



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
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Philosophical Concepts and Linguistic Bridges

European Research Council Advanced Grant 249431

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Platonizing Aristotle: The Concept of 'Spiritual' (rūḥānī) as a Keyword of the Neoplatonic Strand in Early Arabic Aristotelianism

Gerhard Endress

To the memory of Alain Segonds

قَدَّسَ اللهُ رُوحَهُ

ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστὶν ὄργανον
καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος
Plato, *Cratylus*, 388 B-C

Tout a été dit. Sans doute.
Si les mots n'avaient changé de sens; et les sens, de mots.
Jean Paulhan (1884-1968)

Abstract

Working with the assumption that translation is interpretation, it is shown in this article that *rūḥ* and its cognate words translate not only πνεῦμα, but also the words for the intellectual activity (e.g., νοερός), and even the words for the divine realm, a move that paves the way to the Neoplatonized Aristotle of the Arabic tradition.

The reception of the rational sciences, scientific practice, discourse and methodology, into Arabic Islamic society went forth in several stages of exchange with the transmitters of Iranian, Christian-Aramaic and Byzantine-Greek learning. Translation, and the acquisition of knowledge from the Hellenistic heritage, went hand in hand with a continuous refinement of the methods of linguistic transposition, and the creation of a standardized technical language in Arabic: terminology, rhetoric, and the genres of instruction. Demonstration *more geometrico*, first introduced by the paradigmatic sciences – mathematics, astronomy, mechanics – and adopted by philosophers embracing the cosmology of Neoplatonism, was complemented and superseded by the methods of syllogistic demonstration. In face of the establishment of philosophy as a demonstrative science, claiming absolute and universal knowledge, even the hermeneutical disciplines of grammar, theology and law – dependent upon analogical reasoning from the Scripture – took up logical definition and deduction. The Islamic philosophy instituted by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), answering questions of Muslim theology, resulted in the integration and unification of scientific and philosophical discourse, and after a process of competition and dispute, led to the adoption of the language of demonstration by the scholasticism of the later schools of law.

The language of philosophy and the sciences illuminates the links, or even constitutes the common denominator, between the intellectual traditions of the Mediterranean world – the Near East, North Africa, Southern and Northern Europe: between the peoples who received, revived and transformed the heritage of Ancient Greece. After the decline of the ancient languages of erudition and commerce, the translators created a common system of reference which until today renders possible – in spite of the protestations of autonomy and otherness – a dialogue over the essential questions of the human condition, between speakers of the Indo-European languages, Romance, Germanic, Iranian and Arabic, between Jews, Christians, and Muslims: a dialogue where the words

may differ but in the context of science and its conventions, continue to convey the same concepts sustained by a coherent tradition of teaching and textual transmission.

*

Words, in science as in literature and everyday usage, have their own fortunes. We cannot take their net contents at face value. In each individual language, the technical term is constituted, on the one hand, by the convention – *iṣṭilāḥ*, in Arabic, the Aristotelian συνθήκη – of the community of scholars and scientists, participants of the philosophic, scientific or other professional discourse. On the other hand, it is embedded in a system of cross-linked connotations which differ from language to language. Language is metaphor; so is the technical term, albeit its primary image be forgotten and ignored after the meta-meaning has come to prevail, the symbolical content will determine the semantic development of the term in its new linguistic environment.¹

1. *Literal and Conceptual Transposition*

a) *Functional*

The primitive, but (even in the first period of Arabic translations) by no means predominant procedure of functional transposition is that of the adoption of loan-words – words adopted or borrowed, with little modification, from the source language – and loan-translations, i.e. expressions adopted from the source in more or less literally translated form of its semantic elements ('calque'). These serve as functional shells for the concepts defined by the respective disciplines and systems.

Some Greek loan-words had been current in Syriac, whence they were adopted into Arabic: Greek, such as ὑλη 'matter', Arabic *hayūlā* (from a Syriac transliteration where *yw* represents Greek *γ*); Greek στοιχεῖον 'element', Arabic *ustūquṣṣ*. Some transliterated terms were coupled with an Arabic equivalent for the sake of clarity, while the Arabic word in itself was not deemed sufficiently specific as a technical term: *ṭāqs* 'order', from Greek τάξις, appears in the syntagmas *ṭāqs wa-martaba*, *ṭāqs wa-šarḥ* (to be replaced soon by Arabic *nizām*). But many of the ad hoc transliterations of the early translations fell from use as soon as Arabic equivalents gained acceptance, except terms figuring as titles of some parts of the Aristotelian encyclopaedia, or those naturalized completely in analogy to the paradigms of Arabic morphology: *safsāṭa* for the *Sophistica*, and *falsafa*, Greek φιλοσοφία, in distinction from the more general Arabic *ḥikma*, originally 'wise saying', 'wisdom'.

Loan-translations ('calque'), like loan-words, function as shells for the concepts they are appointed to represent: from the root *naṭāqa* 'speak', translating the basic meaning of Greek λέγειν, are formed *nāṭiq*, for Greek λογικός 'rational', and *manṭiq* 'logic'. In algebra, Greek δύνασθαι (παρά τι) 'to be equivalent with respect of the value of the square (to)' is a calque for the Arabic *qawiya* ('*alā*'). While these are semantically plausible applications of the Arabic words, transpositions like *qānūn ḡuz' al-tālif* for Euclid's κατατομή κανόνος must have been incomprehensible except to the experts of musical theory.

¹ H. Blumenberg, *Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1960; Id., *Die Lesbarkeit der Welt*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1979.

b) Paradigmatical

From the earliest reception of scientific professional language, indigenous Arabic words were applied to technical concepts by analogy, extension or specification of the inherent metaphors, concrete images representing abstract universals.

ğawhar (from the Persian, 'jewel') never had a serious competitor as a term for 'substance' (Greek οὐσία), even though the Iranian Ibn al-Muqaffa' used a different – Arabic – word in his early rendering of the *Organon*: 'ayn 'eye', 'the thing itself'. Everyday speech provided *sabab*, 'rope', for 'cause'. Arabic *sūr* 'wall, limit' is used for the ποσοδιορισμός 'quantifier [of an assertory judgement]'. Beginning with the early group of translators around al-Kindī, we observe the triumph of abstraction by semantic derivation. In deriving abstract terms from such metaphors of the common language, abstraction is mainly achieved by two procedures:

[i] The formation of the verbal noun, *mašdar*, is used to convey the universal as a process;

[ii] Derived from the concreta by the formation of abstract nouns based on the relative adjective (*-ī* > *-iyya*), the abstract is in its turn hypostatized ('verdinglicht').

