁ μὲν πρῶτως ἐλλάμπων εἷς, οἱ δὲ ἐλλαμπόμενοι καὶ ἐλλάμποντες πλείους ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥλιος εἷς, τὸ δὲ φῶς εἴποις ἄν τρόπον τινὰ μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὰς ὄψεις. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἥλιον παραβέβληκεν ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς, Πλάτων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον.

12.

De Unitate intellectus, V 370-379

Unitatem autem huius separati principii probat Themistius per hoc quod docens et addiscens idem intelligit, quod non esset nisi esset idem principium illustrans.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 235.22-236.26 Verbeke

Sic autem et in scientiis docens addiscenti eadem intelligit: neque enim utique esset docere et addiscere, nisi idem esset conceptus docentis et addiscentis; si autem idem, sicut est necesse, palam quia et idem fit intellectus qui docentis cum eo qui addiscentis.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 104.6-10 Heinze

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι ὁ διδάσκων τῷ μανθάνοντι τὰ αὐτὰ νοεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν τὸ διδάσκειν καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ταῦτό ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος. εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, δηλονότι καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς γίνεται νοῦς ὁ τοῦ διδάσκοντος τῷ τοῦ μανθάνοντος.

13.

De Unitate intellectus, V 379-385

(...) unde in fine concludit "Sed quod quidem dixi pronuntiare quidem de eo quod uidetur philosophis, singularis est studii et sollicitudinis. Quod autem maxime aliquis utique ex uerbis que collegimus accipiat de hiis sententiam Aristotilis et Theophrasti, magis autem et ipsius Platonis, hoc promptum est propalare".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VII, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 244.2-6 Verbeke

Sed quod quidem dixi pronuntiare quidem de eo quod uidetur philosophis, singularis est studii et sollicitudinis. Quod autem maxime aliquis utique ex uerbis quae collegimus accipiat de his sententiam Aristotilis et Theophrasti, magis autem forte et ipsius Platonis; hoc enim promptum forte propalare.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VII, pp. 108.35-109.3 Heinze

ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, τὸ μὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δοκοῦντος τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἰδίας καὶ σχολῆς ἐστὶ καὶ φροντίδος, ὅτι δὲ μάλιστα ἂν τις ἐξ ὧν συνηγάγομεν ῥήσεων λάβοι τὴν περὶ τούτων γυνῶσιν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως καὶ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος, τοῦτο γοῦν πρόχειρον ἴσως δισχυρίζεσθαι.

Summaries and comments

1.

De Unitate intellectus, II 93-97

Quod autem Alexander intellectum possibilem posuerit esse formam corporis, etiam ipse Auerrois confitetur; quamuis, ut arbitror, peruerse uerba Alexandri acceperit, sicut et uerba Themistii preter eius intellectum assumit.

2.

De Unitate intellectus, II 55-58

Patet igitur ex premissis uerbis Themistii, quod non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem partem anime humane esse dicit, et Aristotilem ait hoc sensisse; et iterum quod homo est id quod est, non ex anima sensitiua ut quidam mentiuntur, sed ex parte intellectiua et principaliori.

Cf. Literal quotations, **8**.

3.

De Unitate intellectus, III 286-289

Et per hunc modum arbitror et Themistium in uerbis supra positis, et Plotinum in uerbis nunc inductis, dixisse quod homo est anima uel intellectus.

4.

De Unitate intellectus, IV 15-18

Plato autem ponens intellectum unum separatum, comparauit ipsum soli, ut Themistius dicit: est enim unus sol, sed plura lumina diffusa a sole ad uidendum.

Cf. Literal quotations, **11**.

Appendix II

Macrobius as a Source of Thomas Aquinas' Account of Plotinus in the De Unitate intellectus

De Unitate intellectus, III 264-289

Sed et Plotinus, ut Macrobius refert, ipsam animam hominem esse testatur, sic dicens 'Ergo qui uidetur non ipse uerus homo est, sed ille a quo regitur qui uidetur. Sic, cum morte animalis discedit animatio cadit corpus a regente uiduatum, et hoc est quod uidetur in homine mortali. Anima uero, quia uerus homo est, ab omni mortalitatis condicione aliena est'. Qui quidem Plotinus unus de magnis ponitur inter commentatores Aristotilis, ut Simplicius refert in Commento Predicamentorum. Hec autem sententia nec a uerbis Aristotilis multum aliena uidetur (...). Et per hunc modum arbitror et Themistium in uerbis supra positis, et Plotinus in uerbis nunc inductis, dixisse quod homo est anima uel intellectus.

Macrobius, *In Somn. Scip.*, II 12, 7-10

Et quia Tullio mos est profundam rerum scientiam sub breuitate tegere verborum, nunc quoque miro compendio tantum includit arcanum quod Plotinus, magis quam quisquam verborum parcus, libro integro disseruit, cuius inscriptio est 'quid animal quid homo'. in hoc ergo libro Plotinus quaerit cuius sint in nobis voluptates, maerores, metusque ac desideria et animositas vel dolores, postremo cogitationes et intellectus, utrum merae animae an uero animae utentis corpore; et post multa quae sub copiosa rerum densitate disseruit, quae nunc nobis ob hoc solum praetereunda sunt, ne usque ad fastidii necessitatem volumen extendant, hoc potremo pronuntiat, animal esse corpus animatum. sed ne hoc neglectum vel non quesitum relinquit, quo animae beneficio, quae uia societatis animetur. has ergo omnes quas praediximus passiones adsignat animali, uerum autem hominem ipsam animam esse testatur. ergo qui uidetur, non ipse uerus homo est; sed uerus ille est a quo regitur quod uidetur. sic cum morte animalis discesserit animatio, cadit corpus regente uiduatum, et hoc est quod uidetur in homine mortale, anima autem, qui uerus homo est, ab omni condicione mortalitatis aliena est, adeo ut in imitationem dei mundum regentis regat et ipsa corpus, dum a se animatur.

Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* edidit Iacobus Willis, editio secunda, Teubner, Leipzig 1970 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), pp. 131.25-132.15. Macrobius' source is Plotinus, *Enn.* I 1[53], Περὶ τοῦ τί τὸ ζῷον καὶ τίς ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Thomas' further information on Plotinus is taken, as he says, from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, known to him thanks to Moerbeke's Latin translation. As pointed out in the *apparatus fontium* of the *De Unitate intellectus*, ad III, 274, the relevant passage by Simplicius in Moerbeke's version reads: "Plotinus autem magnus super haec operosissimas disquisitiones in tribus totis libris *De generibus entis* inscriptis ad librum *Predicamentorum* protulit". Cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, éd. critique par A. Pattin, Louvain-Paris 1971 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum V.1), p. 2.25-27, corresponding to p. 2.3-5 Kalbfleisch: Πλωτῖνος δὲ ὁ μέγας ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰς πραγματειωδέστατας ἐξετάσεις ἐν τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις τοῖς Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιγεγραμμένοις τῷ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίῳ προσήγαγε.