On the one side, we find *qiyās* 'taking measure' > 'analogy' *tağrīd*, 'stripping, peeling' > 'abstraction', *idāfa* 'putting next to one another' > πρὸς τι 'relation', *tašawwur* 'picturing, imagining' > 'conception', *tašdiq* 'declaring as true' > 'judgment'.

On the other hand, a long repertory of neologisms appears in which abstract nouns are derived from pronouns and particles with the Arabic *nisba* suffix, as *māhiyya* 'quiddity' from *mā* 'what?', *kayfiyya* 'quality' from *kayfa* 'how?', imported into mediaeval Latin by the twelfth-century translators.

c) Syntagmatical

Simple, descriptive approximations of the processual or syntagmatical elements of the concepts conveyed by a given term sometimes yielded expressions not recognized as pregnant renderings of the underlying terminology and were discarded in the usage of demonstrative discourse, to be replaced by more adequate terms. But while the Arabic mathematicians had, from a fairly early stage of scientific writing, fully worked out sets of terms, e.g., for describing and deducing the axioms and deductions of geometry, the philosophers had not.

It is striking, for example, that the early translator of Aristotle's *De Caelo* is unable to render the concept of *analogia*, using Arabic *iqtirān* 'conjunction' and the verb *ašbaha* 'be similar' instead, and that in some of the Neoplatonic texts, the crucial concept of μέθεξις is rendered occasionally by a simple *fī* 'in', 'A is in B' meaning that 'A participates in B', in other instances by expressions with *nayl* 'taking', *istifāda* 'making use of'. The degree of abstraction involved here was mastered by the translators only after the philosophers had paved the way.

For the sake of univocity, even the concreta of natural designations were given up in favour of a 'scientific', syntagmatic paraphrase, where the meaning of the term is specified through its position in an array of oppositional pairs or triads.

Scientific terminology replaced Arabic simplicia by binary syntagmas: *irq dārib* 'artery' instead of *iryān* (from the Syriac), requiring the analogous *irq ġayr dārib* 'vein' (Gr. φλέψ). The early *nā t* 'description' for Greek κατηγορία goes together with *hāmil* 'bearer' for the substrate, Greek ὑποκείμενον. The 'scientific' *maqūla*, 'predicate', derived from the root *q-w-l* 'to say' as Greek κατηγορία from κατηγορεῖν, required a different set of terms where the ὑποκείμενον was Arabic *mawdū'* 'posited [*scil.* as a substrate]'.²

² For references, and a more detailed inventory including examples, see my article "Die Entwicklung der Fachsprache", in H. Gätje (ed.), *Grundriß der Arabischen Philologie* 3 (Suppl.), Reichert, Wiesbaden 1992, p. 3-23.

2. Keywords of systematic re-interpretation

Translation is interpretation. Beyond the rendering of words in a source text with more or less adequate words or syntagms in the target language, the translators, especially in the early phase of the reception of Greek philosophy used by scientists as an ideology legitimizing their world-view, employed certain keywords as signals or catchwords of the specific S-World of an author, discipline or school of thought,³ pointing to the systematic coordinates⁴ of a scientific or philosophical paradigm. For the historian, these are valuable ‘guide fossils’ of schools and doctrinal strands.

Consulting the *Glossarium Graeco-Arabicum*, the lexical database of our project *Greek into Arabic*, will yield copious references to the familiar use of *rūḥ* ‘spirit’ as an equivalent of Greek πνεῦμα in the usage of Stoicism and Galen’s physiological theory. Against this, a totally different concept of *rūḥ*, and especially of *rūḥānī*, ‘spiritual’, is found in the sources of Graeco-Arabic Neoplatonism, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Theology* corpus based on Plotinus and Proclus, and also in some Aristotelian writings translated in the same milieu – notably in the circle of the ‘Philosopher of the Arabs’, al-Kindī⁵ – and through the translator, received a Neoplatonic interpretation. What is remarkable is the use of *rūḥānī*, not as rendering a specific Greek word, but as an *interpretamentum*: a keyword signalling the translators’ tendency towards Platonizing Aristotle.

a) *rūḥ*, *pneuma*

Plato established “an emphatic and uncompromising dualism, separating the sense functions from the operations of soul or mind and treating the two as entirely heterogeneous and heteronomous”. Moreover, “Plato’s ethics, his epistemology, his doctrine of soul had developed and consolidated themselves in a context of problems which suggested no, or very little, consideration of physiology”. A Platonic physiology had to respect the dualism of body and soul, mind and senses; “to be sure, Plato’s soul is invisible and nonmaterial. It would be too much to expect that the physiology of his time or of any time should be able to bridge the gulf between the material and the nonmaterial”.⁶ The same holds of the Platonists of Arabic-Islamic Hellenism, at least for their ethics – even when, as physicians, they supported Galen’s doctrine of the material *spiritus vitales*. As physicians they regarded the spirit, Greek πνεῦμα, in Arabic *rūḥ*, as matter, even in its highest function as vital spirit, mixed with blood in the heart, and by the heart, conveyed to the bodily organs. Whereas in Platonic and in Aristotelian philosophy, the material *pneuma* is distinguished strictly from the immaterial νοῦς, whereas the Stoics regarded the individual souls as well as the world soul, and even deity as a material *pneuma*,⁷ in Neoplatonic philosophy – Plotinus, Porphyry, equally with the Christian

³ For the concept of S-World, see R. Specht, *Innovation und Folgelast*, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt 1972 (Problemata, 12), p. 21-6.

⁴ “Erklärungskontext”, cf. Specht, *Innovation*, p. 27-34.

⁵ See G. Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindī: Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy”, in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds.), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences, dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth Birthday*, Research School CNWS, Leiden 1997 (CNWS Publications, 50), p. 43-76.

⁶ F. Solmsen, “Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves”, *Museum Helveticum* 18 (1961), p. 150-67, 169-97, p. 159f., repr. in F. Solmsen, *Kleine Schriften*, Olms, Hildesheim 1968-1982 (Collectanea, 4), 1968/1: p. 536-82; German trans.: “Griechische Philosophie und die Entdeckung der Nerven”, in H. Flashar (ed.), *Antike Medizin*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1971 (Wege der Forschung, 221), p. 202-79, p. 218.

⁷ L. Oeing-Hanhoff, “Geist. I”, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 3 (1974), p. 155.

Neoplatonist John Philoponus⁸ – soul is an intermediate realm (τὸ μεταξύ, analogous to the *mathematica* in Pythagorean doctrine): albeit form of a body (Aristotle), and accordingly, entelechy of a body serving the soul as a tool, it is nevertheless, a substantial form, separable from the body. The *pneuma* is regarded as an intermediary link between the immaterial and the material. This is evident in the process of cognition: the soul does not get into immediate contact with material objects, but grasps the images of things in the pneumatical mantle of soul; predictions and enthusiasm happen through the agency of a divine *pneuma*, enlightening and purifying the soul, and through this, man is enabled to gain higher cognition.⁹

[1] Plot., *Enn.* IV 7[2], 8³.22-23

οὐκ ἄρα οὕτως ψυχὴ ὡς πνεῦμα οὐδ' ὡς σῶμα

Theol. Arist. 3.52, p. 52.8 Badawi

فليست النفس إذا بروح غريزي ولا بجرم البتة .

The soul is therefore neither an innate breath nor a body at all.

(Trans. G. Lewis, *Plotini Opera*, eds. Henry - Schwyzer, II, p. 207)

Medical theory follows the Stoic physiology of the *pneuma*, but through the elaboration and revision of Galen the Platonist, and like him, upholds the Platonic ethics of knowledge: while the *pneuma*, the ‘spirit’, is matter, the incorporeal soul is able to leave the body once it is purified from all bodily remnants, and thus reaches the highest level of rational activity.

[2] Galen., *Quod animi virtutes corporis temperamenta sequantur*, p. 45.4-8 Müller

ἐν ταῦτῳ δὲ γένει τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἡ τῶν Στοικῶν περιέχεται δόξα. πνεῦμα μὲν γὰρ τι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι βούλονται καθάπερ καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὑγρότερον μὲν καὶ ψυχρότερον τὸ τῆς φύσεως, ζηρότερον δὲ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.

Maqāla fī anna Quwā l-nafs ṭabī a li-mizāg al-badan, p. 19.6-9 Biesterfeldt

وهذا الجنس من أجناس الجوهر يخص النفس علي رأي الرواقيين أيضا، وذلك لأنهم يرون أن النفس روح كما يرون ذلك في الطبيعة أيضا، إلا أن روح الطبيعة عندهم أرطب وأبرد وروح النفس أبيض وأحرّ.

In the ninth century, the physician and translator Qusṭā ibn Lūqā from Baalbek (died in 912) gave an exposition of this model in his treatise *On the difference between spirit and soul*, much read in the Christian as well as Muslim Arabic milieu, and later on, in the Latin West (πνεῦμα, Arabic *rūh*, Latin *spiritus*, und ψυχὴ, Arabic *nafs*, Latin *anima*).¹⁰

⁸ H.J. Blumenthal, “Body and Soul in Philoponus”, *The Monist* 69 (1986), p. 370-82.

⁹ G. Verbeke, “Geist. 2”, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 3, Schwabe, Basel 1974, p. 159; Blumenthal, “Body and Soul in Philoponus”.

¹⁰ Arabic, *Kitāb al-Farq bayn al-rūh wa-l-nafs*, ed. G. Gabrieli, “La risalah di Qusṭā b.Lūqā ‘sulla differenza tra lo spirito e l’anima””, *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, Cl. di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, s. 5, vol. 19, Roma 1910, p. 622-55; Latin: *De Differentia animae et spiritus liber quem filius Lucae nomine Costa-ben-Lucaae, cuidam amico suo scriptori eiusdam regis edidit, Johannes Hispalensis ex arabico in latinum Raimundo Toletano Archiepiscopo transtulit*, ed. C.S. Baruch, *Excerptae libro Alfredi Anglici “De Motu cordis” item Costa-ben-Lucaae “De Differentia animae et spiritus liber” translatus a Johanne Hispalensi*: als Beiträge zur Geschichte der Anthropologie und Psychologie des Mittelalters [...] hrsg. und mit einer einl. Abhandlung und Anmerkungen

b) *rūḥānī* ἀσώματος, θεῖος

In the pseudo-Aristotelian Neoplatonic texts, translated in the Kindī circle, *rūḥānī* serves as an equivalent of ἀσώματος, but denoting in particular the realm of the intelligible ‘spiritual’ beings that in the monotheistic interpretation of ancient texts take the place of the Greek Gods. The theological dimension of the word, adapting it to convey, instead of the apophatic predicates of a ‘negative’ theology, a positive, emphatic concept, was inherent in Greek πνευματικός, Syriac *rūḥāyā*, *rūḥānāyā* and was highlighted by the Christian Arabic, and then, by the Koranic usage of Arabic *rūḥ*. On the other hand, the connotations of *rūḥ*, *rūḥānī*, *al-rūḥāniyyūn* in the early Arabic tradition of gnostic, magical and alchemistic speculation – under the influence of the gnostic dualism of πνεῦμα vs. σῶμα as well as of the Neoplatonic model of emanation – may have influenced the usage of the word in the translations of philosophical texts at an early period.

Cf. P. Kraus, Index, s.v., in Id., “Jābir ihn Hayyān”, II (1942); Ġābir’s definition of *rūḥ* in *K. al-Hudūd, Rasā’il*, p. 109.9 Kraus; for early Ismā’īlī Neoplatonism and the ps.-Empedocles: D. De Smet, *La quiétude de l’intellect*, Peeters, Leuven 1995 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta), Index, s.v. “*rūḥ*”; Id., *Empedocles Arabus. Une lecture néoplatonicienne tardive*, KAWLSK, Brussels 1998 (Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, 165), s.v. “*rūḥānī*”; H. Ritter in *Picatrix: Das Ziel des Weisen*, eds. H. Ritter - M. Plessner, Warburg Institute, London 1962 (Studies of the Warburg Institute, 27), p. xxiv ff. for the *rūḥāniyyūn* in the *Kitāb Iḥwān al-Šafā’* and in ps.-Mağrīṭī (cf. also *Picatrix* 288f. ed. Ritter = 299f. trans. Ritter - Plessner); al-Šahrastānī’s chapter on the *aṣḥāb al-rūḥāniyyāt*, esp. the *Šābi’a*, *al-Milal wa-l-nihal*, ed. Badrān (cf. E.E. Calverley s.v. “*nafs*” in A.J. Wensinck - J.H. Kramers (eds.), *Handwörterbuch des Islam*, Brill, Leiden 1941, p. 571).

1. In the Arabic Plotiniana and Procliana, *rūḥānī* translates ἀσώματος and νοερός, but in various interpretamenta and corollaria, serves as an epithet of the Divine.

[3] Plot., *Enn.* V 1 [10], 5.9-11

ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐ γὰρ ὄγκοι τὰ πρῶτα οὐδὲ μεγέθη· τὰ γὰρ παχέα ταῦτα ὕστερα, ἃ ὄντα ἢ αἰσθησις οἴεται.

Theol. Arist. 8.132, p. 113.1-4 Badawī

فإن كان هذا هكذا كانت النفس عددًا أيضاً لأن الأشياء الأولى العالية ليست بجث ولا عظم لها بل هي روحانية ولا ليست من حيز الجث والأقدار وإن كانت الجث والأشياء ذوات الأقدار الغليظة أخرى إلى أن يظن الحس أنها الأثبات وليست بأثبات.

If this is so, soul is number too, because the high first things are not masses and have no magnitude, but are spiritual and are not of the realm of masses and sizes, although masses and the gross things which have size are posterior, except that sense perception thinks they are essences, whereas they are not essences (trans. Lewis, in *Plotini Opera*, eds. Henry - Schwyzer, II, p. 273).

[4] Plot., *Enn.* V 8 [31], 3.27

τῶν δὲ θεῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ ὄντες – σχολή γὰρ αὐτοῖς – θεῶνται ἀεὶ, οἷον δὲ πόρρωθεν, τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ αὖ τῷ οὐρανῷ (...) οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντες, ὅσοις ἢ οἴκησις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν παντὶ οἰκοῦντες τῷ ἐκεῖ οὐρανῷ (...).

versehen, Bibliotheca Philosophorum Mediae Aetatis, vol. 2, Innsbruck 1878, p. 121-39; both reprinted in: *Qustā ibn Lūqā, Texts and Studies*, ed. F. Sezgin et al., Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Sciences, Frankfurt a. M. 1996 (Islamic Medicine, 34).

Theol. Arist., 4.54, p. 63.3-4 Badawī

والروحانيون أصناف، وذلك أنّ منهم من يسكن السماء التي فوق هذه السماء النجومية، والروحانيون الساكنون في تلك السماء كل واحد منهم في كلية فلك سمائه .

The spiritual ones are of various classes, for some of them dwell in the heaven that is above this starry heaven and the spiritual ones dwelling in that heaven are each one of them in the totality of the sphere of that heaven (trans. Lewis, *Plotini Opera* eds. Henry - Schwyzer, II, p. 383).

2. The full dimension of *rūḥānī* as a label of the divine, transcendent, immaterial and intelligible appears in corollaria and interpretamenta having no immediate correspondence in the Greek texts.

[5] Procl., *Elem. theol.*, prop. 15, p. 16.30 Dodds

πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν ἀσώματόν ἐστιν.

Proclus Arabus, p. 13.1-2 Endress (Arabic text)

إنّ كلّ ما رجع إلى ذاته فهو روحاني لا جرمي، ولا يمكن شيئاً من الجرمية أن يرجع إلى ذاته .

The Arabic version inscribes the propositions 15, 16, and 17 as follows:

فصل في إثبات الصور الروحانية .

In the end of all three propositions, the Arabic adds the following sentence (*Proclus Arabus*, p. 14, 16, 18 Endress):

فقد استبان واضح أنّ هاهنا أشياء روحانية هي صور فقط لا هيولى لها البتة .

[6] Procl., *Elem. theol.*, prop. 54, p. 52.8-14 Dodds

πᾶς αἰὼν μέτρον ἐστὶ τῶν αἰωνίων, καὶ πᾶς χρόνος τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ (...) δύο ἄρα μόνα τὰ μέτρα, τὸ μὲν τῶν αἰωνίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντων.

Proclus Arabus, p. 22.1; 6-7 Endress (Arabic text)

إنّ الدهر هو عدد الأشياء الدائمة، والزمان هو عدد الأشياء الزمانية (...) فقد استبان الآن وصحّ أنّ العدد اثنان فقط، أحدهما يعدّ الأشياء الدائمة الروحانية وهو الدهر، والآخر يعدّ الأشياء الجرمية الواقعة تحت الزمان وهو الزمان .

[7] Procl., *Elem. theol.*, prop. 21, p. 24.1-2 Dodds

πᾶσα τὰς ἀπὸ μονάδος προεἰσιν εἰς πληθους τῆ μονάδι σύστοιχον κτλ.

Proclus Arabus, p. 21.30-38 Endress (add. *in fine*):

If this is like we said, it is proven that there are things that are not material, but are form only, and there is another thing having neither matter nor form, that is being (*huwiyya*, ὄν) only: this is the True One, above which there is none other, the cause of causes. And it has become evident by what we said that the things are divided into three classes: either a thing is matter with form, and its essence (*anniyya*, εἶναι) is formal and material; or a thing is but form, and its essence is formal and not material; or it is being (*anniyya*, εἶναι) only and its essence is neither material nor formal: this is the First Cause, above which there is no other cause, as we have said and explained before.

The Arabic headings of props 15-17 (and implicitly, of prop. 21) and the corollaries appended to all of these define the principles treated by the author in these propositions as *ṣuwar rūḥāniyya*, 'spiritual', pure forms; the proof of existence (*it̄bāt*) of these is stated as the common scope of this section in the Arabic headings. Under these comes the πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν, incorporeal according to prop. 15, and whose essence according to prop. 16 is separable from all corporeality, and also the αὐτοκίνητον (τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινουῦν πρῶτως), identified with the ἐπιστρεπτικόν in prop. 17. The added final clauses, however, presuppose the existence of such essences – given by Proclus as hypothetical in the first instance – and from this, deduce the existence of "spiritual forms" characterized by such predicates; prop. 16 has further modifications against the Greek to this effect.

The expression *ṣuwar rūḥāniyya*, with the added specification *allatī lā hayūlā lahā*, interprets the ἀσώματα of the Greek (prop. 15, p. 16.30 Dodds) as ἄϋλα εἶδη. This follows the author's intention to state that not all immaterial substances are πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικά but only the ἀθυπόστατα (props 42, 43), as opposed to ζῶα and ἔνυλα εἶδη (cf. Dodds, *Comm.*, p. 244 on Procl., *Elem. Theol.*, prop. 82, p. 76.22). Among these there is the soul, viz. the καθ'ἑαυτὸ αὐτοκίνητον of prop. 17 (cf. *Elem. Theol.*, prop. 20, p. 22.8 Dodds: ὡς ψυχῆς τὴν αὐτοκίνητον οὐσίαν λαχούσης, cf. Dodds, *Comm.*, p. 202), imperishable qua immaterial ἐπιστρεπτικόν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ (props 186-187); among these there are, above all, the νοερά εἶδη, the Platonic ideas (*Elem. Theol.*, prop. 176, p. 154.3-8 Dodds: τὰ νοερά εἶδη ... ἀϋλως ἔστι πάντα καὶ ἀσωμάτως).

Notwithstanding its being used in this context, it is doubtful whether the translator / commentator is using the concept of "spiritual forms," as employed here and in the Arabic corollary to prop. 21, in direct reference to Proclus's νοερά εἶδη.

Prop. 21 of the *Proclus Arabus* shows that in the *ṣuwar rūḥāniyya*, the totality of immaterial forms between the First Cause and the ἄϋλα εἶδη is included. Correspondingly, in prop. 54, the eternal things (*al-ašyā al-dā'ima al-rūḥāniyya*, for 52.14 Dodds τὰ αἰώνια) are called the spiritual ones (*al-rūḥāniyya*), as opposed to the temporal-material things.¹¹ However, the word *rūḥānī* designates not just the immaterial and intelligible substances, but in particular the divine, and transcendent realm (*rūḥānī* ~ θεῖος, cf. *supra*, text [4]). Aristotle already called the αἰών the realm of Deity (*De Caelo* 279 a 22-23, v. *infra*, texts [8] [11] [12] [13]), and Plotinus calls it σεμνότατόν τι (*Enn.* III 7 [45], 2.5, cf. on this Beierwaltes [as in n. 11], p. 151).

We have not to do here with the differentiated hierarchy of forms of later Neoplatonism (cf. *Elem. theol.*, props 176-178, with Dodds, *Comm.*, p. 292 f.), but with the fundamental dichotomy between Platonic ἰδέαι and the Aristotelian εἶδη. This goes back to the authors of 'Middle' Platonism, who sought to mediate between the Platonic theory of ideas and its Aristotelian interpretation, such as Alcinoos who distinguished, in the separate ideas on the one hand and the ἔνυλα εἶδη on the other, two classes of νοητά: τῶν νοητῶν τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ὑπάρχει, ὡς αἱ ἰδέαι, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα, ὡς τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ἀχώριστα ὄντα τῆς ὕλης (*Didasc.* 4, 155.39-41 Whittaker; cf. 10, 166.3-4 Whittaker).¹²

¹¹ The link between the αἰών and the νοητά is fully elaborated in prop. 169, p. 146.24-25 Dodds: πᾶς νοῦς ἐν αἰῶνι τὴν τε οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. the sources adduced by Dodds, *Comm.*, p. 228, and W. Beierwaltes, *Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 1967 (Quellen der Philosophie, 3), p. 149 f. (ad *Enn.* III 7[45], 2.2). Here and elsewhere, Proclus makes a sharp division between the temporal-corporeal and the eternal-intelligible beings, as in *In Tim.* I 402.15-17 Diehl: ἡ μὲν νοερά οὐσία ἀμέριστός ἐστι καὶ ἐνοειδῆς καὶ αἰώνιος, ἡ δὲ τῶν σωματῶν μεριστὴ καὶ πεπληθυσμένη καὶ μετὰ τῆς χρονικῆς συνυφεστῶτα παρατάσσεως.

¹² For a sketch of his doctrine with further references see Ph. Merlan in A.H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1967, p. 64 ff.

Galen introduces this division into his interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus*.¹³ Further, after Alcinoos had allotted to the two classes of *intelligibilia* two kinds of cognition (155.41-2 Whittaker: καὶ νόησις ἔσται διττή, ἡ μὲν τῶν πρώτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων), Alexander of Aphrodisias in his turn took the difference between the *ἄϋλα εἶδη* – here: the transcendent universals – and the *ἐνυλα εἶδη* – the immanent forms of the sensible world – as a basis for his re-interpretation of the Aristotelian noetic theory. The *ἄϋλα εἶδη* – χωρὶς ὕλης τε καὶ ὑποκειμένου τινός (Alex. Aphr., *De An.*, p. 87.26 Bruns) – are the proper objects of the νοῦς ποιητικός, hence are νοητὰ κατ'ἐνέργειαν, whereas the *ἐνυλα εἶδη* are δυνάμει νοητὰ only. In the noetic psychology of one of the eminent representatives of the school of Platonizing Aristotelianism in VIth century Alexandria, the Christian John Philoponus, we find the same pattern. Cf. Philop., *In De An.*, p. 50.9-11 Hayduck: καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα χωρισθεῖσα τοῦ σώματος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἀντιλήψεται, ἀλλ'οὖν τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἄϋλων.

Hence we should look for the paradigm of the 'spiritual', immaterial forms of the Arabic Neoplatonica, rather than in Proclus's νοερά εἶδη (prop. 176, p. 154.3 Dodds), in the *ἄϋλα εἶδη* of the older dichotomy *ἄϋλα* – *ἐνυλα εἶδη*, first attested in Alcinoos. Not only this, but also the triad God (First Cause) – Ideas (*ἄϋλα εἶδη*) – matter (the substrate of the *ἐνυλα εἶδη*) can be traced to IInd century Platonism. It appears, again in Alcinoos, as the hierarchy of the ἀρχαί (*Didasc.* 9, 163.11-14 Whittaker), and already in the doxography of Aetius: Πλάτων (...) τρεῖς ἀρχάς, τὸν θεὸν τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἰδέαν (*Doxogr. gr.*, p. 287.17-288.1 Diels) and the subsequent tradition of 'Middle' Platonism.¹⁴ Added to the Aristotelian classes of *causa materialis* and *causa efficiens* (*Metaph.* Δ 2, cf. *De An.* III 5) is the paradigmatic cause, being the correlate of the transcendent forms. Above matter and the forms stands the highest principle, the divine First Cause, designated as ποιητής and *causa efficiens* in our Arabic Neoplatonica as well. Through the modifications and additions of the *Proclus Arabus*, against the original texts of Plotinus and Proclus, we can observe a tendency to re-interpret and simplify the Platonic theology: God, the Cause of Causes ('*illat al-'ilal*'), is neither matter nor form, but is pure being. This interpretation allows neither for a hypostasis of Being separate from the One, nor for a plurality of θεῖαι ἐνάδες above Being.¹⁵

The same language, and many of the same doctrinal tendencies, pervade another reworking of the *Proclus Arabus*, by a member of the Kindī circle, the *Kitāb Maḥḍ al-ḥayr*, in Latin, *Liber de Causis*.¹⁶ Another text stemming from the same milieu is the doxography of ps.-Ammonius *fi' Ārā' al-falāsifa*, showing the same usage of *rūḥānī*, for the highest intelligible substances.¹⁷ The usage of this and other related texts shows the 'theological dimension' of the term *rūḥānī* in the context of a Neoplatonism adapted and simplified to be compatible with a monotheistic, creationist theology.¹⁸

¹³ See R. Walzer in *Galenii Compendium Timaei Platonis*, praef., p. 9; A.J. Festugière, "Le *Compendium Timaei* de Galien", *Revue des études grecques* 45 (1952), p. 97-118, in part. p. 110; and cf., e.g., *Compendium* 8, p. 13.4 [Arabic text] with *Tim.* 50 C 6 ff.

¹⁴ Cf. also Galen, *Compendium Timaei*, Arabic text, p. 5; and see (with further parallels and variants of the model of three principles) Walzer, *ibid.* 8, p. 39 n. 21; Festugière, "Le *Compendium Timaei*", p. 105 ff.

¹⁵ See further Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 227; 229-30.

¹⁶ Examples in Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 131.

¹⁷ U. Rudolph, *Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios: ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Islam*, Steiner, Wiesbaden - Stuttgart 1989 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 49/1), p. 147.

¹⁸ See Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 204-26, for an analysis of this aspect.

c) *Neoplatonizing Aristotle*

While the usage of *rūḥānī* in the pseudo-Aristotelian texts quoted above is in tune with the gnostic Neoplatonism of the Arabic pseudo-Aristotle, the use of this and related concepts in the Arabic versions of authentic Aristotelian texts from the circle of al-Kindī shows a characteristic tendency of platonizing Aristotle.

1. The translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* published by Badawī – early, but neither from the Kindī circle nor (as presumed by Badawī) done by Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn – translates τὸ θεῖον with the Arabic *al-rūḥānī*, but for the rest, has none of the typical vocabulary of Arabic Neoplatonism.

[8] Arist., *De Anima*

τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ θεῖον (415 a 29)

al-abadī al-rūḥānī (p. 37.14 Badawī)

2. Much more in tune with the early ps.-Aristotelian Neoplatonic sources, and representing – at least partly – a text translated in this milieu, is an Arabic translation-paraphrase of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*, called *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* after its first part, the *De Sensu et sensato*.¹⁹ Among the terminological preferences and doctrinal tendencies it shares with the Arabic Procliana and Plotiniana, there is “first and foremost its concept of spirituality (*rūḥāniyya*), and a dualistic tendency that is accompanied by a certain disdain for the corporeal as opposed to the ‘spiritual’ world, with the human soul precariously posed in-between the two”.²⁰

[9] *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, MS Rampur 1752, fols 7r 20 - 7v 5:

وذلك توهموا الصور المحمولة بالمتوسّطات جسمانيّة. فإنّا نقول ألا ترى أنّ الصور الجسمانيّة تأخذ من المكان قدراً ما والصور الروحانيّة لا تمسك مكاناً والدليل علي ذلك ما نقول ألا ترى أنّ العالم كله في وهمك فإن أنكرت أن يكون هذا هكذا قلنا ألا ترى أنّ في وهمك مائة صورة قد نظر إليها بصرك فإذا في أخذ البصر في في الوهم بقدر نظرك إليها في حدّ الجرميّة فإن كانت في الوهم على قدر نظرك إليها في حدّ الجرميّة فمحال لأنّه ليس في الوهم من المكان ما تتصور صورة واحدة مكانيّة فقط فكيف مائة صورة

For they fancy the forms that are carried by the intermediaries to be corporeal. So we shall say: do you not see that corporeal forms take up some measure of space, whereas spiritual forms do not lay hold of any space? Proof of that is what we shall say now: do you not see that the whole world is formed in your imagination? If you deny that this is so, we shall say: do you not see that there are hundred[s of] forms in your imagination which your gaze has met and witnessed? Once you do not have them within your sight [any more], they will be in [your] imagination in the [same] measure in which your gaze [has taken] them [in] in the realm of corporeality. But if they are [supposed to be] in [your] imagination in the measure in which your gaze [has taken] them [in] in the realm of corporeality, that will be absurd. For there is no space in the imagination where even a single spatial form could be formed – so how [*a fortiori*] could hundred[s of] forms [be formed there]?²¹

¹⁹ R. Hansberger, “The Transmission of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic”, unpublished doctoral thesis (Oxford, 2006/7); Ead., “*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-Maḥsūs*: Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic guise”, in P.-M. Morel - Ch. Grellard (eds.), *Les Parva naturalia d'Aristote: fortune antique et médiévale*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 2010 (Philosophie, 28), p. 143-62; Ead., “Plotinus Arabus Rides Again”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 21 (2011), p. 57-84.

²⁰ Hansberger, “Plotinus Arabus”, p. 58.

²¹ Text and translation from Hansberger, “Plotinus Arabus”, p. 65.

In connection with *De Memoria*, 450 b 11 - 451 a 8, on the question of how we can remember objects absent from sense perception, but present to the mind only as an image or phantasma, the adaptor of *fī l-Dīkr* develops his system of the three faculties of the soul: the 'spiritual' faculties of imagination, thought, and memory. This is a central topos, and a momentous systematization of Aristotle's basic concepts. These 'inner senses' are (1) the 'formative' faculty, or imagination (φαντασία), called simply *al-muṣawwir*, 'the formator' – as a term, without parallel in other Arabic texts of psychology (going back to a misunderstanding, or even a misreading, of *taṣawwur?*), (2) cogitation, and (3) memory. Cogitation, *fīkr*, is assigned the task to discern between the *ṣūra*, "formed" by the formative faculty (φαντασία), and its *ma'nā*, the object of the faculty of memory; these latter are put into the relation of 'shell' and its 'core'. The faculty of representation (*al-muṣawwir*) conveys a *ṣūra rūḥāniyya*, the spiritual form of a thing, and presents a *ma'nā* of this to memory (f. 20r 8).²²

3. An important and impressive case of interpretation by verbal translation is, on the other hand, the first Arabic version of Aristotle's *De Caelo* done by Yaḥyā (Yūḥannā) ibn al-Bīṭrīq.²³

[10] Arist., *De Caelo* 288 b 6

ἀσώματος = *rūḥānī*

[11] *De Caelo* I 9, 279 a 31; II 3, 286 a 11; 292 b 32

(τὸ) θεῖον (σῶμα) = (*ḡirm*) *rūḥānī*

[12] *De Caelo* I 3, 270 b 7; I 9, 278 b 15

τὸ θεῖον = *al-rūḥāniyyūn*, *al-rūḥāniyya*

Aristotle accompanies his exposition of the existence, essential attributes, quantity and quality of the circular body with statements of a theological nature: the eternity of the stars is linked with divinity, although the concept of a personal god is absent. But what, if anything, is beyond the sphere? Subsequent to his proof of the uniqueness of the world (*De Caelo* I 8-9), he provides a hint: there cannot be more than one world, and outside the heaven, there can be no place or void or time.

Hence whatever is there (τᾶκεῖ) is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most self-sufficient of lives (*De Caelo* I 9, 279 a 18-22, trans. J.L. Stocks).

The passage does not contain any explicit evidence of an Unmoved Mover. Still, some early commentators understood it so, and the question has continued to be discussed in modern scholarship. It is true that Aristotle ascribes life to the 'things out there', as elsewhere to the pure actuality of the First Mover. But the cosmology of the *De Caelo* in general does not presuppose the theory of the Prime Mover, and would contradict it in some respects. It seems more probable that the plural τᾶκεῖ denotes separately existing, supra-mundane principles which, like Plato's realm of

²² See R. Hansberger, "The Transmission", p. 42, 78 ff., 122, and Arabic text, f. 20r 8.

²³ See G. Endress, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen von Aristoteles' Schrift De Caelo*, Inaug.-Diss. - Frankfurt a. M. 1966.

subsistent ideas, are outside the heavens, while the heavens constitute space, movement and time, and – again as in Plato’s cosmology – are ensouled.²⁴

The passage following immediately is a reference to the ἐγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα of popular philosophy, but was understood by the Greek commentators, and also by the Arabic translator, to refer to Aristotle’s exoteric writings. Here the Arabic version of Aristotle’s text contains an important and characteristic interpretation; it changes ‘divine’ into ‘spiritual’ (*rūhānī*) and makes it the First Cause.

De Caelo I 9, 279 a 30-35

καὶ γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι περὶ τὰ θεῖα, πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκάϊον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον· ὃ οὕτως ἔχον μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλον κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ὃ τι κινήσει (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν εἴη θειότερον) οὔτ’ ἔχει φαῦλον οὐδέν, οὔτ’ ἐνδεδὲς τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν οὐδενός ἐστιν.

In its discussions concerning the divine, popular philosophy often propounds the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is necessarily unchangeable. This fact confirms what we have said. For there is nothing else stronger than it to move it – since that would mean more divine – and it has no defect and lacks none of its proper excellence (trans. J.L. Stocks).

Arabic version of Ibn al-Biṭrīq, ed. Badawī, p. 194.17-195.7 (reviewed from the critical edition prepared by the present author):

وقد ذكرنا في كتبنا في الفلسفة الخارجة أعني التي وضعنا للعمامة، فقلنا إنه قد ينبغي للشيء الروحاني ألا يتغير ولا يفسد اضطراراً، لأنه علة كل علة من عللها، وليست من ورائها علة أخرى، وهو على هذه الصفة التي وصفت لا يتغير ولا يستحيل، تام كامل دائم إلى الأبد، وذلك أنه ليس فوقه علة أخرى معلولة حتى تحركه. فإن ألفت علة أخرى كانت هي أيضاً ثابتة قائمة دائمة ليس من خلفها أفضل منها.

We have explained in our books on the exoteric philosophy that this spiritual thing must be unchanging and indestructible by necessity, because it is the cause of all its [*scil.* the heaven’s] causes, there being no other cause beyond it. It is, as has been stated, unchanging and unalterable, perfect, complete and perpetual in eternity, because above it there is no other intelligible cause which should move it, and if there was another cause, this in its turn would be enduring and eternal, and nothing more excellent would be beyond it.

In the final analysis, we may say that through this and other ‘signal words’ the translator explicates the Platonism inherent in the earlier parts of the *De Caelo*.²⁵

[14] Arist., *De Caelo*, II 3, 286 a 8-11:

Everything which has a function exists for its function. The activity of God [Arabic version: *al-šay’ al-ilāhī* ‘the divine entity’] is immortality, i. e. eternal life. Therefore the movement of that which is divine must

²⁴ P. Moraux (ed.), *Aristote, Du ciel*, p. XLIV, with references (note 5); but according to Alexander (as quoted by Simpl., *In De Cael.*, p. 287.21 ff. Heiberg), the whole passage would refer to the sphere of the fixed stars exclusively.

²⁵ See G. Endress, “Averroes’ *De Caelo*: Ibn Rushd’s Cosmology in his Commentaries on Aristotle’s *On the Heavens*”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 5 (1995), p. 1-41.

be eternal. But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body [Arabic, *ǧirm rūḥānī mustadīr*] whose nature it is to move always in a circle.

In the Arabic version, ed. Badawī, p. 235.2-7:

فنقول إنّ علّة كثرة الحركات المستديرة هي هذه أنّ كلّ شيء له فعلٌ فإن كان من أجل فعله ذلك. وإن فعل الشيء الإلهي هو الدوام والبقاء، وهذا هو الحياة الدائمة. فإن كان هذا على هذا كانت للشيء الإلهي حركة دائمة لا محالة. والسماء على هذه الصفة لأنها جرمٌ روحانيٌّ مستديرٌ متحركٌ بحركةٍ مستديرةٍ طبيعيةٍ دائمةٍ.

d) *šarīf* and *karīm*, ‘noble, divine’

The same tendency is evident in the usage of *šarīf* and *karīm*, ‘noble’ as epithets of the divine, especially the divine heavenly body. These are found in the *Proclus Arabus* and in further texts of the Kindī circle, in the *Theologia Aristotelis* as well as in some of the metaphysical treatises by Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Šarīf, ‘noble, sublime’, is, even more frequently than *rūḥānī*, a substitute for θεῖος as an attribute of the transcendent realm of the celestial spheres and the intelligible hypostases. In the Plotinian texts, it occasionally stands for Greek σεμνός, a word similar in context and meaning,²⁶ and in this way, co-determining the usage of *šarīf*.

Karīm – in the same meaning – is used beside *šarīf*, both in the *De Caelo* and the *Plotiniana*. This is as an attribute of God also in the Koran. Both words occur singly and in hendiadys. As a verbal translation, *šarīf* and *karīm* are used as equivalents of Greek κρείττων:

[15] Procl., *Elem. theol.*, prop. 16, p. 18.10-12 Dodds

ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἀχωρίστου τῆς οὐσίας σωμάτων οὐσης, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χωριστήν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας κρείττων.

Proclus Arabus, prop. 16, p. 15.4-5 Endress (Arabic text)

وإلا كان الفعل أكرم من الجوهر

[16] Procl., *Elem. theol.*, prop. 76, p. 72.15-17 Dodds

εἰ γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως παραγόμενον ἀμετάβλητον αὐτὸ μένει, κρεῖττον ἔσται τῆς ὑποστησάσης αἰτίας

Proclus Arabus, prop. 76, p. 27.13 Endress (Arabic text)

أفضل وأشرف من علته

[17] Plot., *Enn.* IV 8 [6], 1.3-5

τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας πιστεύσας τότε μάλιστα εἶναι, ζῶν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θεῷ εἰς ταῦτόν γεγεννημένος

Theol. Arist. 1.22, p. 22.5 Badawī

فأعلم أنني جزء من أجزاء العالم الشريف الفاضل الإلهي ذو حياة فعالة

²⁶ Cf. Beierwaltes, *Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit*, p. 151.

[18] Plot., *Enn.* IV 8[6], 1.42-43
τὸν κόσμον (...) θεὸν λέγει εἶναι εὐδαίμονα

Theol. Arist. 1.41, p. 24.16 Badawī

قال إنه [أي: هذا العالم] جوهر شريف

In the Arabic version of Aristotle's *De Caelo*, θεῖος = *šarīf, karīm* is equivalent to *rūḥānī*:

[19] Arist., *De Caelo* II 1, 284 a 4
ὡς ἔστιν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ θεῖον τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν κίνησιν
Arabic version, p. 224.7 Badawī (with corrections)

قالوا ان هاهنا شيئاً من الأشياء المتحركة شريفاً دائماً غير واقع تحت الفساد والفناء

[20] Arist., *De Caelo* I 2, 269 a 31
τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα συστάσεις, θειότερα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀπάντων
Arabic, versio B (Ibn al-Biṭrīq), and versio C (revised version of book I), p. 134.5 Badawī [C only]
أَنَّ ههنا جرمًا آخر وجوهراً آخر غير الأجرام التي تلينا، وهو جوهر وجرم كريم فائق [جرم كريم
شريف إلهي جدا C] وهو أول هذه الأجرام كلها

Frequently, in the Arabic *De Caelo* and related texts, the eternal, circular body is called *al-ḡirm al-karīm* “the noble body”, where the epithet has no single equivalent in the Greek:

[21] *De Caelo* I 2, 269 b 20 σώμα ἄπαν: *al-ḡirm al-awwal al-karīm*; I 3, 270 a 13 περὶ αὐτοῦ: *hādā l-ḡirm al-karīm, ibid.*, l. 24, τούτῳ *hādā l-ḡirm al-awwal al-karīm*, etc.

Further references in Endress, *Ar. Üb. De Caelo* (as in note 23), p. 58-59.

[22] Alex. Aphr., *Quaestiones* II 3, p. 47.30-31 Bruns
τίς ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ θείου σώματος ἐγγινομένη δύναμις τῷ γετηνῶντι αὐτῷ θνητῷ τε καὶ
ἐν γενέσει σώματι;

Faṣl fi l-quwwa al-ātiya min ḥarakat al-ḡirm al-šarīf ilā l-aḡrām al-wāqī'a taḥt al-kawn wa-l-fasād
Ms. Carullah1279, f. 64r 13

[23] Cf. τὰ θεῖα σώματα, *ibid.*, II 3, p. 49.31, 33 Bruns = *al-aḡrām al-samāwiyya* (...) *al-aḡrām al-šarīfa*
Ms. Carullah1279, f. 64r 35; 64v 1, 2

Further examples in *Proclus Arabus*, p. 129.

3. Key Words as doctrinal lead fossiles

The further reception of the Neoplatonic pseudo-Aristotle can be traced through the use of terms indicative of the doctrinal adaptation of the sources in early Arabic Neoplatonism. The sections from *Proclus Arabus* based on props 15-17 of the *Elements of Theology*, deducing from the reversion

(ἐπιστροφή, *ruǧūʿ*) of the spiritual forms (ἄσώματα, *al-ṣuwar al-rūḥāniyya allatī lā hayūlā labā*) the existence of immaterial and eternal, substantial forms, was widely read in the Islamic East as well as in the West as an excerpt made by Alexander of Aphrodisias from the *Theology of Aristotle*.

The Andalusian Ibn Bāǧǧa (died 1139), developed in his *Tadbīr al-mutawahhid* (p. 49.17-20 Faḥrī etc. *passim*) a hierarchy of “spiritual forms” (*ṣuwar rūḥāniyya*), the highest of which is the Agent Intellect, *al-ʿaql al-fāʿāl* (Alexander’s νοῦς ποιητικὸς). This is not only in explicit dependence on the Proclean text under the name of Alexander, but also, in the light of this source, Ibn Bāǧǧa’s theory can be understood more clearly: the Proclean theorem permitted to argue for the separability of substance from the separability of activity (viz., the reversion of the spiritual form – the substantial form of soul – upon itself).²⁷

Four centuries later, in the philosophical theology of the school of Isfahan, we find eager readers of the *Theology of Aristotle* and other Neoplatonic sources supporting the fusion of Avicenna metaphysics, the Ašʿarite scholasticism founded by Faḥr-al-Dīn al-Rāzī and the mystical philosophy of Suhrawardī. Here again, there are several clear references to the concept of *rūḥānī* as found in the *Proclus Arabus*. The leading authority of the school, Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (died 1640), in his magnum opus *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-arbaʿa*, says:²⁸

وأيضاً البرهان قائم على أن المدرك للصور الجزئية الحاصلة في الحواس ليس هو إلا النفس دون الحس ودون آتته إذ المدرك للشيء لا بد وأن يدرك ذاتها في ضمن ذلك الإدراك كما مر بيانه وليس للجسم ولا قوة يقوم به إدراك ذاته وكل راجع إلى ذاته في إدراكه فهو روحاني البتة، فثبت بهذه الوجوه وأمثالها أن النفس الناطقة في الإنسان هي المدركة للجزئيات والكلديات جميعاً.

There is proof that the percipient of the particular forms arising through the senses is none other but the soul, not the sense perception and not (helped by) sensual tools, since the percipient of a thing must necessarily perceive himself in the very process of that perception, as has been shown – and this is not for the body to achieve, having no power to perceive itself, but all that is reverting upon itself must be spiritual (*rūḥānī*). From this and similar considerations, it results that the rational soul in man is perceiving the particulars and the universals together.²⁹

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But this is only a glimpse of what we can learn from the use of words, marking the way of intellectual traditions through the centuries, and a promising vista towards the rich harvest of our project.

²⁷ See C. D’Ancona, *Man’s Conjunction with Intellect: a Neoplatonic Source of Western Muslim Philosophy*, Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem 2008, p. 82. Pace D’Ancona, I am reluctant to believe that the same source influenced Averroes as well, directly or indirectly.

²⁸ Muḥammad Ṣadr-al-Dīn (Mullā Ṣadrā), *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-arbaʿa*, ed. Muḥammad Hāminaʿi, Gulāmriḍā A wānī, Bunyād-i Ḥikmat-i Islāmī-i Ṣadrā, Tīhrān 2001-2004, quotation from vol. 8, p. 66.

²⁹ A rich collection of materials is found in R. Arnzen, *Platonische Ideen in der arabischen Philosophie. Texte und Materialien zur Begriffsgeschichte von ṣuwar aḥlātūniyya und muthul aḥlātūniyya*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2011 (Scientia graeco-arabica, 6).

